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Abstract
Our society has become heavily dependent on electronic communication, and preserving the
integrity of this communication has never been more important. Cryptography is a tool that can
help to protect the security and privacy of these communications. Secure messaging protocols
like OTR and Signal typically employ end-to-end encryption technology to mitigate some of the
most egregious adversarial attacks, such as mass surveillance. However, the secure messaging
protocols deployed today suffer from two major omissions: they do not natively support group
conversations with three or more participants, and they do not fully defend against participants
that behave maliciously. Secure messaging tools typically implement group conversations by
establishing pairwise instances of a two-party secure messaging protocol, which limits their
scalability and makes them vulnerable to insider attacks by malicious members of the group.
Insiders can often perform attacks such as rendering the group permanently unusable, causing
the state of the group to diverge for the other participants, or covertly remaining in the group
after appearing to leave. It is increasingly important to prevent these insider attacks as group
conversations become larger, because there are more potentially malicious participants. This
dissertation introduces several new protocols that can be used to build modern communication
tools with strong security and privacy properties, including resistance to insider attacks.
Firstly, the dissertation addresses a weakness in current two-party secure messaging tools:
malicious participants can leak portions of a conversation alongside cryptographic proof of au-
thorship, undermining confidentiality. The dissertation introduces two new authenticated key
exchange protocols, DAKEZ and XZDH, with deniability properties that can prevent this type of
attack when integrated into a secure messaging protocol. DAKEZ provides strong deniability in
interactive settings such as instant messaging, while XZDH provides deniability for non-interactive
settings such as mobile messaging. These protocols are accompanied by composable security
proofs.
Secondly, the dissertation introduces Safehouse, a new protocol that can be used to im-
plement secure group messaging tools for a wide range of applications. Safehouse solves the
difficult cryptographic problems at the core of secure group messaging protocol design: it se-
curely establishes and manages a shared encryption key for the group and ephemeral signing
keys for the participants. These keys can be used to build chat rooms, team communication
servers, video conferencing tools, and more. Safehouse enables a server to detect and reject
protocol deviations, while still providing end-to-end encryption. This allows an honest server to
completely prevent insider attacks launched by malicious participants. A malicious server can
still perform a denial-of-service attack that renders the group unavailable or “forks” the group
into subgroups that can never communicate again, but other attacks are prevented, even if the
v
server colludes with a malicious participant. In particular, an adversary controlling the server
and one or more participants cannot cause honest participants’ group states to diverge (even
in subtle ways) without also permanently preventing them from communicating, nor can the
adversary arrange to covertly remain in the group after all of the malicious participants under
its control are removed from the group. Safehouse supports non-interactive communication, dy-
namic group membership, mass membership changes, an invitation system, and secure property
storage, while offering a variety of configurable security properties including forward secrecy,
post-compromise security, long-term identity authentication, strong deniability, and anonymity
preservation. The dissertation includes a complete proof-of-concept implementation of Safehouse
and a sample application with a graphical client. Two sub-protocols of independent interest are
also introduced: a new cryptographic primitive that can encrypt multiple private keys to several
sets of recipients in a publicly verifiable and repeatable manner, and a round-efficient interactive
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ur society has become heavily dependent on electronic communication, with our most
critical discourse now being conducted over the Internet and other digital communica-
tion networks. Securing and protecting the privacy of modern digital communication
tools has never been more important. At the same time, public awareness of data security and
privacy has increased in response to revelations of government surveillance, high-profile data
breaches, negative consequences of concentrated corporate control over communications, and
other incidents. Shortly after the Snowden revelations, the American public expressed an interest
in gaining control over information about them stored online [Mad15]. Since then, worldwide
concern about online privacy has increased, and a majority of users believe that social media,
search engine, and internet technology companies hold too much power [Bri18]. Similarly, most
Canadians are worried about the privacy and security of their personal information, and four
in ten have altered their behavior due to data privacy concerns [Sim18]. A majority of Ameri-
cans continue to feel that companies and governments are collecting too much of their personal
information, that their data has become less secure, and that they have little control over this
collection [ARA+19]. At the same time, the privacy situation has become worse: widespread
quarantines issued to slow the COVID-19 pandemic have caused mass adoption of communica-
tion tools with woefully inadequate security and privacy properties, such as the Zoom group
videoconferencing application [BBG+20; Hod20]. Due to this widespread concern about data
security and privacy, mass adoption of inadequate tools, increased activity by adversarial actors,
and a general sense that nothing can be done to improve the situation, there is an opportunity
for change. An important part of that change is a technological improvement to existing tools.
As a technical tool to rearrange power relationships [Rog15], cryptography can help to
address some of the security and privacy problems with digital communication technologies. In
particular, end-to-end encrypted secure messaging protocols can mitigate some of the threats
to user privacy. By cryptographically restricting the platform’s access to communication data,
systems can continue to reach Internet scale while eliminating the most egregious adversarial
attacks, such as mass surveillance. Ever since the Snowden revelations began in 2013, there
has been an explosion of secure messaging protocols, components, and tools that attempt to
accomplish this goal [UDB+15]. Following adoption by several major platforms [Mar14a; Mar16;
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Lun18], the Signal protocol [Ope13] has become the leading standard for achieving strong
security in the “two-party setting” (i.e., where two users exchange secure messages with each
other). Noteworthy protocols and applications that compete against Signal include: the Off-
The-Record messaging (OTR) protocol [BGB04], which is used by many applications to secure
communications [OTR14]; Wire [WIRE15], a web-based messenger and protocol incorporating
techniques from both Signal and OTR; and Ricochet [Ric14], a messenger with a focus on hiding
conversation metadata. There are many other secure messaging applications that have gained
popularity without academically remarkable protocol features, such as Telegram [Tel14] and
Briar [RST+14].
While all of these applications and protocols offer attractive security features for two-party
text messaging, there is a generally a lack of support for encrypted conversations among groups
of three or more users, also known as “secure group messaging”. This omission is understandable
due to the complexity of the problem, but it is also very significant: user studies show that secure
group messaging is one of the most important features for users [EHM17; HEM18]. Applications
that do offer secure group messaging to the user, such as Signal, almost always do so using a
two-party protocol to secure pairwise messaging channels. For example, the Signal protocol for
group text messaging involves establishing pairwise Signal conversations. The client uses hybrid
encryption to protect the messages, where the Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) takes place
over the pairwise channels, and the Data Encapsulation Mechanism (DEM) is broadcast to all
members of the group by a central server that duplicates the ciphertext. While this approach
provides basic security properties such as confidentiality and authentication, its computation
and communication costs scale linearly with the group size due to the pairwise KEM operations,
and the technique makes certain security properties prohibitively expensive [CCG+18]. These
limitations exclude the possibility of securing important modern applications such as virtual
meetings, institutional communications, and large communities such as those supported by Slack
and Discord. A better approach is warranted.
Unfortunately, while the two-party case has been researched extensively, protocols for secure
group messaging are only just beginning to emerge. Prior academic publications that propose
complete secure group messaging systems [KTN04; RKAG07; GUVC09; LVH13; HLZZ15; SVH18;
SH19] are not suitable for modern group messaging scenarios of interest due to a lack of scalabil-
ity, missing features (such as asynchronicity—the ability to be used on intermittently connected
mobile devices), or the lack of critical security properties. Partly due to the lack of a complete
and robust academic foundation for secure group messaging, several public protocol develop-
ment efforts emerged around 2015–2016, including (n+1)sec [eQu15], flute [Kad16], and
mpEnc [LK16]. Each of these initiatives lacked important features and/or security properties.
Eventually, the community consolidated its efforts into the Message Layer Security (MLS) pro-
tocol [BBM+20], forming an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) working group that has
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drafted the most advanced secure group messaging solution currently available. Unlike prior
academic and public efforts, MLS provides a vast set of security properties, is widely applicable to
secure communication scenarios, and has existing proof-of-concept implementations. However, it
is missing one important security property: insider security.
A protocol with insider security is one that prevents malicious participants (e.g., users in a
group conversation) from attacking the protocol. The exact meaning of “insider security” is thus
dependent on the protocol’s security goals, so it is more accurately described as a family of related
security properties. One aspect of insider security for secure messaging is preventing participants
from provably leaking conversation plaintexts—either maliciously or under coercion. In the
context of a secure group messaging protocol, insider security further ensures that all participants
have a consistent view of the set of participants and messages (where the exact meaning of
“consistent” may be strict or loose depending on the purpose of the protocol). For example, when
naïvely building a secure group messaging protocol from pairwise two-party secure messaging
channels, a malicious server can inject message recipients for a subset of legitimate users, or
selectively deliver messages to only a few users. Real-world deployments of Signal have proven
to be vulnerable to such attacks [SKH17; RMS18]. MLS is designed to store all group state
at the endpoints rather than in routing infrastructure. While this choice results in excellent
scalability properties, it comes with several disadvantages: there is no authoritative source for
the “true” group state, spam prevention is frustrated, and insider security is damaged [ACJM20].
For example, the MLS draft specification points out how a single malicious insider can cause
the entire group to fragment into disjoint subgroups with a denial-of-service attack [BBM+20,
§10.2]. Insider security becomes more important as groups become larger because there are
more potential attack vectors. Since protocols like MLS are designed to scale to support large
groups, insider security is more important than ever before.
This dissertation improves the robustness of modern end-to-end secure messaging protocols
by introducing efficient new key exchange protocols to prevent attacks by malicious insiders
while conservatively relying on only basic and widely accepted security assumptions. Specifically,
the new DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH protocols prevent insiders from provably leaking messages
in two-party secure messaging protocols, even when they interactively collaborate with the
party attempting to verify the leaks. XZDH is designed to be a drop-in replacement for the
existing mechanism used by the Signal protocol. The dissertation also introduces Safehouse: a
comprehensive solution for secure group messaging in a wide range of scenarios that enforces
correct participant behavior, thereby preventing insider attacks. All of these new protocols
support “non-interactive” or “asynchronous” scenarios where all secure message recipients are
temporarily offline when a message is sent; this feature is critical for mobile use cases where




This dissertation establishes the following:
We can design efficient key exchange protocols that provide strong
end-to-end security properties for low- and high-risk users in common
secure messaging scenarios, such as instant messaging, mobile messag-
ing, team communication, and group video conferencing, while relying
on only common security assumptions. In particular, it is possible to
protect against attacks by malicious insiders and coerced users even
while operating in an asynchronous network setting where devices
may be disconnected for long periods of time without warning.
1.2 Contributions
At the core of this dissertation are the new cryptographic protocols that provide insider security.
However, it also includes many other academic contributions of independent interest. The most
notable contributions are:
1. A survey of group key exchange protocols. Chapter 3 surveys and categorizes prior ap-
proaches to group key exchange protocols, which are an important building block for secure
group messaging systems.
2. A new interactive deniable authenticated key exchange protocol with offline and online
deniability. Section 5.4 presents DAKEZ, a new protocol for securely establishing a shared
key between two parties that can interactively communicate. DAKEZ prevents an insider (i.e.,
one of the two alleged participants) from provably sharing the key with an outside party.
Consequently, leaked conversations are indistinguishable from pure forgeries and alleged
leaks can never be cryptographically authenticated.
3. A new non-interactive deniable authenticated key exchange protocol with offline deni-
ability, partial online deniability, and configurable forward secrecy. Section 5.6 presents
XZDH, another new key exchange protocol. Unlike DAKEZ, XZDH is a drop-in replacement
for Signal’s key exchange protocol. It prevents insiders from provably sharing the key with an
outside party in most, but not all, situations. This is a strict improvement compared to Signal’s
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existing guarantees, as XZDH preserves all of Signal’s other desired security properties. Unlike
DAKEZ, XZDH can be used to send secure messages to a recipient that is temporarily offline.
4. Composable proofs of security for the aforementioned protocols. Chapter 6 provides
comprehensive proofs that the new two-party key exchange protocols in this dissertation
satisfy all of their promised security properties. These are simulation-based proofs in the
universal composability framework, which provides extremely powerful composability guar-
antees. Specifically, this allows the protocols to be incorporated into larger secure messaging
protocols in a safe manner without the need to re-prove the underlying security properties.
The security proofs include novel definitions of idealized protocol functionalities that are
applicable to a broad class of key exchange schemes.
5. A new cryptographic primitive: batch recursive attested key encapsulation. Chapter 8
defines a new cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to encapsulate a set of private
keys to sets of receivers in a publicly verifiable manner. Moreover, the private key being
encapsulated corresponds to the same group as the recipients’ keys, so the entire process
can be repeated with the encapsulated key as a new receiver. This primitive has widespread
applications, but this dissertation focuses on the application to secure group messaging.
6. A new round-efficient interactive group key exchange protocol for populating key
trees. Chapter 9 presents a new protocol that allows an interactively communicating set of
participants to establish a set of shared keys according to a pre-determined access policy using
exactly four communication rounds. This protocol is publicly verifiable and secure against
active network attackers. It is generally applicable to any protocol that requires establishing a
hierarchical set of shared keys. The protocol can be used to accelerate the process of adding
users to a secure group conversation.
7. A new comprehensive secure group messaging protocol with insider security. Chapter 10
presents the Safehouse protocol. Safehouse takes responsibility for managing all of the shared
cryptographic keys involved in a secure group messaging system and handling invitations to
join the group. Developers can implement secure groupmessaging tools that use Safehouse for
key management, avoiding the need for custom application-specific designs and automatically
inheriting Safehouse’s security guarantees. Safehouse grants the developer complete control
over how the shared group key is used to encrypt and transfer messages, making it suitable for
a wide variety of applications. Safehouse requires the presence of a server that is responsible
for ordering, storing, delivering, and verifying the correctness of messages. MLS recommends
such a server, but does not require it [BBM+20, §12.1]. In contrast, Safehouse provides
cryptographic tools that can be used by the server to reject spam and enforce group access
control policies. A misbehaving server can attack the availability of the group, but nothing
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else. Chapter 11 implements a complete group chat system using Safehouse that approximates
the user experience of IRC using a server-side “bouncer” proxy, including a complete GUI
client and a server backed by MySQL. This proof-of-concept deployment demonstrates the
viability of the Safehouse protocol for one of its intended applications.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The new cryptographic protocols presented in this dissertation are very complex. Moreover, each
protocol is examined from a variety of perspectives that span a broader range of disciplines than
one might typically expect to find in a single document. Within this dissertation, the reader
will find a mix of abstract cryptographic definitions, discussions of design concerns, very low-
level implementation details, textbook-like background information for developers interested in
implementing the protocols, solutions to problems that arise only during practical deployments,
empirical performance evaluations, and mathematically intensive security proofs. This thorough
treatment of the subject matter means that this dissertation is atypically long, but it also means
that most readers will be interested in only a subset of the content types.
To help readers quickly identify content of interest, this document uses symbology to annotate
chapter and section headings with the type of content that they contain. Each section heading
includes symbols indicating the type of content in the section (and any subsections within it).
Each chapter begins by listing the union of all content types appearing within its sections in
order of first appearance, as well as a textual reminder of the meaning of the symbols. These
annotations allow readers to quickly identify if a chapter or section contains relevant content of
interest. Table 1.1 lists the symbols that are used throughout the document.
Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between chapters in terms of expected prerequisite knowl-
edge. It also provides shorthand titles, lengths, and content types for each chapter. When skipping
to a particular chapter, readers may find it helpful to refer to this diagram in order to quickly
identify the assumed knowledge.
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Table 1.1 Chapter and section content type symbology. (Ref: 6)
Annotation Meaning
Background Sections with this annotation contain background information such
as surveys of related work, notation, and definitions. These sections
can help to understand the protocols, but they can also be treated
as reference material.
Discussion Sections with this annotation discuss aspects of the core contribu-
tions in terms of a broader context. In particular, these sections
discuss motivation for design choices or practical deployment con-
cerns for the protocols.
Protocol Sections with this annotation contain the core contributions of the
dissertation. These sections introduce the new protocols and the
supporting material required to define them.
Implementation Sections with this annotation contain implementation details, either
as general advice, or concerning a specific implementation that was
developed as part of this work. These sections are primarily of
interest to developers.
Evaluation Sections with this annotation contain empirical performance eval-
uations, providing insight into the practicality of the protocols in
various configurations.
Proof Sections with this annotation contain security proofs or construc-
tions that are only necessary for the purpose of providing a security
proof. These sections are primarily of interest to cryptographers and









































2 Understanding Secure Messaging
In this chapter: Background
S
ecure messaging systems vary widely in their goals and corresponding design deci-
sions. Security properties that are desirable to one group of users may be undesirable
to another group. Additionally, their target audiences often influence how they are
defined. A protocol developed by a working group of developers might be specified solely as
network message structures, whereas a protocol defined in a cryptography journal article might
be specified solely in terms of abstract algebra. It is important to understand the history of secure
messaging protocol designs and how they are presented in order to build and evaluate protocols
that overcome new challenges. This chapter defines terminology to differentiate these designs
and provide a foundation for an exploration of the secure messaging design space.
Portions of this chapter have been adapted from previous work by Unger et al. [UDB+15], a
collaborative publication in which the author systematized secure messaging schemes. Interested
readers will find additional details in the publication. The adapted portions have been significantly
updated to cover important developments in the intervening years. The material concerning
deniability in Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 is partially adapted from previously published work by
Unger and Goldberg [UG15; Ung15].
2.1 Usability Studies
The incentives for developing cryptographic protocols like secure messaging schemes are often
at odds with the needs of real users. For academic publications, the path of least resistance is
often developing a novel cryptographic technique first, and then later finding a secure messaging
scenario to serve as “motivation”. For software developers, the incentives are to quickly produce
a differentiated product with a compelling story. It is usually not worth the effort to scan
the academic literature for advanced cryptography that may be beneficial, but would require
significant development resources to implement at a production-ready level of quality.
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The best outcomes for users are achieved when we take a step back, investigate the scenarios
in which a solution can benefit users, derive a precise set of requirements, develop cryptographic
tools to build an appropriate protocol, and produce a proof-of-concept implementation that can
be used as a guide and reference for production-ready libraries. This is a time-consuming process
that is difficult to get right. Luckily, we can learn a lot about the problems that need to be solved
by consulting the results of user studies. These studies provide insights into the threat models of
users, the security and privacy properties that they expect, and how they value these properties
in the context of their overall relationship to technology. Considering the results of these studies
is important because even the most theoretically secure protocol does not provide any security
in practice if nobody uses it.
This section surveys user studies that have found usability problems and other factors limiting
adoption of secure messaging tools.
2.1.1 Encrypted Email Usability
Although encrypted email is not normally considered to be part of “secure messaging” (a term
that refers primarily to instant and mobile messaging), studies of the usability of secure email
tools spans decades. Many of the results from these studies are applicable to the secure messaging
domain, and so it is worthwhile to consider them. The seminal paper on usable secure email is
due to Whitten and Tygar [WT99]. In “Why Johnny Can’t Encrypt”, the authors investigate the
usability of PGP 5.0 using cognitive walkthroughs [WRLP94] and a user study. Their findings
were shocking: the majority of participants could not encrypt and sign an email within 90
minutes, and three of twelve participants accidentally sent unencrypted emails. They concluded
that “effective security” requires distinct user interface design techniques. This paper sparked a
long line of follow-up studies that are colloquially known as “Johnny” papers in reference to the
recurring character in the publication titles.
Garfinkel and Miller [GM05] conducted a user study similar Whitten and Tygar’s study, but
with a focus on S/MIME in Outlook Express. Unlike PGP, which requires users to manually verify
the correctness of public key fingerprints, S/MIME verifies identities using certificate authorities
and automated certificate pinning. The authors argue that the poor usability uncovered by
Whitten and Tygar was primarily caused by the complex fingerprint verification mechanism in
PGP, rather than by the software’s user interface. They found that automated key management
dramatically improves usability, but that participants still had difficulty withmaking trust decisions
and determining who can read encrypted messages. Sheng et al. [SBKH06] repeated Whitten
and Tygar’s study (seven years later) and found that users were still overwhelmingly unable
to complete the tasks, despite years of interface improvements to PGP. They also found that
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users were troubled by software that did not show the ciphertext, because it was unclear if the
encryption software was working. During the same year (2006), Gaw et al. [GFF06] investigated
user opinions of encrypted email within an activist organization. They found that users thought
email encryption was “justified” for secret communications, but that it was “paranoid” to encrypt
day-to-day communications.
Clark et al. [CGM+11] investigated the use of an encrypted two-way radio technology used by
federal law enforcement surveillance operatives in the USA. They were able to intercept hundreds
of hours of accidentally unencrypted sensitive communications over two years. They found that
these errors were primarily caused due to the ability of users to switch radios into an unencrypted
transmission mode, the inability to see the mode of received transmissions, and a centralized
and inflexible group keying architecture. Fahl et al. [FHM+12] investigated user preferences
for encrypted messaging on Facebook. Their results revealed a strong preference for automated
key management. Users also normally opted for automated encryption, but did not express a
preference for it. A usability analysis by Moecke and Volkamer [TV13] led to a set of criteria
for usable end-to-end encryption tools: it should be easy to join the encrypted communication
network, the provided tools should provide the information necessary to make informed trust
decisions, there should be no requirement to understand public key cryptography, and secure
communication should be permitted without a requirement for out-of-band identity verification.
Renaud et al. [RVR14] conducted an exploratory qualitative study investigating barriers to
adoption of end-to-end encrypted email. Their results suggest that most users never reach a
stage where the poor usability of tools is the problem. To reach that point, users must first have
an awareness of privacy violations, be concerned about privacy, achieve a full understanding
of the issues, see a need to act, and know that end-to-end encryption can help [RVR14]. Their
conclusion is that researchers and developers should focus on building comprehensive end-user
mental models for secure email through education.
Several studies have considered usability concerns surrounding automatic email encryption.
Ruoti et al. [RKB+13] studied user interactions with Pwm (pronounced “poem”), a transparent
(i.e., non-visible) automatic encryption overlay for Gmail that uses key escrow. They compared
the usability of Pwm with a mockup called “Message Protector” (MP), a standalone desktop
application where users manually encrypt and decrypt texts. Somewhat surprisingly, they found
that users trusted MP more than Pwm and gave both comparable usability ratings, but users
expressed a preference for tight browser integration. Their conclusion, similar to the much earlier
hint from Sheng et al. [SBKH06], was that some encryption details should be exposed to the
user as part of a tightly integrated system. Atwater et al. [ABH+15] suspected that this trust
disparity was due to confounding factors like user interface polish and inherent trust differences
between browser plugins and desktop applications. They designed three types of email encryption
tools to test this hypothesis, among others. They found that users strongly prefer encryption
13
Chapter 2 Understanding Secure Messaging
systems to be integrated in email clients, visibility of ciphertext itself does not affect user trust,
the main source of trust is the developer’s online reputation, and showing ciphertext does not
improve usability beyond having clear indications that the message is encrypted. Their work
provides three key design goals for secure messaging systems: setup should be easy, basic tasks
should be accomplishable without adjusting settings, and the effect of buttons and the encrypted
status of messages should be clear and explicit. Ruoti et al. [RAH+16b] conducted a follow-up
study with an updated version of Pwm that found similar effects. They found that automatic
encryption does not have any usability impact when appropriate user interface indicators are
present. These findings were confirmed yet again in additional studies where pairs of participants
were tasked with sending messages to each other, rather than to the researchers [RAZS15;
RAH+16a; RAD+19].
2.1.2 Secure Messaging Usability
Historically, usability studies in secure communication have focused on encrypted email. The rise
of secure messaging applications in recent years has caused an increased focus on the instant
and mobile messaging domains: dozens of usability studies specific to secure messaging have
been published since 2014. This section surveys the most notable results.
Several studies have identified that users adopt secure messaging tools for reasons that may
be unexpected. Roesner et al. [RGK14] examined user perceptions and behaviors surrounding the
“self-destructing messages” feature of the popular photo sharing tool Snapchat. Contrary to what
one might expect, they found that users typically do not send sensitive content through Snapchat
(although 25% claimed they had done so “experimentally”). Moreover, users were generally
aware that the security guarantee of a “self-destructing message” is theoretically impossible due
to, among other things, the ability to use a second device to capture the screen (an example of the
“analog hole”). Most understood that “deleted” messages could be recovered, and the practice
of screenshotting photos was common and expected. Most users decided to use Snapchat for
reasons unrelated to security or privacy. De Luca et al. [DDO+16] found similar user motivation
more broadly: peer influence, not security or privacy, primarily drives the adoption of messaging
tools with advertised security features. Elliott and Brody [EB16] found that vulnerable users in
New York appreciated Snapchat’s “self-destructing message” policy because “shoulder surfing”
and physical device compromise were significant and constant threats. Geeng et al. [GHR20]
surveyed “sexting” (i.e., exchanging messages containing sexually explicit photos) practices
across multiple messaging platforms. They recommended that platforms supporting this use case
should provide a mechanism to manage unsolicited sexts, support a “self-destructing” messages
feature, but also normalize and secure the process of overriding the “self-destruction” in order to
save the content of a message.
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Usability concerns are not the main barrier to adoption of secure messaging tools, and when
the tools are adopted, users often lack correct mental models of what the tools do or how to
safely use them. Abu-Salma et al. [ASB+17] performed a comprehensive analysis of barriers to
the adoption of secure messaging tools and found results consistent with the work of Renaud
et al. [RVR14]: lack of understanding, concern, and accurate mental models are more common
obstacles than poor tool usability. One of the primary obstacles for niche security-focused tools
is the lack of interoperability and fragmented user bases. As some participants pointed out, a
messaging tool is useless if it cannot send messages to any of a user’s contacts. Low quality
of service (QoS), such as poor audio/video connections or poor interface design, is another
significant obstacle: users perceived tools with lower QoS to have lower security. This finding
echoes the earlier results from Atwater et al. [ABH+15]. Abu-Salma et al. [ASB+17] also found
that the sensitivity of messages does not drive the adoption of secure messaging tools; users
consider these tools to be primarily for “informal” communication, while sensitive information
should be sent through “formal” channels, or split across multiple channels. Users also expressed
inaccurate mental models of communications technology and security: users typically think of
each application as a separate “channel” (rather than adopting a network-centric view), believe
that security requires obscurity, and misunderstand adversarial capabilities. Consequently, users
described insecure behaviors and practices: they ranked the security of communication channels
incorrectly (voice calls and SMS messages were considered more secure than secure messaging
tools), considered openness of protocol designs and audits to be negative security properties,
believed that service providers could read end-to-end encrypted content, and expected to be
informed when governments or operators accessed their account records. Users also generally
viewed attempts to secure communications as futile. As a result of this study, Abu-Salma et al.
recommended that researchers focus on improving existing messaging tools with proven utility
instead of developing niche secure messaging applications, work to improve the QoS of tools,
and understand the target population and their mental models. These findings continued to
hold true in subsequent studies. Abu-Salma et al. [AKP+17] and Vaziripour et al. [VFO+18]
found that Telegram [Tel14] users had an indistinct feeling of security (likely due to the QoS
and marketing) despite consistently failing to activate the opt-in end-to-end encryption feature.
Gerber et al. [GZH+18], Abu-Salma et al. [ARUW18], and Dechand et al. [DNDS19] all confirmed
that most users believe SMS to be more secure than secure messaging tools, believe that end-to-
end encryption is easily defeated (e.g., by skilled neighbors or service providers), and switch to
insecure channels to send sensitive content.
Some studies have identified a disconnect between users’ mental models of secure messaging
technology and signaling used by the tools. Wu and Zappala [WZ18] examined user mental
models of encryption and found four categories of models with various levels of correctness. All
users conceptualized encryption in terms of symmetric keys. The users in the study considered en-
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cryption to be a tool reserved for illicit, immoral, or paranoid activities. Demjaha et al. [DSB+18]
extracted mental models of end-to-end encryption from study participants, generated metaphors
from these models, and reflected them back to other participants as an educational tool. They
found that metaphors generated in this manner were harmful: they undid correct understanding
that users already had and did not improve understanding of end-to-end encryption. However,
they also found that these metaphors were less harmful than metaphors already used in practice
that were not derived from user mental models. They conclude that explanatory metaphors for
end-to-end encryption should be avoided.
Ermoshina et al. [EHM17] examined secure messaging tools from a different angle: they
compared the needs of users to the perceived needs of users according to developers. Moreover,
they differentiated between “low-risk” and “high-risk” users based on the potential for imminent
concrete physical harms due to failures in information security, and criticized previous researchers
for focusing exclusively on low-risk users (typically students in the United States and Western
Europe). They expanded these results in a subsequent follow-up study [HEM18]. They found
that the needs of low-risk and high-risk users differ, and that developers often focus on security
properties that both user categories report as unimportant. The two groups differ in terms of
whether they are primarily concerned about passive adversaries (adversaries that monitor and
capture network traffic but do not modify traffic or participate in protocols) or active adversaries
(adversaries that may create, alter, or delete network traffic, or directly participate in protocols).
Low-risk users are most concerned about global passive adversaries (i.e., passive adversaries
with a global view of the network) and server seizures. They are indifferent about metadata
collection (possibly due to unfamiliarity with the power and impact of the practice). Of all
of the secure messaging tool features discussed in the study, low-risk users rated only support
for group conversations as “high importance”. In contrast, high-risk users are most concerned
about local active adversaries capable of physical device compromise and other targeted attacks.
These users rate both group conversations and metadata protection as “high importance”. They
prefer open-source systems, but without an informed rationale. The high-risk users consider
key verification to be important, but prefer to verify identities out-of-band instead of using
cryptographic key verification protocols. Finally, while they are concerned about metadata
leaks, their meaning of the term differs from that of developers: they are primarily concerned
about distribution of metadata (e.g., phone numbers and account associations) to their contacts,
rather than network characteristics observed by a government surveillance entity. In particular,
high-risk users considered pseudonyms to be a very important feature. Neither high-risk nor
low-risk users cared about deniability, decentralization, or openness in protocol design. Dev et
al. [DMC20] examined the similarities and differences between privacy concerns in Saudi Arabia
and India. Their study resulted in three key recommendations: avoid automatically sharing
contact information that could be used to contact users outside of the secure messaging platform
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without their consent, require users to explicitly consent to being added to a group chat, and
enable information sharing boundaries based on group types (e.g., professional versus personal
groups).
In order to evaluate the impact of human behavior on security protocols, Ellison [Ell07] intro-
duced the concept of a ceremony. In addition to the standard machines and network connections
in most security models, the ceremony also contains human “nodes”, connections between the
humans and the machines (e.g., through user interfaces), and connections between the humans.
The ceremony captures all of the behavior that is normally described as “out-of-band”. Given
empirical measurements of human behavior during the ceremony, this framework can be used
to assess the real-world security of a protocol that involves human interaction. Vaziripour et
al. [VWO+18] used this framework to evaluate the authentication ceremony in the Signal [Ope13]
app—the authentication ceremony involves having the users compare “safety numbers” out of
band in order to defend against active network attackers.1 Users were not aware of the existence
of the ceremony, had difficulty completing it when prompted, and were confused about the pur-
pose even after completing it. The authors evaluated an alternative approach using opinionated
design: by explicitly prompting users and guiding them through the ceremony (and allowing
remote authentication based on vocal recognition), the success rate increased drastically, but
users still did not understand the purpose of authentication. In stark contrast to this approach,
several studies have called for secure messaging applications to be redesigned around users’
existing mental models and values, rather than prescribing behaviors as in opinionated design.
Dodier-Lazaro et al. [DABS17] evaluated several areas of security research, including secure
messaging, in terms of “value-sensitive design”. Under this approach, users’ engagement and
adherence to the designer’s security goals is mediated by the users’ values. Modeling these
values helps to understand failure cases and to design viable alternatives. In the case of secure
messaging tools, they point out that users are primarily driven by the desire to communicate with
their peers as conveniently as possible, rather than security goals. Fassl [Fas18] subsequently
used value-sensitive design to examine users’ mental models and evaluate three alternative au-
thentication ceremonies derived from these models: combination locks for the conversation,
pseudo-passport IDs to compare, and live photo prompts similar to those used by Reddit users to
“prove” their identity. These ceremonies all have serious disadvantages, but illustrate the general
user-centric design approach. Wu et al. [WGH+19] used value-sensitive design to re-imagine
the authentication ceremony in Signal. They evaluated user interpretation of various icons and
phrases, then framed the ceremony as a “privacy check”. In a user study where participants were
1 ⋏The “safety numbers” are derived from a cryptographic hash of a key exchange transcript. If an active network
attacker modifies any of the transmitted key material, the numbers will not match. When two users confirm that
the safety number matches between their devices, future communications between them are protected. This
concept is borrowed in Section 11.2.3 as part of the Safehouse demonstration.
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tasked with sending non-sensitive messages through the redesigned Signal, they found that users
were consciously choosing to skip the authentication ceremony as an informed trade-off. The
main result of the work is a demonstration that risk communication can empower users to make
security decisions aligned with their values.
2.2 Specification Layers
When it is time to design and specify a secure messaging protocol, one must first decide the level
of abstraction of the specification. There are three broad levels of abstraction that are normally
used to describe a secure messaging protocol:
1. Abstract protocols: At the most abstract level, protocols can be defined as sequences of
values exchanged between participants. This mode of specification deals with high-level data
flows and often omits details as significant as the choice of cryptographic protocols (e.g., key
exchanges) and primitives to use. For example, an abstract protocol for two participants
𝐴 and 𝐵 might specify that “𝐴 sends to 𝐵 a value 𝐻 (𝑚) where 𝐻 denotes a cryptographic
hash function applied to the message 𝑚”; note that this description omits the mechanism of
transmission, the method of encoding the hash output, the definition of the hash function,
the encoding of the message input to the hash, and other implementation details. Academic
publications typically specify protocols this way.
2. Wire protocols: Complete wire protocols aim to specify a binary-level representation of
message formats. A wire protocol should be complete enough that multiple parties can
implement it separately and interoperate successfully. Wire protocols often contain versioning
mechanisms to ensure compatibility as changes are made over time. Implicitly, a wire protocol
implements some higher-level abstract protocol, though extracting it may be non-trivial.
Internet standards such as Requests For Comments (RFCs) released by the IETF typically
specify protocols this way.
3. Tools: Tools are concrete software implementations that can be used for secure messaging.
Tools may take the form of an end-user application, or as a software library that fully im-
plements a secure messaging interface and can be embedded in an end-user application.
Implicitly, a tool contains a wire protocol, though it may be difficult and error-prone to derive
it, even from an open-source tool.
In practice, each type of specification provides distinct benefits. It is easiest to analyze the
ideal security properties of abstract protocols and these are most likely to receive effective outside
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review from experts as they can be read and understood quickly. Specifying abstract protocols
encourages reuse of technology and derivation of new designs. Specifying wire protocols allows
for the development of interoperable tools with differing interfaces or intended use cases and can
surface practical problems often glossed over by abstract protocols (such as message padding or
concatenation bugs). Wire protocols are most often read by software developers and are best used
to specify systems that are intended to be implemented by people other than the specification
authors. This separation of authorship is useful for federated systems and to provide end users
with choice about which implementation to trust. Finally, the availability of tools, particularly
with open-source code that facilitates code auditing, is critical for the adoption of protocols by
end users. Moreover, developing a tool enables the collection of real-world performance data.
Analyzing performance data is important because modern computing hardware is extremely
complex and it is difficult to accurately predict the performance of algorithms for abstract or wire
protocols. Discovering the location of performance bottlenecks in tools can often lead to protocol
refinements that affect all specification layers.
Very few secure messaging systems define up-to-date abstract and wire protocols while also
making a tool available, with a notable exception being OTR [BGB04; OTR16; OTR14].
2.3 Threat Model
The usability studies discussed in Section 2.1.2 primarily focused on scenarios where endpoints
do not share any affiliation. However, “messaging” is a very broad objective that covers a wide
range of applications. In many scenarios, all of the endpoints trust the same third party (e.g.,
a collection of microservices might trust a company’s key distribution system, or a set of users
might all trust the same software provider). In those scenarios, there is no need for sophisticated
cryptography: the endpoints can simply establish secure channels with the trusted party and use
a traditional messaging protocol, such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) over Transport Layer Security
(TLS), or an on-premises Slack-like service such as Mattermost [Mat15]. Thus, when building a
secure messaging protocol (or more generally, any security system) it is important to precisely
define the scenario(s) of interest and the associated threat model. The threat model specifies
what information the adversary can obtain, the actions that it can perform, and its computational
capabilities.
This dissertation focuses on practical systems that protect low- and high-risk users who do
not trust a shared third party to protect message confidentiality or integrity. The adversary
in this threat model is bound by real-world computational constraints. Notably, the adversary
is bound to classical computation at realistic time scales and is not permitted to run quantum
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algorithms. Additional research is required in order to fully secure the new protocols against
quantum adversaries.2 The logical adversary represents a potential group of colluding attackers.
These attackers may include:
• Local Adversary (active/passive): An attacker controlling local networks (e.g., owners of
open wireless access points). An active attacker can manipulate the traffic sent across the
network, whereas a passive attacker only monitors and records the legitimate traffic.
• Global Adversary (active/passive): An attacker controlling large segments of the Internet,
such as powerful nation states or large Internet service providers.
• Service providers: For messaging systems that require centralized infrastructure, the service
operators are considered to be potential adversaries.
• Insiders: Parties to the conversation that are under some degree of adversarial control, either
because they are legitimate parties that are being coerced, or because they are entities created
by the adversary.
Any entity that is not party to the secure conversation must not be trusted to protect any security
property aside from availability.3
The exact capabilities of the adversary when acting in the aforementioned roles is affected by
the security property under consideration. For example, the games for some security properties
(e.g., confidentiality) will assume that adversarial corruptions are “all-or-nothing”, whereas in
other scenarios (e.g., for post-compromise security) the extent of adversarial corruption might be
limited (e.g., able to read ephemeral secrets, but unable to sign messages with long-term secrets).
Even in cases where the adversary does not control an insider in a particular conversation, a
strong threat model for secure messaging must assume that the adversary is enrolled in the
messaging system. In particular, the adversary must always be able to start conversations, send
messages, or perform other actions afforded to an ordinary user.
2 ⋏ The new key exchanges presented in Part II include a mechanism to defend against future quantum adversaries.
Defending against current quantum adversaries would require the use of quantum-resistant ring signatures. The
Safehouse protocol presented in Part III employs many primitives for which quantum-resistant equivalents are
unavailable. Most significantly, a quantum-resistant version of Safehouse would require a quantum-resistant
instantiation of the new cryptographic primitive defined in Chapter 8. This is a major challenge that is left to
future work.
3 ⋏ In practice, there are usually many different entities that can attack the availability of a protocol that operates
over the Internet, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) participants, Domain Name System (DNS) servers, and
routers. Security techniques that provide greater availability, such as anonymization (to defend against targeted
attacks) and replication, are largely orthogonal. Protocols that introduce new points of failure (e.g., a central
server) can often have these weaknesses mitigated by making performance trade-offs (e.g., replacing a server
with a computing cluster that runs protocols to emulate a single server).
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2.4 Deniability
Deniability is a particularly interesting security property to consider in the context of secure
messaging. In the original publication of OTR, Borisov et al. argued that unrestricted non-
repudiation is an undesirable property for secure messaging protocols [BGB04]. Non-repudiation
can be considered to enable a form of insider attack: a protocol participant can cryptographically
prove to a third party that their communication partner sent a message, without the consent
of that communication partner. This vulnerability is not present in unencrypted conversations;
the attack is only possible due to the presence of non-repudiable cryptographic proofs (e.g.,
digital signatures). At first glance, it may seem that this is a necessary trade-off in order to
provide authentication to the clients, but the situation is actually more nuanced: if a secure
messaging protocol can somehow authenticate participants in a non-transferrable way (i.e., using
a proof mechanism that only provides evidence to a designated verifier), then it is possible to
achieve authentication without enabling this insider attack. Protocols with this ability to plausibly
repudiate message authorship are said to be deniable. Such protocols are desirable because they
allow participants to send messages “off-the-record”, as they would with unencrypted protocols.
Deniability is a notoriously difficult concept to define. This problem arises due to the fact that
deniability is actually a series of distinct, but related, properties. Deniability must be discussed
with respect to an action and a type of judge.⁴ An action is deniable with respect to a given
judge if the judge cannot be convinced that an individual performed the action. To make such a
definitive statement about a judge’s behavior, one must define the type of evidence that is required
to convince the judge that the action was performed, and the environment in which the judge
resides. If an action is deniable with respect to a judge, then individuals can “plausibly deny”
performing the action (with the definition of “plausibility” being determined by the requirements
of the given judge).
It is not possible for a secure messaging protocol to afford more plausible deniability to
message authors than an unencrypted protocol operating over the same network. This is because
it is always possible for a participant to provide the plaintext transcript corresponding to a
secure messaging session to a judge, regardless of the secure messaging protocol in use; this
provides the judge with the same set of evidence that they would receive in the unencrypted case.
Consequently, meaningful statements about deniability for secure messaging protocols must
show that the protocol is not worse than the unencrypted case. To eliminate any possible gap,
deniability proofs formulate the judge as an entity that would not be convinced by a plaintext
4 ⋏Herein, “judge” refers to an entity that decides whether or not a certain event occurs. This entity is not necessarily
a “judge” in the legal sense—in practice, a judge may be an ordinary citizen trying to ascertain the validity of a
claimed message.
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transcript alone: a perfectly rational decision maker that accepts only cryptographic arguments
as evidence.
Deniability for secure messaging can be divided into two types based on the judge’s environ-
ment: offline deniability and online deniability. Offline deniability is a more traditional property
that can be found in protocols like the first version of OTR [BGB04], while online deniability has
only just begun to appear in secure messaging protocols like the fourth version of OTR [OTR17]
as a result of the work in Chapter 5. Both are forms of insider security.
An offline judge examines the transcript of a protocol execution that occurred in the past, and
decides whether or not the event in question occurred. A judge of this type is given a purported
protocol transcript, showing all of the (usually encrypted) data transmitted between participants,
and a chat transcript, showing the high-level chat messages that were exchanged. The judge
must then decide whether the protocol and chat transcript constitute proof that the action in
question occurred (e.g., a given user sent a given message, or two given users communicated
with each other using the secure messaging protocol). When proving the deniability of protocols,
it is also normally assumed that an offline judge is given access to the long-term secrets of all
parties named in the transcript; judges should not be able to distinguish real transcripts from
fake ones even when given access to these secret keys. Since a judge with access to these long-
term secrets has at least as much distinguishing power as the same judge without this access,
designing protocols that achieve this level of deniability ensures that judges have no incentive to
compromise long-term secrets in practice.
Typically, deniability with respect to offline judges is provided by designing the protocol
such that many potential entities can produce forged chat and protocol transcripts. An offline
deniability security proof defines a simulator program that produces transcripts, and then shows
that no judge can distinguish these from real transcripts. When the simulator requires fewer
inputs to produce a forgery, more real-world entities can run the simulator, and thus the deniability
becomes more plausible.
An online judge interacts with a protocol participant, referred to as the informant, while the
secure messaging protocol is being executed. The judge has a secure and private connection to
the informant, and may instruct the informant to perform actions in the protocol. In practice,
the judge may be coercing the informant into participating in this attack, such as a government
agency forcing the covert cooperation of a service provider. The goal of the judge is to evaluate
whether the actions of other participants in the protocol are actually occurring, or if the informant
is fabricating the conversation (i.e., they are actually a misinformant). The judge does not have
any direct visibility into the network, but it may instruct the informant to corrupt participants.
The judge is also informed whenever a participant has been corrupted. This situation can be
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likened to a real-world situation in which the informant is “wearing a wire” and an earpiece
providing secure communication to a judge in another physical location.
A protocol offers strong deniability if it offers both offline and online deniability. If a secure
messaging protocol claims to offer insider security, then it must also provide strong deniability
or explicitly consider this type of insider attack to be out of scope.
2.5 DAKEs in Secure Messaging
Deniability for secure messaging protocols is primarily implemented as part of the initial Au-
thenticated Key Exchange (AKE) sub-protocol. An AKE is a protocol that allows two parties—an
initiator and a responder—to securely derive an ephemeral shared secret and authenticate each
other using long-term identity keys without the assistance of a trusted authority. Bellare and
Rogaway first formalized the definition of AKEs in 1993 [BR93a]. Shortly afterward, several
AKEs claimed to offer deniability informally [Kra96; Kra03; BMP04]. Each of these Deniable Au-
thenticated Key Exchanges (DAKEs) lacks some aspect of strong deniability. Contemporaneously,
deniability was also widely studied in the context of authentication schemes [DNS98; DDN00;
Kat03; YLP11].
With the release of the OTR protocol in 2004, deniability was recognized as a desirable feature
for secure messaging [BGB04]. Since then, a variety of DAKEs have been published [DGK06;
JS08; DKSW09; YZ13; WWX14; Sch15; UG15; MP16; UG18]. Walfish [Wal08] was the first
to introduce a DAKE, Φdre, that simultaneously provides strong deniability, (weak) forward
secrecy [BPR00], security against active attackers, and operation without trusted authorities. This
work was later reiterated in a publication by Dodis et al. [DKSW09]. Unger and Goldberg [UG15]
subsequently introduced two DAKEs designed for secure messaging—RSDAKE and Spawn—with
comparable security proofs. Notably, Spawn was the first DAKE with (partial) online deniability
that can be used in non-interactive applications. Unfortunately, RSDAKE and Spawn have several
limitations that make them less desirable for practical deployments, including the use of obscure
and inefficient cryptographic primitives.
OTR [AG07] and Signal [Ope13], the two most popular secure messaging protocols that
use DAKEs, do not provide strong deniability. OTR’s variant of the SIGMA DAKE offers no
online deniability, and requires fragments of legitimate exchanges to forge transcripts offline.
Signal originally used Triple Diffie-Hellman (3DH) [Mar13], an implicit DAKE with unrestricted
offline deniability (i.e., anyone can forge transcripts using only public keys), but lacking online
deniability. Signal subsequently switched to a DAKE known as Extended Triple Diffie-Hellman
(X3DH) [MP16] that improves forward secrecy but regresses to the deniability properties of
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OTR’s DAKE. Consequently, real-world deployments of “deniable” secure messaging protocols
still lack strong deniability. Chapter 5 presents two new DAKEs that provide strong deniability
for secure messaging while overcoming the limitations of RSDAKE and Spawn.
2.6 Secure Messaging Design Layers
While most complete secure messaging solutions try to deal with all possible security concerns,
securemessaging can be divided into three nearly orthogonal design layers: the trust establishment
problem, ensuring the distribution of cryptographic long-term keys and proof of association with
the owning entity; the conversation security problem, ensuring the protection of exchanged
messages during conversations; and the private transport problem, hiding the communication
metadata. The following subsections examine each of these design layers in turn.
While any concrete tool must decide on an approach for each design layer, abstractly defined
protocols may only address some of them. Additionally, the distinction between these three
design layers is sometimes blurred since techniques used by secure messaging systems may be
part of their approach for multiple design layers. For each design layer, a given protocol can be
analyzed in terms of its security and privacy properties, the usability impacts, and additional
barriers to adoption.
The three design layers—trust establishment, conversation security, and private transport—
and their associated properties are discussed in sections 2.6.1, 2.6.2, and 2.6.3, respectively.
2.6.1 Trust Establishment
One of the most challenging aspects of messaging security is trust establishment, the process of
users verifying that they are actually communicating with the parties they intend. Long-term
key exchange refers to the process where users send cryptographic key material to each other.
Long-term key authentication (also called key validation and key verification) is the mechanism
allowing users to ensure that cryptographic long-term keys are associated with the correct real-
world entities. Trust establishment refers to the combination of long-term key exchange and
long-term key authentication. After contact discovery (the process of locating contact details for
communication partners using the messaging service), secure messaging tools must perform trust
establishment to facilitate secure communication. Without secure trust establishment, it is always
possible for an active adversary (such as the service provider) to violate the confidentiality of
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conversations by sending the wrong long-term keys to the participants, establishing a conversation
with each participant under a false identity, and relaying messages between them.
Most trust establishment schemes require key management: secure messaging tools must
generate, exchange, and verify other participants’ keys. For some approaches, users may be
confronted with additional tasks, as well as possible warnings and errors, compared to classic
tools without end-to-end security. Unfortunately, as discussed in Section 2.1.2, usability studies
have consistently shown that most end users cannot reliably perform trust establishment that
involves visible key management. Moreover, they lack appropriate mental models to understand
the objective of trust establishment or why it is necessary, even for systems that enable them
to complete the trust establishment ceremony correctly. This is unfortunate because, from a
philosophical standpoint, the correct “identity” that a cryptographic key should be bound to is
a construct within the user’s mind, and so it is difficult for a secure messaging tool to perform
long-term key authentication without user input. More concretely, in one scenario, Alice might
expect “Bob’s” private key to be accessible only to a human she has previously met, whereas in
another scenario, Alice might expect “Carol’s” private key to be accessible only to the operator
of a particular social media account. Moreover, the notion of “Bob” and “Carol” may evolve in
Alice’s mind (e.g., if Alice meets Carol in person). It is supremely difficult to design usable trust
establishment systems that can be completed reliably, much less systems that can evolve with
users’ notions of identity.
In practice, secure messaging tools that are designed to protect low-risk users from mass
surveillance can focus on passive adversaries. For these systems, it makes sense to implement a
simple long-term key exchange and automatically monitor for misbehavior such as key equivo-
cation (i.e., if the service provides conflicting information about the long-term key for a given
user) without having the user perform explicit long-term key authentication. High-risk users
are targeted by active adversaries, so tools often implement additional, optional long-term key
authentication methods to serve their needs.
2.6.2 Conversation Security
After trust establishment has been achieved, users of a secure messaging protocol can begin
communicating. Each message that is sent using a secure messaging protocol can be thought of
as belonging to a conversation associated with a list of participating members that are authorized
to receive the message. Secure messaging protocols can structure these conversations in a wide
variety of ways: protocols may impose limits on the number of members in the conversation
(e.g., “direct messaging” protocols may limit membership to exactly two), associate conversations
with chat histories, alter the membership of a conversation over time, structure the secure
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messaging tool’s user interface in terms of conversations, automatically create conversations
when messages are sent, apply an ordering to messages in a conversation, and more. This
notion of a “conversation” in terms of a set of messages, each associated with a set of authorized
recipients, is handled quite differently by secure messaging tools with different communication
models, such as two-party instant messaging, chat rooms, group teleconferences, email-like
asynchronous message delivery services, and microblogging platforms. Regardless of how a
secure messaging protocol creates and manages conversations, the protocol’s conversation security
scheme protects the security and privacy of the exchanged messages. This encompasses how
messages are encrypted, the data and metadata that messages contain, and what cryptographic
protocols (e.g., ephemeral key exchanges) are performed. A conversation security scheme does
not specify a trust establishment scheme nor define how transmitted data reaches the recipient.
In classic messaging tools, users must only reason about two simple tasks: sending and
receiving messages. However, in secure messaging, additional tasks might be added. Old sys-
tems, often based on OpenPGP, allow users to manually decide whether to encrypt and/or sign
messages. Most recent tools secure all messages by default without user interaction. However,
other usability and adoption factors, such as resilience to poor network conditions, should be
taken into account. Modern approaches to conversation security achieve advanced security prop-
erties beyond the traditional confidentiality, integrity, and authentication guarantees: forward
secrecy, post-compromise security, anonymity preservation, deniability, and asynchronicity are
examples of some properties discussed in the literature. These properties were defined by Unger
et al. [UDB+15] as follows:
• Confidentiality: Only the intended recipients are able to read a message. Specifically, the
message must not be readable by a server that is not a member in the conversation.
• Integrity: No honest conversation member will accept a message that has been modified in
transit.
• Authentication: Each member in the conversation receives proof of possession of a known
long-term secret from all other members that they believe to be participating in the conversa-
tion. In addition, each member is able to verify that the message was sent from the claimed
source.
• Forward secrecy: An active adversary that captures encrypted messages and subsequently
corrupts all key material cannot decrypt the previously captured messages. The forward
secrecy property for a particular protocol might be more limited about the adversarial ca-
pabilities. For example, protocols may specify that the forward secrecy property holds only
when the delay between when the captured messages were sent and when the adversary
corrupts the keys is longer than a given duration.
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• Post-compromise security: A passive adversary⁵ that corrupts all key material (thereby
allowing it to decrypt newly sent messages) will eventually become unable to decrypt newly
sent messages. Similarly to the forward secrecy property, the post-compromise security
property usually only restores confidentiality for new messages after some given amount of
time has elapsed after the adversarial key compromise.
• Anonymity preservation: Any anonymity features provided by the underlying private trans-
port layer (discussed in Section 2.6.3) are not undermined. For example, if the private
transport layer ensures that message senders are anonymous, then the conversation security
layer does not deanonymize senders by attaching identities to message ciphertexts.
• Deniability: It is possible to plausibly deny participation in a conversation. Deniability can
be divided into offline deniability and online deniability types. Definitions for these properties
were given in Section 2.4.
• Asynchronicity: Messages can be sent securely to disconnected members and received by
those members upon reconnection.
There are many security and privacy design issues specific to secure group chat protocols.
For example, if groups have dynamic membership, then members must not be able to decrypt
messages sent before they join or after they leave. There should be a mechanism to ensure that
all members of the group perceive the same participant list (and possibly the same messages) to
exclude the possibility of an invisible adversarially controlled member. The conversation security
protocol should provide cryptographic enforcement of invitations, moderation, and member
eviction, if applicable. For some applications, it is also desirable to guarantee that all participants
receive messages in the same order (or at least in an order that preserves the causality of replies).
There are many additional properties that are specific to group settings. Chapter 7 enumerates
the conversation security goals for the new secure group messaging protocol introduced in this
work. Conversation security for group settings can be broken down into even more granular
design layers if desired [Wei19].
5 ⋏No defenses in the conversation security layer can provide post-compromise security against an active adversary,
because such an adversary can always use the compromised key material to behave in the same way as the
compromised conversation members would. The only way to recover against such an attack would be to invoke
the trust establishment scheme to authenticate some replacement keys. Secure messaging protocols in the
literature normally discuss post-compromise security in terms of a passive adversary, while secure messaging tools
usually provide a way for the users to perform trust establishment again if a compromise is suspected.
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2.6.3 Private Transport
The private transport layer defines how messages are exchanged, with the goal of hiding message
metadata such as the sender, receiver, and conversation to which the message belongs. The most
generic type of private transport architecture simply adds privacy to data links between entities;
this type of architecture can be combined with any conversation security architecture. However,
the private transport architectures that offer the greatest privacy protections usually impose some
sort of structure on the conversation security layer. For example, a private transport architecture
might require that every user in the system operates a “mailbox” server that can only be reached
through a combination of specific peer-to-peer network protocols, or it might require that all
messages must be sent as part of globally visible batches that occur at regular intervals. When
using these more restrictive private transport architectures, the techniques in the conversation
security layer must take the required structure into account. The private transport schemes may
also be used for privacy-preserving contact discovery.
Of the three design layers, private transport has remained the most difficult to solve. Recent
work has shown that there are inherent insurmountable conflicts between strong anonymity,
low latency overhead, and low bandwidth overhead, even in protocols where participants work
together to enhance anonymity [DMMK20]. Nonetheless, anonymity remains an important
property, especially for high-risk users—former National Security Agency director Michael Hay-
den famously stated that “we kill people based on metadata” [Joh14, 17:54]. Several secure
messaging protocols have attempted to find an acceptable compromise between usability and
anonymity by using sophisticated private transport mechanisms.
Private transport is not the focus of this work because it is deeply challenging and largely
orthogonal to trust establishment and conversation security. However, it is not entirely orthogonal:
it is possible for a protocol to undermine the guarantees of a private transport mechanism.
For example, a protocol that includes user identifiers in plaintext as part of its conversation
security layer will undermine network-level anonymity by revealing conversation metadata. A
conversation security design that does not undermine the guarantees of private transports is said
to have anonymity preservation. Thus, a conversation security design with anonymity preservation
is necessary but not sufficient for anonymity: it must be combined with an appropriate private
transport scheme if anonymity is desired.
2.6.4 Other Considerations
There are several other considerations that should inform the design of a complete secure
messaging protocol. These aspects are mostly independent of the other components, and do not
fit neatly into the previous design layers.
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When secure messaging is used in an instant messaging setting (i.e., an environment in which
messages are sent and received with low latency), it is important to provide presence information.
Presence information includes data about a user’s messaging state, such as whether they are
currently “online” (available to receive interactive messages), a custom textual status message,
user-provided information about their current activities (e.g., music or games being played), and
more. Traditional insecure messaging applications typically provide presence information about
a user’s contacts. This information provides improved quality of service, but it is also important
for improved protocols. Specifically, knowing whether a communication partner can conduct
interactive protocols enables dynamic selection of the transmission mechanism.
Unfortunately, naïvely storing presence information on a central server exposes metadata,
potentially undermining the properties of the private transport design layer. Preserving presence
privacy requires more sophisticated techniques like those of the DP5 protocol [BDG15], which
uses Private Information Retrieval (PIR) to distribute presence information without revealing
contact relationships through access patterns. Cobb et al. [CSKH20] studied the features and
implementation of presence information across 40 mobile applications and the implications for
metadata privacy. They derived design guidelines and concepts for privacy-conscious systems
that provide presence information.
Another important consideration is how to handle users that own multiple devices that must
all be given access to the secure messaging system. Handling this problem (or ignoring it) has
implications for all of the design layers, with particularly important implications for the trust
establishment mechanism. The simplest approach, which is used by the majority of the popular
secure messaging tools, is to generate a unique long-term key pair for every device, and to
maintain a list of long-term public keys associated with each “account” (e.g., entity uniquely
identified by a username). The downside of this approach is that the list of user devices is
exposed to contacts, and trust establishment must be performed for each device. Moreover,
changes to a user’s devices (e.g., when a device is purchased, sold, or stolen) necessitates new
trust establishment activities for every one of that user’s contacts.
Shatter [AH16] investigated the use of threshold cryptography to solve the multi-device
problem in the context of encryption and signature generation. This work also enumerated other
possible approaches, including key synchronization between devices, the use of a “personal PKI”
(a master certification keypair that authenticates device keys), and group signatures. Each of
these approaches has advantages, disadvantages, and implications for each protocol design layer.
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2.7 Two-Party Secure Messaging
Before considering secure group messaging, it is beneficial to trace the history of two-party
protocols. While the two-party scenario is simpler, both in terms of the desired security properties
and the cryptographic schemes, many of the techniques and lessons learned are applicable to the
group setting. This section summarizes some of the most significant two-party secure messaging
protocols.
The most basic features that a secure messaging protocol can provide are confidentiality and
integrity. These properties can be achieved by simply using participants’ static long-term asymmet-
ric keypairs for signing and encrypting. OpenPGP and S/MIME are two well-known and widely
implemented standards for message protection, mostly used for email but also in tools based on
the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [CDF+07; FL04; RT10; Sai11].⁶ While
most OpenPGP and S/MIME tools are vulnerable to surreptitious forwarding [Dav01] or identity
misbinding [DOW92] attacks, these can be prevented in a new protocol instantiation by using
an appropriate authenticated encryption scheme. The main weaknesses of this approach are
that it lacks forward secrecy (i.e., compromise of a secret key enables retroactive decryption of
recorded ciphertexts encrypted for the matching public key), it produces cryptographic proof of
conversations (i.e., it is non-repudiable and lacks deniability), and it must be combined with more
complex mechanisms to achieve the nuanced security properties introduced in later schemes.
Several authors have designed secure messaging systems using Identity-Based Encryption
(IBE) in order to simplify key distribution. IBE allows a user’s public key to be derived from
their identifier and a master public key that is distributed as part of the setup. Unlike traditional
systems that use public keys as identifiers (e.g., Ricochet [Ric14]), IBE-based schemes allow users
to choose and distribute arbitrary identifiers without explicitly attached public keys. One of the
earliest and simplest of these IBE-based secure messaging systems is SIM-IBC-KMS [BMHD08],
which acts as an encryption overlay on top of the (now discontinued)MSN chat network. Messages
are encrypted using IBE with a third-party server acting as the Private Key Generator (PKG). The
protocol from Wang et al. [WLL13] operates similarly, but distributes the PKG function across
multiple servers with a non-collusion assumption. The main problem with these approaches
is that while they simplify key distribution (since public keys can be derived from identities),
they do not simplify trust establishment. Specifically, users still need to somehow authenticate
6 ⋏ XMPP is a popular federated protocol for instant messaging that is often used in Internet telephony applications.
The XMPP open standard also provides mechanisms for distributing presence information (e.g., whether users
are currently online) and maintaining contact lists. Secure messaging protocols can be layered on top of XMPP
to provide end-to-end encryption; the Gajim [FL04] messaging client, for example, can encrypt messages using
several different protocols, including OpenPGP, before sending them with XMPP.
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that the identities correspond to the expected real-world entities using one of the other trust
establishment techniques. In practice, this means that IBE schemes do not have any significant
advantage over traditional key distribution methods. Moreover, IBE-based schemes introduce a
vulnerability: if the PKG is compromised (or some threshold is compromised in the distributed
variant) then all authentication is undermined.
A more interesting potential use of IBE for secure messaging is forward secure IBE (FS-IBE).
One example is the scheme proposed by Canetti, Halevi, and Katz [CHK03]. FS-IBE schemes
permit efficient distribution of ephemeral public keys; the associated private keys can be erased
to preserve forward secrecy. Puncturable encryption [GM15] is a similar mechanism that provides
forward secrecy by updating a private key so that it can no longer decrypt ciphertexts with a
specific tag.
The oldest and simplest way to achieve forward secrecy is to use a central key directory to
distribute ephemeral public keys. This technique has efficient implementations based on well-
tested security assumptions, but lacks the asymptotic efficiency (and thus scalability) of FS-IBE
or puncturable encryption. Two early schemes in which users upload ephemeral keys to a key
directory are IMKE [MO06] and SIMPP [YK07; YKAL08]. To prevent denial-of-service attacks,
the key directory authenticates users before accepting new ephemeral keys. IMKE uses passwords
for authentication, while SIMPP uses long-term keys and digital signatures. These protocols both
lack end-to-end confidentiality because the key directory can inject malicious ephemeral keys.
While the use of central servers for presence information and central authentication is fun-
damental to systems such as IMKE and SIMPP, there is an alternative class of solutions that
instead perform end-to-end authenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) AKEs. The session key output by
the AKE is used to derive symmetric encryption and Message Authentication Code (MAC) keys,
which then protect messages using an encrypt-then-MAC approach. This basic design provides
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. This process does not inherently require a third
party, but it still requires a trust establishment mechanism for the long-term keys. TLS with an
ephemeral DH cipher suite and mutual authentication (TLS-EDH-MA) is a well-known example
of this approach that uses the TLS Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for trust establishment. Note
that further protections, such as the party identifiers included in the SIGMA protocols [Kra03],
are required during the key exchange to protect against identity misbinding attacks.
OTR [BGB04] uses ephemeral session keys derived from an AKE for conversations, and intro-
duces a number of additional mechanisms designed to support deniability. The use of ephemeral
session keys provides forward secrecy and post-compromise security (i.e., compromising session
keys does not compromise future sessions) between conversations. This technique also makes
message authorship unlinkable (i.e., since different conversations do not use the same keys, one
cannot use knowledge of authorship in one conversation to derive knowledge of authorship for
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another session). Message authorship is deniable against offline judges since a DAKE is used, and
messages are authenticated with shared MAC keys rather than being signed with long-term keys.
The simulator corresponding to the DAKE used by OTR requires a legitimately signed ephemeral
public key as input. This means that messages can be forged by any entity that can establish
real connections to the claimed participants to receive the required signatures. OTR users can
increase the number of possible forgers by publishing previously signed ephemeral keys in a
public location, thereby providing the appropriate simulator input to forgers. OTR additionally
publishes old MAC keys and intentionally uses malleable encryption, which expands the set of
possible message forgers by enabling protocol transcripts to be altered undetectably [BGB04].
A desirable property is forward secrecy for individual messages rather than for entire con-
versations. This is especially useful in settings where conversations can last for the lifetime of a
device. To achieve this, the session key from the initial key agreement can be evolved over time
through the use of a session key ratchet [PM16]. A simple approach is to use a Key Derivation
Function (KDF) to compute future message keys from past keys. This simple approach, as used
in SCIMP [MBZ12], provides forward secrecy. However, it does not provide post-compromise
security within conversations: if a key is compromised, all future keys can be derived using the
KDF.
A different ratcheting approach, introduced by OTR, is to attach new DH contributions to
messages [BGB04]. With each sent message, the sender advertises a new DH public key. Message
keys are then computed from the latest acknowledged DH values. This design introduces post-
compromise security within conversations since a compromised key will regularly be replaced
with new key material. A disadvantage of the DH ratchet is that session keys might not be
renewed for every message (i.e., forward secrecy is only partially provided).
The Signal protocol [Ope13] adopts many of OTR’s techniques and builds upon them for use
in mobile environments, where devices are frequently offline and conversations last for a very
long time. Signal uses a double ratchet [PM16; UDB+15; CCD+17; BRV20] for key evolution.
This technique combines the DH and KDF ratchets of OTR and SCIMP. DH contributions attached
to messages are used to instantiate new SCIMP-style ratchets. Each stage of these KDF ratchets
is hashed to derive the key for the individual message. This technique permits messages to be
dropped or arrive out of order while still preserving per-message forward secrecy and providing
post-compromise security across DH ratchet stages. Signal also incorporates an implicit AKE
called X3DH [MP16]. This AKE is performed between long-term keys, a digitally signed medium-
term (e.g., weekly) ephemeral key, and one-time ephemeral keys. The ephemeral keys for a
message receiver, called the signed prekey and one-time prekey, are distributed to senders by an
untrusted central server. This construction provides better forward secrecy properties, prevents
the server from undermining confidentiality, and enables asynchronous messaging (the ability to
send messages to offline users).
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2.8 Secure Group Messaging
Secure group messaging is a more difficult problem than two-party secure messaging. Compared
to two-party secure messaging, there are fewer academic papers and far fewer end-user tools.
This section presents a comprehensive survey of notable systems and their distinctive advantages.
2.8.1 Centralized Schemes
One of the earliest secure group messaging schemes available to end users was SILC [SILC00].
The SILC project has published a wire protocol and an official tool, and the protocol has been
briefly analyzed in an academic context [SYG08]. SILC most closely resembles the IRC protocol
with an encryption layer. Messages are routed to channels across federated servers using client-
to-server encryption for metadata (but without network path obfuscation). Messages to channels
are also encrypted using AES in an encrypt-then-MAC mode. By default, the key for message
encryption is known to the servers. However, there is an optional mode in which users can provide
their own pre-shared key when joining a channel. This very basic design allows SILC to scale well,
but the usability of opt-in pre-shared keys is poor, and the central servers retain the ability to
launch myriad attacks (e.g., message replays, manipulation of channel lists, and traffic analysis).
In an early and widely cited result, Kikuchi et al. [KTN04] designed a protocol that resembles
a group version of SIMPP [YK07], although it was published several years before SIMPP. Users
register long-term keys with a fully trusted central server that forms channels and acts as a
key directory. Users establish two-party session keys using an unusual DH-based key exchange
protocol that provides authentication if the server is not malicious. The creator of a channel
generates and distributes a room key using two-party session keys. Everyone encrypts their
messages using this room key. In addition to breaking confidentiality by exploiting the key
directory, a malicious server can perform the same attacks as a SILC server.
The GROK [CKFP10] system is a plugin for the Pidgin instant messaging client that enables se-
cure group messaging. Like the aforementioned schemes, GROK uses pairwise AKEs to distribute
a room key. Long-term public keys are exchanged out-of-band. Unlike the previous schemes,
GROK refreshes the room key when the group membership changes; this prevents insiders from
decrypting captured messages sent when they are not part of the group. GROK accomplishes
this by selecting a user to distribute a new room key using the minimum number of pairwise
channels.
The “group OTR” protocol from 2007 [BST07] is another extremely simple scheme. One
group participant acts as a proxy that controls all of the messages. Other members initiate
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OTR conversations with the leader and use these channels to send messages to the group. Like
SIM-IBC-KMS, this scheme was designed to use the MSN network for message transport.
Thukral and Zou [TZ05] published the first academic group messaging paper to use identity-
based cryptography, but the design suffers from numerous cryptographic deficiencies. Their
IBECRT system assumes a fully trusted central server that routes messages, maintains presence
information, and acts as the PKG. Users register with the server using a username and password.
A user’s identity is an MD5 hash of their username. When logging in, a user encrypts and sends
their password to the server, which then replies with their private key encrypted using a key
derived from their identity and password. Group conversations are formed by assigning co-prime
scalars to each user. The group initiator selects the initial list of group members and broadcasts
ciphertexts formed using each group member’s scalar. These ciphertexts can be decrypted using
the Chinese remainder theorem and the receiver’s private key, allowing each member to verify the
list of participants (and thus the protocol offers participant consistency). Finally, each participant
sends a key contribution to the others such that everyone can derive the same session key for the
conversation. This initial key establishment requires 𝑂(𝑛2) computation and transmission for 𝑛
users. When a new user joins the group, their contribution can be directly incorporated into the
session key, permitting joins with 𝑂(𝑛) work. When a user leaves the group, the protocol must
essentially restart.
2.8.2 Causality Preserving Schemes
Unlike the aforementioned work, which is typically concerned with group key establishment and
membership management, the OldBlue [VC12] protocol instead focuses on reliability for the
subsequent messages. Specifically, OldBlue is concerned with causality preservation: enabling
tools to avoid displaying a message before other messages that causally precede it. OldBlue also
provides speaker consistency: all participants agree on the sequence of messages sent by each
participant. Each message in OldBlue is encrypted under a previously established group key
and signed with the sender’s long-term key. Each message includes a minimal list of message
identifiers that causally precede it (i.e., messages that were observed by the sender before they
sent the message). An OldBlue message identifier is a hash of the message contents, the sender,
and the list of preceding identifiers. In this respect, OldBlue message identifiers form a hash tree.
When a client receives a message with a missing predecessor, it internally buffers the message
and issues resend requests to all other group members. Luo [Luo14] examined this UI policy,
proposed and evaluated several different ways of handling out-of-order messages, and described
mutual exclusion between various forms of transcript consistency.
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KleeQ [RKAG07], a protocol designed for use by multiple trusted participants with tenuous
connectivity, uses a different approach for causality preservation. The protocol begins with a
deniable authenticated multi-party key exchange,⁷ which establishes a shared secret key among
the participants. The group can be efficiently expanded by incorporating the DH contribution
of a new member and deriving a new group key. However, like IBECRT, the protocol must be
restarted when a participant leaves in order to preserve confidentiality. For deniability purposes,
all messages are encrypted and authenticated with a MAC using keys derived from the group
secret. When two participants can establish a connection, they exchange the messages that the
other is missing using a patching algorithm. The participants deterministically partition the
sequence of messages into a sequence of “blocks”, each containing multiple messages. The KleeQ
protocol guarantees that any message in a block is not a reply to a message in a future block—it
may be a reply to messages in the same or previous blocks, or it may not be a reply at all. The
participants “seal” a block by verifying that they all agree upon its hash. After each block is
sealed, the participants derive new keys using the previous keys and the block contents. KleeQ
includes a mechanism to seal blocks even if some users are inactive in the conversation. This
occasional block sealing mechanism ensures that causality is preserved and that participants have
a consistent view of the conversation (e.g., it prevents users from sending different messages to
other participants). This mechanism achieves the same purpose as the message predecessor lists
in OldBlue.
2.8.3 Comprehensive Decentralized Schemes
The mpOTR [GUVC09] scheme is a highly influential approach for secure group messaging,
although it was never defined as a wire protocol or implemented. mpOTR is designed for use
by a group of interactive participants with a fixed and known group membership list. Like OTR,
mpOTR includes many mechanisms meant to preserve various notions of deniability. In the
original scheme [GUVC09], participants initially perform pairwise DAKEs and use these deniable
channels to distribute ephemeral verification keys for a digital signature scheme. In follow-up
work [Van13b], this procedure was replaced with a more efficient protocol that derives a shared
room key for all participants and distributes ephemeral verification keys. During the conversation,
messages are encrypted with the room key and signed with the sender’s ephemeral signing
key. Once the conversation has finished, a special “shutdown phase” ensues. Each participant
broadcasts a hash of all messages seen in the conversation, in a well-defined order. If there is a
hash mismatch, the user is alerted that an inconsistency has been found in the conversation, but
no specific information about the anomaly is available. A significant drawback of this approach is
that in many deployment scenarios, there is no notion of “finishing” a conversation.
7 ⋏Group key exchanges are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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Signal [Ope13] offers group messaging support in addition to its prolific two-party protocol.
While the project originally considered adopting mpOTR, this idea was rejected for several
reasons [Mar14b]. Specifically, mpOTR is not well suited for mobile environments due to its
setup overhead, short-lived conversations, lack of in-conversation forward secrecy, delayed and
coarse transcript consistency notifications, and implementation complexity. Consequently, group
messaging in Signal simply involves pairwise two-party Signal messages. When a message is
sent to the group, the sender uses hybrid encryption with a KEM transmitted to each recipient
using the two-party Signal protocol. The server duplicates the DEM for all recipients. The
hybrid encryption key is reused across several messages for efficiency. Finally, the protocol also
incorporates an OldBlue-style transcript consistency mechanism. This construction inherits many
of the benefits of the underlying two-party Signal protocol, but lacks more advanced features
like deniability, protection against equivocation, and participant consistency. The requirement to
establish pairwise shared keys between participants using the KEM also means that the protocol
scales poorly and is therefore not suitable for large groups. Moreover, the Signal protocol is no
longer openly documented.
Liu et al. [LVH13] defined a protocol, BD-GOTR,⁸ with the goal of improving the deniability
properties of group messaging beyond those offered by mpOTR. Specifically, BD-GOTR provides
strong deniability as defined in Section 2.4. Unfortunately, the protocol does not scale well due
to its method of establishing shared group keys and the need to establish pairwise authenticated
channels for transcript consistency verification. Chapters 3 and 4 describe more efficient key
exchange techniques.
In subsequent work, Schliep et al. [SVH18] designed a new protocol, SYM-GOTR, with the
same objectives as BD-GOTR. Unlike BD-GOTR’s complex mechanism for establishing shared
secret keys, SYM-GOTR simply establishes peer-to-peer deniable secure channels and distributes
ephemeral keys over these channels. Each sender simply encrypts their message with a symmetric
key that they have previously distributed using the pairwise channels. After a message has been
broadcast, all users send a signed hash of the message over the pairwise deniable channels.
This design imposes a consistent global transcript for all participants. The advantage of this
design is that it provides very powerful security guarantees for small and low-traffic group instant
messaging applications. The downside is that it scales poorly due to pairwise communication,
and the entire protocol must halt during each message broadcast as the consistency checks are
performed. The protocol cannot handle participants going offline, because all parties are needed
for these consistency checks.
8 ⋏ In the original publication, the protocol was named Group OTR (GOTR). However, this name was already used
by an unrelated work in 2007 [BST07]. In a later publication [SVH18], the authors started referring to their
earlier protocol as “BD-GOTR” for disambiguation.
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2.8.4 Anonymous Conversations
There are a variety of abstract protocols and tools for secure group messaging that are primar-
ily concerned with transport privacy. Anonymous group messaging applications require low
bandwidth, low latency, and one or more forms of anonymity, depending on the intended use
cases. Within these constraints, protocols offer several different security properties [UDB+15].
Senders, receivers, or both might be anonymous (from the perspective of a network adversary).
Senders and/or receivers might be anonymous to other participants, with the anonymity set
being equivalent to the group participant list. The protocols may or may not resist attacks by
global adversaries, and they may or may not prevent or detect denial of service attacks or other
misbehavior. Messages sent within one “conversation” might be unlinkable from the perspective
of the network layer. Transport privacy schemes may also impose restrictions on the security
properties (e.g., deniability) of the overall scheme. This section only discusses notable group
messaging schemes that provide anonymity properties as their top priority; it does not include
anonymity networks that are primarily intended for other purposes (e.g., web browsing).
One class of anonymous communication technique that is intrinsically well suited to group
communication is DC-nets. DC-nets are interactive group protocols that operate in rounds.
During each round, each member of the group either submits a secret message or no message.
At the end of the round, every user receives the XOR of all submitted secret messages, but not the
identity of the sender. When combined with encryption and a group key exchange protocol, these
messages are only revealed to group participants. DC-nets require a mechanism to avoid message
collisions. Anonycaster [Hea12] uses “silent rounds” to detect misbehavior. Dissent [CF10] and
Verdict [CWF13] take a different approach by constructing a DC-net system through the use
of a verifiable shuffle and bulk transfer protocol, which facilitates a blame protocol that can
pinpoint the entity that caused a round to fail. Dissent appoints one participant as a leader
to manage these systems. Verdict achieves better scalability by providing central servers that
execute the DC-net protocol. As long as any one server is honest, users’ privacy is maintained.
Riposte [CBM15] and Atom [KCDF17] are more recent systems that scale to a large number of
users, but require many minutes or hours of latency for message transmission; they are primarily
intended for microblogging applications.
Mix networks [Cha81] are another popular anonymous communication technique that can
be used for group communication while defending against global adversaries. Similarly to
DC-nets, mix networks aggregate incoming messages into periodically published batches. Unfor-
tunately, they also typically impose high latency or low throughput in order to achieve a desirable
privacy level. While mix networks have historically been used primarily in anonymous email
systems [SP06], they have recently found use in several private transport systems intended for
incorporation into secure messaging protocols. Vuvuzela [HLZZ15] uses a mix network that
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abandons cryptographic indistinguishability in favor of differential privacy [DMNS06]. This
design achieves better performance than solutions based on DC-nets while still offering some
protection against global passive adversaries. Stadium [TGL+17] subsequently improved upon
this design by replacing components of Vuvuzela that required vertical scaling (i.e., more power-
ful servers to support more users) with components that scale horizontally (i.e., use more servers
to support more users). In both cases, these schemes still require minutes of latency to transmit
messages when scaling to millions of users in the system, making them more suitable for email
or microblogging applications than for instant messaging.
Several other systems implement private transport by building on the Tor network [DMS04].
In Ricochet [Ric14], each user is associated with a Tor hidden service. Users periodically poll their
server to see if any messages have arrived. Cwtch [Lew18] builds a group messaging layer on
top of Ricochet channels. Creating a group in Cwtch produces a shared secret, group identifier,
and invitations to securely distribute to other participants. Cwtch clients then anonymously
subscribe to receive messages from the server, decrypt messages for their group(s), and perform
an identity verification protocol over Ricochet channels. MTor [LSL16] instead extends Tor
to support multicast communication by arranging relays in a tree structure, where each node
forwards messages to its children. In MTor, a group chat is established by distributing a group
descriptor that contains a group encryption key and a group signing key. MTor conversations
take place over several sessions, where each session derives a different multicast structure and
keys from the group descriptor; this prevents messages from being linked. Approaches based
on the Tor network provide low latency, but make the schemes vulnerable to deanonymization
attacks by global adversaries.
2.8.5 Contemporary Designs
The currently available tools for group messaging are all based on pairwise two-party protocols.
Multiple public development efforts have attempted to produce a superior group messaging
specification that scales to larger group sizes with stronger security properties.
The flute [Kad16] system is a very basic “full stack” group messaging scheme (i.e., it provides
an abstract protocol, a wire protocol, and a tool) that resembles a simplified GROK. Although flute
can operate on any chat substrate, the initial release is designed to be used over IRC. All users
exchange long-term signing keys out of band. The room creator invites new users to the group.
When a new user joins, they send a signed ephemeral key to the creator, who then generates a
new group key, and sends it to all current members using their ephemeral keys. The protocol
provides entity authentication, confidentiality, and forward secrecy, but it does not attempt to
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provide deniability, transcript consistency, or participant consistency. Both the room creator and
the underlying chat network have significant potential for malicious behavior.
The (n+1)sec [eQu15] protocol provides more advanced security properties than flute,
but currently only exists as an abstract and wire protocol. The system consists of three sub-
protocols: a deniable authenticated group key exchange, a communication protocol, and a
transcript consistency verification protocol. The group key exchange results in a shared group
key and the distribution of ephemeral signing keys for the participants. The protocol enables the
computation of subgroup keys without further communication. The exchange concludes with a
key confirmation step. Messages sent to the group are encrypted using the group’s shared secret
key and signed using the ephemeral signing key of the sender. Each message includes a new
ephemeral key that causes the group key to ratchet forward. The protocol assumes that it operates
on a reliable network that guarantees a global message ordering. A transcript verification, similar
to the one in mpOTR, is performed after each message is sent to ensure that the global transcript
is consistent. Joining or leaving the group is made efficient by the key agreement scheme, but
requires synchronous communication. Optionally, members can informally forward messages to
users as the joining procedure is being performed.
Unlike (n+1)sec, the mpEnc [LK16] protocol does not require the network substrate to
impose a global order on messages, although it still requires group membership operations to be
handled sequentially. Each group membership change begins a new “subsession” with a group
key exchange. Though this exchange accomplishes the same goals as the one in (n+1)sec, it
is non-repudiable and inefficient. Within a session, mpEnc implements OldBlue-like transcript
consistency checks. The protocol also includes message acknowledgements that raise warnings
when they time out. The authors provide an abstract protocol, wire protocol, and user interface
design advice for handling transcript consistency. The mpEnc protocol was designed to be
deployed as part of the chat feature on the MEGA file sharing website.
Schliep and Hopper [SH19] designed a deniable secure group messaging protocol named
Mobile CoWPI that improves upon their previous work with BD-GOTR and SYM-GOTR, as
discussed in Section 2.8.3. Mobile CoWPI is primarily concerned with providing deniability
and transcript consistency in asynchronous environments: unlike BD-GOTR and SYM-GOTR,
participants do not need to stay online during the conversation. Mobile CoWPI establishes pairwise
secure channels using the NAXOS key exchange scheme [LLM07], which is nearly identical to
3DH and provides similar deniability properties. Conversation messages are encrypted using
symmetric keys that are delivered in protocol messages. Protocol messages encrypt the new
symmetric keys using the pairwise NAXOS shared secrets, as well as new ephemeral DH public
keys to be used as part of new NAXOS exchanges—this constitutes a pairwise DH ratcheting
mechanism. The system also incorporates “order-enforcing services” (OESes) that authenticate
the position of protocol messages within the global transcript. As long as at least two OESes
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are honest, Mobile CoWPI provides global transcript consistency. The main weakness of Mobile
CoWPI is that sending a protocol message (e.g., an actual conversation message or a group
membership alteration) involves transmitting a new key to each group member. This expense
scales linearly with the group size, making the protocol unsuitable for larger groups.
In 2017, the disparate public efforts to design a secure group messaging protocol coalesced
into the MLS project [BBM+20]. The goal of the MLS IETF working group is to specify, standard-
ize, and implement widely deployable secure group protocol with all desirable security properties,
including support for asynchronous communication without a trusted central server or designated
“leader”. MLS is by far the most comprehensive design to date, and understanding its design
requires additional context discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes the core primitive and
design of MLS.
2.9 Chapter Summary
This chapter established the background knowledge necessary to understand the design of
modern secure messaging protocols. Section 2.1 surveyed notable usability studies related to
secure email and secure messaging; these studies are extremely helpful for determining what
security properties to target when designing protocols. Section 2.2 defined different levels of
abstraction for specifying secure messaging protocols, and the most appropriate use of each type.
Section 2.3 provided a general definition of the threat model considered by the protocols in this
dissertation. Section 2.4 presented common definitions of “deniability” with respect to secure
messaging, including the distinction between “offline” and “online” deniability, with “strong
deniability” encompassing both notions. Section 2.5 surveyed the most notable DAKEs used in
secure messaging protocols; this background is very important for Part II, which presents new
strongly deniable DAKEs for modern secure messaging applications. Section 2.6 defined several
mostly orthogonal design layers that divide the task of developing a secure messaging tool into
independently manageable problems. Section 2.7 surveyed notable secure messaging protocols
for the two-party setting, and Section 2.8 did the same for the group setting.
This chapter introduced specification and design layers that can be used to frame a discussion
about the design of secure messaging protocols, but it limited analysis of the surveyed protocols
to a surface level. Chapter 3 introduces the specific background information necessary to analyze
the conversation security layer of secure group messaging protocols, which is the focus of the
primary contributions in Part III.
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In this chapter: Background
I
n contrast to simple schemes built using pairwise secure channels, efficient secure group
messaging systems typically involve the establishment of some shared secret key that
is known to all participants. Aside from pairwise AKEs, the simplest cryptographic
protocol that can be used to establish this “group key” is a Group Key Exchange (GKE). GKEs
are also sometimes called group key agreement (GKA) protocols, along with a variety of other
terms (e.g., conference key distribution systems). Moreover, some authors distinguish between
the terms, defining GKAs to be contributory (i.e., every participant contributes to the group key)
and GKEs to be non-contributory. For simplicity, all such schemes are hereafter referred to as
GKEs with properties mentioned as needed.
In its most basic incarnation, a GKE is an interactive protocol performed between 𝑛 parties
(where 𝑛 ≥ 2, and the interesting cases occur when 𝑛 ≥ 3) that outputs a shared secret key. GKEs
are usually designed to be secure (at a minimum, ensuring key secrecy) against a passive network
adversary. The Katz-Yung compiler [KY03] trivially adds protection against active network
adversaries if desired; this compiler adds digital signatures and nonces to an unauthenticated
GKE to produce an authenticated GKE. The modifications made by the Katz-Yung compiler are
typically suboptimal, so protocols can often be made more efficient by specifying a hand-crafted
authentication mechanism.
GKEs assume that group membership is fixed when the protocol is performed. This limitation
is inadequate for many higher-level protocols, so the GKE definition can be extended to support
dynamic group membership. This is typically modeled by having an initial fixed-group “setup”
phase, followed by “join” and “leave” sub-protocols to add and remove participants, respectively.
Schemes supporting dynamic groups are widely referred to as Dynamic Group Key Exchanges
(DGKEs). Note that these should not be confused with “deniable GKEs” (a GKE providing deniable
authentication), for which no standard term exists. Some DGKEs additionally support optimized
functions to add or remove multiple participants at a time, called “mass join” and “mass leave”.
Critically, any DGKE must update the group key after each membership change; this prevents
new members from retroactively decrypting old messages or previous members reading messages
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sent after their departure. Note that DGKEs are different from GKEs in a fundamental way:
whereas GKEs are run once to derive a shared key and are then finished forever, DGKEs are
stateful protocols that are executed indefinitely across multiple changes in the set of participants.
Defining a DGKE therefore requires additional considerations about how state is stored and how
this state interacts with “join” and “leave” operations over time.
DGKEs sufficiently met the demands of secure messaging protocol designers until recently,
when the desire for asynchronicity, forward secrecy, and post-compromise security once again
necessitated extending the definition. This chapter surveys notable GKE and DGKE schemes that
can be used to build secure group messaging protocols, while Chapter 4 discusses subsequent
extensions to the DGKE concept and their use in contemporary secure group messaging protocols
like MLS.
3.1 Unobtainium: Non-Interactive Key Exchanges
An optimally efficient and maximally useful GKE would require only a single flow of communi-
cation and no a priori knowledge of key material. In such a scheme, each of the 𝑛 participants
would broadcast their independently generated key material, and upon receiving the other par-
ticipants’ material, everyone would immediately derive the same shared secret key. A scheme
like this is incredibly useful: if key material is uploaded to a public bulletin board, then any
participant would be able to derive a shared secret key for any subgroup at any time using a
local computation with their private key as input. A GKE protocol that satisfies this special case
is called a multi-party Non-Interactive Key Exchange (NIKE). The DH key exchange protocol can
be viewed as a NIKE for the case where 𝑛 = 2. Ideally, there would exist an efficient and secure
generalization of DH to larger group sizes.
The only (arguably) practical NIKE realization for 𝑛 > 2 is the Joux protocol [Jou00], which
uses cryptographic pairings to solve the 𝑛 = 3 case. The Joux technique, based on bilinear maps,
can be naturally extended to the 𝑛 > 3 case using multilinear maps [BS03]. The 𝑛 > 3 case is also
solvable using indistinguishability obfuscation [BZ14] or lattice assumptions [MZ17]. Unfortu-
nately, the known approaches for 𝑛 > 3 all rely on cryptographic techniques that are currently in
a tumultuous “break and fix” research phase, or impose impractical resource requirements. Until
these techniques become established and efficient, NIKEs are of limited use for secure group
messaging, and we must instead rely on less desirable GKE constructions.
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3.2 Early and Unique Schemes
In one of the first attempts to extend two-party DH exchanges to the group setting, Ingemarsson
et al. [ITW82] presented multiple protocols. In one of their schemes, the 𝑛 participants logically
order themselves in a ring (i.e., each participant has two “neighbors”). The group key is derived
in 𝑛 rounds. Each participant begins with the group generator 𝑔 as an intermediate value. During
each round, each participant 𝑖 raises their intermediate group element to their secret exponent
𝑥𝑖, then sends the element to their “next” neighbor. After the final round, the participants share
the group key 𝑔𝑥1𝑥2...𝑥𝑛 . The main weakness of this approach is that it requires a large number of
rounds.
The STR protocol [SSDW90] computes group keys based on DH exchanges between sub-
groups. Given a group 𝑋 of participants with group secret key 𝑥 and another group 𝑌 with
secret key 𝑦, the group secret key for 𝑋 ∪ 𝑌 is 𝑔𝑥 𝑦. Groups can be “merged” in this way by
performing a DH exchange to compute the new shared secret. A group of 𝑛 participants can
derive a group key by performing a DH exchange between two participants, broadcasting a
public key corresponding to their shared secret, performing another DH exchange between this
first subgroup and a third participant, and repeating the process until all participants have been
“merged”. Note that this process requires an efficient mapping from group elements to scalars
in order to derive the public keys and complete the exchanges. Moreover, this mapping cannot
be the discrete logarithm, because if discrete logarithms were efficiently computable, the DH
exchanges would not be secure. A hash of the binary representation of the group element is a
suitable mapping. This STR approach would later be recognized as a special case of generalized
DH tree-based approaches, where the STR exchange tree is a maximally unbalanced full binary
tree of 𝑛 − 1 exchanges [KPT02]. Section 3.5 discusses tree-based GKEs.
Becker and Wille [BW98] introduced several interesting schemes with the intention of im-
proving efficiency. In the “Octopus” protocol, four of the 𝑛 participants are selected as “leaders”.
These leaders derive a group key using three DH exchanges in a manner similar to a 4-party
STR exchange. The remaining 𝑛 − 4 participants each choose a leader and establish a shared
secret with them. The leaders then distribute values to their followers that allow them to derive
the group key. In the “2𝑑 cube” protocol, each of the 𝑛 = 2𝑑 participants becomes a vertex in a
𝑑-dimensional hypercube. During the 𝑖th round, each pair of subgroups joined by an edge in the
𝑖th dimension perform a 2-party DH exchange to form a new subgroup with a new subgroup key.
After 𝑑 rounds, all participants have been merged into a group with the same group key. The
“2𝑑 Octopus” protocol combines these approaches by replacing the four leaders in the Octopus
protocol with 2𝑑 leaders. While these schemes are interesting, the Octopus protocols require
additional trust for the leaders, and all of the schemes are less efficient than subsequent designs.
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Boyd and Nieto [BN03] described a very simple GKE that takes advantage of designating one
trusted participant as the “leader”. The 𝑛−1 “followers” each send their public key and a nonce to
the group leader. The leader then chooses their own nonce, encrypts it for each public key, signs
all of the communication data, and distributes these values along with all nonces to all followers.
The group key is derived from the concatenation of nonces. The primary disadvantage of this
scheme is that it grants complete control to the leader, making many insider attacks possible
(e.g., the leader can cause followers to output different keys, or even choose arbitrary nonces to
force a specific key selection). Essentially, this scheme is equivalent to a key distribution by a
trusted authority.
Bresson and Catalano [BC04] described an unusual GKE based on a combination of ElGamal
encryption and Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The core of the protocol involves each participant
choosing a secret group element and encrypting it for each other participant. The group key is
derived from the combination of all secret group elements; each participant can derive this key by
combining ciphertexts (due to ElGamal being partially homomorphic) and decrypting the result.
The secret sharing component is used as a sort of information-theoretically secure commitment
scheme to prevent adaptive selection of group elements. The resulting GKE is provably secure in
the standard model with the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH) assumption.
Yoneyama et al. [YYK+16] presented a DGKE based on techniques from the broadcast
encryption and multicast literature. The protocol involves an honest-but-curious central server
that assists in the key exchange. The primary concession of the protocol is that if the server is
covertly malicious, it can completely compromise the DGKE. In exchange for this weakness, the
DGKE supports many desirable security properties. The group key cannot be compromised using
only long-term secrets or only ephemeral secrets. The scheme also requires only one round:
messages sent from participants to the server, and a resulting broadcast from the server. The
group key is efficiently changed regularly, and also when a member joins or leaves the group.
Moreover, Yoneyama et al. also enable post-compromise security by periodically rotating the
group key even when no group membership change has occurred. The scheme is constructed
using ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption, along with standard primitives.
3.3 The CLIQUES Family
The early proposed schemes from Ingemarsson et al. described in Section 3.2 operate by logically
organizing participants in a ring, and all 𝑛 participants send a constant-size message during
each of the 𝑛 rounds. Another early scheme based on a significantly different approach is the
CLIQUES protocol suite [STW96; STW98]. The most notable protocol from the suite is called
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GDH.2. In GDH.2, the participants are arranged in a line. The participant at the “end” of the
line is called the “group controller” and should ideally be the most trusted participant. The
participant at the “start” of the line initially “receives” the group generator 𝑔. When a participant
receives a message, they exponentiate each element in the message with their secret key. The
participant then sends the unmodified last element from the message they received, as well as all
exponentiated values, to the next participant in the line. For example, the first participant will
send {𝑔, 𝑔𝑥1}, the second will send {𝑔𝑥1 , 𝑔𝑥2 , 𝑔𝑥1𝑥2}, the third will send {𝑔𝑥1𝑥2 , 𝑔𝑥1𝑥3 , 𝑔𝑥2𝑥3 , 𝑔𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3},
and so forth. Once the group controller (the final participant) processes their incoming message,
they will have a set of elements {𝑔𝑥1𝑥2...𝑥𝑛−1 , 𝑔𝑥2𝑥3,...𝑥𝑛 , 𝑔𝑥1𝑥3...𝑥𝑛 , . . . , 𝑔𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3...𝑥𝑛}. This concludes the
“upflow” phase of the protocol. In the “downflow” phase, the group controller sends to each
participant the element missing that participant’s secret in the exponent. All participants can
then derive the group key 𝑔𝑥1𝑥2...𝑥𝑛 . This scheme may be useful in very niche networking scenarios
where the unidirectional “upflow” phase is inexpensive, but it is very inefficient when performed
over the Internet due to requiring 𝑛 rounds of communication (albeit with a single participant in
each round).
The CLIQUES suite is notable in that it was one of the earliest works to consider dynamic
groups. When a new participant would like to join an established group, they become the new
group controller. The old group controller generates a new secret key, and the protocol resumes
the upflow phase from that point. If it is desirable for the role of the group controller to be
fixed, then the protocol can be easily modified to insert new participants immediately before
the existing group controller (rather than after it). When a participant is leaving an established
group, the group controller generates a new secret key and performs a new downflow phase.
The original CLIQUES suite was unauthenticated (and thus insecure against active attackers)
and its security was unproven. Bresson et al. [BCP01] modified GDH.2 to add authentication
using digital signatures under long-term keys; they optimistically called the resulting scheme
AKE1. They also proved the key secrecy and mutual authentication of the resulting scheme
under the “group Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDH)” assumption (G-CDHΓ), which is
essentially just the definition of the scheme itself. Specifically, the G-CDHΓ problem is to compute
𝑔𝑥1𝑥2...𝑥𝑛 given just⋃︁𝐽∈Γ 𝑔∏︁ 𝑗∈𝐽 𝑥 𝑗 . For the AKE1 security proof, Γ reflects the set of elements that are
transmitted during the protocol. The same authors later defined a variant called AKE1+ [BCP02]
that uses secure coprocessors for storing the secret keys and smart cards for producing digital
signatures. They proved the security of AKE1+ in a stronger model (with notions of forward
secrecy, key freshness, and AKE security) without random oracles, but with even more hardness
assumptions.
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3.4 The BD Family
One of the most prominent early GKEs that spawned significant follow-up research is the
Burmester-Desmedt (BD) protocol [BD94]. Like the suite from Ingemarsson et al. described in
Section 3.2, participants in the BD protocol are logically arranged in a ring. However, the BD pro-
tocol completes in only two rounds and with broadcast messages of constant size, making it much
more suitable for use over the Internet than the 𝑛 rounds of 𝑂(𝑛) sized messages used by other
schemes. In the first round, each participant 𝑖 generates a secret exponent 𝑥𝑖 and broadcasts 𝑔𝑥𝑖
to the group. In the second round, each participant computes 𝑋𝑖 = (𝑔𝑥𝑖+1/𝑔𝑥𝑖−1)𝑥𝑖 , where the index
wraps around the sequence (1, 2, . . . , 𝑛), and broadcasts the result to the group. The group key is
𝑔𝑥1𝑥2+𝑥2𝑥3+···+𝑥𝑛−1𝑥𝑛+𝑥𝑛𝑥1 . Each participant can compute the group key as (𝑔𝑥𝑖−1)𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑋𝑛−1
𝑖
𝑋𝑛−2
𝑖+1 . . . 𝑋𝑖−2.
The original BD paper also includes an authenticated version of the scheme, which includes in
the first broadcast a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete logarithms of both 𝑔𝑥𝑖 and a
long-term public key.
Kim et al. [KLL04], hereafter denoted Kim-Lee-Lee (KLL), simplified the BD scheme and
extended it to dynamic groups, transforming it into a DGKE. The original BD scheme is used
for the initial group setup with some modifications. Firstly, the second round broadcast is
simplified: each participant now broadcasts 𝑔𝑥𝑖−1𝑥𝑖 ⊕ 𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑖+1 , where ⊕ denotes the XOR operator.
Each participant can compute all DH shared secrets from these broadcasts using knowledge
of either their “left” or “right” DH shared secret. Secondly, the authentication mechanism is
changed: during the first round, each participant broadcasts 𝑔𝑥𝑖 and a digital signature of this
value. Moreover, participant 𝑛 also includes a signed hash of some random “keying bytes” 𝑘𝑛.
During the second phase, every participant 𝑖—except for participant 𝑛—includes their own
random keying bytes 𝑘𝑖 in their broadcast. Participant 𝑛 instead includes 𝑘𝑛 ⊕ 𝑔𝑥𝑛𝑥1 in their
second broadcast. Recovering 𝑔𝑥𝑛𝑥1 from the second broadcast in the usual manner is sufficient
to derive all keying bytes. The group key becomes KDF(𝑘1∥𝑘2∥ . . . ∥𝑘𝑛). The scheme is provably
secure in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) with the CDH assumption.
KLL also describe mechanisms to make the group membership dynamic. When a new par-
ticipant joins the group, they are placed into the logical ring. The protocol then proceeds as
normal, except that only three of the old members participate: the left and right neighbors
behave normally, but the remainder of the old group is represented by a single participant that
uses the previous group key as their secret exponent. All participants still broadcast new keying
bytes. Note that this approach naturally supports “mass join” functionality (where more than
one participant joins an existing group at once) by adding all new participants to the ring simul-
taneously. When participants leave the group, their left and right neighbors chose new secret
exponents and broadcast their new public keys and XORed DH shared secrets in two rounds.
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Only participants that are adjacent to a leaving participant broadcast new keying bytes, and only
one of these XORes the bytes with a DH shared secret as in the setup phase. Both the join and
leave procedures include digital signatures on the new values for authentication.
Jarecki et al. [JKT07] investigated techniques to make the BD protocol variant from KLL
robust. Their resulting schemes include redundant messages that can successfully establish a
group key without restarting even when some of the participants fail to complete the protocol.
Their primary scheme operates by having each participant broadcast XORed DH secrets for
multiple possible neighbors. The set of possible neighbors is chosen based on the topology of
the 𝑇 th power1 of the original ring graph for some failure threshold parameter 𝑇 . This allows
participants to skip failed nodes when computing the group key.
Dutta and Barua [DB08] described the DB protocol, a modification of the original unauthen-
ticated variant of the BD protocol. The design of the DB scheme begins by applying the Katz-Yung
compiler [KY03] to the BD protocol for authentication. The authors then manually simplify
the resulting construction. The resulting scheme is essentially the original unauthenticated BD
protocol with digital signatures incorporating a session identifier for every sent message. The
scheme is made dynamic using the same technique as KLL, except without independent keying
bytes and with digital signatures on all messages. The primary difference between the DB and
KLL protocols is that KLL did not prove the security of their dynamic group operations, and that
the full DB protocol is provably secure in the standard model assuming the DDH problem is hard
and the digital signature scheme is secure; KLL used the ROM with the CDH assumption.
Abdalla et al. [ACMP10] described a BD variant supporting subgroup messaging. This exten-
sion to the GKE definition allows participants to efficiently establish shared keys with specific
subgroups of the original participant set. A GKE that supports subgroup messaging for 2-party
subgroups is called a GKE+P protocol. A GKE that supports subgroup messaging for 𝑚-party
subgroups (for 1 < 𝑚 < 𝑛) is called a GKE+S protocol. Abdalla et al. describe two variants of
KLL: mBD+P is a GKE+P protocol, and mBD+S is a GKE+S protocol. mBD+P operates similarly
to the DB protocol—an application of the Katz-Yung compiler to the BD protocol. The primary
difference is that instead of using the DH shared secrets to produce the XORed value during
the second round, the DH shared secrets are passed through a key derivation function, KDF1,
first. Subgroup keys are then formed by computing the DH shared secret (using the public keys
from the first round) for the participants and passing it through another key derivation function,
KDF2. mBD+S is the same, except establishing subgroup keys requires a single additional round
that simply runs the second round protocol again for the subgroup. The security model for the
1 ⋏Given a graph 𝐺 with vertices 𝑉 and edges 𝐸, the 𝑇 th power of 𝐺 is a graph 𝐺𝑇 with the same vertices 𝑉 and a
new set of edges 𝐸𝑇 such that there is an edge from 𝑣1 to 𝑣2 in 𝐸𝑇 if and only if there is a path from 𝑣1 to 𝑣2 of
length 𝑇 or less in 𝐺.
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protocols requires that subgroup keys are independent from all other subgroup keys and the
overall group key across all sessions. Cheng and Ma [CM10] subsequently cryptanalyzed the
protocols and found a flaw that requires an additional key confirmation round to correct. The
(n+1)sec group messaging protocol described in Section 2.8.5 uses both mBD+P and mBD+S.
Yang and Tan [YT10] presented a modification to the KLL protocol designed to be provably
secure with stronger definitions in the standard model with the DDH assumption. The main
difference from KLL is that all participants commit to their keying bytes in the first round, and
all but the last participant open their commitments in the second round; the last participant still
XORs their keying bytes with their “right” shared secret as in KLL. The session identifier is a
concatenation of the commitments. The authors define a security model that captures the notions
of SK-Security (key secrecy), MA-Security (no honest instance accepts an unmatched instance),
and Co-Security (contributiveness; no participant has any control over the value of the group
key). They then prove the security of the scheme based on the DDH problem, the security of the
digital signature and commitment schemes, and security of two independent pseudo-random
function families.
Finally, two extensions to BD were made in 2013. Liu et al. [LVH13] used the original
unauthenticated BD scheme to construct a more complex GKE to provide online deniability in
GOTR (2013). Li and Xu [LX13] described a minor performance optimization to BD that avoids
connecting the first and last participant in the ring (thereby changing the topology to a line).
When broadcasting is implemented on a unicast network, this saves two message transmissions
at the cost of additional security assumptions; the security relies on the hardness of the “squaring
DDH” problem, which asks the adversary to distinguish between (𝑔𝑥 , 𝑔𝑥2) and (𝑔𝑥 , 𝑟) for a random
group element 𝑟.
3.5 Key Trees
By far, the largest area of GKE research relates to key trees. Key trees are tree structures where
each node is associated with some cryptographic key, and subtrees correspond to subgroups with
knowledge of a key. This area of research is substantial because many of the same approaches are
useful in other contexts, such as broadcast encryption, multicast communications, and wireless
sensor networks, among others. GKEs using key trees form the core of modern secure group
messaging protocols. This section surveys some of the more notable tree-based schemes.
Burmester and Desmedt [BD96] adopted many of the techniques from their original BD
scheme into a tree-based protocol suite. In the generic form of their new scheme, participants
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arrange themselves into a tree by computing the minimum spanning tree of their network graph
weighted by some performance measure. One participant acts as the group leader (“conference
chair”) and becomes the root node of the tree. All participants then perform 2-party key agree-
ments with their neighbors. The root chooses a group key, and sends it in encrypted form to
its neighbors using their pairwise keys. Each participant recovers the group key and encrypts
it for its descendants using their pairwise keys. The paper then proposes a more sophisticated
multicast version [BD96, Algorithm 2] based on Diffie-Hellman exchanges, later referred to as
“BD-II” [DLB07]. During the distribution phase, each participant multicasts, to each subtree
associated with one of its children, the key it shares with its parent encrypted with the key it
shares with the child. For the root, “the key it shares with its parent” is instead the group key.
Each participant can then use the key it shares with its parent to decrypt every key up to the
root, thereby recovering the group key. Desmedt et al. [DLB07] later added authentication to
the BD-II scheme. Simply applying the Katz-Yung compiler [KY03] requires the distribution of
𝑂(𝑛) digital signatures, which undermines the logarithmic performance of the scheme. Desmedt
et al. showed that modifying the compiler so that signatures are only attached to messages sent
during the unauthenticated protocol yields a secure scheme.
In an RFC, Wallner et al. [WHA99] proposed several techniques for establishing cryptographic
keys in multicast networks where a server is responsible for key generation and distribution.
Their recommended approach is to create a tree where each node contains a symmetric key.
The root node’s key is the “net key” (i.e., the group key) and is used for group broadcasts. Each
participant in the network arranges a shared key with the server, and is associated with a leaf
node in the tree. In contrast to the BD-II scheme, participants are not associated with internal
nodes in the tree, and the tree does not necessarily correspond to the network architecture. The
server then sends to each participant (using their shared key for encryption) the set of all keys
on the path from the root to the participant’s leaf node. When a participant is removed from the
group, all of the nodes on the participant’s path must be rekeyed. The server accomplishes this
by encrypting the replacement keys with all of the keys for sibling nodes of the participant’s path
(these nodes are referred to as the copath) and multicasting the wrapped keys to the affected
participants. This allows every participant who previously knew an affected key, except for the
removed participant, to obtain the new values. The primary advantage of this scheme is that key
storage and replacement communication costs for each participant is 𝑂(log 𝑛) when the tree is
balanced.
Wong et al. [WGL00] contemporaneously and independently published work on symmetric
key trees. This work and the RFC fromWallner et al. popularized the notion of key trees for GKEs.
They define the more general notion of a key graph, which consists of a set of participants, a set
of keys, and a relation mapping participants to keys they possess. Each participant is associated
with a vertex called a 𝑢-node. Each key is associated with a vertex called a 𝑘-node. Directed
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edges defined by the relation always point to a 𝑘-node. If and only if there is a path from a
𝑢-node to a 𝑘-node, then the private key associated with that 𝑘-node is known by the participant
associated with the 𝑢-node. Interesting topologies of key graphs include a star graph, a tree, and
a complete graph. The star graph (where every participant shares a single key) is the base case
for a GKE; the only reason to add extra keys to the graph is to improve the performance of group
management operations in a DGKE. The authors describe a tree-based scheme that is equivalent
to the work from Wallner et al. Beyond this, they also describe various approaches for rekeying
operations on the tree: user-oriented, where the server multicasts to each subgroup on the copath
their set of replacement keys; key-oriented, where each replacement key is subgroup multicasted
to its new set of participants; and graph-oriented, where all replaced keys are multicasted to the
entire group. The replacement keys are encrypted with the appropriate copath keys in all three
cases. In their performance evaluation, the authors provide guidance for selecting the optimal
rekeying technique based on the network and group configuration.
Kim et al. [KPT00] were the first to construct a DGKE defined as a key tree that is initialized
with DH exchanges. They specifically address guarantees of the underlying network model: their
scheme requires View Synchrony (VS) semantics [FLS97]. VS guarantees that everyone sees the
same message set between group membership events, the sender’s requested message order is
preserved, and a message is received by everyone who is in the group from the perspective of
the sending application. Kim et al. argue that any GKE either requires VS semantics or must
reimplement them. They then describe their fault-tolerant and robust DGKE protocol, Tree-based
Group DH (TGDH). TGDH supports mass joins and mass leaves, which the authors refer to as
“group merges” and “group partitions”. TGDH offers group key secrecy, forward secrecy (with
respect to old group keys), post-compromise security (with respect to new group keys), and key
independence (which implies the other properties) against passive adversaries. Participants in
TGDH are associated with leaf nodes of a binary tree, and each generate DH keypairs. The secret
key associated with each internal node is the DH shared secret of an exchange between its two
children. Like STR, the TGDH process requires an efficient mapping from group elements to
scalars. The group key is the root node’s secret key.
Authentication in TGDH is accomplished by ensuring that all messages are signed, times-
tamped, sequence-numbered, and type-identified. A participant can join a TGDH group with the
support of a “sponsor” in the existing group. The new participant broadcasts their DH public key.
The new participant and the sponsor form a new internal node in an unambiguous position in
the tree. The sponsor computes the new group key and broadcasts all DH public keys that they
know. When a participant leaves the group, the rightmost participant in the subtree of the leaving
participant’s sibling node becomes the sponsor. The sponsor moves their subtree up to replace
the parent node of the leaving participant, resulting in a new group key. Mass join and mass
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leave events work similarly to an iterative application of these algorithms. The TGDH protocol
was refined in a later publication by the same authors [KPT04].
A natural way to improve the performance of DH key trees is to extend the number of children
per node. The tripartite Joux protocol [Jou00] can support three children per node. Schemes
following this idea appear in publications from both Lee [LKKR03] and Barua et al. [BDS03].
Neither scheme specifies an authentication mechanism. Dutta et al. [DBS04] later incorporated
multi-signatures to efficiently defend against active adversaries, but with static groupmembership.
Dutta and Barua [DB05] then described how to achieve authentication in the dynamic setting.
Brecher et al. [BBM09] noted that the TGDH protocol must be restarted if participants fail
to complete certain steps. They investigated techniques to add robustness to TGDH so that the
remaining participants can still derive a group key even if others fail during the session. They
present two schemes: R-TDH1, and IR-TDH1. Both schemes provide several security properties
against attackers outside the group: authenticated key exchange, forward secrecy (with respect
to earlier sessions), protection against outsider key compromise impersonation attacks, and
mutual authentication. IR-TDH1 additionally provides some defense against malicious insiders:
protection against insider impersonation attacks, key agreement, resistance against unknown-
key share attacks, and contributiveness. The core idea of R-TDH1 is “tree replication”. Each
participant 𝑖 builds their own maximally unbalanced full binary tree (as in STR) containing
participants 𝑖 to 𝑛 with themselves as the leftmost leaf. After the setup round has completed
and some of the participants have failed and disconnected, the remaining participants choose
the deepest tree with a live node as the leftmost leaf. Any failed participants that remain in
the chosen tree are immediately removed with the normal mass leave protocol. IR-TDH1 adds
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to R-TDH1 to prevent cheating insiders. Unfortunately,
Brecher et al. made an error that undermines the correctness of IR-TDH1 in practice; this error
is discussed in Section 8.2.9.
Some recent work has focused specifically on GKEs where participants maintain state between
protocol sessions (stateful GKEs or stGKEs). Yang et al. [YLL+17] survey multiple security models
for authenticated GKEs and propose a new model for authenticated stGKEs. They present a new
protocol, TrAGKE, designed to defend against key compromise impersonation attacks, PKI-related
chosen identity and public key attacks, forward secrecy attacks, and leakage attacks on ephemeral
secret keys. TrAGKE is a dynamic variant of a Joux-based key tree. Chen and Tzeng [CT17]
examined the problem of rekeying in situations where participants may miss rekeying rounds.
One way to handle this is to cache the rekeying message history and send the cached messages
when the participant comes back online, but the participant then needs to process all of the missed
rounds in order to derive the current keys. Chen and Tzeng show how to design a tree-based
scheme where only the most recent message needs to be processed; rekeying within a group of 𝑛
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users requires only 𝑂(log 𝑛) time and communication size regardless of the number of missed
rekeying messages.
3.6 The ASGKA Family
GKEs and DGKEs are defined to output a secret key that is shared by all participants. Wu et
al. [WMS+09] considered a related class of protocols that instead derive a shared public key
for the group, and distinct individual secret keys for each of the group’s members. A protocol
of this type is called an asymmetric group key agreement (ASGKA). The motivation for ASGKAs
is to enable anyone, including outsiders, to efficiently send secure messages to a group. An
ASGKA can also be used to build a broadcast encryption scheme without a trusted dealer. Wu
et al. propose a construction with 𝑂(1) sized ciphertexts and keys, but 𝑂(𝑛) sized broadcast
messages during the protocol setup. The construction relies on an uncommon cryptographic
primitive called an aggregatable signature-based broadcast. The scheme can uniquely identify
misbehaving participants. The scheme is constructed with cryptographic pairings, and its security
is based on the bilinear DH exponentiation problem.
Zhang et al. [ZWQD10] extended the previous work from Wu et al. with the goal of building
a broadcast encryption scheme. Their newer scheme uses IBE for the initial setup phase so that
the group members do not need to distribute public keys before the ASGKA. A trusted entity is
needed to act as the PKG for the IBE scheme, but such an entity normally exists in a broadcast
encryption setting.
Wu et al. [WQZ+11] attempted to unify the notions of broadcast encryption and ASGKAs
with a new primitive called contributory broadcast encryption (CBE). In the context of ASGKAs, a
CBE protocol allows a group to generate a group public key and individual group member private
keys, but also allows senders to encrypt messages to specific subgroups on an ad-hoc basis. This
means that a CBE scheme essentially operates like broadcast encryption without a trusted third
party. The initial CBE proposal was only for static groups (with ad-hoc subgroups), but followup
work by Phan et al. [PPS12] combined parallel BD sessions and Cramer-Shoup encryption to
construct a dynamic variant. All of these schemes require pairing-based cryptography or obscure
primitives and hardness assumptions.
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3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter surveyed several classes of GKEs, which are cryptographic primitives that allow
a group of participants to efficiently and securely derive a shared secret key. These schemes
are of particular importance to secure group messaging because they can be used to build
protocols that scale far beyond what is possible with pairwise two-party AKEs. Section 3.1 briefly
discussed NIKEs: non-interactive key exchanges that would trivialize secure group messaging;
unfortunately, no practical constructions are known. Section 3.2 surveyed GKE schemes that are
considered to be inferior to current approaches (typically because they were published when
the field was relatively young); these schemes are highly unusual and are worth occasionally
re-considering as new cryptographic tools are discovered. Section 3.3 surveyed the CLIQUES
family of GKEs, a formerly popular but still interesting group of GKEs that have since been made
obsolete by competing protocols with superior performance. Section 3.4 discussed the BD family
of GKEs, which use a clever trick to establish a shared key in a small constant number of rounds,
unlike prior approaches; the small number of rounds that is independent of the group size makes
these GKEs very attractive for interactive key exchanges over the Internet, where round-trip times
are the dominant performance cost. This section provides important background for Part III,
since the new secure group messaging protocol therein includes a new sub-protocol in the BD
family (presented in Chapter 9). Section 3.5 surveyed the most notable GKEs built using “key
trees”; this is the family of GKEs that forms the core of modern non-interactive secure group
messaging systems, including MLS and the new design in Part III, and thus is critically important
background information for understanding recent advances. Finally, Section 3.6 discussed an
interesting class of protocols called ASGKAs, which are a type of GKEs in the asymmetric setting;
these protocols are one method of allowing outsiders to securely send messages to a group.
While secure group messaging protocols have historically used GKEs to implement their
conversation security layer, more recent protocols have asynchronicity and dynamic membership
requirements that necessitate a slightly different primitive. Chapter 4 discusses these modern





MLS and Continuous Group Key
Agreements
In this chapter: Background
A
s secure group messaging schemes continued to evolve, it became apparent that the
GKE and DGKE schemes discussed in Chapter 3 were no longer sufficient and needed
to be augmented. Contemporary secure group messaging schemes like MLS have
four specific requirements that cannot be satisfied using a GKE alone:
• Groups must have dynamic membership, with shared keys being securely replaced whenever
the membership changes. This necessitates the functionality of a DGKE rather than a simple
GKE.
• The protocol must provide forward secrecy and post-compromise security. These properties
are achieved by periodically replacing shared secrets using newly transmitted key material.
This “key ratcheting” approach prevents old key material from being compromised, and
allows compromised key material to be securely replaced. This should occur even in the
absence of membership changes.
• The protocol should be “non-interactive” in the sense that all operations can be performed
unilaterally (although an always-available server may be involved) without feedback from
other group participants. In other words, no operation should require two group members
to be online at the same time. This enables mobile use cases where network connectivity is
intermittent.
• Group initialization is also non-interactive in order to support use cases like email, where
it is possible to specify a recipient list without consent from the recipients. The process
of initializing a group produces a “welcome message” containing ciphertexts that enable
recipients to recover the shared secret key for the group. This allows the group initiator to
send messages immediately, without waiting for acknowledgment that others would like to
join the group.
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A protocol that provides all of these features is called an Asynchronous Continuous Group
Key Agreement (CGKA). Cohn-Gordon et al. [CCG+18] were the first to sketch a protocol that
provided all of these features in order to implement a secure group messaging scheme. This
protocol sketch was missing some important details, such as the method for providing dynamic
membership. Nonetheless, it can be credited as the impetus for the MLS effort. Section 4.1
discusses the design of this pioneering protocol, and Section 4.2 describes its successor, which
eventually formed the foundation of MLS. Section 4.3 describes how MLS constructs a complete
secure group messaging system from a CGKA. It was not until 2019 that Alwen et al. [ACC+19]
recognized the core functionality of these protocols and defined them as CGKAs; Section 4.4
presents their formal definition. Section 4.5 surveys the most recent improvements to CGKA
designs, which have not yet been incorporated into MLS.
4.1 ART
Cohn-Gordon et al. [CCG+18] were the first to publish a GKE specifically designed for modern
secure group messaging applications. They sketched a protocol called Asynchronous Ratcheting
Trees (ART) that provides key secrecy, authentication, forward secrecy, post-compromise security,
and non-interactivity. However, ART is an incomplete protocol that is missing multiple important
components for a complete secure group messaging solution; most notably, it has no defined
mechanism for dynamic group membership. It is possible to add these missing elements using
techniques from the literature discussed in Chapter 3, but doing so is non-trivial: the interaction
of components often exposes new security or performance problems.
ART is heavily based on TGDH, as discussed in Section 3.5. Like TGDH, the core of ART is a
DH-based key tree with each group member represented by a leaf 𝑢-node. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the key tree for an ART group with exactly four group members: 𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3, and 𝑢4. Each
rectangular box represents a 𝑘-node with an associated public key (in a group with generator 𝑔
suitable for DH exchanges, written in exponential notation); private keys are the values in the
exponent and are not written independently for clarity of the presentation. Each circle represents
a 𝑢-node with an associated group member. If and only if there is a path in the directed graph
from a 𝑢-node to a 𝑘-node, then the member associated with the 𝑢-node knows the private key
associated with the 𝑘-node. In a key tree, the set of nodes connecting the 𝑢-node to the root is
called the path for that group member. The set of sibling nodes is called the copath: for 𝑢𝐵 in
Figure 4.1, the copath would consist of the two nodes associated with 𝑔𝐴 and 𝑔KDF(𝑔𝐶𝐷). This
visual key graph notation is used throughout this dissertation.
55
Chapter 4 MLS and Continuous Group Key Agreements
Figure 4.1 An ART key tree. The group contains four members. The rectangles are 𝑘-nodes and the circles
are 𝑢-nodes. The values inside the 𝑘-nodes are their associated public keys. (Refs: 55 a b and 57)
Each private key in the ART key tree is derived by performing a DH exchange between the
two children, and then using a KDF to convert the shared secret into a scalar. The main problem
when using a TGDH-based scheme like this in a secure group messaging setting arises when
non-interactivity is desired: performing a DH exchange to derive the value for a 𝑘-node seemingly
requires interaction between members from the two child sub-trees. ART avoids this problem
using two tricks: the group initiator is permitted to learn some private keys that it is not supposed
to know, and the group membership is fixed (i.e., ART does not define or use a DGKE).
To enable a non-interactive group setup, ART borrows the notion of “prekeys” from Signal, as
discussed in Section 2.7. Each user 𝑢𝑖 in the system (not just the group) publishes a long-term
identity public key 𝑔IK𝑖 and a prekey 𝑔EK𝑖 . This prekey can be frequently replaced, as in Signal:
users might upload multiple prekeys (one for each group), replace them automatically at regular
intervals, or employ other strategies. When an initiator 𝑢𝐴 wants to form a group with recipients
𝑢𝐵, 𝑢𝐶 , and 𝑢𝐷, they first download a prekey and the identity key for each recipient. The initiator
then completes an AKE with each recipient. ART does not specify a particular AKE, but relies
upon it for authentication. A reasonable choice for instantiation would be something like 3DH
as originally used in Signal. When using 3DH in the example scenario, the initiator would first
generate an ephemeral private key 𝑒, and then complete the following key exchanges:
𝐵 = KeyExchange(IK𝐴, 𝑒, IK𝐵, EK𝐵) = KDF(𝑔IK𝐴·EK𝐵 ∥𝑔𝑒·IK𝐵 ∥𝑔𝑒·EK𝐵)
𝐶 = KeyExchange(IK𝐴, 𝑒, IK𝐶 , EK𝐶) = KDF(𝑔IK𝐴·EK𝐶 ∥𝑔𝑒·IK𝐶 ∥𝑔𝑒·EK𝐶 )
𝐷 = KeyExchange(IK𝐴, 𝑒, IK𝐷, EK𝐷) = KDF(𝑔IK𝐴·EK𝐷 ∥𝑔𝑒·IK𝐷 ∥𝑔𝑒·EK𝐷)
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Once the initiator generates a private key 𝐴 for their own leaf node, they now have access to
every leaf node private key in the tree (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, and 𝐷). Since they know these keys, the initiator
can derive the keypairs for all 𝑘-nodes shown in Figure 4.1. When the initiator sends 𝑔𝑒 to a
recipient, they are able to download IK𝐴 from the key directory and complete the AKE to recover
the private key associated with their 𝑢-node. To learn all of the keys on their path, a recipient
will need to be given, at a minimum, the public keys of 𝑘-nodes on the copath. The initiator in
ART also sends a MAC of this data to each recipient when initializing the group using a MAC key
derived from the AKE with that recipient. The group key is derived from the private key for the
root 𝑘-node. Since all of these operations can be performed by the initiator (and cached by the
server) using only the recipients’ prekeys, the entire process is non-interactive and the initiator
can immediately send messages encrypted with the group key.
Aside from the setup phase, ART also specifies a key update protocol. Updating the keys
provides forward secrecy and post-compromise security. It is also particularly important for
members to perform a key update operation after joining a group in order to replace their key
material with private keys unknown to the group initiator. During a key update, a member
replaces the keys for every 𝑘-node on their path. The operation is conceptually simple: the
member generates a new keypair for the 𝑘-node immediately connected to their 𝑢-node, and then
derives the new keys on their path using DH exchanges with nodes on the copath. To complete
the key update, the member publishes the new public keys on the path along with a MAC derived
from the previous group key.
The ART publication does not formally specify a mechanism for dynamic group membership,
which would present several problems for this otherwise simple scheme. Notably, the fact that the
group initiator initially learns all of the private keys in the tree presents a serious problem if the
initiator is removed from the group before other members have performed their first key update,
since the initiator will know private keys other than those indicated by the ostensible key tree.
Additionally, it is unclear exactly how a group member would add or remove another member
unless their leaf nodes are siblings—otherwise, they would need to complete DH exchanges
outside of their path. These gaps, among others, inspired the subsequent work described in this
chapter.
4.2 TreeKEM
Bhargavan et al. [BBR18] developed a system called TreeKEM that overcomes the limitations of
ART. Unlike ART, TreeKEM is an almost fully specified DGKE scheme that supports all of the
features required to build modern secure messaging protocols. TreeKEM forms the core of the
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MLS specification for this reason. However, the core TreeKEM definition is an abstract protocol
and not a wire protocol; as such, it does not specify what cryptographic primitives to use and it
provides multiple choices for certain core algorithms. The authors’ intention is to keep TreeKEM
relatively generic and thus widely applicable, leaving concrete instantiation choices to MLS.
Like ART and TGDH before it, TreeKEM uses a binary tree structure for its key graph. Unlike
those protocols, TreeKEM abandons the requirement that 𝑘-node keys are derived from DH
exchanges. Relaxing this restriction makes it possible to implement simple and efficient group
dynamism, and also provides some concurrency benefits.
Each 𝑘-node in TreeKEM is associated with an asymmetric keypair. This keypair is generated
from an underlying symmetric key, which itself is derived from exactly one child node’s sym-
metric key using a cryptographic hash 𝐻. The asymmetric keypairs are used by an underlying
cryptosystem that is specified as part of the protocol construction.1 In order to be usable in more
applications, TreeKEM allows developers to configure the cryptosystem to use, as well as the
function that is used to derive asymmetric key pairs from shared secrets.2 Figure 4.2 depicts a
TreeKEM key tree for a group with four members: 𝑢𝐴, 𝑢𝐵, 𝑢𝐶, and 𝑢𝐷. Note that by convention,
ART key trees are normally depicted with public keys in the 𝑘-nodes (to emphasize the DH-based
structure of the keys), whereas TreeKEM key trees are normally depicted with the underlying
symmetric keys in the 𝑘-nodes (since the method to derive public keys can be configured based
on the application). The internal 𝑘-nodes in a TreeKEM key tree are initially derived from their
right child using 𝐻. The group key can be derived from the root key using a KDF. The group is
initialized by 𝑢𝐴 in the same way as ART: the initial private keys for recipients (𝐵, 𝐶, and 𝐷) are
separately encrypted to the associated members using an AKE, along with the public keys for
subtrees outside of each recipient’s path.
The core algorithm in TreeKEM is called a “key update” operation. When a group member
performs a key update operation, they begin by generating a new keypair for their leaf 𝑘-node.
They then compute new keys for each 𝑘-node on their path from the bottom up: each key is
derived from the (unique) child key that is also on the path using 𝐻. For each internal 𝑘-node
on the path, the new private key is encrypted to the (unique) child key on the copath, and the
new public key is broadcast to the whole group (or only to members in its sibling subtree as
an optimization). Figure 4.3 depicts the tree from the previous example after two key update
operations: 𝑢𝐶 performs a key update with a new private key 𝐶′, and then 𝑢𝐵 performs a key
update with a new private key 𝐵′. Since a key update is effectively a ratcheting operation that
1 ⋏ The underlying scheme must be a public-key cryptosystem rather than a KEM, because it must be used to encrypt
pre-determined symmetric keys derived using 𝐻.
2 ⋏ In practice, TreeKEM is typically used with a DH-based public-key cryptosystem. To derive the private key for a
𝑘-node, the shared secret is input into a KDF, and the output is interpreted as an integer modulo the group order.
The public key for the 𝑘-node is then derived as in the normal key generation procedure.
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Figure 4.2 A TreeKEM key tree. The group was initialized with four members. The rectangles are 𝑘-nodes
and the circles are 𝑢-nodes. The values inside the 𝑘-nodes are the symmetric keys used to derive their
associated keypairs. (Refs: 58 and 59)
Figure 4.3 A TreeKEM key tree after two updates. This tree is derived from Figure 4.2 after a key
update from 𝑢𝐶 followed by another key update from 𝑢𝐵. (Refs: 58 and 60)
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Figure 4.4 A TreeKEM key tree after a removal. This tree is derived from Figure 4.3 after a
group-initiated removal of 𝑢𝐴. (Ref: 60)
replaces all keys known to a member, it provides forward secrecy (because the previous group
key cannot be derived from the new root key state) and post-compromise security (because all
previously known private keys are replaced by new key material).
TreeKEM’s support for dynamic group membership is derived from the key update operation.
To non-interactively add a new member to the group, another group member adds new nodes
to the key tree and then performs a key update as if they were the new member. The private
key for the new member’s leaf 𝑘-node can be computed and delivered using an AKE in the same
manner as group initialization (in fact, group initialization can be modeled and implemented as
a sequence of member additions). To non-interactively remove (a.k.a. evict) someone from the
group, another group member can perform a key update as if they were the removed member,
and then simply remove the deleted member’s leaf 𝑘-node from the graph instead of generating
a private key and delivering it to them. Figure 4.4 depicts the key tree from the ongoing example
after another group member has evicted 𝑢𝐴 from the group, using a new private key 𝛼 for the
parent of 𝑢𝐴’s leaf 𝑘-node.
In summary, the original definition of TreeKEM specifies five operations: creating a group,
adding someone to a group, evicting someone from a group, performing a key update, and
encrypting a message to the group. More precisely, it defines a matching “send” and “receive”
function for each of these five operations. Note that this definition of TreeKEM has an inherent
confidentiality problem due to the “double join” problem: as part of the group creation, member
addition, and eviction operations, the members performing these operations may learn private
keys in the tree that they are not meant to know. For this reason, TreeKEM trees are technically
not “key graphs” in the sense of Wong et al. [WGL00], because they do not fully capture the
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knowledge of keys—they capture the intended knowledge. The consequence of this behavior is
that evictions may fail to preserve confidentiality: for example, if the group initiator is evicted
before other members perform an initial key update, they will still know some remaining private
keys and will be able to compute the group key after their “eviction”. In general, the way to solve
this problem is to keep track of the true key graph and account for all keys known by evicted
members. The core TreeKEM protocol does not prescribe a specific algorithm for this task.
In general, TreeKEM provides two main efficiency optimizations: group members may only
need to store keys on their own path and copath (instead of the whole tree), and group members
may perform certain update operations concurrently. Both of these optimizations negatively
impact the security properties of the scheme [BBR18], but this trade-off may be worthwhile
for some applications. The TreeKEM authors carefully describe how to handle overlapping
update operations when concurrency is enabled, and characterize the security implications of
the optimizations.
4.3 MLS
The MLS project is an in-progress IETF collaboration to produce a complete and general purpose
secure group messaging wire protocol [BBM+20]. At the core of MLS is a modified instantiation
of TreeKEM, as discussed in Section 4.2. Each group member maintains a local group state con-
taining the complete TreeKEM tree (i.e., the partial storage optimization suggested by TreeKEM
is not used), the private keys for some 𝑘-nodes, and additional group metadata.
The TreeKEM key tree in MLS is always a left-balanced binary tree that preserves the “tree
invariant”: if a member knows the private key associated with a 𝑘-node, then there is a path in
the tree from the member’s 𝑢-node to the 𝑘-node (i.e., the member is a descendant of the 𝑘-node).
Note that this does not imply that the private key for a 𝑘-node is known to all descendants—only
a subset of the descendants may actually know the private key. For this reason, just like the trees
in TreeKEM, the tree in MLS is not technically a key graph as defined by Wong et al. [WGL00].
Each 𝑘-node in MLS is associated with a set of “unmerged leaves”: the set of 𝑢-nodes in the
subtree rooted at the 𝑘-node that do not actually know the associated private key. In other words,
if and only if all sets of “unmerged leaves” are ∅, then the MLS tree is a key graph. In addition,
some 𝑘-nodes in an MLS tree may be “blank nodes”. A blank node is a 𝑘-node with no associated
keypair. When an algorithm would normally call for encrypting a key to a blank node, it must
instead encrypt the key to the minimal set of 𝑘-nodes that covers the same set of descendant
𝑢-nodes—this is exactly equivalent to the set of shallowest non-blank 𝑘-nodes in the subtree.
When encrypting to any 𝑘-node (whether blank or not) with a non-empty set of unmerged leaves,
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the new key must also be encrypted to each unmerged leaf. By introducing unmerged leaves and
blank nodes, MLS enables efficient and secure implementation of eviction operations.
The group state in MLS can be modified by three possible operations: “add”, “remove”, and
“update”. These operations are analogous to the same operations in TreeKEM. However, whereas
the definition of TreeKEM in Section 4.2 implements each operation as a pair of “send” and
“receive” functions, MLS defines a single “proposal” function for each of the three operations,
and one global “commit” function that applies a sequence of proposals. Each proposal operation
includes some new key material generated by the caller of the function, but does not actually
alter the group state. The commit function takes as input a specific sequence of proposals, then
outputs a cryptographic message. This message is then provided as input to a “process” function
that alters the group state to apply the sequence of proposals given to the commit function.
It is important to note that the proposals may be produced by different group members than
the member that executes the commit function; the process function is then called by all group
members, including the committer. Moreover, “add” and “remove” proposals may actually come
from outside of the group in some applications (e.g., when an outside party is responsible for
fully or partially managing group membership). MLS encourages an implementation to apply a
consistent total order to all commits, ideally using a server-side mechanism [BBM+20, §12].
As in TreeKEM and ART before it, MLS supports non-interactive creation of groups using the
notion of “prekeys” borrowed from Signal. In MLS, the combination of a public key with metadata
(e.g., supported versions and ciphersuites) is called a “key package”. Each key package is used
to join exactly one group, with the possible exception of a “key package of last resort”—this is
similar to Signal’s use of prekeys. Unlike the prior protocols, MLS uses the public key from a key
package directly in the key tree, rather than performing an AKE that causes the existing group
member to learn the resulting private key.
At a high level of abstraction, the operations in MLS are defined as follows:
1. Add: adds a new member to an existing group. The proposal for a member addition consists
of a key package previously uploaded by the new member. When committing the proposal,
the committer computes a new position in the tree that maintains its left-balanced binary
structure, then adds a new 𝑘-node and 𝑢-node to this position. If necessary, the tree is
extended to the right by adding a new root node and an appropriate number of blank nodes.
The public key for the new 𝑘-node is set to the public key in the key package from the proposal.
The new 𝑘-node is added to the set of unmerged leaves for every non-blank node on the new
member’s path. The committer then encrypts the private keys for deepest common ancestor
of the new member and committer, as well as every non-blank 𝑘-node on the path to that
common ancestor, and sends these ciphertexts to the new member as part of a “welcome
message”. The new member can decrypt these keys to recover the new group state.
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2. Remove: removes an existing member from the group. When processing a committed remove
proposal, the removed member’s 𝑢-node and the attached 𝑘-node are deleted from the tree,
and then all intermediate nodes on the path are blanked.
3. Update: replaces an existing member’s leaf key. This mechanism provides forward secrecy
and post-compromise security. When proposing an update, the proposer generates a fresh
key pair and includes the public key in the proposal. When processing the operation, the
proposer’s 𝑘-node is updated to use the new public key. All intermediate nodes on the
proposer’s path are blanked.
As part of a commit, the committer generates new key pairs for every 𝑘-node on their own path
and encrypts the new private keys to other members in each subtree. This operation works in
the same manner as the TreeKEM update described in Section 4.2 (in particular, key pairs are
derived from the updated child using a KDF), except that it must take unmerged leaves and blank
nodes into account. As a result of this commit operation, any blank nodes on the committer’s
path become regular 𝑘-nodes with associated keys—this is the only mechanism to “unblank”
nodes. Moreover, the committer’s 𝑢-node is removed from any unmerged leaf sets on their path,
since they now have access to the private keys for all of the 𝑘-nodes that they should.
Group initialization in MLS is equivalent to forming a single member tree (containing only
the creating member), proposing an add operation for each recipient, committing these propos-
als, processing the commit, and then sending welcome messages to the recipients. Figure 4.5
depicts the initial state of the tree in an MLS group after member 𝑢𝐴 creates a group with three
other members. The public keys associated with 𝐵, 𝐶, and 𝐷 are extracted from key packages
downloaded from a key directory by 𝑢𝐴 when creating the group—these keys were previously
uploaded by the recipients. Initially, the three other leaves are all unmerged. When committing
the initial group state, 𝑢𝐴 generates welcome messages for the recipients: it sends an encryption
of 𝐻 (𝐴) to 𝑢𝐵 and encryptions of 𝐻 (𝐻 (𝐴)) to 𝑢𝐶 and 𝑢𝐷. Figure 4.6 depicts the same example
after two more operations have been performed. First, 𝑢𝐵 proposes and commits an update for
itself: it generates fresh key material 𝐵′ to derive a new key pair for its 𝑘-node, and updates
the tree appropriately. The parent 𝑘-node is derived from 𝐻 (𝐵′), and the root is derived from
𝐻 (𝐻 (𝐵′)). 𝑢𝐵 encrypts 𝐻 (𝐵′) to 𝐴 as part of the commit. This process also removes 𝑢𝐵 from
the sets of unmerged leaves. Next, 𝑢𝐶 proposes and commits a removal of 𝑢𝐴 from the group.
First, all 𝑘-nodes on the path to 𝑢𝐴 are blanked, and the 𝑢-node and associated 𝑘-node for 𝑢𝐴 are
removed from the tree. 𝑢𝐶 then generates fresh key material 𝐶′, populates the previously blank
parent 𝑘-node with a key pair derived from 𝐻 (𝐶′), and derives the new root from 𝐻 (𝐻 (𝐶′)). This
commit involves encrypting 𝐻 (𝐶′) to 𝐷 and encrypting 𝐻 (𝐻 (𝐶′)) to 𝐵′ (this latter encryption
target is derived by looking at the children of the newly blanked 𝑘-node). 𝑢𝐶 is also removed
from the sets of unmerged leaves as a result of performing this commit.
63
Chapter 4 MLS and Continuous Group Key Agreements
Figure 4.5 An MLS key tree. The group associated with this tree was created by 𝑢𝐴 with other members
𝑢𝐵, 𝑢𝐶 , and 𝑢𝐷. Internal 𝑘-nodes are depicted with their symmetric key (used to derive the associated
asymmetric key pair based on the configured cryptosystem) and their set of unmerged leaves. The
𝑘-node containing “-” is a blank node. (Refs: 63 and 64)
Figure 4.6 An MLS key tree after an update and a removal. This tree is derived from Figure 4.5
after 𝑢𝐵 commits an update proposal for itself and 𝑢𝐶 commits a removal of 𝑢𝐴. (Ref: 63)
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4.4 CGKAs
Alwen et al. [ACC+19] were the first to identify that the core algorithms of ART, TreeKEM, and
MLS are all variants of a new type of cryptographic primitive: an extension of the DGKE that
incorporates non-interactivity into the design. They named this new primitive an Asynchronous
Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) [ACC+19], and in 2020 Alwen et al. [ACJM20]
presented a formal definition for the primitive. A CGKA is a scheme that implements the following
functions, where the protocol state 𝛾 is local to each member:
• CGKA.KeyGen() → (pk, sk): Generates a new long-term asymmetric key pair (pk, sk).
• CGKA.Create() → (𝛾, 𝑒): Returns a fresh protocol state 𝛾 representing a group with the
party running the algorithm as the sole participant. 𝑒 is the identifier for the initial epoch.
• CGKA.ProposeAdd(𝛾, id𝑡, pk𝑡) → (𝛾′, 𝑝): Proposes adding a member with identifier id𝑡 and
long-term public key pk𝑡 to the group. Takes the protocol state 𝛾 as input, and outputs a new
state 𝛾′ and a proposal 𝑝.
• CGKA.ProposeRemove(𝛾, id𝑡) → (𝛾′, 𝑝): Proposes removing a member identified by id𝑡
from the group. Takes the protocol state 𝛾 as input, and outputs a new state 𝛾′ and a proposal
𝑝.
• CGKA.ProposeUpdate(𝛾) → (𝛾′, 𝑝): Proposes updating the calling member’s key material.
Takes the protocol state 𝛾 as input, and outputs a new state 𝛾′ and a proposal 𝑝.
• CGKA.Commit(𝛾, ⃗⃗𝑝) → (𝛾′, 𝑐, 𝑤): Applies (a.k.a. commits) the proposal messages in vector ⃗⃗𝑝
to the group. Takes a protocol state 𝛾 as input, and outputs a new state 𝛾′, a commit message
𝑐, and a welcome message 𝑤. The welcome message may be the empty symbol ⊥ if ⃗⃗𝑝 does
not contain any proposed additions to the group.
• CGKA.Join(sk, 𝑤) → (𝛾′,
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
id, id𝑖): Joins a group using the long-term private key sk and the
welcome message 𝑤. Outputs a protocol state 𝛾′, a list of existing group members
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
id (where
each vector element is the identifier for an existing member), and the identifier id𝑖 for the
member that invited the caller to the group (i.e., the one that created 𝑤).
• CGKA.Process(𝛾, 𝑐, ⃗⃗𝑝) → (𝛾′, 𝑒′,
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
info): Takes as input a protocol state 𝛾, a commit message
𝑐, and the corresponding list of proposal messages ⃗⃗𝑝. Outputs a new protocol state 𝛾′ having
epoch identifier 𝑒′ such that all of the valid proposed changes in the sequence ⃗⃗𝑝 have been
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applied to the state. The output
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
info describes the changes to the group that have occurred
while processing the commit message; it has the form (id,
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
propSem), where id is the identifier
for the member that produced the commit message, and
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
propSem is a sequence of semantic
group changes. Each element of
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗
propSem has the form (id𝑠, op, id𝑡), where id𝑠 is the identifier
for the member that proposed the change, op ∈ {“addP”, “remP”} denotes the type of change,
and id𝑡 is the identifier for themember targeted by the change (i.e., either added to or removed
from the group).
• CGKA.Key(𝛾) → (𝛾′, 𝐾): Takes as input the protocol state 𝛾. Outputs the shared secret key
𝐾 for the group, and a new protocol state 𝛾′ in which the key has been erased (for forward
secrecy purposes). If the key has already been erased from 𝛾, this function outputs the special
symbol ⊥.
CGKAs are designed to be used to construct a higher-level secure group messaging protocol
like MLS. All participants in the system use CGKA.KeyGen to generate long-term key pairs; the
public keys are distributed and verified using the trust establishment mechanism. To create
a group, an initiator calls CGKA.Create to produce an initial state and epoch identifier. Each
participant in a group conversation maintains a local state for the group. Over time, changes to
the group are proposed by group members (using CGKA.ProposeAdd, CGKA.ProposeRemove, or
CGKA.ProposeUpdate), and then “committed” by a group member (using CGKA.Commit). The
act of committing a set of proposed changes causes them to be applied to the group in a specific
sequence, producing a state with a new epoch identifier and shared secret key. Committing
changes produces a commit message that must be distributed to other group members; all
members (including the committer) must call CGKA.Process in order to derive the group state
for the new epoch. When a proposed addition to the group is committed, a “welcome message”
is generated. When the new group members receive the welcome message, they can use their
long-term private key to recover key material from the message, thereby initializing their own
local state for the group. The security properties of a CGKA are defined in a simulation-based
model—interested readers will find formal security definitions and proofs in the work by Alwen
et al. [ACJM20].
Section 4.3 previously described a secure group messaging scheme built from a variant of
TreeKEM. This TreeKEM variant implicitly implements the CGKA definition; the CGKA in MLS
can be replaced with another system that implements the definition in order to improve the
security or efficiency of the overall protocol.
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4.5 Improvements to TreeKEM
Several notable works have modified the original TreeKEM [BBR18] scheme discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2 in order to improve the security properties or apply the system in new settings.
Weidner [Wei19] modified TreeKEM in order to construct a privacy-enhancing collaborative
editing system—a system that allows multiple users to edit a shared document simultaneously.
These systems require causality preservation of messages, but not necessarily a consistent global
transcript. Weidner points out [Wei19, §4.2.3] that TreeKEM’s support for concurrent updates
undermines post-compromise security in certain scenarios. For example, if the adversary corrupts
a group member 𝑢𝐵, members 𝑢𝐵 and 𝑢𝐴 perform concurrent key updates, and 𝑢𝐵’s update is
applied before 𝑢𝐴’s update after merging, then the adversary will learn the new group key
because 𝑢𝐴’s update encrypts the new keys to 𝑢𝐵’s old (compromised) keys. Since this weakness
is considered unacceptable for the collaborative editing setting, Weidner describes a variant
called “Causal TreeKEM” that supports concurrent key updates, but exploits the properties of the
underlying DH-based group to combine keys (instead of overwriting them) during key updates.
This variant provides the post-compromise security guarantees needed by the application. In
addition to this contribution, Weidner also defines more granular conversation security properties
for secure group messaging in a manner inspired by Unger et al. [UDB+15].
In the same work that initially recognized the CGKA primitive, Alwen et al. [ACC+19] defined
a variant called Tainted TreeKEM (TTKEM). This scheme was based on a previous draft of the
MLS protocol that did not yet separate the notions of “proposing” and “committing” operations,
so the CGKA definition in this work is now outdated. Nonetheless, the main idea of TTKEM
remains valuable: instead of using “blank nodes” as described in Section 4.3, TTKEM introduces
“tainted nodes”. A tainted node is a 𝑘-node that is known by members that it should not be;
a tainted node is associated with a set of 𝑢-nodes with superfluous knowledge of the private
key. Instead of blanking a node during an “add” or “remove” operation, the proposer generates
a new keypair for the 𝑘-node, encrypts the private key to the appropriate subtrees, and adds
their own 𝑢-node to the 𝑘-node’s tainted set. When a member performs a commit operation, all
𝑘-nodes on their path become untainted. When a key is encrypted to a node with a non-empty
tainted set as part of any operation, the 𝑘-node associated with the new key material inherits the
tainted set. When removing a member, all 𝑘-nodes with that member in their tainted set must
be updated—not just the removed member’s path as in MLS. The TTKEM approach represents a
trade-off: more keys must be replaced when evicting members, but more internal 𝑘-nodes are
available as encryption targets during other operations.
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Alwen et al. [ACDT20] identified a weakness in the forward secrecy properties of TreeKEM
that allows an adversary to recover previously captured plaintexts after corrupting members
in certain scenarios. They proved that this weakness could be robustly overcome by replacing
the public-key cryptosystem with “updatable public-key encryption” (UPKE). A UPKE scheme
is identical to a PKE scheme, except that the encryption function outputs a new public key in
addition to the ciphertext, and the decryption function outputs a corresponding new private
key in addition to the recovered plaintext. An important security property of a UPKE scheme
is that a private key output by the decryption function cannot decrypt ciphertexts that were
previously encrypted to the old private key. The purpose of UPKE is similar to puncturable
encryption [GM15], but several trivial and efficient constructions for UPKEs exist. For example, it
is simple to construct a UPKE from ElGamal encryption by updating a public key 𝑔𝑥 to be 𝑔𝑥 · 𝑔𝑦 ,
and encrypting 𝑦 as part of the encryption function.
Most recently, Alwen et al. [ACJM20] presented an approach to achieve insider security in
MLS. Their scheme alters TTKEM to include a hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE)
scheme that ensures all keys are updated with every operation. They also introduce non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs that demonstrate knowledge of symmetric secret keys in
certain situations. The new scheme is proven secure in a simulation-based model. The main
weakness of the approach is that the zero-knowledge proofs must prove statements about crypto-
graphic hash functions, which typically requires either prohibitively slow proof systems, or very
strong security assumptions.
4.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced CGKAs and their application to MLS and other modern secure group
messaging protocols. A CGKA scheme is an extension of a DGKE that supports non-interactive
group creation and ongoing group key ratcheting. Section 4.1 covered the ART protocol, which
was the first published non-interactive secure group messaging framework; it inspired the creation
of the MLS working group. Section 4.2 discussed TreeKEM, which was the first true CGKA
(although it was not abstracted in those terms at the time) and the core of MLS. Section 4.3
covered MLS itself, which is the most advanced secure group messaging protocol supporting
non-interactive environments that currently exists. After the publication of early drafts of MLS,
Alwen et al. [ACC+19] recognized that the core primitive in the TreeKEM construction was
generalizable; they extracted and defined the CGKA primitive, which is covered in Section 4.4.
Finally, Section 4.5 covered several improvements to TreeKEM that have been recently proposed,
including TTKEM.
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The content that was presented in this chapter and the rest of Part I provides the background
necessary to contextualize the contributions of this work. Part II introduces new cryptographic
protocols to improve the deniability of two-party secure group messaging schemes; these con-
tributions are expressed using the terminology and context that was introduced in Chapter 2.
Chapters 3 and 4 established the foundation for understanding the design of the new secure
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In this chapter: Discussion Protocol Implementation Evaluation
D
eniability—the ability to plausibly deny sending a secure message—is a desirable
feature for secure messaging tools in certain contexts. As defined in Section 2.4, a
“deniable” secure messaging protocol is one in which denying message authorship is
just as plausible as it would be for an insecure (i.e., unauthenticated) messaging protocol from the
perspective of a “judge”. Since most Internet communication protocols have historically lacked
cryptographic authentication, deniability can be viewed as the “default” state. Consequently,
users may be unpleasantly surprised to discover that the tool they are using lacks deniability. A
notable example of this situation occurred in the high-profile data leak of emails from the Clinton
campaign in the 2016 US presidential election, where DKIM digital signatures were used to
strongly indicate the authenticity of some emails in the leak despite the authors’ denials [Ros16].1
When designing a secure messaging protocol with authentication, it is easy to accidentally enforce
non-repudiation of message authorship. For example, digitally signing messages with a long-term
identity key provides not just authentication, but also non-repudiation. To avoid mistakenly
harming users, a protocol designer should explicitly decide whether to provide deniability or
non-repudiation, and make this choice clear. Since deniability is the default state, choosing to
introduce non-repudiation has the effect of increasing the power of third-party observers (who
gain the ability to cryptographically verify authorship) while potentially decreasing the power
of conversation participants (who lose any ability that they may have had to plausibly deny
authorship). This may be desirable in some contexts (e.g., when public accountability is more
important than candid conversation), but not in others (e.g., casual private messages between
friends).
Deniability is difficult to preserve while simultaneously providing authentication. Moreover,
the very notion of deniability is difficult to precisely define. Section 2.4 covered several common
1 ⋏ The presence of a DKIM signature ensures that the contents of an email and important metadata cannot not be
forged without the private key of the signing server. In most cases, this dramatically limits the plausibility of any
denial of authorship. Specter et al. [SPG21] recently proposed several new protocols to make DKIM signatures
deniable.
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definitions of deniability, and Section 2.5 surveyed the history of DAKEs—the primary method
of preserving deniability in secure messaging protocols. Ideally, it should be possible to design
modern secure messaging protocols that provide strong deniability in addition to authentica-
tion; strong deniability is an important form of insider security. As discussed in Section 2.5,
three previously introduced protocols ostensibly meet these requirements: Walfish’s protocol
Φdre [Wal08], and Unger and Goldberg’s protocols RSDAKE and Spawn [UG15]. However, Φdre
is inferior to RSDAKE in terms of performance [UG15], and RSDAKE and Spawn lack some key
properties that are desired by the designers of secure messaging protocols like OTR and Signal:
1. the protocols are too slow to use in real-world secure messaging settings like smartphone
applications;
2. the protocols cannot provide forward secrecy against active adversaries in non-interactive
settings;
3. the protocols do not provide forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries;
4. the protocols make users susceptible to Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) attacks; and
5. the protocols are not contributory—shared secrets are unilaterally determined by one party,
which permits sophisticated attacks against key secrecy.
This chapter presents three new DAKEs—DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH—that overcome the afore-
mentioned limitations with RSDAKE and Spawn. These are the first practical mechanisms for
achieving strong deniability in two-party secure messaging settings, including non-interactive
scenarios.2 Moreover, these DAKEs can act as drop-in replacements for the DAKEs in protocols
like OTR and Signal in order to efficiently provide strong deniability without sacrificing any
existing security properties. The protocols also explicitly include the option to add quantum
transitional resistance, which preserves the confidentiality of past conversations in the event that
future quantum computers are able to break present-day cryptography. While the new protocols
are limited to the two-party case, the threat model and design methodology in this chapter
provide important and generalizable insights; Chapter 10 draws upon these insights to design a
deniable secure group messaging protocol.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 motivates the desire for online deniability;
Section 5.2 defines the security properties and features of the new DAKEs, and outlines their
2 ⋏ The protocols do make a few concessions that weaken the deniability guarantees in some circumstances. Notably,
the protocols only provide online deniability for one participant in the non-interactive case. These limitations
seem to be inherent to the settings.
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design; Section 5.3 establishes notation and introduces constructions for cryptographic primitives;
Section 5.4 defines DAKEZ; Section 5.5 defines ZDH; Section 5.6 defines XZDH; Section 5.7
covers practical considerations for deploying the new DAKEs; Section 5.8 describes a prototype
implementation of the new DAKEs; Section 5.9 evaluates the time and space efficiency of the
protocols and existing key exchanges; and Section 5.10 discusses key compromise impersonation
attacks in the context of strongly deniable key exchanges. Security proofs for the schemes are
presented in the next chapter, Chapter 6.
The content of this chapter was previously published by Unger and Goldberg [UG18]. Subse-
quently, the DAKEs described in this chapter were incorporated into the OTRv4 protocol [OTR17],
where they serve as the core mechanism for providing deniable authentication. The prototype
described in Section 5.8 served as a reference for independent implementations of the abstract
protocols. While OTRv4 is not yet deployed, it will soon provide strong deniability for end-user
secure messaging tools.
5.1 Online Deniability Attacks
Offline and online deniability defend against an insider attack where one party in the conversation
provably leaks messages to an outsider. As discussed in Section 2.4, online deniability is a
relatively new consideration for secure messaging protocols, which have traditionally focused
on offline deniability. It is natural to wonder if online deniability is truly necessary, or if offline
deniability alone is sufficient to defend against the insider attack in practice.
This section demonstrates what can go wrong in a secure messaging protocol that overlooks
online deniability by presenting two insider attacks against two popular protocols in great
detail. Section 5.1.1 presents an insider attack in which a protocol participant is forcibly coerced
by an outsider into proving the authorship of incoming messages. Section 5.1.2 considers a
scenario in which a malicious insider reserves the right to selectively prove the authorship of
incoming messages to outsiders at a future time. Both sections describe the technical details of
implementing these attacks against the OTRv3 [OTR16] and Signal [Ope13] protocols.
These sections assume that the reader is familiar with the technical details of the relevant
specifications, including X3DH [MP16] and the double ratchet [PM16] used by Signal; these
sections use the notation of the specifications without definition or explanation. Since the purpose
of this section is merely to illustrate that online deniability is an important consideration and the
technical details do not directly inform the design of defenses, readers that already accept the
importance of online deniability may wish to skip to the next section.
74
Chapter 5 Designing DAKEs for Modern Two-Party Secure Messaging
5.1.1 Coercive Judges
In this insider attack, an online judge3 coerces a protocol participant into interactively proving
that messages were authored by a victim, without compromising long-term secrets. The judge is
able to detect if the coerced participant deviates from the protocol.⁴ As in all online deniability
attacks, the participant shares a secure channel with the judge. The same general approach
works for attacking both OTRv3 and Signal:
1. The AKE is completed between the victim and the judge. The coerced participant provides the
authenticating information necessary to cause the victim to believe they are communicating
with the participant, rather than the judge.
2. The judge conducts the resulting conversation normally, with no need for the coerced par-
ticipant other than relaying ciphertexts. The judge can be certain that all messages they
exchange are with the victim.
5.1.1.1 Attacking OTRv3
In this example, Judson is the judge, Alice is the victim, and Bob is the coerced participant. Alice
and Bob are the protocol participants described in the OTRv3 specification [OTR16].
1. Bob establishes a connection to Alice.
2. Judson picks random values 𝑟 and 𝑥.
3. Judson sends AES𝑟 (𝑔𝑥) and HASH(𝑔𝑥) to Alice through Bob.
4. Alice replies with 𝑔𝑦.
5. Judson computes 𝑀𝐵 normally, forces Bob to produce sig𝐵(𝑀𝐵), and verifies the signature.
6. Judson continues normally and sends 𝑟, AES𝑐 (𝑋𝐵), and MAC𝑚2(AES𝑐 (𝑋𝐵)) to Alice through
Bob.
3 ⋏As discussed in Section 2.4, an online judge is an entity that interacts with a protocol participant in order to
evaluate if the purported ongoing conversation is genuine.
4 ⋏ It is theoretically possible that two online judges cause two coerced participants to implicate each other. This
is still a valid online deniability attack, because both judges learn that the conversation was “genuine” in the
sense that the protocol was not simulated. The attack does not reveal the motives of the participants—only that
the conversation between the participants (who may have been coerced by outsiders to send messages) truly
occurred.
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7. Alice sends AES𝑐′ (𝑋𝐴) and MAC𝑚2′ (AES𝑐′ (𝑋𝐴)).
8. Judson now shares 𝑠 = 𝑔𝑥 𝑦 with Alice and continues the OTR session, relaying ciphertexts
through Bob.
The reverse attack, where Judson coerces Alice into establishing a session with Bob, is nearly
identical.
5.1.1.2 Attacking Signal
In this example, Judson is the judge, Alice is the coerced participant, and Bob is the victim. Alice,
Bob, and the server are the entities in the X3DH specification [MP16].
1. Alice contacts the server and receives Bob’s prekey bundle containing the identity key IK𝐵, the
signed prekey SPK𝐵, the signature Sig(IK𝐵, Encode(SPK𝐵)), and (without loss of generality)
the one-time prekey OPK𝐵.
2. Judson generates a key pair with public key EK𝐴.
3. Judson forces Alice to compute and reveal DH1 = DH(IK𝐴, SPK𝐵). Optionally, Judson may
ask for a zero-knowledge proof of correctness for DH1.
4. Judson sends EK𝐴 to Bob through Alice.
5. Judson computes DH2, DH3, and DH4 using the secret for EK𝐴. Judson then computes
SK = KDF(DH1∥DH2∥DH3∥DH4), which is also known by Bob. Judson now continues the
Signal session normally, relaying ciphertexts through Alice.
Note that while this attack does not reveal IK𝐴 to Judson, it does slightly weaken the security
of future exchanges with IK𝐴 and SPK𝐵; this is alleviated when SPK𝐵 is replaced or one-time
prekeys are used by Bob.
The reverse attack, where Judson coerces Bob into communicating with Alice, is more complex
because Judson must generate the prekeys. In that case, the risks to Bob can be mitigated by
using a distributed key generation scheme [GJKR99] to jointly generate the prekeys. When
Alice selects a bundle, Bob sends the associated shares to Judson, who reconstructs the secrets.
For bundles selected by non-victims, Judson sends the associated shares to Bob, who proceeds
unmonitored.
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5.1.2 Malicious Users
In this insider attack, a malicious participant interacts with a purpose-built third-party service
during a conversation with a victim. Assuming that the public keys of the participant, victim,
and service are known and validated, the participant and service did not collude to forge the
transcript, and the service does not have direct access to the connection for the conversation, the
participant is able to produce non-repudiable proof of message authorship by the victim. It is
possible to do this while protecting the participant’s long-term keys, preventing the service from
reading or modifying the conversation, preventing forgery by any individual party or outsider,
allowing the participant to selectively disclose only a portion of the conversation, and preventing
a forward secrecy breach when only the service is compromised.
The overall attack involves using the service to produce a trustworthy log of the protocol
transcript (the exact network data transmitted to and from the participant), and enabling the par-
ticipant to selectively publish ephemeral keys for ciphertexts to reveal portions of the conversation
transcript (the plaintext messages exchanged in the session).
The basic approach is the same for both OTRv3 and Signal: the service maintains the keys
for the session and otherwise behaves honestly, while the participant handles sending and re-
ceiving ciphertexts. Both the participant and service digitally sign protocol messages and, when
necessary, they use secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) to allow the participant to conduct
the conversation. Alternatively, a different trustworthy logging mechanism, like Intel SGX secure
enclaves [AGJS13], can be used instead; Gunn et al. [GPA19] detail a generalized form of the
attack using remote attestation.
5.1.3 Attack Overview
The protocol begins by performing the attack against the AKE from Section 5.1.1 in such a way
that the participant is given proof of the victim’s identity and the service cannot select a specific
ephemeral secret. When the participant receives a message:
1. The participant signs the protocol message.
2. The participant and service perform secure MPC to verify the authenticity of the protocol
message and decrypt the message for the participant (but not the service).
3. The service signs the participant’s signature and as much of the protocol message as possible
without being given enough data to decrypt it.
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When the participant wants to send a message:
1. The participant and service use secure MPC to generate the encrypted and authenticated
protocol message.
2. The participant signs the protocol message.
3. The service signs the participant’s signature and as much of the protocol message as possible.
While the conversation is ongoing, before erasing ephemeral keys needed to decrypt messages,
the service encrypts them under a public key generated by the participant at the start of the
protocol, and stores them. When the participant wants to incriminate the victim:
1. The participant asks the service to terminate.
2. The service sends the encrypted ephemeral keys it has stored, and any currently active keys,
to the participant. The service then terminates the session.
3. The participant publishes the signatures, proving that the protocol transcript is real and
unmodified.
4. The participant can selectively reveal messages by decrypting and publishing the ephemeral
keys needed to decrypt and authenticate target messages.
5.1.3.1 OTRv3 Attack Details
When the service performs the attack from Section 5.1.1 on OTRv3, the ephemeral key is produced
using distributed key generation [GJKR99] and the participant’s share is revealed to the service.
The service reveals 𝑟, 𝑚1, 𝑐′, and 𝑚1′ to the participant to verify the victim.
When receiving a message, secure MPC is used to check the MAC; the victim keeps the cipher-
text and received MAC secret, and the service keeps 𝑚𝑘 secret. To decrypt, the service verifiably
reveals the AES-CTR keystream for the received 𝑐𝑡𝑟 using secure MPC, and the participant uses
it to privately decrypt the ciphertext. The service only assists with decryption after signing the
participant’s signature on the protocol message. It is not necessary for the service to verify the
participant’s signature, since cheating will be detected during verification of the incriminating
transcript.
When sending a message, the participant generates a symmetric key. The parties then use
secure MPC to encrypt and authenticate a message (known to the participant) with the message
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key (known to the service), with the resulting ciphertext being encrypted under the participant’s
symmetric key (so it is not revealed to the service). The service stores encrypted versions of the
expired DH secrets that can be revealed during the incrimination procedure.
5.1.3.2 Signal Attack Details
As in the attack against OTRv3, the attack against Signal also begins with producing the ephemeral
key using distributed key generation. For Signal, the participant uses the signed prekey to verify
the victim. When receiving a Signal message, the service simply reveals the message key to the
participant. Sending a message uses the same procedure as the OTRv3 attack: the participant
performs secure MPC with the service to encrypt and authenticate the message. Unlike for OTRv3,
it is not necessary for the service to store encrypted versions of message keys in the Signal attack,
since message keys are always revealed immediately upon receipt of an incoming message.
5.2 Designing Defenses
The three new protocols, Deniable Authenticated Key Exchange with Zero-knowledge (DAKEZ),
Zero-knowledge Diffie-Hellman (ZDH), and Extended Zero-knowledge Diffie-Hellman (XZDH),
are meant to be used in common secure messaging scenarios. DAKEZ is designed for use in
interactive settings such as instant messaging applications, while ZDH and XZDH are designed to
be used in non-interactive settings such as text messaging. ZDH is the most efficient, but XZDH
provides stronger forward secrecy than ZDH. The new DAKEs share many design similarities with
RSDAKE and Spawn, but they are 4000–5000 times more efficient in practice. This significant
efficiency advantage comes from constructing and using cryptographic primitives that rely on
the ROM for security proofs.
Section 5.4 constructs DAKEZ by adopting RSDAKE’s approach to authentication, but using
several new instantiations of cryptographic primitives in the ROM. Additionally, slight improve-
ments in the design of DAKEZ provide some enhanced security properties. For comparison
purposes, Section 5.5.1 adapts Spawn to the random oracle model using the new primitives.
Examining this ROM-based variant of Spawn reveals that performance can be further improved
by leveraging the fact that Spawn provides only partial online deniability; this leads to the de-
velopment of ZDH, described in Section 5.5.2. Finally, Section 5.6 describes XZDH, a variant of
ZDH that adopts X3DH’s forward secrecy technique to gain more control over the confidentiality
guarantees.
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5.2.1 Proof Technique
There are two general approaches to proving the security of key exchanges: security by indis-
tinguishability, where security properties are expressed in terms of indistinguishable adversarial
games [BR93a]; and security by emulation, where a protocol is shown to be indistinguishable
from an idealized protocol with access to secure channels and a trusted third party [CK02b].
The new DAKEs are designed to be proven secure using the emulation method through the
Generalized Universal Composability (GUC) framework [DKSW09], which was also used to prove
the security of RSDAKE and Spawn [UG15]. GUC-based security proofs are generally more
convincing of real-world security, more resistant to insecure composition, and able to naturally
express deniability properties. On the other hand, GUC-based proofs are often overly restrictive
and more complex.
While RSDAKE and Spawn were proven secure using the GUC framework, the proof sketches
used the standard model with obscure hardness assumptions. The new protocols can be proven
secure using random oracles and widely accepted standard assumptions. While the use of random
oracles in security proofs has historically caused debate among theorists [KM15], it remains to
be shown that instantiation of random oracles using appropriate cryptographic hash functions in
real-world protocols introduces any actual security flaws.
The newDAKEs are designed to providemany security properties and features. However, proof
of these properties within the GUC framework requires the definition of an ideal functionality and
proof showing that the real key exchanges behave indistinguishably from the idealized version.
Formal definitions of these ideal functionalities, explanations for how they exhibit desirable
properties, and expression of the resulting security theorems, are long and complex. For ease
of presentation, the formal definition of the GUC ideal functionalities, security theorems, and
proof sketches are deferred to Chapter 6. This chapter focuses on intuitive definitions of the new
DAKEs and practical issues surrounding their deployment. While this chapter does not contain
the formal proof sketches, to facilitate design discussion and comparison with prior schemes,
the next section defines high-level security objectives for the new DAKEs, and simplified security
propositions are presented throughout this chapter.
5.2.2 Protocol Properties
The new DAKEs provide the following properties:
1. Universally composable AKE [CK02b]: The protocols emulate idealized authenticated key
exchanges facilitated by a trusted third party (without requiring one in practice), and continue
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to do so evenwhen composed within arbitrary protocols. This property includes the traditional
notions of mutual authentication, key secrecy, and key freshness [BR93a; CK02b].
2. Offline deniability [DGK06]: Anyone can forge a DAKEZ, ZDH, or XZDH transcript between
any two parties using only their long-term public keys. Consequently, no transcript provides
evidence of a past key exchange, because it could have been forged. This is similar to the
deniability offered by 3DH [Mar13].
3. Online deniability [DKSW09]: Participants in a DAKEZ exchange cannot provide proof of
participation to third parties without making themselves vulnerable to KCI attacks, even if
they perform arbitrary protocols with these third parties during the exchange. ZDH and
XZDH provide this property for one party.
4. Contributiveness: The new DAKEs are initiator-resilient [HMS03] in the same sense as
traditional Diffie-Hellman [DH76] key exchanges—the initiator of the protocol cannot force
the shared secret to take on a specific value. In practice, it is also computationally infeasible
for the responder to select a specific shared secret, although it may attempt to select one with
some desirable characteristic through a brute-force search. The initiator (and, in practice,
the responder) cannot force the shared secret to be a value known to a third party before the
exchange begins.
Without contributiveness, an adversary can specify a secret, coerce a participant into forcing
that shared secret, and then decrypt the subsequent conversation without access to the key
exchange transcript [HMS03]. A non-contributory protocol also permits a participant to force
a shared secret known to an innocent third party, enabling that third party to decrypt the
conversation without their consent.
5. Forward secrecy [BPR00]: A classical adversary that compromises the long-term secret
keys of both parties cannot retroactively compromise past session keys. DAKEZ offers strong
forward secrecy—it protects the session key when at least one party completes the exchange.
ZDH offers weak forward secrecy [BPR00]—it protects the session key only when both parties
complete the exchange, but not when only one party completes and begins using the session
key. XZDH protects completed sessions and incomplete sessions that stall long enough to be
invalidated by a participant. Section 5.6 discusses this distinction in greater detail.
6. (Optional) quantum resistance [SWZ16]: The new DAKEs can optionally be combined with
a quantum-resistant KEM to maintain forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries,
at the expense of performance.
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7. Post-specified peer [CK02a]: Participants in DAKEZ exchanges learn the identities of their
partners during the exchange. For ZDH and XZDH exchanges, only one party begins the
protocol with knowledge of the other’s claimed identity.
In all configurations, the new protocols are universally composable AKEs with offline deniability,
contributiveness, and post-specified peers. Given these baseline properties, this chapter describes
several configurations that offer different tradeoffs between online deniability, forms of forward
secrecy, computational efficiency,⁵ and quantum resistance; the best configuration to use depends
on the particular secure messaging context.
5.2.3 Quantum Transitional Security
The new DAKEs include a mechanism to address the problem of forward secrecy against future
quantum adversaries. The purpose of forward secrecy in key exchange protocols is to prevent
future adversaries from retroactively compromising recorded sessions. This property is extremely
important because it minimizes the impact of compromised long-term keys. However, current
deployments of key exchanges with forward secrecy are believed to be vulnerable to quantum
cryptanalysis. This leads to the worrying possibility that all communications that are currently
protected by “secure” protocols like Signal might be retroactively decrypted by a passive adversary
that gains access to a quantum computer in the future; such an event could be potentially
devastating to many real users. As quantum computation continues to appear more feasible,
it is becoming increasingly clear that defenses against this potential threat must be deployed
as quickly as possible. However, implementing protocols that are fully resistant to all quantum
attacks remains challenging and expensive. Moreover, the security (even classically) of “quantum-
resistant” cryptosystems remains suspect, relative to the confidence in classical schemes based
on widely examined hardness assumptions.
An interesting class of key exchanges and KEMs are “hybrid” schemes that provide quantum
transitional security. Bindel et al. [BBF+19] define security notions for four security settings
based on when quantum computers become capable of breaking the cryptosystems and whether
or not the communication protocol itself is quantum:
• CcC: the “classical” setting. In this setting, the protocol is classical and the adversary never
gains access to quantum computation.
5 ⋏ The constructions are preferentially optimized based on computational efficiency rather than other performance
metrics, such as network transmission size.
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• CcQ: the “future quantum” setting. In this setting, the protocol is classical and the adversary
gains access to quantum computation at some point in the future (after the protocol sessions
have completed).
• QcQ: the “post-quantum” setting. In this setting, the protocol is classical and, while the
adversary already has access to quantum computation, the adversary is restricted to interacting
with the protocol classically.
• QqQ: the “fully quantum” setting. In this setting, the adversary and the parties performing the
protocol are all able to perform quantum computations and send quantum communications.
Typically, “quantum transitional security” refers to the CcQ setting. It is relatively straightforward
to construct a “hybrid” KEM with quantum transitional security by performing a quantum-
resistant KEM in addition to a classically secure KEM and deriving the shared key from both
outputs. This approach preserves forward secrecy against future quantum adversaries while also
maintaining classical security in the event that the security assumptions of the quantum-resistant
KEM fail. The downside of schemes that are only secure in the CcC or CcQ settings is that
they must be immediately replaced with post-quantum schemes after adversaries gain access to
sufficiently powerful quantum computation.
In 2016, Google tested the deployment of a quantum transitionally secure key exchange in
TLS [Lan16]. In a follow-up study in 2019, Google and Cloudflare jointly tested another quantum
transitionally secure TLS ciphersuite using more recent quantum-resistant key exchanges [KV19].
They found that recent lattice-based schemes are so efficient that they effectively do not add any
latency to most TLS handshakes.
DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH optionally provide quantum transitional security in the CcQ setting
by incorporating an Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) quantum-
resistant KEM. Because there are many different quantum-resistant KEMs with varying security
properties, performance, and usage restrictions, the new DAKEs provide generic “placeholders”
for a quantum-resistant KEM. An implementer is free to incorporate the KEM of their choice
when using the new protocols. Section 5.7.1 returns to the practical issues surrounding this
choice.
5.3 Efficient Cryptographic Primitive Constructions
The primary barrier to adoption of strongly deniable DAKEs like Φdre, RSDAKE, and Spawn is poor
performance caused by the use of inefficient Dual-Receiver Encryption (DRE) and ring signatures
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in the standard model. DRE [DLKY04] is similar to ordinary public-key encryption, except that
messages are encrypted for two recipient public keys. The message can be decrypted by either
corresponding private key, and it is verifiable that decrypting with either key produces the same
result. DRE is similar to the more well-known notion of broadcast encryption [FN93], except
that DRE does not require centralized generation of private keys, and broadcast encryption does
not provide any verifiability guarantees. Ring signatures [RST01] are similar to ordinary digital
signatures, except that messages are signed by a set of potential signers called a ring. Anyone
with knowledge of a private key corresponding to any public key in this ring can produce the
ring signature, and it is not possible to determine which key was used.
These two primitives are very useful in deniable key exchanges; ring signatures provide
deniable authentication, and DRE can assist with online transcript forgery. Ring signatures with
a carefully selected ring can convince a verifier of the authenticity of a message (due to a non-
transferable belief that the signer cannot know certain keys) while allowing the signer to plausibly
deny authorship (because the signature could have been produced using other keys in the ring).
DRE can be used to allow a simulator to recover the shared secret and use it to forge subsequent
messages even when outsourcing the generation of ephemeral secrets to an adversary; this
technique enables online deniability by eliminating a potential protocol for producing evidence
of an exchange.
The best known constructions of DRE and ring signatures with the appropriate security
properties in the standard model are inefficient and make use of primitives such as cryptographic
pairings. Pairing-based DRE constructions rely on stronger security assumptions than their
ROM-based counterparts, and these assumptions are still occasionally the subject of newly
discovered attacks [KB16]. This section specifies the DRE and ring signature primitives, the
security properties that they must provide to construct the new DAKEs, and efficient ROM-based
constructions of the primitives.
5.3.1 Notation
All of the definitions in this chapter are implicitly given with respect to a security parameter
_. When defining concrete two-party protocols, the initiator and the responder are denoted
as I and R, respectively. When written with quotes, “P” denotes an implementation-defined
identifier for the party P.
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5.3.2 Dual-Receiver Encryption with Associated Data
While it is possible to construct the new DAKEs using traditional DRE [DLKY04], transmission
sizes can be reduced by incorporating Rogaway’s notion of associated authenticated data [Rog02]
in the primitive. The combined primitive is a new cryptosystem called Dual-Receiver Encryption
with Associated Data (DREAD). A DREAD scheme consists of the following functions:
• DRGen(𝑠): a key generation function. DRGen produces a key pair (pk, sk) for use with the
scheme. 𝑠 represents the random coins used to generate the key pair. Omitting 𝑠 implies that
𝑠 is set to newly sampled randomness.
• DREnc(pk1, pk2, 𝑚,Φ; 𝑟): an encryption function. DREnc encrypts a message 𝑚 with asso-
ciated data Φ under two public keys pk1 and pk2 using the random coins represented by 𝑟.
If pk1 and pk2 are valid public keys, then DREnc produces a ciphertext 𝛾. Otherwise, DREnc
returns the special value ⊥. The output of DREnc is consistent across invocations with the
same (pk1, pk2, 𝑚,Φ; 𝑟) as input and varies when 𝑟 is changed. Any value of 𝑟 produces a
valid encryption of 𝑚. Omitting 𝑟 implies that 𝑟 is set to newly sampled randomness.
• DRDec(𝑖, pk1, pk2, sk,Φ, 𝛾): a decryption function. For 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}, if (pk𝑖, sk) was generated
by DRGen and 𝛾 ≠ ⊥ is a ciphertext 𝛾 = DREnc(pk1, pk2, 𝑚,Φ; 𝑟) for some 𝑟 and 𝑚, then
DRDec(𝑖, pk1, pk2, sk,Φ, 𝛾) returns𝑚. In all other cases, DRDec returns⊥with overwhelming
probability.
The associated data Φ is information that is not transmitted with the ciphertext, but is nonetheless
authenticated; the same value must be provided to both DREnc and DRDec in order for the
decryption of 𝑚 to succeed.
Note that the definitions of DREnc and DRDec implicitly rely on the ability to verify that a
public key is valid and corresponds to a unique secret key. A scheme satisfying this property is
called admissible [CFZ14]. This chapter considers only admissible schemes. Additionally, the
new key exchange protocols require DREAD instantiations to satisfy two security properties that
are naturally extended from the DRE security definitions introduced by Chow et al. [CFZ14]
by incorporating the Φ parameter where necessary: the chosen DREAD scheme must be sound
(decryption always produces the same value for both secret keys) and Indistinguishability under
adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2). Section 5.3.2.1 details the necessary modifica-
tions to the definitions from Chow et al. [CFZ14], which merely involve allowing the adversary
to select Φ in the security games.
The few explicit constructions of DRE in the literature are almost all designed for the standard
model. Since random oracles are permitted in the new DAKE protocols, an extremely efficient
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(key KDF(𝑔K ), AD Φ):
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IND-CPA IND-CPA Sim-sound [FKMV12] IND-CCA2
IND-CCA2 [FKMV12]
IND-CCA2 [CS03b]
Figure 5.1 IND-CCA2 proof method for DREAD construction. The new construction is a hybrid
encryption of message 𝑚 for keys pk1 and pk2 with associated data Φ. (Ref: 86)
DREAD scheme can be constructed using the Naor-Yung paradigm [NY90] within a hybrid
cryptosystem. Figure 5.1 depicts the new DREAD cryptosystem built using this approach. The
ciphertext consists of a secret group element encrypted twice with ElGamal [ElG85] (once to each
recipient), a Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge (NIZKPK) proving that the
ElGamal ciphertexts contain the same plaintext, and an Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data (AEAD) of the message 𝑚 using a symmetric key derived from the secret group element.
This approach is known to generate a sound DRE system [CFZ14]. ElGamal was chosen because it
is a very efficient scheme with the desired security properties, and it can be instantiated without
adding new security assumptions to the new DAKEs. The NIZKPK is formed using the Fiat-Shamir
transform [FS87]. When used in the Naor-Yung paradigm, Faust et al. [FKMV12] proved that
such NIZKPKs are simulation-sound and thus yield IND-CCA2 security when combined with
IND-CPA encryption schemes like ElGamal. Since an AEAD must be IND-CCA2 secure, the overall
combination of schemes is also IND-CCA2 secure using the proof from Cramer and Shoup [CS03b,
Th. 7.2].⁶ In practice, the AEAD may be instantiated using AES-256 in OCB or an equivalent
unpatented mode [HKM15] using the NIZKPK to derive the nonce. Section 5.3.2.1 shows that
the soundness of the NIZKPK proof implies soundness of the DREAD construction.
The complete DREAD construction is as follows:
• Setup: all users share a group description, (𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔), for use in the ElGamal scheme [ElG85].
𝑔 is a generator for the group 𝔾 of prime order 𝑞. All hash functions used in this chapter
output values in ℤ𝑞.
• DRGen(𝑠): keys are generated as in the ElGamal scheme [ElG85]. If 𝑠 is omitted, it is set to
𝑠
$←− ℤ𝑞. The resulting public key for a user is ℎ = 𝑔𝑠, and the secret key is 𝑠.
6 ⋏When expressing the ElGamal encryptions of K and the NIZKPK as the key encapsulation mechanism, AES-OCB
as the one-time symmetric key encryption scheme, and the IND-CCA2 security game as in Section 5.3.2.1, the
proof directly applies.
86
Chapter 5 Designing DAKEs for Modern Two-Party Secure Messaging
• DREnc(pk1, pk2, 𝑚,Φ; 𝑟): If 𝑟 is omitted, then it is set to 𝑟
$←− ℤ𝑞5. In any case, 𝑟 is inter-
preted as 𝑟 = (K, 𝑘1, 𝑘2, 𝑡1, 𝑡2). 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are used to encrypt 𝑔K for each recipient using
ElGamal [ElG85], and 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 are used later in the NIZKPK.⁷ If pk1 or pk2 are outside of 𝔾
or are the identity element, DREnc returns ⊥. Otherwise, the resulting ciphertexts consist
of 𝑐1𝑖 = 𝑔𝑘𝑖 and 𝑐2𝑖 = pk𝑘𝑖𝑖 · 𝑔K for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. The message 𝑚 is encrypted using the AEAD
scheme with key KDF(𝑔K), where KDF is secure key derivation function, and associated
data Φ, denoted by Θ = AEnc(KDF(𝑔K), 𝑚,Φ). The result also includes a NIZKPK of the











The party calling DREnc acts as the prover P for the NIZKPK. P uses the random values
𝑡𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} to compute 𝑇11 = 𝑔𝑡1 , 𝑇12 = 𝑔𝑡2 , and 𝑇2 = pk𝑡11 /pk𝑡22 . Next, P computes the
hash:
𝐿 = 𝐻 (𝑔∥𝑞∥pk1∥pk2∥𝑐11∥𝑐21∥𝑐12∥𝑐22∥𝑇11∥𝑇12∥𝑇2∥Φ)
where 𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function modeled by a random oracle.⁸ P then com-
putes 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑡𝑖 − 𝐿 · 𝑘𝑖 (mod 𝑞) for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. DREnc returns the encryption of 𝑚, 𝛾 =
(𝑐11, 𝑐21, 𝑐12, 𝑐22, 𝐿, 𝑛1, 𝑛2,Θ).
• DRDec(𝑖, pk1, pk2, sk𝑖,Φ, 𝛾): the recipient parses 𝛾 to retrieve its components. If either public
key is outside of 𝔾 or is the identity element, or if 𝛾 is not of the correct form, then DRDec
returns ⊥. Otherwise, the recipient computes the following three values:
𝑇′11 = 𝑔







7 ⋏The IND-CPA security of ElGamal holds only when the “plaintext” is a group element. For this reason, directly
encrypting a random scalar such as K would be insecure in most circumstances without additional security
assumptions. This topic is revisited in Section 8.2.4.2, which presents a scheme that encrypts “raw” scalars and
discusses various techniques to make this approach secure.
8 ⋏ If 𝐻 is instantiated with a concrete hash function that suffers from length-extension or padding attacks [Tsu92]
(e.g., SHA-2), then Φ should be hashed before it is passed as input to 𝐻, thereby ensuring that the input is of
fixed length. This additional hash is unnecessary if Φ is unused, is already of fixed length, or when using an
appropriate hash function (e.g., SHA-3).
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The recipient then computes 𝐿′ using the same hash operation described in DREnc:
𝐿′ = 𝐻 (𝑔∥𝑞∥pk1∥pk2∥𝑐11∥𝑐21∥𝑐12∥𝑐22∥𝑇′11∥𝑇′12∥𝑇′2∥Φ)
If 𝐿 ≠ 𝐿′, DRDec returns ⊥. Otherwise, the recipient recovers the secret group element
𝑔K = 𝑐2𝑖/𝑐sk𝑖1𝑖 . The recipient can then recover the message 𝑚 by decrypting the AEAD ciphertext
Θ with key KDF(𝑔K) and associated data Φ, denoted by 𝑚 = ADec(KDF(𝑔K),Θ,Φ). If ADec
fails, DRDec returns ⊥. Otherwise, it returns 𝑚.
5.3.2.1 Proof of Security
Security properties for DREAD schemes can be easily derived from those for DRE schemes given
by Chow et al. [CFZ14] by incorporating the associated data parameter Φ where needed:
• Soundness⁹: ciphertexts decrypt to the same value (including ⊥) even when the keys used
by DREnc are not honestly generated, or the ciphertext is not produced by DREnc at all.
Concretely, any Probabilistic Polynomial Time (PPT) adversary has negligible advantage in
the following game:
1. The adversary produces a ciphertext 𝛾, associated data Φ, and two public keys pk1 and
pk2.
2. Let sk1 and sk2 be the unique secret keys associated with pk1 and pk2.
3. The adversary wins if DRDec(1, pk1, pk2, sk1,Φ, 𝛾) ≠ DRDec(2, pk1, pk2, sk2,Φ, 𝛾).
Note that this definition requires the cryptosystem used in the DREAD construction to be
admissible, as defined in Section 5.3.2. ElGamal is admissible [CFZ14].
• Dual-receiver IND-CCA2 security: any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the fol-
lowing game against a sound scheme1⁰:
1. The challenger produces (pk𝑖, sk𝑖) ← DRGen() for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} and sends (pk1, pk2) to the
adversary.
2. The adversary is given decryption oracle access for DRDec(1, pk1, pk2, sk1, ·, ·). The ad-
versary may perform a polynomially bounded number of DREnc calls, oracle requests,
and other operations.
9 ⋏Chow et al. [CFZ14] refer to the analogous property for DRE as strong soundness.
10 ⋏The soundness property simplifies the definition of the game by eliminating the need for two decryption
oracles [CFZ14].
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3. The adversary chooses two messages, 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, of equal length, and associated data
Φ. The adversary sends (𝑚1, 𝑚2,Φ) to the challenger.
4. The challenger chooses 𝑏 $←− {1, 2} and sends 𝛾 ← DREnc(pk1, pk2, 𝑚𝑏,Φ) to the adver-
sary.
5. The adversary may perform a polynomially bounded number of calls to DREnc, oracle
requests, and other operations. The adversary immediately loses if it ever queries the
oracle for DRDec(1, pk1, pk2, sk1,Φ, 𝛾).
6. The adversary outputs a guess 𝑏′.
7. The adversary wins if 𝑏 = 𝑏′.
It is easy to see that the DREAD construction in Section 5.3.2 satisfies the soundness property.
If the NIZKPK verifies, then except with negligible probability, both ElGamal ciphertexts must
encode the same value 𝑔K due to the soundness of the NIZKPK scheme. Consequently, both sk1
and sk2 must cause ADec to return the same value. Otherwise, decryption with either key returns
⊥.
The proof of dual-receiver IND-CCA2 security for the new DREAD construction can be derived
from the proofs given by Faust et al. [FKMV12] according to themethod described in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.3 Efficient Ring Signatures for Three Keys
One way to achieve strong deniability in a DAKE is to use ring signatures, as in RSDAKE and
Spawn [UG15]. Unfortunately, the literature lacks an explicit ring signature construction that
provably provides the security properties required by the new DAKEs while also being efficient,
even though the techniques to do so are known. Schemes introduced prior to the publication of
the security definitions from Bender et al. [BKM06] lack the appropriate proofs [AOS02], require
unusual primitives that are difficult to use in practice [BGLS03; DKNS04; ZK02], or reduce to a
generic form of the approach described in this section [AHR05]. Schemes published after the
definitions from Bender et al. [BKM06] either focus on adding new features, or offering strong
standard model security proofs (at the expense of practicality) [XQL13]. Additionally, “efficient”
ring signature schemes typically focus on scalability with respect to ring size [DKNS04]. The
new DAKEs described in this chapter use small rings with only three potential signers, so scalable
schemes are usually not optimized for this setting. There are also a variety of well-known ring
signature schemes that operate in slightly different scenarios, at the cost of performance [BSS02;
LWW04; WMZW11; CYH05].
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RSDAKE and Spawn use ring signatures to prove that the signer knows one of three private
keys. It is possible to construct an efficient ROM-based ring signature scheme to accomplish
this by issuing a Signature of Knowledge (SoK) of one out of three discrete logarithms [CS97].
An SoK is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system demonstrating knowledge of a value.
The ring signature presented in this section is constructed using an SoK based on the Schnorr
signature scheme [Sch91] and the “OR proof” technique introduced by Cramer et al. [CDS94].11
The Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] makes this proof non-interactive. This approach is far more
efficient than the ring signature scheme used in RSDAKE and Spawn [SW07].
Assume that each public key is of the form 𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔𝑎𝑖 , as in a typical DH key exchange (where
𝑔 is the generator for a group 𝔾 of prime order 𝑞). The SoK over keys (𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3) is a proof of
the following statement, given in Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97]:
SKREP
{︁
(𝑎) : 𝑔𝑎 = 𝐴1 ∨ 𝑔𝑎 = 𝐴2 ∨ 𝑔𝑎 = 𝐴3
}︁
(𝑚)
Assuming without loss of generality that the signer knows 𝑎1, the proof proceeds as follows:
1. Generate random values 𝑡1, 𝑐2, 𝑐3, 𝑟2, 𝑟3 ∈ ℤ𝑞.
2. Compute 𝑇1 = 𝑔𝑡1 .
3. Compute 𝑇2 = 𝑔𝑟2𝐴𝑐22 and 𝑇3 = 𝑔𝑟3𝐴
𝑐3
3 .
4. Compute 𝑐 = 𝐻 (𝑔∥𝑞∥𝐴1∥𝐴2∥𝐴3∥𝑇1∥𝑇2∥𝑇3∥𝑚), where 𝐻 is a hash function modeled by a
random oracle and 𝑚 is the message to “sign”.
5. Compute 𝑐1 = 𝑐 − 𝑐2 − 𝑐3 (mod 𝑞).
6. Compute 𝑟1 = 𝑡1 − 𝑐1𝑎1 (mod 𝑞).
The resulting proof consists of (𝑐1, 𝑟1, 𝑐2, 𝑟2, 𝑐3, 𝑟3). To verify the proof, the verifier begins by




3 ∥𝑚). The verifier then checks whether
𝑐′
?
= 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 + 𝑐3 (mod 𝑞).
In the general case where the prover knows a secret 𝑎𝑖, they select 𝑡𝑖 randomly, compute
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑡𝑖 , and compute 𝑇𝑗 = 𝑔𝑟 𝑗𝐴𝑐 𝑗𝑗 for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, proceeding as normal and ultimately computing 𝑐𝑖
and 𝑟𝑖. The order of elements passed to 𝐻 and sent to the verifier must not depend on the secret
known to the prover (otherwise, the key used to produce the proof can be inferred in practice).
11 ⋏This technique was subsequently extended [CPS+16b; CPS+16a]; however, these results are not useful in the
ring signature construction because the statement to prove is fully known when the proof commences.
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The SoK can be used to construct a ring signature scheme that will authenticate participants
in the new DAKE protocols. The ring signature scheme consists of the following functions:
• RSig(𝐴, 𝑎, 𝑆, 𝑚; 𝑟): RSig produces an SoK 𝜎, bound to the message 𝑚, that demonstrates
knowledge of a private key corresponding to one of three public keys. 𝑆 is the ring of public
keys {𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3} that could possibly have produced the proof. It is required that (𝐴, 𝑎) is a DH
keypair in the appropriate group, and 𝐴 ∈ 𝑆. 𝑟 contains the random coins used to compute the
output. The SoK is computed as described above, with 𝑟 interpreted as 𝑟 = (𝑡𝑖, 𝑐 𝑗, 𝑐𝑘, 𝑟 𝑗, 𝑟𝑘),
where 𝑖 is the index of 𝐴 in 𝑆, and 𝑗 and 𝑘 are the values in {1, 2, 3} such that 𝑖, 𝑗, and 𝑘 are
distinct and 𝑗 < 𝑘. If 𝑟 is omitted, then 𝑟 is set to 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞5.
• RVrf(𝑆, 𝜎, 𝑚): a verification function. RVrf returns TRUE if the SoK 𝜎 is valid, and FALSE
otherwise. Correctness requires that RVrf(𝑆, 𝜎, 𝑚) = TRUE when 𝜎 = RSig(𝐴, 𝑎, 𝑆, 𝑚; 𝑟) for
any valid inputs.
Bender et al. [BKM06] defined several security properties for ring signature schemes. The
new DAKEs require RSig and RVrf to exhibit anonymity against full key exposure (the signer
remains anonymous within the ring even if all signing keys are subsequently compromised) and
unforgeability with respect to insider corruption (signatures are unforgeable even if signing keys
outside of the ring are adversarially generated). The next section includes the definitions of these
properties and the security proofs for the RSig/RVrf ring signature scheme.
5.3.3.1 Proof of Security
The RSig/RVrf scheme presented in Section 5.3.3 must satisfy the following two security prop-
erties defined by Bender et al. [BKM06]:
• Anonymity against full key exposure [BKM06, Def. 4]: it is not possible to determine
which secret key was used to produce the ring signature, even if all secret keys are revealed.
Concretely, any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger generates 𝑛 key pairs (PK𝑖, SK𝑖) where 𝑛 is a polynomial of the security
parameter. Let PK be the set of all public keys, and SK be the set of all secret keys.
2. The adversary is given PK and access to an oracle ORSig(·, ·, ·) such that ORSig(𝑆, ?̄?, ?̄?)
returns RSig(PK ?̄?, SK ?̄?, 𝑆, ?̄?) such that PK ?̄? ∈ 𝑆.
3. The adversary outputs a message 𝑚, distinct indices 𝑖 and 𝑗, and a ring 𝑆 for which
PK𝑖, PK 𝑗 ∈ 𝑆. The adversary is given SK.
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4. The challenger chooses 𝑏 $←− {𝑖, 𝑗} and sends 𝜎← RSig(PK𝑏, SK𝑏, 𝑆, 𝑚) to the adversary.
5. The adversary outputs 𝑏′ and wins if 𝑏 = 𝑏′.
• Unforgeability with respect to insider corruption [BKM06, Def. 7]: it is not possible to
produce an illegitimate ring signature, even with access to legitimate signatures that were
produced using adversarially controlled keys in their rings. Concretely, any PPT adversary
wins the following game with negligible probability:
1. The challenger generates 𝑛 key pairs (PK𝑖, SK𝑖) where 𝑛 is a polynomial of the security
parameter. Let PK be the set of all public keys, SK be the set of all secret keys, and 𝐶 ← ∅
be the set of corrupted users.
2. The adversary is given PK.
3. The adversary is given access to an oracle ORSig(·, ·, ·) such that ORSig(𝑆, ?̄?, ?̄?) returns
RSig(PK ?̄?, SK ?̄?, 𝑆, ?̄?) such that PK ?̄? ∈ 𝑆.
4. The adversary is given access to a corruption oracle Ocorr(·) such that Ocorr( ?̄?) returns SK ?̄?
and sets 𝐶 ← 𝐶 ∪ {PK ?̄?}.
5. The adversary outputs (𝑆, 𝜎, 𝑚) and wins if RVrf(𝑆, 𝜎, 𝑚) = TRUE, the adversary never
queried ORSig(𝑆, 𝑚, ·), and 𝑆 ⊆ PK \ 𝐶.
Some previous work has been done on proving the security of ring signatures in the universal
composability framework. Fischlin and Onete [FO11] presented ideal functionalities for SoKs,
and Yoneyama and Ohta [YO07] defined a ring signature functionality that is provably equivalent
to Bender’s security properties [BKM06]. However, neither of these schemes is defined for recent
frameworks with more accurate modeling of cross-session state (e.g., long-lived public keys).
Defining ring signature functionalities for more realistic frameworks is a substantial task that is
beyond the scope of this work. The remainder of this section presents security theorems for the
RSig/RVrf scheme following the game-based definitions.
Theorem 1 Anonymity of RSig/RVrf
If the SoK produced by RSig is zero-knowledge, then the RSig/RVrf ring signature scheme
provides anonymity against full key exposure. (Ref: 92)
The proof of Theorem 1 directly follows from the security assumption. Since the SoK is zero-
knowledge, the adversary learns nothing from the signing oracle or from the private keys. The
construction of the SoK in Section 5.3.3 is known to be zero-knowledge in the ROM [CS97].
In fact, the RSig/RVrf construction fulfills an even stronger property than required: the signer
remains anonymous even if the secret keys are revealed at the start of the game.
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Theorem 2 Unforgeability of RSig/RVrf
If the discrete logarithm problem is hard in 𝔾, then the RSig/RVrf ring signature scheme
provides unforgeability with respect to insider corruption. (Ref: 93)
It is known that SoKs produced by the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS87] are weakly simulation-
extractable [FKMV12]: for any PPT adversary with access to a proof simulator that can produce a
valid new proof (one not retrieved from the simulator), there is an efficient extractor that can
retrieve a witness for that proof. Using this extractor, the reduction for Theorem 2 becomes
simple: given an adversary that can forge ring signatures, include a blinded group element in
the ring, then extract a witness from the forged proof to compute the discrete logarithm of that
group element with non-negligible probability.
5.3.4 Quantum-Resistant Key Encapsulation
As described in Section 5.2.3, the new DAKE protocols optionally provide quantum transitional
security against future quantum adversaries. This is accomplished by using a black-box passively
secure quantum-resistant KEM modeled by the following functions:
• QRGen(𝑠): a key generation function for initiators. QRGen produces a key pair (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼)
for use with the scheme. 𝑠 represents the random coins used to generate the key pair and
may be omitted to denote that 𝑠 is set to newly sampled randomness.
• QREncaps(PQ𝐼; 𝑠): an encapsulation function used by responders. QREncaps takes an ini-
tiator public key as input and produces a response message 𝑄𝑅 and a shared secret 𝑄𝑘. 𝑠
represents the random coins used to generate the encapsulation and may be omitted to denote
that 𝑠 is set to newly sampled randomness.
• QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅): a decapsulation function used by initiators to derive the shared key.
QRDecaps takes a private key SQ𝐼 and a response message 𝑄𝑅 as input and returns either a
shared secret 𝑄𝑘 or the special symbol ⊥ to indicate a failure condition.
This model permits a variety of quantum-resistant KEMs to be used in the new DAKEs.12 For
contributory schemes, QREncaps uses PQ𝐼 to derive 𝑄𝑘, and 𝑄𝑅 is a public contribution from the
12 ⋏ The candidate quantum-resistant KEMs in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [AAA+20]
standardization effort are all expressed in terms of these three functions. However, the names of the functions
and variables differ slightly from the NIST notation because the DAKEs in this chapter were developed prior to
the standardization of the notation.
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responder. For non-contributory (key transport) schemes, the responder unilaterally determines
𝑄𝑘, and 𝑄𝑅 securely delivers 𝑄𝑘 to the initiator. If (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen() and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄′𝑘) ←
QREncaps(PQ𝐼), then a correct scheme will ensure that QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅) produces 𝑄𝑘 = 𝑄′𝑘.
Some schemes do not guarantee correctness: they allow QRDecaps to return ⊥ for valid inputs,
but with only negligible probability. A scheme is said to be 𝛿-correct [HHK17, §2.2] if:
Pr
[︁
QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅) ≠ 𝑄𝑘
|︁|︁ (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen(); (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)]︁ ≤ 𝛿
The new DAKE protocols perform both a black-box quantum-resistant KEM and a traditional
DH key exchange, then input both shared secrets to a key derivation function. A similar combined
KEM technique is used by CECPQ1 [Lan16] and CECPQ2 [KV19]. For a given security parameter
_, the quantum-resistant KEM must be 2−_-correct and IND-CPA secure. Since the probability
of QRDecaps failing for a valid encapsulation is negligible, it can be ignored in the protocol
design. The security propositions and theorems in this chapter restrict their attention to classical
security. The quantum transitional security properties of the schemes are discussed separately in
Section 6.2.4.1.
To disable the optional quantum transitional security feature, the functions can be instantiated
with “no-op” versions that produce values with zero length, denoted by ∅:
• QRGen∅(𝑠): returns PQ𝐼 = ∅ and SQ𝐼 = ∅.
• QREncaps∅(PQ𝐼; 𝑠): returns 𝑄𝑅 = ∅ and 𝑄𝑘 = ∅.
• QRDecaps∅(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅): returns 𝑄𝑘 = ∅.
In terms of abstract protocols, the interpretation of these values is that transmission of PQ𝐼 = ∅
and 𝑄𝑅 = ∅ is free, and concatenating 𝑄𝑘 = ∅ with another value does not alter that value.
In practice, implementations that do not use quantum transitional security can simply exclude
these function calls from the DAKEs.
5.4 DAKEZ
Given the cryptographic primitives defined in Section 5.3, it is now possible to define the first new
DAKE: DAKEZ. Figure 5.2 depicts the protocol. KDF refers to a secure key derivation function
that is distinct from the KDF used in the DREAD construction.
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I R
“𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞
(PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅∥




(𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute 𝑘
Erase 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘
Verify proof from R
𝑄𝑘 ← QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅)
Compute 𝑘
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
RSig(𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑟},
“1”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ) Verify proof from I
Figure 5.2 DAKEZ key exchange protocol. Φ is shared session state. The shared secret is 𝑘 =
KDF(𝑔𝑖𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘).
(Refs: 94 and 122)
Initially, the developer selects a common group 𝔾 generated by 𝑔 with prime order 𝑞. The
CDH problem should be hard within 𝔾. Initiator I chooses long-term secret key 𝐼 and public key
𝑔𝐼 . Responder R chooses long-term secret key 𝑅 and public key 𝑔𝑅. All parties in the system are
expected to have securely distributed their long-term public keys before the start of the protocol
session.13
A DAKEZ session normally takes place within a higher-level protocol (e.g., XMPP or HTTP).
To prevent attacks that rebind the DAKEZ transcript into different contexts, it is prudent to
ensure that the DAKEZ session authenticates its context. Given state information Φ associated
with the higher-level context, DAKEZ authenticates that both parties share the same value for Φ.
Section 5.7 discusses the contents of this state information in practice. A DAKEZ session proceeds
as follows:
1. I selects ephemeral secrets 𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen(). I sends “𝐼”, 𝑔𝑖, and PQ𝐼 to
R.
13 ⋏ This assumption simplifies the protocol definitions and security proofs. In practice, the implementation-defined
identifier “P” for a party P can include the long-term public key, and these keys can be verified using a trust
establishment mechanism (see Section 2.6) at some point before or after the DAKE session. Section 5.7 discusses
how to integrate the DAKEs with secure messaging protocols in greater detail.
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2. R selects ephemeral secrets 𝑟 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼). R sends “𝑅”, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑄𝑅,
and RSig(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡) to I, where the tag 𝑡 is 𝑡 = “0”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ. R
computes 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘) and securely erases 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘.
3. I verifies the proof sent by R. I sends RSig(𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑟}, 𝑡) to R, where the tag 𝑡 is
𝑡 = “1”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ. I computes 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅) and uses it to
compute the shared secret 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑟) 𝑖∥𝑄𝑘), then securely erases 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘.
4. R verifies the proof sent by I.
This algebraic description of DAKEZ omits several important practical considerations that
must be handled correctly to produce a secure implementation. Section 5.7 discusses these
considerations.
Proposition 1 states a simplified security theorem for DAKEZ. A formal theorem and proof
sketch appear in Section 6.2.
Proposition 1 DAKEZ is secure (informal)
If the RSig/RVrf scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect
to insider corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in 𝔾, then DAKEZ provides the security
properties listed in Section 5.2.2 against adaptive corruptions. (Refs: 96 and 502)
5.5 ZDH
Spawn [UG15] is a two-flow DAKE with a single post-specified peer [CK02a] (i.e., the initiator
I does not know the identity of its partner a priori, but the responder R does). In an interactive
setting, Spawn provides online deniability for both parties. In non-interactive settings where the
adversary is able to guarantee that the first message is honestly generated by the true I, Spawn
does not provide online deniability for R [UG15]. In these settings, explicitly sacrificing online
deniability for R results in a more efficient protocol, ZDH.
5.5.1 Efficient Spawn with Random Oracles
Before introducing the construction of ZDH, it is insightful to first instantiate Spawn [UG15]
using the DREAD and ring signature schemes presented in Section 5.3. While improving the
performance of Spawn is not a primary goal of this work, doing so is important for three reasons:
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I R
“𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞
(PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen() “𝑅”∥
DREnc(𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅,
“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼)∥




(𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute 𝑘
Erase 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘
Verify proof from R
𝑄𝑘 ← QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅)
Compute 𝑘
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
Figure 5.3 Spawn+ key exchange protocol. Φ is shared session state. 𝛾 is the DREnc output. The
shared secret is 𝑘 = KDF(𝑔𝑖𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘). (Ref: 97)
it facilitates a precise characterization of the design improvements in ZDH, it simplifies the
security proof of ZDH, and it provides a baseline performance comparison for ZDH. Figure 5.3
depicts Spawn+, a contributory instantiation of Spawn using the ROM-based primitives. Unlike
DAKEZ, which is secure in the same model as RSDAKE, the contributiveness of Spawn+ makes it
provably secure against stronger adversaries than Spawn.
Initially, the developer selects a common group 𝔾 generated by 𝑔 with prime order 𝑞 in which
the CDH problem is hard. Initiator I and responder R generate long-term key pairs (𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼) and
(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅), respectively, as described in Section 5.3. All parties in the system are expected to have
securely distributed their long-term public keys before the start of the protocol session. A Spawn+
session between I and R within a higher-level protocol with shared session state Φ proceeds as
follows:
1. I selects ephemeral secrets 𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen(). I sends (“𝐼”, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) to R.
An untrusted server may cache this “prekey” message.
2. R selects ephemeral secrets 𝑟 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼). R then computes
the ciphertext 𝛾 = DREnc(𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅, 𝑡), where the tag 𝑡 is given by 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼.
R computes 𝜎 = RSig(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡∥𝛾∥Φ). R sends (“𝑅”, 𝛾, 𝜎) to I. R computes
𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘) and securely erases 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘. Note that R can attach an initial message
𝑚 to this flow by immediately encrypting it with a symmetric cryptosystem keyed with 𝑘.
3. I verifies the proof 𝜎 and decrypts 𝛾 using 𝐼. I verifies that the decrypted message is of the
correct form (e.g., the fields are of the expected length) and that the prekey (𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) that I
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previously sent remains unused. I computes 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅) and the shared secret
𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑟) 𝑖∥𝑄𝑘), then securely erases 𝑖, SQ𝐼, and 𝑄𝑘. If an initial message was attached,
I can decrypt the message using 𝑘.
Developers should incorporate the safeguards discussed in Section 5.7 to securely implement
Spawn+.
Proposition 2 states a simplified security theorem for Spawn+. A formal theorem and proof
sketch appear in Chapter 6.
Proposition 2 Spawn+ is secure (informal)
If the DREAD scheme is sound and IND-CCA2 secure, the RSig/RVrf scheme is anonymous
against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider corruption, and the CDH
assumption holds in 𝔾, then Spawn+ provides the security properties listed in Section 5.2.2
against adaptive corruptions. (Ref: 98)
5.5.2 The ZDH Protocol
This section discusses the construction of ZDH, a DAKE that outperforms the ROM-based variant
of Spawn+ in non-interactive settings primarily by avoiding the use of DREAD operations to
facilitate online deniability for R. ZDH is depicted in the unshaded portions of Figure 5.4 (the
shaded values are used only in XZDH, which is discussed in Section 5.6).
The initial ZDH setup is the same as for Spawn+; parties generate and distribute long-term
ElGamal public keys in a group 𝔾 generated by 𝑔 with prime order 𝑞 in which the CDH problem is
hard. Within a higher-level protocol with shared session state Φ, a ZDH session between initiator
I and responder R with respective key pairs (𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼) and (𝑔𝑅, 𝑅) proceeds as follows:
1. I selects ephemeral secrets 𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen(). I sends (“𝐼”, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) to R.
An untrusted server may cache this “prekey” message.
2. R selects ephemeral secrets 𝑟 ∈ ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼). R then derives
the shared keys ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑖)𝑟 ∥ (𝑔𝐼)𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘), 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^), and 𝑘 = KDF3(^), where
KDF1, KDF2, and KDF3 are key derivation functions modeled by a random oracle. R se-
curely erases 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘. Let the tag 𝑡 be defined by 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ. R com-
putes mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡), where MAC(key,msg) refers to a key-only unforgeable [FGSW16]
message authentication code function for message msg with key key. R computes 𝜎 =
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I R
“𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼 ∥ 𝑔Γ ∥ Sig(𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼, 𝑔Γ)𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞
(PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
“𝑅” ∥ 𝑔𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑅 ∥ MAC(𝑀𝑘,
“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅 ∥𝑔Γ ∥Φ)∥
RSig(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖},




(𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute 𝑘 and 𝑀𝑘
Erase 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘
Verify proof from R
𝑄𝑘 ← QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅)
Compute 𝑘 and 𝑀𝑘
Verify MAC
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
Figure 5.4 ZDH and XZDH key exchange protocols. Φ is shared session state. ^ =
KDF1 (𝑔𝑖𝑟 ∥𝑔Γ𝑟 ∥𝑔𝐼𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘), 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2 (^) and the shared secret is 𝑘 = KDF3 (^). Shaded terms are
used in XZDH only, and omitted for ZDH. In XZDH, 𝑔Γ is a reusable signed prekey.
(Refs: 98 and 101 a b)
RSig(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡). R sends (“𝑅”, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑄𝑅,mac, 𝜎) to I. Note that R can attach a mes-
sage 𝑚 to this flow by immediately encrypting it with a symmetric cryptosystem keyed with
𝑘.
3. I verifies 𝜎. I verifies that (𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) is an unused prekey previously sent by I. I computes
𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅), ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑟) 𝑖 ∥ (𝑔𝑟) 𝐼 ∥ 𝑄𝑘), 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^), and 𝑘 = KDF3(^).
I verifies the MAC and securely erases 𝑖, SQ𝐼, and 𝑄𝑘. If a message was attached, I can
decrypt it using 𝑘.
Developers should incorporate the safeguards discussed in Section 5.7 to securely implement
ZDH.
Proposition 3 states a simplified security theorem for ZDH. A formal theorem and proof sketch
appear in Chapter 6.
Proposition 3 ZDH is secure (informal)
If the MAC is weakly unforgeable under chosen message attack [BKR00], the RSig/RVrf
scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider
corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in 𝔾, then ZDH provides the security properties
listed in Section 5.2.2 against adaptive corruptions when the response is sent by an honest
party. (Refs: 99 and 100)
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5.5.3 Design Discussion
The primary difference between ZDH and Spawn+ is that ZDH does not use DREAD to enable R
to derive the shared secret during online deniability attacks. ZDH also uses a MAC to achieve full
key confirmation for I [FGSW16]. Without this MAC, ZDH would be vulnerable to an identity
misbinding attack [Kra03]; an active adversary P that replaced the ring signature with one for
the ring {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑃, 𝑔𝑖} would cause I to believe that it was communicating with P while sharing a
key with R.
In order to derive the shared secret for Spawn+ from the exchanged information, a party must
either know R ’s ephemeral secret, or I ’s ephemeral secret and either of the long-term secrets. In
order to derive the shared secret for ZDH from the exchanged information, a party must know
either R ’s ephemeral secret, or I’s ephemeral and long-term secrets. The important difference
is that in ZDH, a party that knows R ’s long-term secret and I’s ephemeral secret cannot derive
the key. This is precisely the knowledge available to R when it is trying to simulate I for an
interactive third party. For this reason, the protocol explicitly lacks online deniability for R,
just like non-interactive Spawn and Spawn+. This concession causes the prohibition of corrupt
responders in Proposition 3, but also enables ZDH’s efficient design.
ZDH’s derivation of ^ is similar to the derivation of the shared secret in 3DH [Mar13].
However, 3DH also includes 𝑔𝑖𝑅 as input to its KDF. The purpose of this term in 3DH is to
authenticate R, but ZDH accomplishes this using a ring signature instead. Moreover, including
this term in ZDH would break online deniability for I, as it does in 3DH, because an interactive
third party that chooses 𝑖 and coerces I into sending 𝑔𝑖 can derive the shared secret while
preventing I from doing so.
5.6 XZDH
Spawn, 3DH, Spawn+, and ZDH all share a similar weakness: they are two-flow protocols with
weak forward secrecy. This makes them vulnerable to an attack where an active adversary
modifies the first flow from I to use an adversarially controlled ephemeral key, captures and
drops the response from R, and then compromises I’s long-term secret key [BPR00]. I will
never see the message, and the adversary will be able to decrypt it. Moreover, since long-term
keys are usually meant to last for years, a long time may pass between R sending the message
and the adversary compromising I’s key. In practice, this attack requires a powerful adversary.
Signal’s X3DH protocol [MP16] somewhat mitigates this weakness in 3DH by introducing
the notion of signed prekeys. In contrast to the one-time prekeys used by 3DH, signed prekeys
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are signed by long-term secret keys and are reusable. Each user maintains one signed prekey on
the prekey server, which is changed on a roughly weekly basis [MP16]. The combination of a
one-time prekey and a signed prekey is called a prekey bundle. X3DH incorporates a DH exchange
between I’s signed prekey and R ’s ephemeral key, and makes one-time prekeys optional. The
benefit is that the aforementioned attack is thwarted if I changes its signed prekey and erases
the old one before being corrupted by the adversary. Because the prekey is signed, it cannot
be adversarially altered, and I controls the timing of key erasure. However, the use of signed
prekeys in X3DH severely harms its offline deniability: transcripts can be forged only by one
of the alleged participants, since the forger must complete a DH exchange between I’s signed
prekey and R ’s long-term key.
XZDH is a variant of ZDH incorporating signed prekeys. I’s signed prekey is 𝑔Γ, with cor-
responding secret key Γ ∈ ℤ𝑞. I uploads 𝑔Γ to the prekey server alongside an existentially
unforgeable digital signature [GMR88] for 𝑔Γ created using 𝐼 as the signing key, denoted by
Sig(𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼, 𝑔Γ). The public verification function SVerif(𝑔𝐼 , 𝑚, b) returns TRUE if b is a valid signa-
ture for message 𝑚 created using 𝐼, and FALSE otherwise.
XZDH is identical to ZDH, except that it modifies ^ to be ^ = KDF1(𝑔𝑖𝑟∥𝑔Γ𝑟∥𝑔𝐼𝑟∥𝑄𝑘) and
includes 𝑔Γ in its MAC and RSig messages, as depicted in Figure 5.4. The first flow in Figure 5.4
represents the complete prekey bundle that R downloads from the server. 𝑔Γ is reused across
sessions, but I replaces it regularly (e.g., once a week). XZDH provides online deniability, the
same forward secrecy characteristics as X3DH, and the same offline deniability as ZDH—anyone
can forge an XZDH transcript between I and R given only 𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, and a prekey bundle containing
𝑔Γ and Sig(𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼, 𝑔Γ). Since these values are all publicly distributed, XZDH provides much stronger
offline deniability than X3DH.
Proposition 4 states a simplified security theorem for XZDH.
Proposition 4 XZDH is secure (informal)
If the MAC is weakly unforgeable under chosen message attack [BKR00], the RSig/RVrf
scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider
corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in 𝔾, then XZDH provides the security properties
listed in Section 5.2.2 against adaptive corruptions when the response is sent by an honest
party. (Refs: 101 and 502)
A formal theorem and proof sketch appear in Chapter 6.
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5.7 Secure Messaging Integration
This section covers several practical considerations involved in securely implementing DAKEZ,
Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH for use in secure messaging tools.
All elements in the ciphertexts must be encoded using a method that is unambiguously
parseable (e.g., using length-prefixed strings and fixed-length integer encodings). The identifiers
for the parties (e.g., “𝐼” and “𝑅”) may be cryptographic hashes of usernames, or they may include
the long-term public keys. Identifiers can also include device codes to differentiate between
devices owned by a user. In general, the problem of supporting multi-device conversations is
difficult and mostly orthogonal. Any multi-device technique that works for 3DH or X3DH should
also be applicable to the new DAKEs; the most common techniques in practice—replicating one
key or generating per-device keys [AH16]—are directly applicable.
While the definitions in this chapter are given in terms of generic groups, the primitives
should be implemented using elliptic curve cryptography for maximum performance. Parties
must also ensure that the DH contributions they receive are in the expected group and are not the
identity element. Otherwise, the implementation may be vulnerable to identity-element [Din05],
small-subgroup [LL97], or invalid-curve [ABM+03] attacks.
As discussed in Section 5.5, interactive DAKEZ and Spawn+ provide online deniability for
both I and R, while ZDH and XZDH do not. Consequently, for applications in which interactive
communication is sometimes possible, developers should consider a hybrid approach where
interactive DAKEZ is attempted first, and non-interactive ZDH or XZDH is used as a fallback
option. This hybrid approach enables non-interactive messaging and minimizes the use of one-
time prekeys, but sacrifices online deniability for R when I is willing to use the fallback option.
Using ZDH or XZDH non-interactively requires an untrusted central server to store prekeys.
If prekey submissions are not authenticated, then malicious users can perform denial-of-service
attacks. To preserve the deniability of the overall protocol, one-time prekeys should never be
digitally signed. The best approach is to authenticate prekey uploads using a DAKEZ exchange
between the uploader and the server, which preserves deniability. As an added safeguard, the
server can require a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the private keys associated with the
prekeys.
All of the new DAKEs permit authenticating the shared session state Φ as part of the exchange.
Theoretically, this ensures that the DAKE is “bound” to a session of the messaging protocol. The
higher-level protocol should always include its implicit or explicit session identifier inΦ to perform
this binding. In practice, Φ also allows both sides to cryptographically verify some beliefs they
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have about the session. For example, in an application that assigns some attribute to users before
a conversation (e.g., a networked game in which players take on specific roles), the expected
attributes (encoded in an unambiguously parseable manner) should be included in Φ. If the
DAKE succeeds, then the participants know that they agree about the attribute values.
Implementations of the DAKEs should follow standard secure coding practices for crypto-
graphic software. Cryptographic operations with secret data should be performed in constant
time to mitigate side-channel attacks. Secret values, including intermediaries, should be stored
in locked private memory pages, and ephemeral keys should be securely erased in a manner
guaranteed to persist through compiler optimizations. Hash functions used for different purposes
should be domain separated using application-specific strings.
Deployments of the DAKEs should always include tools to forge key exchanges; this improves
plausible deniability in practice. Specifically, implementations of RSig from Section 5.3.3 should
use the same code for honest and forged authentication. To accomplish this in constant time,
developers can use conditional move operations to copy the appropriate keys into memory regions
for the calculations, and again to move the results into the appropriate positions in the proof.
5.7.1 IncorporatingQuantum Resistance
Selecting a quantum-resistant KEM to use in an implementation is challenging. Recently,
dozens of schemes have been developed and reviewed as part of the NIST standardization
effort [AAA+20]. These schemes offer a wide variety of performance and security characteris-
tics, and there is no protocol that is clearly superior to all others. Fortunately, the generality of
the modular quantum KEM functions defined in Section 5.3.4 allows many schemes, such as the
eventual winners of the NIST standardization process, to be seamlessly integrated into the DAKEs.
Developers should consider computational requirements, key size, ciphertext size, the security
assumptions, and the probability of decapsulation failure when selecting a quantum-resistant
KEM.
As mentioned in Section 5.3.4, the security proofs for the new DAKEs require that if a
quantum-resistant KEM is used, it must provide quantum IND-CPA security, and it must be 2−_-
correct (or better) for security parameter _. Almost all of the finalists and alternate candidates
in the third round of the NIST standardization effort satisfy these requirements for _ = 128.1⁴
14 ⋏ All of the proposed schemes are either correct or 𝛿-correct for 𝛿 ≤ 2−128 with the exception of SABER, which
is only 2−120-correct when using the parameter set for 128-bit security. It is reasonable to consider this failure
probability to be effectively negligible. All of the proposed schemes provide quantum IND-CPA security, with
many additionally providing quantum IND-CCA2 security.
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Historically, some quantum-resistant KEMs, such as New Hope [ADPS16], only provided 𝛿-
correctness for a much larger 𝛿 (e.g., 𝛿 = 2−60). This practice has been effectively abandoned
after it became apparent that decapsulation failures are typically a promising avenue for crypt-
analysis [GJY19]. Developers should ensure that a quantum KEM satisfies the security and
correctness requirements before using it with the new DAKEs. Beyond these basic requirements,
developers should consult the results of the NIST standardization effort to compare performance
and security characteristics of popular quantum-resistant KEMs.
5.8 Implementing the Protocols
Although many DAKEs have been described in the literature, very few of them have ever been
implemented. If a DAKE is designed with the intention of protecting real users, then producing
a proof-of-concept implementation has several benefits. In addition to enabling experiments
to quantify real-world performance, the implementation process often reveals practical hurdles
limiting deployability that cannot be identified from a detached security analysis, necessitating
improved designs. For these reasons, a prototype implementation of the new DAKEs was de-
veloped1⁵ in C using production-ready cryptographic libraries targeting a 128-bit security level.
The implementation employs all of the secure coding techniques mentioned in Section 5.7. The
prototype code and evaluation data are available at crysp.uwaterloo.ca/software.
The remainder of this section provides implementation details. Section 5.8.1 lists the third-
party libraries used in the prototype, Section 5.8.2 describes the additions to the elliptic curve
library that were necessary, and Section 5.8.3 lists the chosen primitives.
5.8.1 Libraries
The implementation uses version 1.1.0e of the OpenSSL library for its cryptographic randomness
source and its AEAD primitives. The implementation uses the twisted Edwards curve associ-
ated with Ed25519 [BDL+12] for its group operations. The ed25519-donna library [Moo12]
with SSE2 extensions was selected due to its speed and portability. Curve points generated by
the library are packed into 32 bytes, which includes the 𝑦-coordinate and a parity bit of the
𝑥-coordinate, for transmission and storage. When unpacked, the points can be multiplied by
15 ⋏ The prototype implementation described in this section was developed in 2017. While many of the dependencies
have released updates in the intervening years, the implementation still accomplishes its objectives: acting as a
reference implementation of the new DAKEs, and facilitating a performance evaluation.
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the subgroup order and compared to the identity element to ensure that they are in the cor-
rect subgroup and not on the twist, although this is not required for the security of Ed25519
signatures [BDL+12]. The eXtended Keccak Code Package [Van13a] provides the SHA-3 im-
plementation for the prototype. To hash curve points, the packed 32 bytes are hashed with
SHA-3.
5.8.2 Ed25519-donna Additions
Although Curve25519 [Ber06] is used in Signal [Ope13] and is generally well-regarded in the
secure messaging community, existing libraries cannot be used to implement the new DAKEs
without modification. X25519 [Ber06] libraries typically store points in Montgomery form, which
discards the sign and complicates ElGamal implementations. Ed25519 [BDL+12] libraries store
points on a birationally equivalent twisted Edwards curve, but do not provide independent point
addition or scalar multiplication functions. Consequently, implementing the prototype required
several additions to ed25519-donna.
The prototype implements constant-time scalar multiplication with variable bases using the
windowed double-and-add-always algorithm. To select random scalars, the prototype uses the
X25519 secret generation procedure [Ber06]. Existing library code was adapted to produce
constant-time implementations of point negation, scalar subtraction, conditional memory copies,
and scalar equality tests.
5.8.3 Primitive Instantiations
To instantiate the DREAD scheme from Section 5.3.2, the prototype uses OpenSSL’s implemen-
tation of AES256-OCB with a 16-byte tag and a 15-byte nonce. The first 15 bytes of the 𝐿 hash
derived in the NIZKPK are used as the nonce for OCB mode, since its probability of repeating is
negligible. The implementation computes the secret group element by multiplying the Ed25519
base point by the random scalarK.1⁶ To derive the AEAD key, the secret group element is packed
into its 32-byte representation and hashed using SHA3-256 as a KDF. SHA3-256 is also used to
instantiate the hash 𝐻 used to compute 𝑐 in RSig.
The prototype supports arbitrary caller-defined user identifiers and shared session state Φ.
The ZDH and XZDH implementations use KMAC256 [KCP16] as the MAC, since it is based on
SHA-3. Although all of the hash input fields are of fixed length, the prototype implements the
16 ⋏This is not a safe method for selecting a random point in general, since the discrete log of the point is known.
The method is safe for this application because the result is only input into a KDF.
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complete KMAC256 padding scheme to reflect the overhead of using general-purpose KMAC
libraries.
5.9 Performance Characteristics
When deciding whether or not to include a DAKE in a secure messaging application, one of the
most important considerations for developers is the expected performance impact on both users
and infrastructure. This section provides an analysis of the prototype implementation to precisely
quantify this impact by answering the following questions for DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH:
• What is the computational overhead for generating long-term keys and participating in key
exchanges?
• How large are the long-term public keys?
• How large are the prekeys (where applicable)?
• How much data is transferred during a key exchange?
• How does the performance of the new DAKEs compare to other state-of-the-art AKEs?
The performance of the new DAKEs was compared to four AKEs with weaker security
properties—Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), 3DH [Mar13], X3DH [MP16], and SIGMA-
R [Kra03]—and the three previously known DAKEs with the same properties—Φidre, RSDAKE,
and Spawn [UG15]. (Φidre [UG15] is a more efficient instantiation of Φdre [DKSW09] using an
interactive multi-round DRE construction.)
3DH, X3DH, ZDH, and XZDH are all designed for non-interactive messaging (e.g., text mes-
saging). ZDH and XZDH use ROM-based ring signatures to achieve strong deniability, which
3DH and X3DH lack. Φidre, RSDAKE, Spawn, and DAKEZ are all designed for interactive com-
munication. DAKEZ is similar to RSDAKE, except that it avoids the need for digital signatures,
and uses ROM-based ring signatures. Φidre provides strong deniability using DRE in the standard
model, but it requires an excessive number of network round trips to do so.
In order to fairly compare the high-level designs, ECDH, 3DH, X3DH, and SIGMA-R were
implemented using the primitives described in Section 5.8: group operations over the Ed25519
twisted Edwards curve, SHA3-256 for hashing and key derivation, and KMAC256 for message
authentication. X3DH and XZDH prekeys were signed with EdDSA. SIGMA-R was implemented
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Table 5.1 Performance evaluation of new DAKEs. (Refs: 107 a b)
ECDH 3DH X3DH SIGMA-R Φidre RSDAKE Spawn DAKEZ Spawn+ ZDH XZDH
Offline Deniable
Online Deniable - - -
Authenticated -
Non-Interactive - - - -
Forward Secrecy - - - - -
Proof Model SM ROM ROM ROM SM SM SM ROM ROM ROM ROM










































Flows 2 2 2 4 9 3 2 3 2 2 2
Public Key [B] - 32 32 32 415 395 992 32 32 32 32
Prekey [B] - 32 32+96 - - - 938 - 32 32 32+96
Exchange [B] 64 80 80 272 5 140 7 598 73 763 464 512 304 304
= provides property; = partially provides property; - = does not provide property / not applicable;
SM = standard model; ROM = random oracle model. Standard deviations are in parentheses. “Forward secrecy” is
the strong variant [BPR00] (all schemes have weak forward secrecy). Prekeys are listed as (one-time)+(signed)
sizes.
as described by Di Raimondo et al. [DGK05] using EdDSA for signatures, and without the identity
protectionmechanism in the OTR protocol [AG07]. Φidre, RSDAKE, and Spawnwere implemented
using the primitives selected in the publication that introduced them [UG15, §7], which are
secure in the standard model. The analysis used 8-byte identifiers for users, and no higher-level
shared session data. It also included identifiers in the transmission costs for non-interactive
protocol, since this reflects real deployments.
The key exchanges were performed using all 11 protocols on one Intel Skylake core pinned
to 4.0GHz with 8MB of L3 cache and Intel Turbo Boost disabled. For each protocol, the analysis
measured the thread-specific CPU time required to perform a key exchange and, independently,
to generate a long-term public key. A total of 100,000 measurements were collected for each
protocol except for Φidre, RSDAKE, and Spawn, where the computational costs restricted the
analysis to 1,000 measurements each. The size of the long-term public keys, prekeys (where
applicable), and the total key exchange traffic (including one-time prekeys) was also measured
for each protocol. Table 5.1 compares the schemes and presents the results. The “partial” forward
secrecy for X3DH and XZDH in the table denotes the characteristics described in Section 5.6.
Table 5.1 shows the dramatic difference between the protocol classes. The schemes without
authentication and strong deniability (left) require less than 1ms to generate long-term keys or
complete key exchanges. In contrast, the strongly deniable schemes in the standardmodel [UG15]
(middle) are prohibitively more expensive: RSDAKE and Spawn require several seconds for
exchanges and require kilobytes of transmission, while Φidre requires over four network round
trips. Despite the computational efficiency of Φidre, it is often the slowest protocol in practice
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due to network round-trip time dominating all other costs in typical networks. DAKEZ, Spawn+,
ZDH, and XZDH (right) provide authentication and strong deniability while nearly matching the
weaker schemes’ performance: the new DAKEs require roughly 1ms of CPU time and only slightly
more communication than SIGMA-R. The one-time prekeys are 32 bytes for all non-interactive
schemes except Spawn, which uses 938 bytes. The signed prekeys for X3DH and XZDH are
96 bytes.
The results show that DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH are the first schemes to offer strong deniability
with only slightly more overhead than AKEs used in popular secure messaging protocols. While
comparing Spawn to Spawn+ demonstrates the value of ROM-based primitives, DAKEZ, ZDH, and
XZDH are all more efficient. For non-interactive settings, XZDH provides better forward secrecy
than ZDH with very small overhead.
5.10 Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks
One aspect of online deniability that is often overlooked in the literature is the relationship
between strongly deniable key exchange protocols and key compromise impersonation attacks. A
KCI attack begins when the long-term secret key of a user of a vulnerable DAKE is compromised.
With this secret key, an adversary can impersonate other users to the owner of the key. DAKEs
offering online deniability, such as Φidre, RSDAKE, Spawn, DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH,
are inherently vulnerable to key compromise impersonation attacks. Moreover, “vulnerability” in
this context is actually a desirable property.
In theory, a user who claims to cooperate with a judge may justifiably refuse to reveal their
long-term secret key because it would make them vulnerable to a KCI attack. The design of
strongly deniable DAKEs makes it impossible for the user to provide proof of communication
to the judge without also revealing their long-term secret key. This is the primary benefit and
motivation of this class of key exchanges: they prevent a judge and informant from devising a
protocol wherein the judge is given cryptographic proof of communication while the informant
suffers no repercussions.
However, this scenario may be mostly theoretical. The more common case in practice may be
the one in which the judge has access to the user’s long-term secret keys. A typical real-world
example is when a user is forced to surrender and unlock their mobile device with a secure
messaging application installed; American and Canadian border agents currently exercise this
power over travelers [Gru17; Gol15]. In this situation, the KCI “vulnerability” also becomes an
asset. This section uses non-interactive Spawn+ as an example for simplicity, but the ideas can be
extended to the other DAKEs.
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5.10.1 Attacks Against Spawn+
The security of Spawn+ does not require trusting the central server used to distribute prekeys.
However, in a scenario where the user’s keys have been compromised but the central server has
not, it is possible to achieve better plausible deniability. The user may ask the central server in
advance to assist with a forged conversation, casting doubt on all conversations conducted by the
judge using the compromised device.
If the judge attempts to act as I in a conversation using the compromised device, then the user
(or a trusted accomplice with access to the long-term secret 𝐼) can impersonate R by executing
RSig with 𝑔𝐼 and 𝐼 instead of 𝑔𝑅 and 𝑅. In practice, the user (or accomplice) simply needs to run
the protocol honestly, but pretend to be R in their response to the prekey.
If the judge attempts to act as the responder R of a conversation using the compromised
device, then the situation can be somewhat improved, but it is not possible offer full deniability.
The user must ask the central server to return a false prekey for I that was generated by the
user or their trusted accomplice, and to redirect all traffic to the associated forging device. This
false prekey must be returned to the judge when they request one. The user can derive the
shared secret 𝑘 by decrypting the DREAD ciphertext using 𝐼 instead of 𝑅. In practice, the judge
can always bypass this forgery attempt by obtaining a legitimate prekey for I and using this to
respond using 𝑅. This is a fundamental limitation of Spawn+ that also applies to Spawn, and is
conjectured to be insurmountable by a two-flow non-interactive protocol [UG15]. The design of
ZDH in Section 5.5 explicitly acknowledges this limitation to improve performance.
5.10.2 Limiting or Preventing Attacks
If the KCI vulnerability is undesirable, it is possible to make all of the new DAKEs more resilient
to it while maintaining their deniability properties. To do so, a protocol like Spawn+ can be
altered to include long-term “forger” keys for all participants. For example, initiator I would
distribute both 𝑔𝐼 and 𝑔𝐹𝐼 as its public key, where 𝑔𝐹𝐼 is I’s public forging key, and 𝐹𝐼 is the
associated secret key. The second flow in the Spawn+ key exchange is then altered so that the
ciphertext and proof are computed as follows: 𝛾 = DREnc(𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝐹𝑅 , 𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅, “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼), and
𝜎 = RSig(𝑔𝑅, 𝑅, {𝑔𝐹𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝛾∥Φ).
In general, this transformation changes all long-term public keys in the protocol that are not
used in the “honest” case to reference the forging keys instead. This alteration allows the forging
keys to be stored more securely than the “honest” public keys; since the forging keys are not
needed for normal operation, they may be stored offline (e.g., on paper in a vault). Alternatively,
if a user (or developer) is more concerned about preventing KCI attacks than providing online
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deniability, the forging secret keys can be destroyed immediately after generation; this will
sacrifice online deniability for the user, but also prevent KCI attacks against them.
Counterintuitively, implementing this option for users can actually provide both benefits in
practice. Consider a secure messaging application that asks users whether or not they would
like to save forging keys during setup. Even if most users select the default option to securely
erase the forging keys, thereby preventing them from performing the online forgery techniques
described above, a judge does not generally know the choice of a particular user. Consequently,
a judge that engages in a conversation using a compromised device is given two explanations:
either the conversation is genuine, or the owner of the device was one of the users that elected to
store the forgery keys and they are using those keys to forge the conversation. The result is that
a degree of plausible deniability is preserved, even though most users in this scenario become
immune to KCI attacks.
The same general transformation works for the other DAKEs described in this chapter. Note
that trust establishment (e.g., physical exchange of key fingerprints) must cover both keys in this
scheme. This is most easily accomplished by verifying a fingerprint derived from a hash of both
keys.
5.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced three new two-party DAKEs—the first to practically provide strong
deniability for secure messaging applications in both interactive and non-interactive settings.
Section 5.1 motivated the need for strong deniability by describing insider attacks against OTRv3
and Signal that are only possible because these protocols use DAKEs without online deniability.
Section 5.2 described the desired security properties for the new DAKEs. Section 5.3 defined
and constructed the necessary cryptographic primitives: Section 5.3.2 defined DREAD, which
adds authenticated associated data to DRE cryptosystems; Section 5.3.2 also presented a DREAD
construction built using hybrid ElGamal encryption and a NIZKPK of plaintext equality; Sec-
tion 5.3.3 presented an efficient three-element ring signature scheme in the ROM constructed
using a Schnorr-based NIZKPK; and Section 5.3.4 defined the interface for a quantum-resistant
KEM in order to provide quantum transitional security in the new DAKEs. Section 5.4 introduced
DAKEZ, a new DAKE meant for interactive secure messaging settings like instant messaging.
Section 5.5 introduced ZDH (and a ROM-based variant of Spawn that is useful for comparison
purposes), a new DAKE meant for non-interactive settings that is a drop-in replacement for 3DH.
Section 5.6 introduced XZDH, which improves the forward secrecy of ZDH in the same way that
X3DH improves the forward secrecy of 3DH. Section 5.7 provided practical advice and covered
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common security pitfalls for developers choosing to implement the new DAKEs. Section 5.8
described a prototype implementation of the new DAKEs and competitive schemes constructed
using the same primitives, and Section 5.9 analyzed this prototype as part of a performance
evaluation. Finally, Section 5.10 described the relationship between online deniability and KCI
attacks, as well as a technique to mitigate KCI attacks while preserving plausible deniability.
While this chapter introduced powerful new DAKEs, it focused heavily on a high-level overview
and technical details that are primarily beneficial to developers. In particular, the security
properties of the DAKEs were presented in a very informal manner for clarity of presentation.
However, since AKEs have been historically prone to security oversights, it is important to provide
a formal proof of the claimed security properties whenever possible. The next chapter presents
an in-depth security analysis of the new DAKEs presented in this chapter, and proves that they




Proving the Security of DAKEZ,
Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH
In this chapter: Proof
T
hree new two-party DAKEs with strong deniability intended for secure messaging
applications were introduced in Chapter 5: DAKEZ (Section 5.4), ZDH (Section 5.5),
and XZDH(Section 5.6). Chapter 5 informally defined the security properties of the
new DAKEs and proved the security of the underlying DREAD and RSig/RVrf primitives, but it did
not provide formal security proofs for the DAKEs. This chapter formally defines the threat model
and security properties for the new DAKEs and sketches security proofs for all of these properties.
These proof sketches are academically interesting contributions in their own right, as they include
the definition of several components and techniques that can be reused for the development and
analysis of future DAKEs. However, the details in this chapter are highly technical and will only
be of interest to cryptographers; readers who are uninterested in the minutia of security proofs
may wish to skip to Chapter 7.
Section 6.1 outlines the general approach to prove the security of the DAKEs and the nec-
essary preliminaries. The security proofs for DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH are sketched in
Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5, respectively. Although Spawn+ is an illustrative construction that
is not intended to be used in practice, proving its security is useful for establishing techniques
that are reused when proving ZDH’s security.
6.1 DAKE Security Proof Techniques
Several techniques have been suggested for modeling and proving deniability properties of
DAKEs. Di Raimondo et al. first formalized the notion of DAKEs [DGK06]. More recently, Fischlin
and Mazaheri [FM15] proposed weaker deniability notions that can characterize the properties
of SIGMA, 3DH, and X3DH. Dodis et al. [DKSW09] pointed out that the notions of online and
offline deniability have natural parallels in security proofs within the universal composability
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(Universal Composability (UC)) framework introduced by Canetti [Can01]. UC is a framework
for instantiating security models and using them to prove the security of protocols. A protocol
that is secure in a UC-based model is guaranteed to retain its security properties under arbitrary
compositions, even when arbitrary protocols are run concurrently.
A UC security proof involves defining an ideal functionality that describes a protocol with self-
evident security properties. This ideal functionality is executed by a trusted authority that protocol
participants, and an adversary, interact with. The functionality defines the possible interactions
between the parties and the authority; in the case of the adversary, messages sent to the authority
model adversarial control over protocol execution, and messages sent to the adversary represent
information disclosures. A UC security proof involves showing that any adversary attacking
a particular “real” protocol (without a trusted authority) can be used to construct an attack
against the ideal functionality, thereby showing that their security properties are equivalent. A
protocol with this property is said to UC-realize the functionality. To show this property, proofs
demonstrate that no external environment can distinguish between an adversary interacting with
the real protocol and a simulator interacting with the ideal functionality. This environment can
communicate with the adversary (or simulator), control the inputs of the protocol participants,
and read their outputs, but it cannot directly view or interact with messages exchanged between
the participants. In contrast, the adversary is given complete control over messages transmitted
between participants. The adversary (or simulator) can also corrupt parties, which provides
complete control over their future interactions, and reveals all memory state that has not been
erased (if memory erasure is permitted by the model). The external environment is notified when
parties are corrupted.
Internally, the computational model of UC is defined in terms of interactive Turing machines
with “secure” and “insecure” tapes, and the ability to invoke other machines as subroutines.
The proof sketches in this chapter are not expressed in terms of these internal modeling details;
interested readers are referred to Canetti’s definitions for the formalization [Can01]. The proof
sketches in this chapter assume that the reader is familiar with the UC framework.
Canetti et al. defined the generalized universal composability (GUC) framework for the pur-
pose of proving strong deniability properties [CDPW07]. The GUC framework is an extension
of UC in which all machines (including the ideal functionality and the external environment)
are granted access to shared functionalities that persist between protocol sessions. This pro-
vides a natural way to model features like a PKI. The security proof sketches for RSDAKE and
Spawn [UG15] also used the GUC framework.
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6.1.1 The GUC Framework
Following Dodis et al. [DKSW09] and Unger and Goldberg [UG15], the security proofs for the
new DAKEs are sketched in the GUC framework. The GUC framework corrects a deficiency in
the basic UC framework: in many protocols, some state information persists across sessions
(e.g., long-term public keys). This information should be available to the external environment,
because it could be used to distinguish between simulators and real protocols. This persistent
state is captured by shared functionalities.
For maximum usefulness, the new sketches rely on traditional game-based security proofs
for the primitives (i.e., the DREAD and ring signature schemes) within the GUC framework; this
makes it easy to substitute primitives with other well-known constructions, while also providing
strong composability guarantees for the new DAKEs. The new sketches use a GUC-based security
model including random oracles.
Security proofs in the GUC framework follow four steps: define an ideal functionality with
the desired security properties, define a “real” protocol, construct a simulator S attacking the
ideal functionality based on an adversary A attacking the real protocol, and show that the two
scenarios are externally indistinguishable given the security assumptions. The main participants
in a protocol are called the principal parties. In the real setting, these parties use their inputs to
exchange messages over a network controlled by A, then generate outputs. In the ideal setting,
these parties are dummy parties that simply forward inputs and outputs to and from the ideal
functionality over a secure channel.
To simplify the process of producing GUC security proofs, Canetti et al. [CDPW07] introduced
the External-subroutine Universal Composability (EUC) framework. EUC is equivalent to GUC,
except that it constrains the scheme to a single shared functionality Ḡ (an ideal functionality meet-
ing this definition is called Ḡ-subroutine respecting). Moreover, in the EUC framework it is only
necessary to consider a single session of the challenge protocol. Canetti et al. [CDPW07] proved
that EUC security is equivalent to GUC security for Ḡ-subroutine respecting protocols [CDPW07,
Th. 2.1], greatly reducing the complexity of proofs. Notably, this surprising result means that a
Ḡ-subroutine respecting protocol that EUC-realizes an ideal functionality also GUC-realizes that
ideal functionality when it is run concurrently with itself and with arbitrary external protocols.
This results enables the new proof sketches to use the simpler EUC framework, while the results
can be extended to the GUC framework.
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6.1.2 Proof Notation and Setup
The new proof sketches adopt standard notational conventions for interactive Turing machines
in the EUC/GUC framework. Ideal functionalities include F in their name. The external en-
vironment, denoted by Z, attempts to distinguish between a simulator S attacking the ideal
functionality and a real adversary A attacking a real protocol. 𝑃 denotes an idealized party
interacting with an ideal functionality in the EUC/GUC framework; P denotes the corresponding
party in a real protocol. The corresponding party simulated by S for A is denoted as 𝑃 (𝑠) . As a
notational convenience, 𝑃 is written within the context of a EUC/GUC message to denote a label
for the party. Similarly, P is written in the context of a real protocol message to denote the same
label for the party.
The GUC framework permits more general interactions between entities, but due to the
aforementioned equivalence of the frameworks, the sketches can focus solely on EUC interactions
while effectively producing GUC proofs. In summary, in the EUC framework,Z is permitted to
securely communicate with A (or S), control the inputs of every principal party P (or 𝑃), and
read their outputs. A is given control over the interactions of every principal party P (in the
real setting) or 𝑃 (𝑠) (when being simulated by S), while S is permitted to interact with the ideal
functionality in the prescribed manner. Both A and S are able to corrupt principal parties, and
these corruptions are reported toZ. The ideal functionality, A, S, andZ are all permitted to
interact with with the shared functionality in the prescribed manner.
In the new security proof sketches, code for interactive Turing machines is given in event-
based C-like pseudocode for clarity. The return keyword indicates that message processing
immediately ceases; return combined with if expresses publicly known constraints on message
values. The sketches adopt the common notion of “delayed messages” to mean that the ideal
functionality gives S control over the timing and success of the message delivery by sending a
message to S, and delivering the original message only upon receipt of a delivery instruction
message from S.
The execution of a system of interactive Turing machines takes place sequentially (i.e.,
only one machine is active at any point in time) [Can01]. The new proof sketches follow the
execution semantics defined by Canetti and Krawczyk for real protocols [CK02b, Fig. 1] and ideal
processes [CK02b, Fig. 2], which unambiguously specify the activation order of machines. Note
that these semantics allow principal parties in real protocols to send one message and locally
output a value in the same activation (after whichZ becomes active), and they also allow ideal
functionalities to send multiple messages in an activation (if the functionality sends a message
to S then S becomes active, otherwise the previously activated party becomes active).
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Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro denotes the shared functionality depicted in Algorithm 6.1, which is used by all
of the new proof sketches. This shared functionality models two types of cross-session state:
the registration and distribution of long-term public keys, and a collection of domain-separated
random oracles. This is accomplished by merging together two shared functionalities that
were previously defined in the literature: Ḡ𝜑krk and Ḡro. Ḡ
𝜑
krk refers to the key registration with
knowledge PKI shared functionality defined by Dodis et al. [DKSW09, Fig. 2], which distributes
public keys to all parties, but reveals the corresponding secret keys only to corrupted owners
and the ideal functionality F . Ḡro refers to the random oracle shared functionality defined by
Walfish [Wal08, Fig. 2.4]. Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro essentially combines Ḡ
𝜑
krk with 𝑛 copies of Ḡro in order to
explicitly model the notion of domain separation. It is necessary to combine these functionalities
into one so that the EUC framework applies.
Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro is parameterized with a set of interactive Turing machine programs, 𝜑, that are
permitted to retrieve secret keys.1 Corrupt parties can always retrieve their own secret keys. The
new sketches permit secret keys to be retrieved by honest parties running the real key exchange
protocol (so that they can perform the protocol without revealing their secret keys to Z) and
by the ideal functionality. This restricts honest parties to safe usage of their long-term secret
keys. Borrowing a notational convenience from Walfish [Wal08, §3.3], Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro is implicitly
parameterized with the ideal functionality that a proof sketch is attempting to realize.
Note Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro does not provide the ability to “reprogram” random oracle results or to extract
random oracle queries. This differs from traditional random oracle models, but follows the GUC-
based functionality defined by Walfish [Wal08]. The main reason for omitting these features is
that simulators in the UC (and EUC/GUC) framework must be straight-line simulatable, since S
is given only black-box access toZ and has no control over it [Lin03]. This is an intuitive result,
sinceZ effectively represents concurrent protocols, and these protocols have direct access to the
same random oracle. In general,Z can perform random oracle queries on its own, and transfer
the results to A or S to hide the queries and avoid the possibility of reprogramming. However,
indistinguishability proofs have no such restrictions, and reductions may rewindZ or reprogram
the random oracle, since these reductions can internally executeZ and S. This technique can be
used to employ the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in protocols within the GUC framework by performing
the standard reduction [BR93b] involving programming the random oracle [Wal08, Th. 5.10].
All of the simulators in this chapter are straight-line simulatable and these simulators do not
reprogram the random oracle. The simulators do not require the extraction of witnesses from
1 ⋏ In the UC framework (and by extension in the GUC and EUC frameworks), machines can inspect the code
being run by other machines to see if they are running a particular program. The shared functionality uses this
technique to ensure that only the intended ideal functionality can retrieve uncorrupted secret keys, enabling a
simple analysis of the key secrecy property.
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Algorithm 6.1 Shared functionality for key registrationwith knowledge andrandom
oracles. (Refs: 116 and 160)
Shared Functionality Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro
Parameterized by an implicit security parameter _, a set of interactive Turing machine programs
𝜑, a number of random oracles 𝑛, and a group 𝔾 generated by 𝑔 with prime order 𝑞.
on (register) from P:
if (P is corrupt) return
if (there is a record (key,P, ·, ·)) return
SK $←− ℤ𝑞
PK ← 𝑔SK
Record (key,P, PK, SK)
on (register, SK) from P:
if (P is not corrupt) return
if (there is a record (key,P, ·, ·)) return
PK ← 𝑔SK
Record (key,P, PK, SK)
on (retrieve,Q) from P:
if (there is a record (key,Q, PK, SK)) {
Send (pubkey,Q, PK) to P
} else {
Send (pubkey,Q,⊥) to P
}
on (retrievesecret,Q) from P:
if ((P is honest) ∧ (P ’s code ∉ 𝜑)) {
return
}
if ((P is corrupt) ∧ (P ≠ Q)) return
if (there is a record (key,Q, PK, SK)) {
Send (seckey,Q, PK, SK) to P
} else {
Send (seckey,Q,⊥,⊥) to P
}
on (ro, 𝑖, 𝑥) from P:
if (𝑖 ∉ [1, 𝑛]) return
if (there is a record (ro, 𝑖, 𝑥, 𝑣)) {




Record (ro, 𝑖, 𝑥, 𝑣)
Send (ro, 𝑣) to P
}
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NIZKPKs or SoKs, and thus the protocols do not require straight-line extractable zero-knowledge
proofs (e.g., Ω-protocols [GMY03]).
While this chapter does not include explicit reductions in the proof sketches, the indistin-
guishability proofs note when indistinguishability depends on the security assumptions of the
primitives. In these cases, it is easy to construct reductions that attack the assumptions by inter-
nally executing S and aZ with distinguishing advantage, programming values as necessary to
insert the reduction question, and then using the results ofZ to complete the attack.
6.2 Proof of DAKEZ Security
To prove the security of DAKEZ within the GUC framework, an ideal functionality that represents
a DAKE with the desired features and security properties must be selected. Unfortunately, the
ideal functionalities defined by Dodis et al. [DKSW09] (F IncProckeia ) and Unger and Goldberg [UG15]
(F IncProcpost−keia) do not capture all of the desired properties, so a new functionality is required.
Section 6.2.1 introduces and discusses this new functionality. Section 6.2.2 formally defines
DAKEZ with an interface matching the ideal functionality. Section 6.2.3 presents the security
theorem and an overview of the proof strategy. Section 6.2.4 relates the protocol properties in
Section 5.2.2 to the ideal functionality definition. Finally, Section 6.2.5 describes the actual proof
sketch and subsequent sections of this chapter.
6.2.1 Ideal Functionality for DAKEZ
6.2.1.1 Contributiveness
In their original analysis of universally composable key exchanges, Canetti and Krawczyk [CK02b]
proposed an ideal functionality, Fke, that sends a randomly selected session key to the participants.
They noted that this functionality cannot be realized by protocols like two-flow DH, since the
simulator must “commit” to a shared secret without knowledge of the session key selected by
the ideal functionality. Non-static adversarial corruptions can distinguish between real and
ideal protocols by corrupting ephemeral state prior to the final flow, using it to compute the
shared secret, and comparing the result to the key chosen by the ideal functionality. Hofheinz
et al. [HMS03] later showed that Fke can in fact never be realized in the presence of adaptive
adversaries. There are two simple ways to overcome this problem: modify the ideal functionality
to allow the simulator to dictate the shared secret when a party is corrupted (the approach
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taken by Dodis et al. [DKSW09], Hofheinz et al. [HMS03], and Unger and Goldberg [UG15]), or
move part of the simulator into a protocol-specific non-information oracle (the approach taken by
Canetti and Krawczyk [CK02b]).
A non-information oracle N is a probabilistic interactive Turing machine that interacts with
another machineM and then produces local output. The “non-information” property requires
that the local output ofN is computationally indistinguishable from random from the perspective
ofM, and independent of all messages exchanged between N andM [CK02b]. This construct
can be used as part of an ideal functionality to make notions of key exchange realizable in the
UC framework. Specifically, a properly designed non-information oracle can provide information
to the simulator S, allowing it to provide the “commitments” necessary to simulate a real
protocol, while using secret internal state to provide a session key to the ideal functionality. The
computational indistinguishability of the local output (which becomes the session key) from
random guarantees that S (and thus A) cannot compromise the shared secret key. Since the
shared secret should not be hidden from the protocol participants, these internal secrets are
exposed to S if it corrupts one of the participating ideal parties. Canetti and Krawczyk [CK02b]
defined a relaxed ideal functionality, FNwke, parameterized by a non-information oracle N , that
is realized by a two-party DH key exchange. The security achieved by realizing this ideal
functionality is equivalent to the older notion of SK-security [Can01].
Hofheinz et al. [HMS03] later noted that non-information oracles can be used to capture
the common notion of contributiveness [HMS03]. This notion, which they refer to as initiator
resilience, prevents the initiator of the key exchange from predetermining the value of the shared
secret. As in a DH key exchange, the responder can still completely determine the value of the
secret by selecting their contribution appropriately.
6.2.1.2 Deniability
Dodis et al. [DKSW09] noted that universal composability can be used to prove that a key
exchange protocol is deniable. If a protocol realizes an appropriately chosen key exchange
ideal functionality, then the resulting simulatability properties imply both offline and online
deniability; the simulator S acts as the forger (in the offline case) or the misinformant (in the
online case), and the distinguishing environmentZ acts as the judge.
Dodis et al. [DKSW09] proposed the definition of a key exchange functionality with an “in-
criminating abort”, which can be realized by efficient DAKEs that leak non-simulatable messages
to active adversaries willing to cause session failures. This weakness is not a significant concern
in practice, and it prevents the need to use unrealistically expensive cryptographic primitives.
The simulator is permitted to ask the ideal functionality to abort the exchange, which prevents
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the delivery of the shared secret to at least one party. After aborting the protocol, the simulator
can obtain some non-simulatable information that betrays involvement in the protocol by one of
the parties. The model parameterizes the functionality with a protocol-specific “incriminating
procedure” called IncProc that generates this incriminating information from one of the long-term
secret keys. The security proof sketches for RSDAKE and Spawn [UG15] adopted this approach.
6.2.1.3 Functionality Construction
Algorithm 6.2 depicts F +post-keia, a new ideal functionality. This functionality incorporates the
Hofheinz et al. [HMS03] model of contributiveness [HMS03], the Dodis et al. [DKSW09] model
of deniability with incriminating abort [DKSW09], and the Unger and Goldberg [UG15] model
of post-specified peers [UG15]. Consequently, the functionality is parameterized by both a
non-information oracle N and an incrimination procedure IncProc.
The core of F +post-keia is the computation and delivery of a shared secret key. F +post-keia expects
two parties to declare participation in the protocol with initiate and establish messages.2
These parties are thereafter referred to as the initiator 𝐼 and responder 𝑅, respectively. Like
Dodis et al. [DKSW09] [DKSW09, Fig. 3], all parties are assumed to have registered secret
keys with the shared functionality before beginning a protocol session. F +post-keia ensures that
the initiator is always defined first by delaying the processing of an establish message until a
initiate message is seen. This simplifies simulator construction. Once both roles are defined,
the simulator S is permitted to control delivery of the shared secret to 𝐼 and 𝑅. S sends an ok
message to indicate that the shared key has become fixed. S can then individually choose to
deliver the key to the ideal parties by sending delivermessages. Post-specified peers are modeled
by allowing S to specify the identity of the remote party in deliver messages. S may only
specify “incorrect” remote identities if it has corrupted the corresponding parties. As in Canetti
and Krawczyk [CK02b], the 𝑎𝑢𝑥 parameter in the initiate and establish messages contains
auxiliary routing information. Real protocols use this information to deliver messages to the
other party even though their logical identity is not known at the start of the protocol. The ideal
functionality simply ignores 𝑎𝑢𝑥. The protocol-specific details of the message routing (e.g., local
broadcasts, message pools, or central servers) are independent of the security analysis [CK02a].
When both parties receive the key, F +post-keia halts.
2 ⋏Walfish [Wal08, Fig. 3.5], Dodis et al. [DKSW09, Fig. 3], and Unger and Goldberg [UG15, Alg. 1] all make a
mistake in the registration messages by requiring the secret keys SK𝐼 and SK𝑅 as input. In UC/EUC/GUC, ideal
functionalities are executed with dummy parties that simply pass inputs received from Z to the functionality.
Since one purpose of using a shared functionality to model the PKI is to hide honest parties’ secret keys fromZ,
this preventsZ from starting the protocols. The correct solution, as noted in Section 6.1.2, is to give the ideal
functionality access to the secret keys for the purpose of invoking IncProc. Walfish and Dodis et al. [DKSW09]
both do this, but superfluously and erroneously also require SK𝐼 and SK𝑅 as inputs from the principal parties.
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Algorithm 6.2 Ideal functionality modeling DAKEZ’s behavior. (Refs: 120 and 160)
Ideal Functionality F +post-keia
F +post-keia proceeds as follows, running on security parameter _, in the Ḡ
𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔
krkro -hybridmodel, with
parties 𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛 and an adversary S. The functionality is parameterized by a non-information
oracle N , and an incrimination procedure IncProc. When initializing, F +post-keia invokes N with
fresh randomness.
on interaction with N :
Allow S to communicate with N by forwarding mes-
sages between them. If at any point 𝐼 or 𝑅 is corrupted
or 𝑅 is “aborted” while N has produced local output,
send the complete state and output of N to S.
on (initiate, sid, 𝐼,Φ, aux) from 𝑃 ∈ {𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛}:
if (an initiate message seen before) return
if (𝑃 ≠ 𝐼) return
Record that 𝐼 is the initiator
Mark 𝐼 as “active”
Send (initiate, sid, 𝐼,Φ) to S
on (establish, sid, 𝑅,Φ) from 𝑃 ∈ {𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛}:
if (an establish message seen before) return
if (𝑃 ≠ 𝑅) return
if (initiator not recorded) {
Resume processing once initiator is recorded
}
Record that 𝑅 is the responder
Mark 𝑅 as “active”
Send (establish, sid, 𝑅,Φ) to S
on (ok, sid, 𝑘) from S:
if (a key tuple (sid, ^) has been recorded) return
if ((𝐼 not recorded) | | (𝑅 not recorded)) return
if ((𝐼 is corrupt) && (𝑅 is corrupt)) return
if ((𝐼 is uncorrupted) && (𝑅 is uncorrupted)
↩→ && (𝑅 is “active”)) { ^ $←− {0, 1}_ }
else if ((𝐼 is corrupt) && (𝑅 is “active”)) {
↩→ Let ^ denote the local output of N }
else { ^← 𝑘 }
Record key tuple (sid, ^)
on (deliver, sid, 𝑃, 𝑃′) from S:
if (no key tuple (sid, ^) has been recorded) return
if (a set-key message was already sent to 𝑃) return
if (IncProc was previously executed) return
if ((𝑃 ∉ {𝐼, 𝑅}) | | (𝑃 is not “active”)) return
if (({𝑃, 𝑃′} ≠ {𝐼, 𝑅}) && (𝑃′ is uncorrupted)) return
Send (set-key, sid, 𝑃′, ^) to 𝑃
if (two set-key messages have been sent) Halt
on (abort, sid) from S:
if (𝐼 is “active”) Send delayed (abort, sid, 𝐼) to 𝐼
if (𝑅 is “active”) {
Mark 𝑅 as “aborted”
Send delayed (abort, sid, 𝑅) to 𝑅
}
on (incriminate, sid) from S:
if (IncProc was previously executed) return
if ((𝑅 is “aborted”) && (𝐼 is “active”)
↩→ && (𝑅 is uncorrupted)) {
Send (retrievesecret, 𝑅) to Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro
Retrieve SK𝑅 from Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro
Execute IncProc(sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
}
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Contributiveness is provided by placing restrictions onS’s ability to set the value of the session
key. If S does not corrupt either party before fixing the session key with an ok message, F +post-keia
selects a key completely at random. However, if S corrupts only 𝐼, its influence over the key is
still restricted. In this case, F +post-keia draws the value of the session key from N . Although S is
granted unrestricted interaction with N , the non-information property of N prevents S from
learning or controlling the key. Only if S corrupts 𝑅 before sending an ok message is it given
complete control over the session key. In all cases, corruption of either party provides knowledge
of the session key; F +post-keia transmits the internal state and output of N to S upon corruption of
either participant.
To permit realization of the functionality, F +post-keia also provides an incriminating abort pro-
cedure through IncProc. If S sends an abort message to F +post-keia before the functionality halts,
the key exchange can no longer fully complete. F +post-keia models this by internally labeling 𝐼 and
𝑅 (when defined) as “active” or “aborted”. The session key cannot be delivered to an “aborted”
party using a delivermessage. For F +post-keia, only 𝑅 is guaranteed to be aborted; it is still possible
for 𝐼 to output a result. When aborting the protocol, S can choose to deliver notifications of the
abort to active parties independently. If both parties have been defined, 𝑅 remains uncorrupted,
and S has aborted the protocol, S can send an incriminate message to trigger invocation of
IncProc, allowing it to receive protocol-specific incriminating messages.
One subtle interaction between the features is thatS must be allowed to derive the session key
when the protocol is aborted. This case models the real-world situation in which the adversary
has altered a message flow to incorporate adversarially controlled ephemeral state. While an
authenticated key exchange must detect this alteration and prevent completion of the protocol
(modeled in F +post-keia by the abort procedure), the attack may allow the adversary to derive the
shared secret after it has become fixed, but before verification occurs.
6.2.2 DAKEZ in the GUC Framework
DAKEZ was defined in Section 5.4. However, to prove the security of DAKEZ in the GUC frame-
work, it is necessary to define the DAKEZ protocol in terms of the F +post-keia interface. An interactive
Turing machine that completes a DAKEZ key exchange in a way that is indistinguishable from
dummy parties forwarding the same inputs to F +post-keia must be defined. The protocol steps are
the same as in Figure 5.2, but the interface must be changed. Algorithm 6.3 contains the adapted
protocol. The protocol is implicitly parameterized with the group 𝔾, 𝑞, and 𝑔.
After receiving its input, the DAKEZ protocol in Algorithm 6.3 determines whether it is
playing the role of the initiator or the responder. The notation “on (𝑚) to P” means that the
122
Chapter 6 Proving the Security of DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH
Algorithm 6.3 DAKEZ implemented in the GUC framework. (Refs: 122 a b, 124 a b, and 140)
Real Protocol DAKEZ
on activation with input (initiate, sid,I,Φ, aux):
Record that we are the initiator, I
Retrieve PK𝐼 and SK𝐼 from shared functionality
Record PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , sid, and Φ
Record 𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
Broadcast 𝜓1 = I∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 using aux for routing
on activation with input (establish, sid,R,Φ):
Record that we are the responder, R
Retrieve PK𝑅 and SK𝑅 from shared functionality
Record PK𝑅, SK𝑅, sid, and Φ
Set state to await-𝜓1
on (P∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝑃) to R in state await-𝜓1:
Record 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝑃)
Record P, 𝑔𝑝, PQ𝑃 , 𝑔𝑟, and 𝑄𝑅
Retrieve PK𝑃 from shared functionality
Let 𝑡 = “0”∥P∥R∥𝑔𝑝∥𝑔𝑟 ∥PQ𝑃 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝑃 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑝}, 𝑡)
Record 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑝)𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Erase 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘
Send 𝜓2 = R∥𝑔𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑅∥𝜎 to P
Set state to await-𝜓2
on (P∥𝑔𝑝∥𝑄𝑃 ∥𝜎) to I:
Retrieve PK𝑃 from shared functionality
Let 𝑡1 = “0”∥I∥P∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥Φ
if (¬(RVrf({PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , 𝑔𝑖}, 𝜎, 𝑡1))) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Compute 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖∥𝑄𝑘)
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
Let 𝑡2 = “1”∥I∥P∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥Φ
Compute 𝜓3 = RSig(PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , {PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , 𝑔𝑝}, 𝑡2)
Send 𝜓3 to P
Locally output (set-key, sid,P, 𝑘) and halt
on (𝜎) to R in state await-𝜓2:
Let 𝑡 = “1”∥P∥R∥𝑔𝑝∥𝑔𝑟 ∥PQ𝑃 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ
if (¬(RVrf({PK𝑃 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑟}, 𝜎, 𝑡1))) {
Locally output (abort, sid,R) and halt
}
Locally output (set-key, sid,P, 𝑘) and halt
on unknown or invalid message:
Let P be our activated role (I or R)
Locally output (abort, sid,P) and halt
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Algorithm 6.4 Incrimination procedure for DAKEZ. (Ref: 124)
Subroutine IncProcDAKEZ(𝑠𝑖𝑑, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
on (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) from S:
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Let 𝑡 = “0”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜓 = “𝑅”∥𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅∥𝜎
Send (inc, 𝑠𝑖𝑑, 𝐼, 𝑅, 𝜓, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) to S
given function is executed when a message of the form 𝑚 is received, and the party is playing the
role of P. When evaluating the form of a message, group elements are checked to ensure that
they are in 𝔾 and are not the identity element. All variables shown in Algorithm 6.3 are scoped
to their containing function unless they are explicitly persisted using the “Record” statement
(e.g., the variable 𝑡 in one function is not the same as the 𝑡 in another function).
The shared functionality for DAKEZ, ḠDAKEZkrkro , is defined to be Ḡ
DAKEZ,2,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔
krkro . All calls to the
key derivation function KDF(𝑥) are modeled by the first random oracle; a message (ro, 1, 𝑥)
is sent to ḠDAKEZkrkro , which then replies with the result. In a similar manner, the random oracle
needed to model the hash function within the RSig scheme (thereby making its security proofs
applicable) is provided by the second random oracle in ḠDAKEZkrkro .
6.2.3 Proof Strategy
This section describes a strategy for proving the security of DAKEZ by showing that it GUC-
realizes F +post-keia. The three message flows of DAKEZ, as shown in Algorithm 6.3, are denoted
as 𝜓1, 𝜓2, and 𝜓3. Since F +post-keia is parameterized by additional procedures, an incrimination
procedure and non-information oracle for DAKEZ is needed. Algorithm 6.4 depicts the DAKEZ
incrimination procedure, which simply computes 𝜓2 as an honest responder would. In practice,
the presence of IncProc allows an adversary to prove that a party is willing to respond to a key
exchange request from an entity with a particular claimed (but unauthenticated) identity. For
most applications, this has no real-world impact on the security or privacy of the protocol.
Algorithm 6.5 depicts the non-information oracle for DAKEZ. The general construction of this
oracle follows the approach of Hofheinz et al. [HMS03] for DH-based protocols. NQRDH internally
generates both ephemeral keys and sends the public parts toM.M can then accept or reject the
proposed keys by sending a completemessage. If the keys are accepted (by sending a complete
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message with ok = TRUE),NQRDH completes the exchange and locally outputs the shared secret.
IfM rejects the keys, NQRDH discards them and accepts one half of the ephemeral key exchange
fromM (in the 𝛼 and 𝛽 parameters). The local output of NQRDH in this case is the shared secret
of an exchange withM. This option is necessary in the event that the adversary corrupts the
initiator in the exchange; N grants the simulator the ability to complete the exchange on behalf
of the remaining honest simulated party. N also provides a facility to generate RSig messages
using either ephemeral key held by NQRDH.
While this section does not formally prove it, NQRDH is clearly a non-information oracle for
appropriately chosen cryptographic groups. The only information revealed toM are public DH
contributions and public values produced by QRGen and QREncaps. The only input fromM is
𝛼 and 𝛽 when the initial exchange has been rejected. In this case,M never receives enough
information to complete the exchange. The release of RSig proofs in response to prove messages
releases no information other than the possession of a key in the set 𝑆 by design. Consequently,
distinguishing the output ofNQRDH from random would requireM to break the CDH assumption
in 𝔾 (in order to determine the correct input to the random oracle) or the zero-knowledge
property of the SoK in RSig.
The security theorem for DAKEZ is as follows:
Theorem 3 DAKEZ is secure
If the RSig/RVrf scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect
to insider corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in the underlying group, then DAKEZ
GUC-realizes F +post-keia within the erasure Ḡ
DAKEZ
krkro -hybrid model with adaptive security for
IncProcDAKEZ and non-information oracle NQRDH.
(Refs: 125, 127 a b c, 128, 129, 153, and 502)
The proof uses the erasure model defined by Dodis et al. [DKSW09], which allows participants
in the protocol to erase private state information, preventing it from being leaked in the event
of a subsequent corruption. Since the capability to securely erase RAM contents is generally
accepted in practice, this weakening of the model does not admit any actual attacks. The
construction of the simulator for the proof of Theorem 3 can be used as guidance for practitioners
seeking to implement real-world key exchange forgery tools (as a means to improve the plausible
deniability of higher-level protocols). In general, the simulator simulates both parties involved
in the key exchange honestly. To produce the RSig proofs, the simulator uses the ephemeral
keys of the remote party in the case when the adversary has not corrupted either participant,
or the compromised long-term keys if a participant has been corrupted. The simulator uses the
non-information oracle to simulate the calculation of the shared secret key, and uses its access
to the non-information oracle’s internal state to construct the simulated memory contents of
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Algorithm 6.5 Non-information oracle for DAKEZ. (Refs: 124 and 149)
Subroutine NQRDH
on (setup,𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔) fromM:
if (a setup message was already received) return
Read (𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔) as group 𝔾, prime order 𝑞, generator 𝑔
Generate 𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞 and 𝑟
$←− ℤ𝑞
Generate (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
Generate (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Record 𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔, 𝑖, 𝑟, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
Send (exchange, 𝑔𝑖, 𝑔𝑟, PQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅) toM
on (complete, ok, 𝛼, 𝛽) fromM:
if (no setup message has been received) return
if (already output a key) return
if (ok is TRUE) {
Compute 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑖)𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘)
} else {
if ((𝛼 ∉ 𝔾) | | (𝛼 is identity element)) return
if (𝛽 not generated by QRGen) return
Generate new 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞
Generate new (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(𝛽)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF(𝛼𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘)
}
Locally output 𝑘
on (prove, 𝑝, 𝑆, 𝑚) fromM:
if (no setup message has been received) return
if (a complete message has been received) return
if (𝑝 ∉ {1, 2}) return
if (𝑝 = 1) { Let 𝑥 ← 𝑖 } else { Let 𝑥 ← 𝑟 }
if (𝑔𝑥 ∉ 𝑆) return
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(𝑔𝑥 , 𝑥, 𝑆, 𝑚)
Send (proof, 𝜎) toM
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corrupted parties. The simulator only uses IncProc if the first message, 𝜓1, is altered by the
adversary.
6.2.4 Relationship to Security Properties
Now that the ideal functionality that represents the features of DAKEZ and stated the associated
security theorem have been defined, the security properties in Section 5.2.2 can be rigorously
defined in terms of the GUC framework. Each property either follows from the definition of
F +post-keia, or from the proof of Theorem 3:
1. Universally composable AKE: F +post-keia provides mutual authentication, key secrecy, and key
freshness. Mutual authentication ensures that S (and thus A) cannot cause 𝐼 (resp. 𝑅) to
output an uncorrupted partner identifier other than 𝑅 (resp. 𝐼). Key secrecy and freshness
ensure that if 𝐼 or 𝑅 is uncorrupted and outputs a key ^ and a partner identifier 𝑃, and 𝑃 is
uncorrupted, thenZ cannot distinguish ^ from ^′ $←− {0, 1}_ .
2. Offline deniability: It is possible to construct a simulator S such thatZ cannot distinguish
between S interacting with F +post-keia and A interacting with DAKEZ after the following
sequence of events: Z selects a party 𝑃 ∈ {𝐼, 𝑅}, allows the key exchange to complete
unmodified, corrupts both 𝐼 and 𝑅, and asks S to reveal 𝑃’s ephemeral keys. Such a simulator
can be constructed from the proof of Theorem 3 by simulating the “honest” case and then
exposing the contents of the non-information oracle toZ.
3. Online deniability: Z cannot distinguish between S interacting with F +post-keia and A inter-
acting with DAKEZ, given the restrictions in Theorem 3.
4. Contributiveness / Initiator-resilience: When 𝑅 is uncorrupted, any key output by 𝑅 is
computationally independent of any values chosen by Z. This property follows from the
design of F +post-keia, which either outputs a bit string chosen uniformly at random or the local
output of the non-information oracle when 𝑅 is uncorrupted.
5. Forward secrecy: In the strong form [BPR00]: if a party 𝑃 outputs a key ^ and a partner
identifier 𝑃′, thenZ can never distinguish ^ from ^′ $←− {0, 1}_ unless 𝑃 or 𝑃′ was corrupted
before the corresponding session completed. In the weak form of the property, this is only
true if S also did not abort the session (and thus A did not modify any messages).
6. Post-specified peer: The initiate and establish messages do not identify the intended
communication partner.
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6.2.4.1 Quantum Transitional Security
Note that Theorem 3 only refers to classical security (i.e., it ignores quantum adversaries). This
is also true of the other theorems presented in this chapter. Quantum transitionally secure
key exchanges cannot realize authenticated key exchange functionalities like F +post-keia against
quantum adversaries because, by definition, they fail to provide the necessary authentication
properties in the QcQ setting (see Section 5.2.3). However, a more traditional analysis makes it
clear that DAKEZ is secure in the CcQ setting (i.e., it provides quantum transitional security).
Because the KDF is modeled by a random oracle, any passive adversary that can derive the session
key using only long-term secret keys and a transcript of the exchange must be able to derive
the KDF input and send it to ḠDAKEZkrkro within an ro message. This KDF input includes 𝑄𝑘, the
shared secret derived from the QREncaps and QRDecaps functions. Since the adversary does not
have access to ephemeral state (I and R already erased SQ𝐼 and 𝑄𝑘 from their memory), the
adversary must be able to derive 𝑄𝑘 using only PQ𝐼 and 𝑄𝑅 (and the unrelated secrets 𝐼 and 𝑅).
Therefore, this passive adversary can break the key secrecy property of the quantum-resistant
KEM, which is assumed to be impossible due to the IND-CPA security of the KEM. Moreover, it is
not possible for an active adversary to modify the KEM transmissions because PQ𝐼 and 𝑄𝑅 are
authenticated by the ring signatures. In the CcQ setting, the adversary does not have access to
quantum computation when the protocol session occurs, so it is not able to break the classical
unforgeability of RSig. Consequently, quantum IND-CPA security is sufficient for the quantum-
resistant KEM—there is no need for quantum IND-CCA2 security. A similar argument holds for
the other DAKEs discussed in this chapter. Combining an IND-CPA quantum-resistant KEM with
a classically secure authentication mechanism to achieve security in the CcQ setting is similar
to the approach used by Bindel et al. [BBF+19, §4.3] to add quantum transitional security to a
SIGMA key exchange protocol.
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, some quantum-resistant KEMs, such as New Hope [ADPS16],
are only 𝛿-correct—the QRDecaps function can fail for valid inputs with probability 𝛿. The ideal
functionalities in this chapter assume that this is not possible and that the quantum-resistant KEM
is completely correct. If 𝛿 is negligible (e.g., 2−_ for security parameter _), as it is for all of the
finalists and alternate candidates in the third round of the NIST standardization effort [AAA+20],
then this is not a problem. In particular, it is acceptable for the ideal functionalities to output
matching session keys for the DAKE participants in an honest case where QRDecaps would return
⊥ in reality, because these situations are overwhelmingly improbable and can be safely ignored.
128
Chapter 6 Proving the Security of DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH
6.2.5 Proof of Theorem 3
(Sketch) To show that DAKEZ GUC-realizes F +post-keia, it suffices to show that DAKEZ EUC-realizes
F +post-keia. DAKEZ EUC-realizes F +post-keia if and only if, for any PPT adversaryA attacking DAKEZ,
there exists a PPT adversary S attacking F +post-keia such that any Ḡ
DAKEZ
krkro -externally constrained
environmentZ cannot distinguish between the real and simulated conditions.
Like most proofs in UC-based models, this proof will construct a simulator S that executes
A internally, simulating the real protocol flows that A expects based on conditions in the ideal
environment. For any ideal party 𝑃, S simulates a party 𝑃 (𝑠) for A. All parties know the shared
protocol parameters used to instantiate ḠDAKEZkrkro : a group 𝔾 of prime order 𝑞 with generator 𝑔.
To achieve the required indistinguishability property, two things must be shown: Z can derive
no useful information from sessions other than the one under consideration, and Z cannot
distinguish between the challenge protocols in the context of the current session. To guarantee
the latter condition, it must be shown that, irrespective of the actions performed by A under
the instruction of Z, the outputs of the main parties of F +post-keia are equal to those of DAKEZ,
corrupted parties provide memory consistent with all other observations, and the protocol flows
within the joint view of A andZ are consistent with the outputs of the main parties.
Section 6.2.6 describes the simulator construction, and Section 6.2.7 presents the indistin-
guishability proof.
6.2.6 Simulator Construction
6.2.6.1 Communications between A andZ
Any data sent to S fromZ are copied to the input of A. Likewise, any output from A is sent to
Z by S.
6.2.6.2 General reactions to actions by A
IfA sends any messages within the simulated environment that are unrelated to DAKEZ, they are
ignored (as they would be in a real network environment). IfA delays delivery of a message flow,
S simply waits for the flow to be delivered before continuing. This leaves A with few possible
actions of consequence: it can alter any of the message flows it perceives (this is equivalent to
delaying a message and sending a different one in its place), and it can corrupt simulated parties.
The model allows A to corrupt parties before the protocol begins, after 𝜓1 has been sent, after
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𝜓2 has been sent, or after 𝜓3 has been sent (i.e., corruptions can be fully adaptive). When A
corrupts a simulated party, S corrupts the corresponding ideal party in order to construct the
expected state history. If A causes a corrupted simulated party to output a message, S causes
the corresponding ideal party to output the same message.
6.2.6.3 Initialization
When S first initializes, it sends a (setup,𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔) message to N through F +post-keia, and waits to
receive a (exchange, 𝑔𝑖, 𝑔𝑟, PQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅)message in response. The group details sent byS correspond
to the protocol instantiation attacked by A. S makes a note of the ephemeral keys in the
exchange message for later use in the simulation.
6.2.6.4 Receipt of initiate message from F +post-keia
When S receives (initiate, sid, 𝐼,Φ𝐼) from F +post-keia, it honestly constructs a 𝜓1 message from
𝐼 (𝑠) with the help of the non-information oracle N . S computes 𝜓1 = “𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼 using the 𝑔𝑖
and PQ𝐼 values previously received from N and sends 𝜓1 through A as if it were broadcast by
𝐼 (𝑠) . S also records the value Φ𝐼 for later reference.
6.2.6.5 Receipt of establish message from F +post-keia
When S receives an establishment message (establish, sid, 𝑅,Φ𝑅) from F +post-keia, it checks to
see the circumstances of the simulated 𝜓1 message transmission. Since F +post-keia only sends an
establish message after it has already sent an initiate message, 𝜓1 is guaranteed to have
been sent and received in the simulated environment (either by S in response to an initiate
message or by A from a corrupted party).
S parses 𝜓1 to recover 𝑔𝑖 and PQ𝐼. If 𝜓1 is not of the correct format, or it fails to validate
(e.g., if “𝐼” is not a valid identity), then S sends (abort, sid) to F +post-keia and delivers the resulting
abort message to 𝑅 immediately. S withholds the abort message to 𝐼.
S records Φ𝑅 for later reference.
If 𝜓1 is valid, then S constructs a message 𝜓2 from 𝑅(𝑠) in response to 𝜓1. The mechanism
for constructing 𝜓2 depends on how 𝜓1 was generated:
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• If S previously created 𝜓1 in response to an initiate message, then S uses the non-
information oracle N to construct 𝜓2. S requests a forged proof under 𝐼 (𝑠) ’s ephemeral keys
by sending (prove, 1, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡), where 𝑡 = “0”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ𝑅, to N and
waiting for a message (proof, 𝜎𝑅) in response. S then constructs 𝜓2 = “𝑅” ∥ 𝑔𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑅 ∥ 𝜎𝑅.
• If 𝜓1 was sent by a corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠), then S uses its access to corrupt 𝐼 to retrieve SK𝐼 = 𝐼
from ḠDAKEZkrkro using a rectrievesecret message. S signals to N that its transcript has been
rejected by sending a message (complete, FALSE, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼). Since 𝐼 is corrupted, F +post-keia
immediately sends the state of N to S. S sends (ok, sid, 0) to F +post-keia, causing it to record
the output from N as the shared key. S uses the newly generated values 𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅 to
construct 𝜓2 = “𝑅” ∥ 𝑔𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑅 ∥ 𝜎𝑅. S calculates 𝜎𝑅 as in the previous case, except that it uses
the long-term keypair (𝑔𝐼 , 𝐼) to produce the proof.
• IfS previously created a message𝜓1′ but𝜓1 ≠ 𝜓1′, thenA has altered the message in transit.
S constructs 𝜓2 through the use of IncProc. S sends (abort, sid) to F +post-keia, but withholds
delivery of the resulting abort messages to 𝐼 and 𝑅. It then sends (incriminate, sid) to
F +post-keia, causing an instance of IncProc to be invoked. Using the values parsed from 𝜓1,
S sends (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ𝑅, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) to the instance of IncProc and receives
(inc, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, 𝜓2, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) in response.
S then sends 𝜓2 through A as if 𝑅(𝑠) sent it to 𝐼 (𝑠) .
6.2.6.6 Receipt of 𝜓2 by uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
When uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠) receives message 𝜓2 claiming to be from 𝑃 (𝑠) , S checks to see if 𝐼 (𝑠) has
previously broadcast a message 𝜓1. If not, then the message 𝜓2 is ignored. S then parses 𝜓2 to
extract “𝑃”, 𝑔𝑝, 𝑄𝑃, and the proof 𝜎𝑃. If 𝜓2 is not of the correct form, or if 𝜎𝑃 is not a correct
proof matching Φ𝐼 and the 𝜓1 sent by 𝐼 (𝑠) , then S sends (abort, sid) to F +post-keia and delivers the
resulting abort message to 𝐼 immediately, while withholding any abort message sent to 𝑃.
If 𝐼 (𝑠) has previously broadcast a message 𝜓1 and 𝜓2 is valid, then S constructs message 𝜓3
to send from 𝐼 (𝑠) to 𝑃 (𝑠) and outputs a shared key. The private key that S uses to construct the
proof 𝜓3, and the shared key that it outputs, depends on the state of the simulation:
• IfA has previously corrupted 𝑃 (𝑠) , then S must have previously corrupted 𝑃 (since S corrupts
ideal parties corresponding to simulated parties corrupted by A). In this case, S retrieves
SK𝑃 = 𝑃 from ḠDAKEZkrkro using a retrievesecret message and uses this key to compute 𝜓3 =
RSig(𝑔𝑃, 𝑃, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑃, 𝑔𝑝}, 𝑡), where the tag 𝑡 is given by 𝑡 = “1”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑃”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥Φ𝐼 .
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𝐼 is expected to output a session key corresponding to the one negotiated between 𝐼 (𝑠) and
𝑃 (𝑠) . If S previously simulated a 𝜓2 message from a party 𝑅(𝑠) and 𝑅(𝑠) ≠ 𝑃 (𝑠) , then S issues
a (abort, sid) message to F +post-keia and withholds the resulting abort messages. In any case,
F +post-keia receives the internal state of N from S, allowing it to acquire the ephemeral keys 𝑖
and SQ𝐼 used to generate 𝜓1 (this occurs because either 𝑅 has been aborted, or 𝑅 is corrupt).
S computes 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖 ∥ QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)) and sends (ok, sid, 𝑘) to F +post-keia, causing
it to record key tuple (sid, 𝑘).
• Otherwise, 𝑃 (𝑠) is uncorrupted. Because RSig is unforgeable with respect to insider corruption,
the only way for 𝜎𝑃 to be valid in this situation is if the sender of the message knows the long-
term private key of one of the parties, or the ephemeral key of 𝐼 (𝑠) . Additionally, 𝜎𝑃 must have
been computed during this session because its validity depends on 𝜓1. Due to the hardness
of the discrete log problem in the group (guaranteeing the secrecy of the keys) and the
uniqueness of 𝜓1, this is only possible if 𝑃 (𝑠) = 𝑅(𝑠) and 𝜓2 was previously generated by S. S
forges the proof 𝜓3 using 𝑅(𝑠) ’s ephemeral key held by the non-information oracleN . S sends
(prove, 2, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑟}, 𝑡), where the tag 𝑡 is given by 𝑡 = “1”∥“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ𝐼, to
N through F +post-keia and receives (proof, 𝜓3) in response. S sends (ok, sid, 0) to F +post-keia,
causing it to record a random session key.
S sends (deliver, sid, 𝐼, 𝑃) to F +post-keia, causing 𝐼 to emit the proper shared secret.
6.2.6.7 Receipt of 𝜓3 by uncorrupted 𝑅(𝑠)
When uncorrupted 𝑅(𝑠) receives message 𝜓3 from 𝐼 (𝑠), S first checks to ensure that 𝑅(𝑠) has
previously received a message 𝜓1 from 𝐼 (𝑠) and that it sent a response 𝜓2. If either of these
conditions do not hold, then the message is ignored. S then verifies the proof in 𝜓3.
If the proof is invalid, does not match Φ𝑅 or the 𝜓2 message previously sent by 𝑅(𝑠) , or fails
to verify, then S sends (abort, sid) to F +post-keia and delivers the resulting abort message to 𝑅
immediately. S withholds the abort message sent to 𝐼.
If the proof is valid, then S also causes 𝑅 to output a key. Since RSig is unforgeable with
respect to insider corruption, it is only possible to reach this state if 𝐼 (𝑠) is corrupt or if the
exchange has completed honestly; in all situations, S has already caused F +post-keia to record a
shared key. S sends (deliver, sid, 𝑅, 𝐼) to F +post-keia, causing 𝑅 to emit the proper shared secret.
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6.2.6.8 Transmission of 𝜓1 by corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
When S has not yet received an initiate message from F +post-keia, but A causes a corrupted
𝐼 (𝑠) to issue message 𝜓1, then S must reflect this in the ideal environment. S causes 𝐼 to send
(initiate, sid, 𝐼,⊥,⊥) to F +post-keia, but ignores the resulting initiatemessage sent by F +post-keia.
6.2.6.9 Transmission of 𝜓2 by corrupted 𝑅(𝑠)
When S has not yet received an establish message from F +post-keia, but A causes a corrupted
𝑅(𝑠) to issue message 𝜓2, then S must reflect this in the ideal environment. S causes 𝑅 to
send (establish, sid, 𝑅,⊥) to F +post-keia, but ignores the resulting establish message sent by
F +post-keia.
6.2.6.10 Constructing state for corrupted parties
When A corrupts a party in the simulated environment, S corrupts the corresponding party in
the ideal environment. If A causes corrupted parties to output values, S outputs these values
from the corresponding ideal parties. In addition, S must provide A with a simulated historical
state for corrupted parties.
If A corrupts the party known as 𝐼 (𝑠) after an initiate message has been received, but
before 𝐼 (𝑠) has received 𝜓2, then S uses its access to N to provide the random coins 𝑖, and SQ𝐼
used to construct 𝜓1. If 𝐼 (𝑠) already received 𝜓2, then S uses its corruption of 𝐼 to provide the
session key 𝑘 that 𝐼 already output.
If A corrupts the party known as 𝑅(𝑠) after it has already received 𝜓1, then it must provide
the session key 𝑘 expected to be stored in 𝑅(𝑠) ’s memory. If 𝑅(𝑠) has already received 𝜓3, then
𝑅 has already output session key 𝑘, and so S can directly provide this value. If 𝑅(𝑠) has not yet
received 𝜓3, then S uses its access to N to obtain 𝑘 (in the event that 𝜓1 was sent by a corrupt
𝐼 (𝑠)), or the random coins 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘 that, together with 𝜓1, can be used to compute 𝑘.
6.2.7 Proof of Indistinguishability
The next task is to prove that S acting on F +post-keia is indistinguishable fromA acting on DAKEZ.
To do this, all possible behaviors of A are divided into several cases. For each case, it must
be shown that the protocol flows generated by S are indistinguishable from those generated
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by DAKEZ, outputs from F +post-keia are indistinguishable from those from DAKEZ, and that the
simulated memory states of corrupted parties are indistinguishable from those of real parties.
6.2.7.1 The honest case
This case occurs whenA does not alter any messages or corrupt 𝐼 (𝑠) or 𝑅(𝑠) until after the session
concludes.
All three messages are generated by the combination of S and N honestly (i.e., exactly how
they would be generated by the parties in a real DAKEZ session), with the exception of the proofs.
The proofs are not signed by the long-term secret keys of the parties, as in a real interaction.
Instead, they are produced byN using the ephemeral key of the opposite party. However, because
RSig is anonymous against full key exposure, Z cannot distinguish the proofs produced by S
from those produced in a real interaction, even when it corrupts the long-term keys of 𝐼 (𝑠) and
𝑅(𝑠) after the session.
If the shared session state provided to the parties byZ differs (i.e., Φ𝐼 ≠ Φ𝑅), then 𝐼 (𝑠) will
immediately abort when 𝜓2 is delivered. This output is the same as in the real protocol because
the SoK in 𝜓2 will be bound to the wrong message.
When Φ𝐼 = Φ𝑅, the output from 𝐼 and 𝑅 in the ideal environment includes the correct
identity of the conversation partner, as well as a shared secret 𝑘 randomly generated by F +post-keia.
These are the expected party identities from the real interaction, so the only possible way for
Z to distinguish between real and simulated outputs is by examining 𝑘. Since 𝑖, 𝑟, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
are erased by real parties before they return output, A cannot access these values, even when
corrupting 𝐼 (𝑠) and 𝑅(𝑠) after the protocol concludes. Therefore, any ability to distinguish between
challenge protocols based on the choice of 𝑘 would mean that Z could distinguish between 𝑘
and KDF(𝑔𝑖𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘). Since KDF is modeled by the random oracle in ḠDAKEZkrkro , this is only possible
if Z can break the CDH assumption in 𝔾 (and the one-way security of the quantum-resistant
KEM, if one is used) and send the message (ro, 1, 𝑔𝑖𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑘) to ḠDAKEZkrkro , which is assumed to be
impossible.
In the event that a quantum-resistant KEM is used (i.e., the QRGen, QREncaps, and QRDecaps
functions are not the “no-op” QRGen∅, QREncaps∅, and QRDecaps∅ implementations defined
in Section 5.3.4) and QRDecaps is 𝛿-correct for some 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 2−_ where _ is the security
parameter, then there is a possibility that QRDecaps may return ⊥ in the honest case. In this
situation, I would fail to derive the same secret 𝑘 as R when executing the real protocol, whereas
F +post-keia would output a randomly generated shared secret for 𝐼 and 𝑅, theoretically allowingZ
to distinguish between the settings. However, this event occurs with negligible probability 𝛿, so
it cannot be used byZ to gain advantage in the distinguishability game.
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6.2.7.2 Alteration of 𝜓1
This situation occurs when 𝜓1 generated by S is altered by A in transit, but neither 𝐼 (𝑠) nor 𝑅(𝑠)
are corrupted when 𝜓1 is delivered.
When𝜓1 is altered, S generates𝜓2 from 𝑅(𝑠) using IncProc. The definition of IncProc involves
honestly generating 𝜓2 using the long-term secret key of 𝑅, so this flow is indistinguishable from
a real message. Likewise, the memory state of 𝑅(𝑠) is indistinguishable from the real situation
because IncProc provides S with the random coins used to generate the ephemeral keys in 𝜓2
and the session key 𝑘.
S causes the protocol to abort, but does not deliver abort messages to either party. If A
allows 𝜓2 to be delivered to 𝐼 (𝑠) , then 𝐼 (𝑠) will abort. This matches the output of real interactions
because 𝐼 (𝑠) expects 𝜓2 to include a proof incorporating the true 𝑔𝑖 and PQ𝐼 values sent by 𝐼 (𝑠)
in 𝜓1. The only way for the simulated and real situations to differ is if A somehow alters 𝜓2 so
that it is a valid response. Since RSig is unforgeable with respect to insider corruption, this is not
possible.
6.2.7.3 Alteration of 𝜓2
This situation occurs when 𝜓2 generated by S is altered by A in transit, but neither 𝐼 (𝑠) nor
𝑅(𝑠) are corrupted when 𝜓2 is delivered. S causes 𝐼 (𝑠) to immediately abort when it receives an
altered 𝜓2. As mentioned previously, 𝐼 (𝑠) will always abort because the proof in the altered 𝜓2
message cannot be correct due to RSig being unforgeable with respect to insider corruption.
6.2.7.4 Alteration of 𝜓3
This situation occurs when 𝜓3 generated by S is altered by A in transit, but neither 𝐼 (𝑠) nor
𝑅(𝑠) are corrupted when 𝜓3 is delivered. S causes 𝑅(𝑠) to immediately abort when it receives an
altered 𝜓3. 𝑅(𝑠) will always abort because the proof in the altered 𝜓3 message cannot be correct
due to RSig being unforgeable with respect to insider corruption.
6.2.7.5 Indistinguishability under corruptions
This situation occurs when either party is corrupted at a time before the times covered by the
previous cases.
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The only difference between the normal operation of S and this case is the secret key used to
compute the proofs in messages generated by S, and the mechanism for generating the shared
secret keys. Whereas S normally uses the ephemeral signing keys 𝑖 and 𝑟 stored inN to produce
the proofs in the messages, the keys generated byN might not be used when a party is corrupted
before sending its first message. In these cases, S instead makes use of the long-term secret key
of the corrupted party to produce the proofs. Again, these message flows are indistinguishable
from real flows due to the anonymity against full key exposure property of RSig. To output the
correct session keys, S extracts the internal state ofN to complete key exchanges with corrupted
parties. In all cases, the outputs of the protocol are indistinguishable because the uncorrupted
party effectively completes the key exchange honestly.
If both simulated parties are corrupted, then indistinguishability is trivial. S never generates
any messages, and so they cannot be used byZ to detect simulation. The outputs of corrupted
parties are copied to the outputs of the corresponding ideal parties, so this is also not useful to
Z.
In all cases of corruption, S provides the expected memory state for the corrupted party—
the set of random coins used to generate ephemeral signing keys, and possibly some shared
secret keys (depending on which party is corrupted and when). In all cases, these values are
indistinguishable from real values because the parties are effectively simulated honestly.
6.2.7.6 Data from other sessions
Since this proof considers the security of DAKEZ in the EUC model, it must also consider the
usefulness of information collected byZ from other protocol sessions. No information from other
sessions can be used to assist A with the generation of false message flows: 𝜓1 is generated
using no long-term information, and both 𝜓2 and 𝜓3 require computation of an SoK bound to
the contents of 𝜓1. Since RSig is unforgeable with respect to insider corruption, collecting SoKs
from other sessions does not allow A to produce proofs correctly bound to the session under
attack. ■
6.3 Proof of Spawn+ Security
This section sketches a security proof for Spawn+. The ideal functionality is defined in Sec-
tion 6.3.1, the real protocol is defined in Section 6.3.2, the security theorem is presented in
Section 6.3.3, and the proof sketch begins in Section 6.3.4.
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Algorithm 6.6 Ideal functionality modeling Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH’s behavior.
(Refs: 138 and 160)
Ideal Functionality F +1psp-keia
F +1psp-keia proceeds as follows, running on security parameter _, in the Ḡ
𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔
krkro -hybrid model, with parties
𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛 and an adversary S. The functionality is parameterized by a non-information oracle N , and an
incrimination procedure IncProc. When initializing, F +1psp-keia invokes N with fresh randomness.
on interaction with N :
Allow S to communicate with N by forwarding mes-
sages between them. If at any point 𝐼 or 𝑅 is corrupted
whileN has produced local output, send the complete
state and local output of N to S.
on (solicit, sid, 𝐼,Φ, aux) from 𝑃 ∈ {𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛}:
if (a solicit message seen before) return
if (𝑃 ≠ 𝐼) return
Record that 𝐼 is the initiator
Mark 𝐼 as “active”
Send (solicit, sid, 𝐼,Φ) to S
on (establish, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅,Φ) from 𝑃 ∈ {𝑃1, . . . , 𝑃𝑛}:
if (an establish message seen before) return
if (𝑃 ≠ 𝑅) return
if (initiator not recorded) {
Resume processing once initiator is recorded
}
if (𝐼 does not match recorded initiator) return
Record that 𝑅 is the responder
Mark 𝑅 as “active”
Send (establish, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅,Φ) to S
on (set-key, sid) from S:
if (a key tuple (sid, ^) has been recorded) return
if ((𝐼 not recorded) | | (𝑅 not recorded)) return
if ((𝐼 is corrupt) && (𝑅 is corrupt)) return
if ((𝐼 is uncorrupted) && (𝑅 is uncorrupted)
↩→ && (𝐼 is “active”)) { ^ $←− {0, 1}_ }
else if (IncProc was previously executed) {
↩→ Let ^ denote the local output of IncProc }
else if (𝐼 is corrupt) {
↩→ Let ^ denote the local output of N }
else { Halt }
Send (set-key, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, ^) to 𝑅
Record key tuple (sid, ^)
on (finish, sid, 𝑃) from S:
if (no key tuple (sid, ^) has been recorded) return
if (𝐼 is not “active”) return
if (𝑃 is uncorrupted) {
Send (set-key, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, ^) to 𝐼 and halt
} else {
Send the state of N to S
Wait for (mismatch-key, sid, 𝑘) from S
if (𝑘 = ^) Halt
Send (set-key, sid, 𝐼, 𝑃, 𝑘) to 𝐼 and halt
}
on (abort, sid) from S:
if ((𝐼 not recorded) ∨ (𝑅 not recorded)) return
Mark 𝐼 as “aborted”
Send delayed (abort, sid, 𝐼) to 𝐼
Send delayed (abort, sid, 𝑅) to 𝑅
on (incriminate, sid) from S:
if (IncProc was previously executed) return
if ((𝐼 is “aborted”) && (𝑅 is “active”)
↩→ && (𝑅 is uncorrupted)) {
Send (retrievesecret, 𝑅) to Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro
Retrieve SK𝑅 from Ḡ𝜑,𝑛,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro
Execute IncProc(sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
}
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6.3.1 Ideal Functionality for Spawn+
Unger and Goldberg [UG15] sketched a security proof for Spawn in a GUC-based standard
model [UG15]. However, the ideal functionality used in the sketch, F IncProc1psp−keia, suffers from the
same problems discussed in Section 6.2.1, and thus it cannot be used to prove the security of
Spawn+. Specifically, F IncProc1psp−keia does not capture the notion of contributiveness. Using the same
techniques as Section 6.2.1, Algorithm 6.6 constructs a new ideal functionality, F +1psp-keia, that
describes a two-flow, single post-specified peer, contributory, and strongly deniable key exchange
protocol.
F +1psp-keia shares similarities with both F IncProc1psp−keia and F +post-keia. An initiating party 𝐼 sends a
solicit message that is answered by a responder 𝑅 with an establish message. When both
parties are defined, the simulator S tells F +1psp-keia to generate a session key and notify 𝑅 using
a set-key message. S can then send a finish message to send the key to 𝐼. If S corrupts a
party 𝑃, it can cause 𝐼 to erroneously report 𝑃 (rather than 𝑅) as a conversation partner with an
arbitrary session key. However, it is not possible for S to accomplish this without also causing the
parties to derive different session keys (leading to termination if high-level protocols incorporate
implicit or explicit key confirmation [FGSW16]).3
F +1psp-keia also includes an incriminating abort procedure. Unlike F +post-keia, where R is forced
to abort, F +1psp-keia forces I to abort when IncProc is called. The incrimination procedure in
F +1psp-keia also has another important difference: rather than sending the fixed session key to
S, it is instead designed to send it directly to F +1psp-keia as local output on F +1psp-keia’s subroutine
tape. This is important for appropriately modeling forward secrecy, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
Because F +1psp-keia can permit an uncorrupted party (specifically, 𝑅) to output a key after IncProc
is invoked (unlike F +post-keia, which prevents this possibility), IncProc must not reveal this key to
S; doing so would trivially break forward secrecy. Instead, any attack against forward secrecy
must exploit the specification of the real protocol by using leaked information fromN or IncProc.
Looking ahead, Section 6.5.1 specifies the attack that limits Spawn+ and ZDH to weak forward
secrecy, and differentiate the forward secrecy of XZDH.
6.3.2 Spawn+ in the GUC Framework
Spawn+ was originally defined in Section 5.5.1. Algorithm 6.7 redefines Spawn+ in terms of the
F +1psp-keia interface. The protocol is implicitly parameterized with the group 𝔾, 𝑞, and 𝑔. The
3 ⋏This attack also applies to Spawn. The original security proof sketch [Ung15, Section 3.8.4.2] erroneously
excludes this possibility.
138
Chapter 6 Proving the Security of DAKEZ, Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH
Algorithm 6.7 Spawn+ implemented in the GUC framework. (Refs: 138 and 140)
Real Protocol Spawn+
on activation with input (solicit, sid,I,Φ, aux):
Record that we are the initiator, I
Retrieve PK𝐼 and SK𝐼 from shared functionality
Record PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , sid, and Φ
Record 𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
Broadcast 𝜓1 = I∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 using aux for routing
on activation with input (establish, sid,I,R,Φ):
Record that we are the responder, R
Retrieve PK𝑅 and SK𝑅 from shared functionality
Retrieve PK𝐼 from shared functionality
Record I, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅, sid, and Φ
on (P∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼) to R:
if (P ≠ I) Locally output (abort, sid,R) and halt
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Let 𝑡1 = I∥R∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼
Compute 𝛾 = DREnc(PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑅, 𝑡1)
Let 𝑡2 = 𝑡1∥𝛾∥Φ
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡2)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑖)𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Erase 𝑟 and 𝑄𝑘
Send 𝜓2 = R∥𝛾∥𝜎 to I
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,R, 𝑘) and halt
on (P∥𝛾∥𝜎) to I:
Retrieve PK𝑃 from shared functionality
Let 𝑡 = I∥P∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼
if (¬(RVrf({PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , 𝑔𝑖}, 𝜎, 𝑡∥𝛾∥Φ))) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Compute 𝑔𝑝∥𝑄𝑃 ← DRDec(PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , SK𝐼 ,Φ, 𝛾)
Compute 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖∥𝑄𝑘)
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , and 𝑄𝑘
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,P, 𝑘) and halt
on unknown or invalid message:
Let P be our activated role (I or R)
Locally output (abort, sid,P) and halt
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adaptation is very similar to the approach used for DAKEZ in Algorithm 6.3: the parties retrieve
the necessary long-term keys from the shared functionality, the initiator broadcasts its initial
message using the routing information in 𝑎𝑢𝑥, and the responder replies in the usual manner.
The shared functionality for the proof, ḠSpawn
+
krkro , is defined to be Ḡ
Spawn+,3,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔
krkro . The key
derivation function KDF(𝑥) is modeled using the first random oracle in ḠSpawn
+
krkro . The second and
third random oracles are used to model the hashes in the RSig and DREAD schemes.
6.3.3 Proof Strategy
Theorem 4 states the security theorem for Spawn+.
Theorem 4 Spawn+ is secure
If the DREAD scheme is sound and IND-CCA2 secure, the RSig/RVrf scheme is anonymous
against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider corruption, and the CDH
assumption holds in the underlying group, then Spawn+ GUC-realizes F +1psp-keia within the
erasure ḠSpawn
+
krkro -hybrid model with adaptive security for IncProcSpawn+ and non-information
oracle NQRDH. (Refs: 140 a b c d, 148, 150, and 153)
Note that Theorem 4 allows for fully adaptive adversaries due to the use of a non-information
oracle, whereas the proof for Spawn only defended against semi-adaptive adversaries [UG15].
The core idea of the proof for Theorem 4 is nearly identical to the security proof for DAKEZ.
Algorithm 6.8 shows the incriminating procedure that is used within F +1psp-keia, IncProcSpawn+ .
IncProcSpawn+ simply honestly calculates the second message flow from 𝑅, using SK𝑅 to produce
the authenticating proof. The non-information oracle NQRDH can be directly reused in the proof,
since Spawn+ uses the same ephemeral key structure as DAKEZ.Where the details of the sketch are
identical to the proof for DAKEZ, the reader is referred to the DAKEZ proof sketch in Section 6.2.
6.3.4 Proof of Theorem 4
(Sketch) The general simulator setup is the same as in Section 6.2. Specifically, a simulator S
is constructed that executes A internally and simulates parties for A while interacting with
F +1psp-keia. The first and second flows of Spawn+, as shown in Algorithm 6.7, are referred to as 𝜓1
and 𝜓2, respectively.
Section 6.3.5 describes the simulator construction, and Section 6.3.6 presents the indistin-
guishability proof.
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Algorithm 6.8 Incrimination procedure for Spawn+. (Ref: 140)
Subroutine IncProcSpawn+ (sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
on (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) from S:
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Let 𝑡1 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼
Compute 𝛾 = DREnc(PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅, 𝑡1)
Let 𝑡2 = 𝑡1∥𝛾∥Φ
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡2)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝜓 = “𝑅”∥𝛾∥𝜎




6.3.5.1 General handling of A
As in Section 6.2.6, S allowsA andZ to communicate, delays messages delayed byA, corrupts
ideal parties when A corrupts the corresponding simulated parties, and replicates output from
corrupted parties.
6.3.5.2 Initialization
When S first initializes, it sends a (setup,𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔) message to N through F +post-keia, and waits to
receive a (exchange, 𝑔𝑖, 𝑔𝑟, PQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑅)message in response. The group details sent byS correspond
to the protocol instantiation attacked by A. S makes a note of the ephemeral keys in the
exchange message for later use in the simulation.
6.3.5.3 Receipt of solicit message from F +1psp-keia
When S receives (solicit, sid, 𝐼,Φ𝐼) from F +1psp-keia, it honestly constructs a 𝜓1 message from
𝐼 (𝑠) with the help of the non-information oracle N . S computes 𝜓1 = “𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼 using the 𝑔𝑖
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and PQ𝐼 values previously received from N and sends 𝜓1 through A as if it were broadcast by
𝐼 (𝑠) . S records the value Φ𝐼 for later use.
6.3.5.4 Receipt of establish message from F +1psp-keia
When S receives an establishment message (establish, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅,Φ𝑅) from F +1psp-keia, it checks
to see the circumstances of the simulated 𝜓1 message transmission. S parses 𝜓1 to recover 𝑔𝑖
and PQ𝐼. If 𝜓1 is not of the correct format, or if the asserted identity is not 𝐼 (𝑠), then S sends
(abort, sid) to F +1psp-keia, delivers the resulting abort to 𝑅 immediately, and withholds the abort
message to 𝐼. Otherwise, S constructs a message 𝜓2 from 𝑅(𝑠) in response to 𝜓1 and causes
F +1psp-keia to record a shared secret key. The mechanism for constructing 𝜓2 depends on how 𝜓1
was generated:
• If 𝐼 (𝑠) is not corrupt and S previously created a message 𝜓1′, but 𝜓1 ≠ 𝜓1′, thenA has altered
the message in transit. S constructs 𝜓2 through the use of IncProc. S sends (abort, sid) to
F +1psp-keia, but withholds delivery of the resulting abort messages to 𝐼 and 𝑅. It then sends
(incriminate, sid) to F +1psp-keia, causing an instance of IncProc to be invoked. Using the
values parsed from𝜓1, S sends (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ𝑅, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) to IncProc, causing
IncProc to send the message (inc, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, 𝜓2) in response. IncProc will then privately send
the session key to F +1psp-keia.
• Otherwise, S constructs the message 𝜓2 by producing a ciphertext and forged proof. The
method for choosing the ephemeral keys contained within the ciphertext and the keys used to
forge the proof depends on the environment. Given a choice of ephemeral keys for 𝑅(𝑠) , 𝑔𝑟 and
𝑄𝑅, S produces a ciphertext 𝛾 = DREnc(PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅, “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼). S then produces
a proof 𝜎𝑅 with tag 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝛾∥Φ𝑅. S selects ephemeral keys and produces the
proof in the following way:
◦ If S previously created 𝜓1 in response to a solicit message, then S uses the values
of 𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅 retrieved from the non-information oracle N to produce 𝛾. S requests a
forged proof under 𝐼 (𝑠) ’s ephemeral keys by sending (prove, 1, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡) to N
and waiting for a message (proof, 𝜎𝑅) in response.
◦ If 𝜓1 was sent by a corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠), then S signals to N that its transcript has been
rejected by sending a message (complete, FALSE, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) to N . Since 𝐼 is corrupted,
F +1psp-keia immediately sends the state of N to S. S uses the newly generated values 𝑔𝑟
and 𝑄𝑅 as the ephemeral keys to be contained within 𝛾. S uses its access to corrupt 𝐼
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to retrieve SK𝐼 from ḠSpawn
+
krkro with a retrievesecret message. S then forges the proof
using 𝜎𝑅 = RSig(PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡).
Given 𝛾 and 𝜎𝑅, S constructs 𝜓2 = “𝑅” ∥ 𝛾 ∥ 𝜎𝑅.
S then sends 𝜓2 through A as if 𝑅(𝑠) sent it to 𝐼 (𝑠) . S sends (set-key, sid) to F +1psp-keia, causing
F +1psp-keia to record a shared secret key and causing 𝑅 to output that key. If IncProc was used,
F +1psp-keia will use its output as the key. Otherwise, F +1psp-keia will use the output from N if 𝐼 (𝑠) is
corrupted, or a fresh random value if 𝐼 (𝑠) is uncorrupted.
6.3.5.5 Receipt of 𝜓2 by uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
When uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠) receives message 𝜓2 claiming to be from 𝑃 (𝑠) , S checks to see if 𝐼 (𝑠) has
previously broadcast a message 𝜓1. If not, then the message 𝜓2 is ignored. S then parses 𝜓2 to
extract “𝑃”, the ciphertext 𝛾, and the proof 𝜎𝑃. If 𝜓2 is not of the correct form, or if 𝜎𝑃 is not a
correct proof matching Φ𝐼 and the 𝜓1 sent by 𝐼 (𝑠) , then S sends (abort, sid) to F +1psp-keia, delivers
the resulting abort message to 𝐼 immediately, and withholds the abort message to 𝑅.
If 𝐼 (𝑠) has previously broadcast a message 𝜓1 and 𝜓2 is valid, then S must cause 𝐼 to output
a session key corresponding to the one negotiated between 𝐼 (𝑠) and 𝑃 (𝑠). The key depends on
the state of the simulation:
• IfA has previously corrupted 𝑃 (𝑠) , then S must have previously corrupted 𝑃 (since S corrupts
ideal parties corresponding to simulated parties corrupted byA). S issues a (finish, sid, 𝑃)
message to F +1psp-keia. Since 𝑃 is corrupted, F +1psp-keia sends the state ofN to S. S recovers the
ephemeral keys 𝑖 and SQ𝐼 used to generate 𝜓1 fromN . S retrieves SK𝑃 from ḠSpawn
+
krkro using a
retrievesecretmessage, then uses this key to decrypt 𝛾, recovering 𝑔𝑝 and 𝑄𝑃. S computes
𝑘 = KDF((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖 ∥ QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)) and sends (mismatch-key, sid, 𝑘) to F +1psp-keia, causing
𝐼 to output key 𝑘 and partner identity 𝑃 with overwhelming probability.
• Otherwise, 𝑃 (𝑠) is uncorrupted. Because RSig is unforgeable with respect to insider corruption,
the only way for 𝜎𝑃 to be valid in this situation is if the sender of the message knows the
long-term private key of one of the parties, or the ephemeral key of 𝐼 (𝑠). Additionally, 𝜎𝑃
must have been computed during this session because its validity depends on 𝜓1. Due to the
hardness of the discrete log problem in the group (guaranteeing the secrecy of the keys) and
the uniqueness of 𝜓1, this is only possible if 𝑃 (𝑠) = 𝑅(𝑠) and 𝜓2 was previously generated by
S. S sends (finish, sid, 𝑅) to F +1psp-keia, causing 𝐼 to emit an appropriate session key that is
shared with 𝑅.
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6.3.5.6 Transmission of 𝜓1 by corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
When S has not yet received a solicit message from F +1psp-keia, but A causes a corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
to issue message 𝜓1, then S must reflect this in the ideal environment. S causes 𝐼 to send
(solicit, sid, 𝐼,⊥,⊥) to F +1psp-keia, but ignores the resulting solicit message sent by F +1psp-keia.
6.3.5.7 Transmission of 𝜓2 by corrupted 𝑅(𝑠)
When S has not yet received an establish message from F +1psp-keia, but A causes a corrupted
𝑅(𝑠) to issue message 𝜓2, then S must reflect this in the ideal environment. S causes 𝑅 to
send (establish, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅,⊥) to F +1psp-keia, but ignores the resulting establish message sent by
F +1psp-keia.
6.3.5.8 Constructing state for corrupted parties
When A corrupts a party in the simulated environment, S corrupts the corresponding party in
the ideal environment. If A causes corrupted parties to output values, S outputs these values
from the corresponding ideal parties. In addition, S must provide A with a simulated historical
state for corrupted parties.
If A corrupts the party known as 𝐼 (𝑠) after a solicit message has been received, but before
𝐼 (𝑠) has received 𝜓2, then S uses its access to N to provide the random coins 𝑖, and SQ𝐼 used to
construct 𝜓1. If 𝐼 (𝑠) already received 𝜓2, then S uses its corruption of 𝐼 to provide the session
key 𝑘 that 𝐼 already output.
If A corrupts the party known as 𝑅(𝑠) after it has already received 𝜓1, then S uses its
corruption of 𝑅 to provide the session key 𝑘 that 𝑅 already output.
6.3.6 Proof of Indistinguishability
The proof of indistinguishability is similar to the proof described in Section 6.2.7. It must be
shown that flows and memory states are indistinguishable in all cases.
6.3.6.1 The honest case
This situation occurs when A does not corrupt 𝐼 (𝑠) or 𝑅(𝑠) until after the session concludes, or
alter any message flows. The proof of this case is the same as the honest case in Section 6.2.7;
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since the protocol is executed honestly (with the exception of proof generation),Z would need
to break the anonymity against full key exposure of RSig to identify that the proofs were forged,
orZ would need to break the CDH assumption within 𝔾 to identify that the shared session key
was randomly generated.
6.3.6.2 Alteration of 𝜓1
This situation occurs when 𝜓1 generated by S is altered by A in transit, but neither 𝐼 (𝑠) nor 𝑅(𝑠)
is corrupted when 𝜓1 is delivered. The proof of this case is the same as in Section 6.2.7, except
thatZ is given even less information when subsequently corrupting 𝑅(𝑠); both the 𝜓2 message
and session key generated by IncProc are effectively generated honestly, so the messages and
output from 𝑅(𝑠) are indistinguishable from a real protocol execution. 𝐼 (𝑠) aborts as expected if
𝜓2 is delivered, since RSig is unforgeable with respect to insider corruption.
6.3.6.3 Alteration of 𝜓2
This situation occurs when 𝜓2 generated by S is altered by A in transit, but neither 𝐼 (𝑠) nor
𝑃 (𝑠) (the party named as the communication partner in 𝜓2) are corrupted when 𝜓2 is delivered.
S causes 𝐼 (𝑠) to immediately abort when it receives an altered 𝜓2. As mentioned previously,
𝐼 (𝑠) will always abort because the proof in the altered 𝜓2 message cannot be correct due to the
unforgeability with respect to insider corruption of RSig.
6.3.6.4 Indistinguishability under corruptions
This situation occurs when either party is corrupted at a time before the times covered by the
previous cases. The proof of this case is nearly the same as in Section 6.2.7. When both 𝐼 (𝑠) and
𝑅(𝑠) are corrupted, indistinguishability is trivial because S can directly replicate the behavior
of A. With only a single corrupted party, the other effectively performs the protocol honestly.
The exception is when 𝐼 (𝑠) is corrupted but 𝑅(𝑠) is not, in which case S forges the proof in 𝜓2
using the long-term key of 𝐼. This forgery is undetectable by Z due to the anonymity against
full key exposure of RSig, even if A corrupts all parties after the session. All memory states are
consistent with honest execution, as mentioned above.
The only major difference with Section 6.2.7 is that A can cause 𝐼 (𝑠) to accept the wrong
communication partner without aborting the protocol by leaving 𝐼 (𝑠) and 𝑅(𝑠) uncorrupted,
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corrupting 𝑃 (𝑠) , and replacing 𝑅(𝑠) ’s 𝜓2 message with an honestly generated message from 𝑃 (𝑠) .⁴
In this case, F +1psp-keia grants S access to the internal state of N . S uses this state to compute
𝐼’s output honestly, with the exception of using 𝑃’s long-term secret key to decrypt the DREAD
ciphertext. Due to the soundness of the DREAD scheme, this process results in the same key
that would have been computed by an honestly behaving 𝐼 (𝑠), so the key must be the one that
Z expects. Revealing the state of N and allowing S to completely dictate the output of 𝐼 is not
a problem in this case, since A effectively controls one of the conversation partners from the
perspective of 𝐼 (𝑠) . LeakingN ’s state to S models that the adversary has access to the key shared
with 𝐼, and it has full control over the value of the key (since it controls the second ephemeral
key contribution).
6.3.6.5 Data from other sessions
As in Section 6.2.7, no information from other sessions can be used to assist A with the gener-
ation of false message flows: 𝜓1 is generated using no long-term information, and 𝜓2 requires
computation of an SoK bound to the contents of 𝜓1. Since RSig is unforgeable with respect
to insider corruption, collecting SoKs from other sessions does not allow A to produce proofs
correctly bound to the session under attack. Additionally, the IND-CCA2 security of the DREAD
scheme implies that it is also non-malleable [BDPR98]. This non-malleability prevents A from
modifying DREAD ciphertexts from other sessions to bind them to the session under attack
without corrupting one of the parties capable of decrypting the ciphertext. ■
6.4 Proof of ZDH Security
It is possible to prove the security of ZDH in nearly the same environment as Spawn+, since
the protocols share most properties. In fact, ZDH can GUC-realize the same ideal functionality
F +1psp-keia that is GUC-realized by Spawn+. Algorithm 6.9 defines ZDH (previously defined in
Section 5.5) in terms of the F +1psp-keia interface. The security theorem for ZDH is as follows:
4 ⋏As mentioned in Section 6.3.1, key confirmation can be used in higher-level protocols to alleviate this weakness.
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Algorithm 6.9 ZDH implemented in the GUC framework. (Refs: 146, 154 a b, and 156)
Real Protocol ZDH
on activation with input (solicit, sid,I,Φ, aux):
Record that we are the initiator, I
Retrieve PK𝐼 and SK𝐼 from ḠZDHkrkro
Record PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , sid, and Φ
Record 𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
Broadcast 𝜓1 = I∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 using aux to route
on activation with input (establish, sid,I,R,Φ):
Record that we are the responder, R
Retrieve PK𝑅 and SK𝑅 from ḠZDHkrkro
Retrieve PK𝐼 from ḠZDHkrkro
Record I, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅, sid, and Φ
on (P∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼) to R:
if (P ≠ I) Locally output (abort, sid,R) and halt
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute ^ = KDF1 ((𝑔𝑖)𝑟 ∥(PK𝐼)𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2 (^) and 𝑘 = KDF3 (^)
Let 𝑡 = I∥R∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟 ∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ
Compute mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡)
Erase 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘, ^, and 𝑀𝑘
Send 𝜓2 = R∥𝑔𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑅∥mac∥𝜎 to I
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,R, 𝑘) and halt
on (P∥𝑔𝑝∥𝑄𝑃 ∥mac∥𝜎) to I:
Retrieve PK𝑃 from ḠZDHkrkro
Let 𝑡 = I∥P∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥Φ
if (¬(RVrf({PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , 𝑔𝑖}, 𝜎, 𝑡))) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Compute 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)
Compute ^ = KDF1 ((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖∥(𝑔𝑝)SK𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2 (^) and 𝑘 = KDF3 (^)
Compute mac′ = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
if (mac ≠ mac′) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑘, ^, and 𝑀𝑘
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,P, 𝑘) and halt
on unknown or invalid message:
Let P be our activated role (I or R)
Locally output (abort, sid,P) and halt
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Algorithm 6.10 Incrimination procedure for ZDH. (Ref: 150)
Subroutine IncProcZDH(sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
on (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼) from S:
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥(PK𝐼)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^) and 𝑘 = KDF3(^)
Let 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ
Compute mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜓 = “𝑅”∥𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅∥mac∥𝜎
Send (inc, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, 𝜓) to S
Locally output 𝑘
Halt
Theorem 5 ZDH is secure
If the MAC is weakly unforgeable under chosen message attack [BKR00], the RSig/RVrf
scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider
corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in the underlying group, then ZDH GUC-realizes
F +1psp-keia within the erasure Ḡ
ZDH
krkro-hybridmodel with partially adaptive security for IncProcZDH
and non-information oracle NZDH. (Refs: 148 a b, 150 a b c d, 152, 153 a b, 157, and 158)
There are a few key differences between Theorem 5 and Theorem 4. ZDH uses a protocol-specific
incrimination procedure, IncProcZDH, that simply provides an honest generation of the second
message flow using 𝑅’s long-term secret key. NZDH is similar to NQRDH, but also enables calls to
MAC with the shared key 𝑀𝑘, and supports adding extra DH secrets into the KDF. The phrase
“partially adaptive” in Theorem 5 means that S may corrupt 𝐼 at any time, but S may only
corrupt 𝑅 after a finish message has been received by F +1psp-keia. In the ideal setting, this means
that S may not send an establish message from a corrupted party. In the real setting, this
means that A cannot transmit a response message 𝜓2 from a corrupted party. This restriction
intentionally prevents the protocol from achieving online deniability for R in order to allow
ZDH to GUC-realize F +1psp-keia. The shared functionality for the proof, Ḡ
ZDH
krkro, is defined to be
ḠZDH,4,𝔾,𝑞,𝑔krkro . The first three random oracles in Ḡ
ZDH
krkro are used to model KDF1, KDF2, and KDF3.
The fourth random oracle models the hash in the RSig scheme.
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Algorithm 6.11 Non-information oracle for ZDH. (Ref: 150)
Subroutine NZDH
NZDH copies the setup and prove commands from NQRDH (Algorithm 6.5), slightly modifies its
complete command, and introduces two new commands.
function KDF-Val(𝐶, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘)
𝛾 ← ∅
for each (𝑐 ∈ 𝐶) {
if ((𝑐 ∉ 𝔾) | | (𝑐 is identity element)) Halt
𝛾 ← 𝛾∥𝑐𝑟
}
return KDF1 (𝛾 ∥ 𝑄𝑘)
on (setup,𝔾, 𝑞, 𝑔) fromM:
Handle the message as in NQRDH
on (prove, 𝑝, 𝑆, 𝑚) fromM:
Handle the message as in NQRDH
on (complete, 𝑜𝑘, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝐶) fromM:
if (no setup message has been received) return
if (already output a key) return
if (𝑜𝑘 is TRUE) {
Compute 𝑘 = KDF-Val({𝑔𝑖} ∪ 𝐶, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘)
} else {
Generate new 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞
Generate new (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(𝛽)
Compute 𝑘 = KDF-Val({𝛼} ∪ 𝐶, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘)
}
Locally output 𝑘
on (authenticate, 𝐶, 𝑚) fromM:
if (no setup message has been received) return
if (a complete message has been received) return
Compute 𝑘 = KDF-Val({𝑔𝑖} ∪ 𝐶, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘)
Compute mac = MAC(KDF2 (𝑘), 𝑚)
Send (authentication,mac) toM
on (verify, 𝐶, 𝑚,mac) fromM:
if (no setup message has been received) return
if (a complete message has been received) return
Compute 𝑘 = KDF-Val({𝑔𝑖} ∪ 𝐶, 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘)
Compute mac′ = MAC(KDF2 (𝑘), 𝑚)
if (mac′ = mac) { Send (verified, TRUE) toM }
else { Send (verified, FALSE) toM }
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The proof sketch of Theorem 5 is nearly identical to the one for Spawn+, since the protocols
behave similarly in all applicable scenarios. While F +1psp-keia provides some additional features
that are not necessary for the proof of Theorem 5, the proof sketch avoids defining a new ideal
functionality in order to clearly show the security relationship between Spawn+ and ZDH.
Algorithm 6.10 shows the incrimination procedure for ZDH, which is simply an honest gener-
ation of a response 𝜓2 using R ’s long-term secret key to produce the proof. Algorithm 6.11 shows
the non-information oracle used for the proof. NZDH is similar to NQRDH, except that it also adds
a facility for the simulator to generate and verify a MAC using the shared key derived from the
exchange. NZDH also permits the callerM to pass in a set of additional DH public contributions,
𝐶, that are combined with the responder’s ephemeral key, 𝑟, as part of the input to KDF1. For
ZDH, 𝐶 contains only the initiator’s long-term public key, PK𝐼 .
It is clear that NZDH is still a non-information oracle, despite the addition of the new MAC
methods and the introduction of the 𝐶 parameter. As in NQRDH, M is never given enough
information to compute 𝑔𝑖𝑟 (when ok is TRUE) or 𝛼𝑟 (when ok is FALSE). M is also not given
enough information to compute 𝑄𝑘. Because KDF1 is modeled by a random oracle, the local
output from complete is indistinguishable from random without access to these values, which
are used as input to KDF1 in KDF-Val. This holds true even ifM is able to compute the other
values concatenated into 𝛾 using knowledge of the secrets associated with keys in 𝐶, since it
cannot compute the entire input to KDF1. For the same reason, the outputs of KDF1 and KDF2
that are passed to MAC in the authenticate and verify handlers is independent of 𝑖, 𝑟, and
𝑄𝑘. Note that the non-information property does not depend on the security of MAC, since the
MAC key is already computationally independent of the secrets andM knows 𝑚.
The proof proceeds as follows:
(Sketch) The proof of Theorem 5 is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 4 in Section 6.3.
For this reason, the sketch only highlights the differences in simulator construction. Section 6.4.1
constructs the simulator and Section 6.4.2 demonstrates indistinguishability.
6.4.1 Simulator Construction
The simulator S behaves exactly as in Section 6.3.5 except that in the proof for Theorem 5, all
references to ḠSpawn
+
krkro are replaced by references to Ḡ
ZDH
krkro.
6.4.1.1 Receipt of establish message from F +1psp-keia
This case is identical to the case in Section 6.3.5, except for the mechanism for constructing 𝜓2:
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• If 𝐼 (𝑠) is not corrupt and S previously created a message 𝜓1′, but 𝜓1 ≠ 𝜓1′, then S behaves
as in Section 6.3.5. The only difference is that IncProc returns a properly constructed 𝜓2
message for ZDH.
• Otherwise, S constructs the message 𝜓2 by producing a forged proof 𝜎𝑅 with tag 𝑡 =
“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥Φ𝑅. The method for choosing the ephemeral keys (𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅) and
the keys used to forge the proof depends on the environment:
◦ If S previously created 𝜓1 in response to a solicit message, then S uses the values of
𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅 retrieved from the non-information oracle N . S requests a forged proof under
𝐼 (𝑠) ’s ephemeral keys by sending (prove, 1, {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡) toN and waiting for a message
(proof, 𝜎𝑅) in response. S also requests a MAC by sending (authenticate, {PK𝐼}, 𝑡) to
N and waiting for a message (authentication,mac) in response.
◦ If 𝜓1 was sent by a corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠), then S signals to N that its transcript has been
rejected by sending a message (complete, FALSE, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼 , {PK𝐼}) to N . Since 𝐼 is cor-
rupted, F +1psp-keia immediately sends the state of N to S. S uses the newly gener-
ated values 𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅 as the ephemeral keys for 𝜓2. S uses its access to corrupt 𝐼
to retrieve SK𝐼 from ḠZDHkrkro with a retrievesecret message. S forges the proof us-
ing 𝜎𝑅 = RSig(PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , {𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡). S also uses the state of N to compute mac. S
computes ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥(PK𝐼)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘), 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^), and then mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡).
Given a choice of ephemeral keys, mac, and 𝜎𝑅, S constructs 𝜓2 = “𝑅” ∥ 𝑔𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑅 ∥ mac ∥ 𝜎𝑅.
As in Section 6.3.5, S sends 𝜓2 throughA as if 𝑅(𝑠) sent it to 𝐼 (𝑠) , and then sends (set-key, sid)
to F +1psp-keia.
6.4.1.2 Receipt of 𝜓2 by uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
When uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠) receives message 𝜓2 claiming to be from 𝑃 (𝑠) , S checks to see if 𝐼 (𝑠) has
previously broadcast a message 𝜓1. If not, then the message 𝜓2 is ignored. S then parses 𝜓2 to
extract “𝑃”, 𝑔𝑝, 𝑄𝑃, mac𝑃, and the proof 𝜎𝑃. If 𝜓2 is not of the correct form, 𝜎𝑃 is not a correct
proof matching Φ𝐼 and the 𝜓1 sent by 𝐼 (𝑠), or if 𝑃 (𝑠) is corrupted, then S sends (abort, sid)
to F +1psp-keia, delivers the resulting abort message to 𝐼 immediately, and withholds the abort
message to 𝑅.
If 𝐼 (𝑠) has previously broadcast a message 𝜓1, 𝜓2 is valid, and 𝑃 (𝑠) is uncorrupted, then S
must cause 𝐼 to output a session key corresponding to the one negotiated between 𝐼 (𝑠) and 𝑃 (𝑠) .
S proceeds under the assumption that 𝑃 (𝑠) = 𝑅(𝑠) (the proof will later argue that this must be
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the case). S uses N to check the validity of mac𝑃 by sending (verify, {PK𝐼}, 𝑡,mac𝑃), where
tag 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥Φ𝐼 . If S receives (verified, FALSE) in response, then it aborts
𝐼 in the same manner as above. Otherwise, S sends (finish, sid, 𝑅) to F +1psp-keia, causing 𝐼 to
emit a session key shared with 𝑅.
6.4.1.3 Transmission of 𝜓2 by corrupted 𝑅(𝑠)
A is not permitted to transmit 𝜓2 messages from corrupted parties, so this case is no longer
needed.
6.4.2 Proof of Indistinguishability
The proof of indistinguishability given in Section 6.3.6 also applies here with several changes.
The proof no longer needs to consider corruptions of the responder before transmission of 𝜓2, so
these cases can be ignored. As in Section 6.3.6, the anonymity against full key exposure of RSig
prevents Z from detecting forgeries of 𝜎𝑃 in 𝜓2 by S, even if A corrupts all parties after the
session. Similarly, the CDH assumption on the underlying group preventsZ from distinguishing
the output key in the honest case, and the unforgeability of RSig with respect to insider corruption
prevents Z from producing forged proofs in 𝜓2, even with information collected from other
sessions.
The only significant difference with the proof in Section 6.3.6 is indistinguishability in the
case of an altered 𝜓2 received by an uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠). Due to the unforgeability of RSig with
respect to insider corruption, any modification to 𝜓2 must include a proof 𝜎𝑃 naming a corrupted
party 𝑃 (𝑠) ≠ 𝑅(𝑠) . In this case, S always aborts 𝐼. This procedure always matches the simulated
environment because 𝜓2 must be invalid. If 𝜓2 includes a valid proof 𝜎𝑃 and 𝐼 (𝑠) does not abort,
then this implies that mac𝑃 is also valid. Due to the weak unforgeability under chosen message
attack of MAC, this is only possible ifA knows the MAC key derived from a secret shared between
𝐼 (𝑠) and 𝑃 (𝑠) , which in turn is only possible (due to the security of the key derivation functions and
the hardness of the CDH problem in the underlying group) if A honestly generated a response
from 𝑃 (𝑠). An honest generation of this type is not permitted due to the “partially adaptive”
constraint in Theorem 5, because it corresponds to the completion of the protocol by a corrupted
responder. Consequently, A cannot possibly cause 𝐼 (𝑠) to output a key when altering 𝜓2. ■
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6.5 Proof of XZDH Security
This section sketches a security proof for the final new DAKE, XZDH. Section 6.5.1 discusses how
the forward secrecy of XZDH is defined in the GUC model. Section 6.5.2 presents the formalized
security theorem. The proof sketch begins in Section 6.5.3
6.5.1 Forward Secrecy of DAKEZ, Spawn+, and ZDH
Chapter 5 previously claimed that DAKEZ has strong forward secrecy, and that the purpose of
XZDH is to improve the forward secrecy properties of ZDH. Using the framework established so
far in this chapter, it is now possible to precisely distinguish between these forward secrecy levels
from the perspective of the GUC-based proof sketches.
Section 6.2.4 defined strong and weak forward secrecy in terms of ideal GUC processes. In
these terms, the proof of Theorem 3 shows that DAKEZ offers strong forward secrecy. Consider
the simulator S interacting with F +post-keia as sketched in Section 6.2.6. In order to break strong
forward secrecy, Z must use S to collect enough information from NQRDH or IncProcDAKEZ to
distinguish a key output by 𝐼 or 𝑅 from random without corrupting the entity or its partner. The
definition of F +post-keia guarantees that no keys can be output when IncProcDAKEZ is invoked, so the
incrimination procedure cannot be used to gather information. Moreover, the only time that S
sends a delivermessage when a party and its partner are uncorrupted is when both 𝐼 and 𝑅 are
uncorrupted, the key was generated by NQRDH, and NQRDH ’s proposed exchange was accepted.
By the non-information property, NQRDH yields no information about this key.
In contrast, F +1psp-keia only guarantees weak forward secrecy, which prevents S from aborting
the session. IncProc is not useful toZ because it requires an abort command to be invoked. By
definition, N is also not useful, even if its proposed exchange is rejected. Proving Theorem 4
and Theorem 5 therefore shows that Spawn+ and ZDH have (at least) weak forward secrecy.
If Spawn+ and ZDH do not offer strong forward secrecy, then there should exist an attack in
whichZ can issue instructions to S to learn information about a key output by 𝑃 with partner 𝑃′
without corrupting either 𝑃 or 𝑃′ during the corresponding session. Indeed, such an attack exists
when S is permitted to abort F +1psp-keia. For simplicity, this section considers only the ZDH case—a
similar attack works against Spawn+. The attack, which takes place in the setting of Theorem 5
and is the idealized equivalent of the one discussed in Section 5.6, proceeds as follows:
1. Z instructs 𝐼 to send a solicit message to F +1psp-keia. This causes S to simulate a message
𝜓1 from 𝐼 (𝑠) .
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2. Z generates 𝑧 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝑍, SQ𝑍) ← QRGen(). Z then instructs S to modify 𝜓1 to be
“𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑧 ∥ PQ𝑍.
3. Z instructs 𝑅 to send an establishmessage to F +1psp-keia. This causes S to abort the protocol,
interact with IncProcZDH, and simulate the resulting 𝜓2 = “𝑅” ∥ 𝑔𝑟 ∥ 𝑄𝑅 ∥ mac ∥ 𝜎𝑅 message
from 𝑅(𝑠). 𝑅 receives a set-key message identifying partner 𝐼 with a key 𝑘 generated by
IncProcZDH. Note that S does not learn 𝑘, since IncProcZDH sends it directly to F +1psp-keia.
4. Z instructs S to deliver 𝜓2 to 𝐼 (𝑠) , which causes S to issue an abort command and deliver
an abort message to 𝐼. The session has now completed.
5. Z causes 𝐼 to be corrupted, revealing secret key 𝐼. Z can now compute (𝑔𝑟)𝑧, (𝑔𝑟) 𝐼, and
QRDecaps(SQ𝑍, 𝑄𝑅), which allows it to derive 𝑘. Z can distinguish 𝑘 from random, even
though neither 𝐼 nor 𝑅 were corrupted during the session that 𝑅 outputted 𝑘.
6.5.2 XZDH Security Theorem
The only difference between XZDH and ZDH is the introduction of signed prekeys in XZDH.
Nonetheless, the presence of signed prekeys necessitates some changes to the security model.
Signed prekeys persist across protocol sessions, so they must be modeled as part of the shared
functionality. Algorithm 6.12 depicts ḠXZDH, a shared functionality that combines ḠZDHkrkro with a
mechanism for sharing signed prekeys. This mechanism is essentially another instance of a key
registration with knowledge functionality, Ḡ𝜑krk, except with the ability for keys to be replaced
with new ones, and distribution of digital signatures produced using the long-term keys.
XZDH was originally defined in Section 5.6. Algorithm 6.13 depicts the XZDH protocol
following the F +1psp-keia interface. The protocol is nearly identical to Algorithm 6.9, except that it
incorporates signed prekey distribution. Differences between Algorithm 6.13 and Algorithm 6.9
are shaded in the protocol definition.
The security theorem for XZDH is as follows:
Theorem 6 XZDH is secure
If the MAC is weakly unforgeable under chosen message attack [BKR00], the RSig/RVrf
scheme is anonymous against full key exposure and unforgeable with respect to insider
corruption, and the CDH assumption holds in the underlying group, then XZDH GUC-
realizes F +1psp-keia within the erasure Ḡ
XZDH-hybrid model with partially adaptive security
for IncProcXZDH and non-information oracle NZDH. (Refs: 157 a b, 158 a b c, and 502)
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Algorithm 6.12 Shared functionality supporting signed prekeys used by XZDH.
(Ref: 154)
Shared Functionality ḠXZDH
ḠXZDH copies all behavior and commands supported by ḠZDHkrkro (i.e., it handles register,
retrieve, retrievesecret, and ro messages identically). In addition, it also supports the
following commands:
on (spk-refresh) from P:
if (no tuple (P, PK, SK) is recorded) return
if (P is corrupt) return





Record tuple (spk,P, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑟, Sig(PK, SK, 𝑔𝑟))
on (spk-corrupt-refresh, 𝑟) from P:
if (no tuple (P, PK, SK) is recorded) return
if (P is uncorrupted) return
if (tuple 𝑡 = (spk,P, ·, ·, ·) is recorded) {
Delete 𝑡
}
Record tuple (spk,P, 𝑔𝑟, 𝑟, Sig(PK, SK, 𝑔𝑟))
on (spk-retrieve,P ′) from P:
if (tuple 𝑡 = (spk,P ′, pk, ·, b) is recorded) {
Send (spk,P ′, pk, b) to P
} else {
Send (spk,P ′,⊥,⊥) to P
}
on (spk-retrievesecret,P ′) from P:
if ((P is honest) ∧ (P ’s code ∉ 𝜑)) return
if ((P is corrupt) ∧ (P ≠ P ′)) return
if (tuple 𝑡 = (spk,P ′, pk, sk, b) is recorded) {
Send 𝑡 to P
}
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Algorithm 6.13 XZDH implemented in the GUC framework. Shaded lines indicate differences
from the ZDH implementation in Algorithm 6.9. (Refs: 154 a b)
Real Protocol XZDH
on activation with input (solicit, sid,I,Φ, aux):
Record that we are the initiator, I
Retrieve PK𝐼 and SK𝐼 from ḠXZDH
Retrieve (spk,I, pk, sk, b) from ḠXZDH
Record PK𝐼 , SK𝐼 , pk, sid, and Φ
Record 𝑖 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (PQ𝐼 , SQ𝐼) ← QRGen()
Broadcast 𝜓1 = I∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 ∥pk∥b using aux to route
on activation with input (establish, sid,I,R,Φ):
Record that we are the responder, R
Retrieve PK𝑅 and SK𝑅 from ḠXZDH
Retrieve PK𝐼 from ḠXZDH
Record I, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅, sid, and Φ
on (P∥𝑔𝑖∥PQ𝐼 ∥pk∥b) to R :
if (P ≠ I) Locally output (abort, sid,R) and halt
if (¬(SVerif(PK𝐼 , pk, b)) ) {
Locally output (abort, sid,R) and halt
}
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute ^ = KDF1 ((𝑔𝑖)𝑟 ∥pk𝑟 ∥(PK𝐼)𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2 (^) and 𝑘 = KDF3 (^)
Let 𝑡 = I∥R∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟 ∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥pk∥Φ
Compute mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡)
Erase 𝑟, 𝑄𝑘, ^, and 𝑀𝑘
Send 𝜓2 = R∥𝑔𝑟 ∥𝑄𝑅∥mac∥𝜎 to I
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,R, 𝑘) and halt
on (P∥𝑔𝑝∥𝑄𝑃 ∥mac∥𝜎) to I:
Retrieve PK𝑃 from ḠXZDH
Retrieve (spk,I, pk′, sk, b) from ḠXZDH
if (pk ≠ pk′ ) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Let 𝑡 = I∥P∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥pk∥Φ
if (¬(RVrf({PK𝐼 , PK𝑃 , 𝑔𝑖}, 𝜎, 𝑡))) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Compute 𝑄𝑘 = QRDecaps(SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑃)
Compute ^ = KDF1 ((𝑔𝑝) 𝑖∥(𝑔𝑝)sk∥(𝑔𝑝)SK𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2 (^) and 𝑘 = KDF3 (^)
Compute mac′ = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
if (mac ≠ mac′) {
Locally output (abort, sid,I) and halt
}
Erase 𝑖, SQ𝐼 , 𝑄𝑘, ^, and 𝑀𝑘
Locally output (set-key, sid,I,P, 𝑘) and halt
on unknown or invalid message:
Let P be our activated role (I or R)
Locally output (abort, sid,P) and halt
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Algorithm 6.14 Incrimination procedure for XZDH. (Ref: 157)
Subroutine IncProcXZDH(sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, SK𝑅)
on (inc, sid,𝔾, 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝐼, 𝑅, “𝐼”, “𝑅”,Φ, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼 , 𝑔Γ) from S:
Generate 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞 and (𝑄𝑅, 𝑄𝑘) ← QREncaps(PQ𝐼)
Compute ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥(𝑔Γ)𝑟∥(PK𝐼)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘)
Compute 𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^) and 𝑘 = KDF3(^)
Let 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥𝑔Γ∥Φ
Compute mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜎 = RSig(PK𝑅, SK𝑅, {PK𝐼 , PK𝑅, 𝑔𝑖}, 𝑡)
Compute 𝜓 = “𝑅”∥𝑔𝑟∥𝑄𝑅∥mac∥𝜎
Send (inc, sid, 𝐼, 𝑅, 𝜓) to S
Locally output 𝑘
Halt
There are a few differences between Theorem 6 and Theorem 5. The shared functionality,
ḠXZDH, enables the use of signed prekeys. The incrimination procedure shown in Algorithm 6.14,
IncProcXZDH, is identical to IncProcZDH except for the addition of a signed prekey 𝑔Γ as input, and
the use of 𝑔Γ to derive the shared key. Although NZDH serves as the non-information oracle, the
XZDH simulator must provide it with signed prekeys so that the correct session keys are derived.
6.5.2.1 Forward Secrecy of XZDH
XZDH offers forward secrecy that exists somewhere between the traditional “strong” and “weak”
definitions. In the context of Theorem 6, the property can now be expressed precisely: if a party
𝑃 outputs a key ^ and a partner identifier 𝑃′, thenZ can never distinguish ^ from ^′ $←− {0, 1}_
unless 𝑃 or 𝑃′ was corrupted before the corresponding session completed, or S aborted the
session and 𝑃′ did not subsequently issue an spk-refresh message to ḠXZDH.
By definition,NZDH cannot assistZ with breaking forward secrecy. The only viable approach
forZ is to abort the session and derive information from IncProc𝑋𝑍𝐷𝐻 , similarly to the attack on
strong forward secrecy described in Section 6.5.1. The main difference with XZDH is thatZ needs
to compute 𝑔Γ𝑟 in order to provide the correct input to the KDF1 random oracle. If 𝐼 has not issued
an spk-refresh message since the end of the session, thenZ can send spk-retrievesecret
from the corrupted 𝐼 to derive (𝑔𝑟)Γ. However, if the signed prekey has been refreshed, then
there is no way forZ to recover Γ from ḠXZDH, thereby satisfying the forward secrecy property.
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6.5.3 Proof of Theorem 6
(Sketch) The proof of Theorem 6 is nearly identical to the proof of Theorem 5 in Section 6.4. For
this reason, the sketch only highlights the differences in simulator construction. Section 6.5.4
constructs the simulator and Section 6.5.5 demonstrates indistinguishability.
6.5.4 Simulator Construction
The simulator S behaves exactly as in Section 6.4.1 except that in the proof for Theorem 6, all
references to ḠZDHkrkro are replaced by references to Ḡ
XZDH.
6.5.4.1 Receipt of solicit message from F +1psp-keia
When S receives (solicit, sid, 𝐼,Φ𝐼) from F +1psp-keia, it honestly constructs a 𝜓1 message from
𝐼 (𝑠) with the help of the non-information oracle N . S requests the current signed prekey for 𝐼
by sending (spk-retrieve, 𝐼) to ḠXZDH, and receiving (spk, 𝐼, 𝑔Γ, b) in response. S computes
𝜓1 = “𝐼” ∥ 𝑔𝑖 ∥ PQ𝐼 ∥ 𝑔Γ ∥ b using the 𝑔𝑖 and PQ𝐼 values previously received from N and sends
𝜓1 through A as if it were broadcast by 𝐼 (𝑠) . S also records the value Φ1 for later reference.
6.5.4.2 Receipt of establish message from F +1psp-keia
This case is mostly the same as the case from Section 6.4.1, with the exceptions noted below.
When checking the validity of 𝜓1, S also examines the signed prekey 𝑔Γ with signature b from
𝜓1. S retrieves PK𝐼 = 𝑔𝐼 , the long-term public key for 𝐼, from ḠXZDH using a retrieve message.
If SVerif(𝑔𝐼 , 𝑔Γ, b) ≠ TRUE, then S sends (abort, sid) to F +1psp-keia, delivers the resulting abort
to 𝑅 immediately, and withholds the abort message to 𝐼.
S also acts slightly differently when constructing 𝜓2:
• If 𝐼 (𝑠) is not corrupt and S previously created a message 𝜓1′, but 𝜓1 ≠ 𝜓1′, then S behaves
as in Section 6.4.1 with the exception of passing 𝑔Γ to IncProc as part of the inc message.
IncProc returns a properly constructed 𝜓2 message for XZDH.
• Otherwise, S constructs the message 𝜓2 by producing a forged proof 𝜎𝑅 with tag 𝑡 =
“𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑟∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑅∥𝑔Γ∥Φ𝑅. The method for choosing the ephemeral keys (𝑔𝑟 and 𝑄𝑅)
and the keys used to forge the proof depends on the environment:
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◦ If S previously created 𝜓1 in response to a solicit message, then S behaves as in
Section 6.4.1, except that it sends (authenticate, {𝑔Γ, 𝑔𝐼}, 𝑡) to N when requesting
mac.
◦ If 𝜓1 was sent by a corrupted 𝐼 (𝑠) , then S signals toN that its transcript has been rejected
by sending a message (complete, FALSE, 𝑔𝑖, PQ𝐼 , {𝑔Γ, 𝑔𝐼}) to N . S proceeds to acquire
𝑟, SK𝐼 = 𝐼, and 𝜎𝑅 as in Section 6.4.1. S computes ^ = KDF1((𝑔𝑖)𝑟∥(𝑔Γ)𝑟∥(𝑔𝐼)𝑟∥𝑄𝑘),
𝑀𝑘 = KDF2(^), and then mac = MAC(𝑀𝑘, 𝑡).
6.5.4.3 Receipt of 𝜓2 by uncorrupted 𝐼 (𝑠)
This case is mostly the same as the case from Section 6.4.1, with two differences. Firstly, when
checking that 𝜓2 matches the 𝜓1 message sent by 𝐼 (𝑠) , S first retrieves the latest signed prekey
for 𝐼 by sending (spk-retrieve, 𝐼) to ḠXZDH, and receiving (spk, 𝐼, 𝑔Γ′, b) in response. If 𝑔Γ
was the signed prekey transmitted in 𝜓1 and 𝑔Γ ≠ 𝑔Γ
′, then S treats 𝜓2 as invalid and aborts 𝐼.
Secondly, when checking the validity of mac𝑃, S sends (verify, {𝑔Γ, 𝑔𝐼}, 𝑡,mac𝑃) to N , where
tag 𝑡 = “𝐼”∥“𝑅”∥𝑔𝑖∥𝑔𝑝∥PQ𝐼 ∥𝑄𝑃 ∥𝑔Γ∥Φ𝐼 .
6.5.5 Proof of Indistinguishability
The proof of indistinguishability given in Section 6.4.2 also applies here with several additional
remarks.
The session keys produced by IncProc𝑋𝑍𝐷𝐻 and NZDH continue to be indistinguishable toZ
due to the CDH assumption for 𝔾, since the inputs to KDF1 still include terms that Z cannot
compute; the inclusion of 𝑔Γ𝑟 does not negate the computational independence of the random
oracle’s outputs.
Although 𝜓1 now contains long-term information—𝑔Γ and its signature b—these values do
not help Z to distinguish between S and A. S ensures that 𝑅(𝑠) checks the validity of the
signature; if b is invalid, S aborts the session in the same manner as a real responder. If Z
replays a signed prekey or generates one from a corrupted 𝐼 via ḠXZDH, S still effectively simulates
𝑅(𝑠) honestly. Replaying the signed prekey or sending a corrupted one also does not affect the
security properties of the MAC or proof in 𝜓2.
Finally, S also aborts 𝐼 when 𝜓2 includes an outdated 𝑔Γ value (i.e., 𝐼 has refreshed the signed
prekey stored by ḠXZDH after S simulated 𝜓1). This is precisely the behavior of a real initiator,
who always knows which signed prekey is being distributed and who refuses to accept responses
using an old key. ■
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6.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter sketched security proofs for the new DAKEs introduced in Chapter 5. The DAKEs
and their security properties were formally defined in the GUC framework, and shown to be
indistinguishable from new ideal functionalities. These ideal functionalities were shown to
provide the desired security properties, thereby completing the simulation-based security proofs.
This proof technique provides good evidence that the DAKEs are secure even when embedded in
a higher-level protocol and executed concurrently.
Section 6.1 surveyed techniques for proving the security of strongly deniable DAKEs, justified
the use of the GUC framework for the proof sketches in this chapter, and defined a shared
functionality that captures the cross-session public keys used by the new DAKEs (Algorithm 6.1).
Section 6.2 sketched the security proof for DAKEZ in the GUC framework, which includes the
definition of a new ideal functionality (Algorithm 6.2) capturing contributiveness. Section 6.3
sketched the security proof for Spawn+ and defined a new ideal functionality (Algorithm 6.6)
that captures the behavior of Spawn+, ZDH, and XZDH. Section 6.4 sketched the security proof
for ZDH as an extension of the proof for Spawn+. Finally, Section 6.5 sketched the security proof
for XZDH, including a formal specification in the GUC framework of the partial forward secrecy
provided by signed prekeys.
The two chapters in Part II defined new strongly deniable DAKEs and established that they
are secure. While these DAKEs can be used to eliminate deniability related insider attacks, they
are fundamentally limited to two-party settings. Because DAKEZ and XZDH can serve as drop-in
replacements for 3DH and X3DH, they can be used in pairwise secure group messaging protocols
like the ones mentioned in Section 2.8. Unfortunately, this approach lacks the scalability of secure
group messaging protocols built with true GKEs, as discussed in Chapter 3. Part III bridges the
gap by developing a new CGKA-like scheme. This new scheme uses some of the same high-level
techniques to achieve strong deniability as the DAKEs in this chapter (in particular, a variant of









Designing A Secure Group
Messaging Protocol
In this chapter: Protocol
C
urrent proposals for secure group messaging protocols, like MLS, do not provide
robust protection against insider attacks. These attacks grow increasingly important
as the size of the group increases, because there are more insiders that can potentially
act maliciously. Since the focus of recent research has been to improve the scalability of protocols,
defending against these attacks has become more important than ever before. This part of the
dissertation introduces a new protocol called Safehouse to address this shortcoming.
This dissertation is a static document andmay not represent the current
state of the Safehouse protocol. The most recent protocol definition,
security notices, news, and implementations will be made available at
safehouse.im. Visit the website for the most recent information.
Safehouse is a cryptographic protocol that extends the notion of a DGKE in a similar manner
to CGKAs,1 providing key establishment and management over time for a dynamic group. Safe-
house can be used to easily construct secure group messaging protocols with insider security for a
wide range of applications. As discussed in Section 2.6, secure messaging protocols are composed
of three mostly orthogonal design layers: trust establishment (see Section 2.6.1) enables the
secure binding of long-term keys to identities, conversation security (see Section 2.6.2) uses the
long-term keys to protect the actual messages in a manner that provides the desired security
properties, and private transport (see Section 2.6.3) protects the metadata. Safehouse is a proto-
col located entirely in the conversation security layer; it is compatible with any appropriate trust
establishment and private transport implementations that make sense for the target application.
Safehouse leaves room for the protocol designer to choose important aspects of the conversation
security layer. For example, a secure group messaging protocol constructed using Safehouse
1 ⋏ See Chapter 3 for an overview of GKEs and DGKEs, and Chapter 4 for a discussion of CGKAs. Differences
between Safehouse and CGKAs are discussed later in this chapter.
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retains full control over how messages are encrypted—Safehouse provides a mechanism to derive
domain-separated shared secrets that can be used as key material, but does not impose any
particular cryptosystems.
Secure messaging protocols can be specified at three general levels of abstraction, as defined
in Section 2.2: an abstract protocol defines the high-level data flows between participants, a wire
protocol defines binary-level network transmissions, and a tool is a concrete software implemen-
tation of the protocol. Safehouse is defined herein as an abstract protocol. Generally speaking, it
is best to specify secure messaging protocols as wire protocols as part of standardization projects.
Safehouse cannot be entirely expressed as a tool because it supports scenarios with many different
network models; a secure messaging tool may include a particular instantiation of Safehouse in
combination with trust establishment and private transport schemes, but the Safehouse protocol
itself is more general.
New secure messaging protocols should be driven by the needs of users in the context of
the overall messaging tool environment (including popular insecure messengers). Section 2.1
surveyed notable user studies that can help to inform protocol design beyond what is simply
academically interesting or valuable to the protocol designer. Ideally, a new secure group mes-
saging protocol would be widely applicable to a variety of currently popular communication
paradigms in order to maximize its usefulness (assuming that wide coverage is possible without
compromising security). Given all of these considerations, Safehouse is designed to provide
security for the following popular use cases, among others:
• A small group of low-risk friends converses using text messaging from mobile devices.
• A medium-sized group of low-risk friends and acquaintances uses mobile and desktop devices
to communicate in an invite-only Slack channel.
• A medium or large group of low-risk users discuss a specific topic in an IRC channel that
anyone can join.
• A small group of low-risk friends talk in a Zoom video call using mobile and desktop devices.
• A small- or medium-sized group of users from several businesses host a private and confidential
video conference discussing a potential deal.
• A small group of political campaign staff discuss strategy in a private text-based channel.
• A small group of high-risk users conduct a private and pseudonymous text- or audio-based
conversation within a repressive regime.
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• A medium or large group of group of medical professionals receives text-based alerts from a
hospital’s group communication system.
• Someone accused of wrongdoing defends themselves during a video call with a small group.
The terms “low-risk” and “high-risk” in this list refer to the definitions by Halpin et al. [HEM18],
as discussed in Section 2.1. The terms “small”, “medium”, and “large” in this list are very loosely
defined to mean approximately 10, 100, and 1000, respectively. These group sizes generally tend
to be associated with messaging tools that have very different user experiences.
The list of target use cases above is not comprehensive, but it serves as a good test for
evaluating the appropriateness of design decisions. Each of the common target scenarios has a
distinct set of security requirements that can be informed by the user studies in Section 2.1. In
some cases, users should have identities that are globally constant, while in others, each message
should be anonymous. In some cases, sending messages and participating in the group should
be deniable, while in others, messages should be non-repudiable. In some cases, conversation
transcripts should be globally consistent, while in others, messages can be randomly delivered
to a subset of participants without significantly impacting utility. Closer inspection reveals even
more differences between the desired properties for the scenarios. Surprisingly, Safehouse is able
to efficiently provide security in all of these settings by providing a few configurable behaviors.
One notable scenario that is not included in the list is the case of a large group of high-risk activists
using a text-based group conversation to coordinate a protest. This scenario requires very different
security properties than the others and, although Safehouse can be used to implement a tool for
this application, it is best served by a separate protocol.2
Informally, Safehouse exhibits the following properties:
• Group key exchange: All members of the group gain knowledge of a shared symmetric
secret key called the group key. The group key is internal to the protocol. Safehouse provides
a function to derive shared application-specific keys from the group key. Messages can be
encrypted using one of these derived keys.
• Dynamic group membership: Over time, members can join and leave the group. The group
key is replaced after every membership change; a message encrypted using the group key
2 ⋏A protocol for this purpose should provide insider security, deniability, an invitation system, no long-term keys,
and a frequently rotated shared key used to encrypt and authenticate all messages anonymously within the
group. Many of the features provided by Safehouse are unnecessary for this application. Additionally, Safehouse
manages many keys that are useful for the other applications, but not for the protest coordination scenario;
this adds unnecessary overhead. A more efficient protocol for this scenario could likely be developed using the
cryptographic primitive introduced in Chapter 8; this is left to future work.
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can only be read by the current members of the group. No colluding group of outsiders, not
even former group members that have left the group, can break message confidentiality.
• Mass membership changes: An external group of online participants that can communicate
interactively are able to collectively join the group in a single mass join operation that is more
efficient than individual joins. Likewise, a subgroup of group members can be evicted in one
mass evict operation more efficiently than evicting them individually.
• Forward Secrecy: Members can send a special type of message that replaces the group
key with a new group key. Once another group member processes this special message,
compromising that member’s long-term and ephemeral keys is insufficient to decrypt messages
encrypted using previous group keys.
• (Optional) Post-Compromise Security: Consider an adversary that passively records net-
work communication and also compromises a snapshot of the long-term and ephemeral keys
of a subgroup. After every compromised group member has sent a special type of message,
the adversary is no longer able to passively decrypt new messages. In effect, Safehouse is
“self-healing” in this mode. This protection is optional because it comes at an additional
performance cost that is not always desirable.
• Semi-trusted server: A semi-trusted always-online central server stores and forwards protocol
messages to all members of the group. The server is responsible for enforcing a total order
on protocol messages. The server can break availability by refusing to relay data. The server
can also fragment the group by relaying different legitimately created messages to different
subgroups, but these subgroups will no longer accept messages from each other; this is called
a fork. These operations are not considered attacks.
• Non-Interactivity: Group membership changes and other operations can be performed by a
single group member interacting with the central server, even while all other group members
are offline. When a group member comes back online, they receive a list of every message
since they disconnected. This list is sufficient to recover the interim conversation and the
current group key, even if all other group members are offline.
• Publicly verifiable operations: The central server is able to verify the correctness of all
operations performed by group members, even in cases where the server is prevented from
decrypting data. The server is able to view a carefully selected subset of the group state,
allowing it to enforce access control policies and implement spam prevention.
• Insider security: Malicious group members are not able to sabotage the group, even by
colluding with each other and with the central server. Specifically, these adversaries cannot
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cause honest group members to communicate while possessing differing group states. At
most, the central server (without any insider assistance) can permanently fork the group,
preventing future communication between subgroups with different states.
• (Optional) Sender authentication: Safehouse generates individual ephemeral signing keys
for each group member. These keys can be used by a secure group messaging protocol to sign
messages, thereby authenticating the sender to other group members. A messaging protocol
may also choose to hide this authorship from outsiders by encrypting the signature using the
group key.
• (Optional) Participant authentication: When configured to do so, Safehouse explicitly
authenticates the long-term identities of all group participants. When combined with a trust
establishment mechanism, this allows users to verify that they are communicating with each
other. When this feature is disabled, participants are identified solely by their ephemeral
signing keys.
• (Optional) Strong deniability: Groups may optionally provide offline and online partic-
ipation deniability, as discussed in Section 2.4. The group can be configured to provide
non-repudiation, offline deniability only, or strong deniability.
• Invitations: The group requires an invitation in order to join. An inviter generates secret key
material (the invitation) that is delivered to an invitee out of band and subsequently used to
join the group. There are two types of invitations: a targeted invitation can only be used by an
invitee with a designated long-term public key, while a bearer invitation can be used by any
invitee. Invitations may have expiration dates, and bearer invitations may have a limit on the
number of times that they may be used. Invitation policies are cryptographically enforced.
All group members are able to see a list of currently outstanding invitations and, if they were
in the group at the time when the invitation was sent, which group member issued them. A
secure group messaging protocol built with Safehouse can implement an “open invitation”
group by publishing an unlimited-use bearer invitation.
• Anonymity preservation: Safehouse never leaks long-term public keys to the network or to
the central server. When invitations are used, it is not possible for the adversary to determine
the long-term identity of the inviter or invitee, but the validity of the invitation used to join a
group is nevertheless publicly verifiable. Note that these protections are necessary but usually
insufficient to provide anonymity in practice—a member’s identity may still be inferred from
network details like an IP address. However, if Safehouse is combined with an underlying
network anonymity layer, this property ensures that the system does not undermine any
anonymity guarantees provided by that layer. While Safehouse preserves the anonymity of
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the members’ identities, it does not attempt to hide group activity from the semi-trusted
server; the server is able to observe how the (anonymous) members alter the group state
over time. In particular, the server can observe when members are added to or removed from
the group, and it can maintain a history of all actions performed by each member. However,
anonymity preservation prevents the server from linking these histories to long-term identities
in the absence of external knowledge (e.g., a social graph obtained from another service).
• Secure property storage: Safehouse supports the storage of an arbitrary key-value table in
the group state. Keys are always public, but values may optionally be encrypted. Encrypted
values can only be read by group members. New group members can decrypt existing values
immediately when joining the group, without waiting for other group members to come
online. This property storage can be used by developers to implement high-level messaging
protocol features that are expected in modern tools, such as channel topics, pinned messages,
and user settings.
Safehouse most closely resembles a CGKA like TTKEM using the insider security extensions
proposed by Alwen et al. [ACJM20], as discussed in Chapter 4. However, Safehouse takes a
different path that differentiates it from CGKAs. CGKAs like TreeKEM allow a participant to
non-interactively initialize a group and immediately send messages, even without the consent
of the recipients. This is similar to how email operates. Safehouse rejects this functionality,
requiring explicit consent (through protocol participation) from members in order to join a
group, as recommended by Dev et al. [DMC20] as a result of their user study. This also improves
the security of the scheme, because it enables a guarantee that participants always have explicit
authentication for all recipients that could possibly decrypt a sent message. Unlike the CGKA
proposed by Alwen et al. [ACJM20], Safehouse’s configurable insider security mechanism does not
rely on expensive zero-knowledge proofs about cryptographic hash functions. Another important
difference from a scheme like MLS is that Safehouse gives the central server verifiable access to
certain public information about the group state, allowing it to enforce access control policies;
a malicious server that fails to do so will at most succeed at forking the group, which is not
considered an attack. In contrast, MLS treats the server as a blind routing mechanism3 in order
to improve performance. Safehouse also provides more features than MLS, which strives to be a
“bare minimum” specification in order to encourage standardization. Safehouse takes the view
that functionality like group invitations and secure property storage, which are desirable in many
of the target applications, require implementations that are tightly coupled to the underlying
cryptographic machinery and thus should be included in the protocol definition. The configurable
aspects of Safehouse are normally established by a secure messaging protocol designer and
3 ⋏Despite this, as discussed in Section 4.3, MLS encourages that the server applies a total order to routed messages
to maximize security.
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hardwired into tools that implement the protocol. However, designers can also allow end users
to configure Safehouse parameters by attaching a custom “mode” to the public group state, and
then using this mode to determine how Safehouse should behave; Safehouse provides a location
for this mode data in the group state and ensures that it is authenticated to prevent tampering
by the central server.
Safehouse is a very complex protocol with many interacting components. This part of the
dissertation introduces the protocol in a “bottom-up” approach, starting with the two largest
and most complex sub-protocols. Chapter 8 introduces a new cryptographic primitive that is the
main mechanism for achieving Safehouse’s insider security guarantees. This new primitive is a
contribution of independent interest: its applications reach beyond secure messaging. Chapter 9
introduces a new GKE that can be used to efficiently establish shared secrets for a given key
tree. This approach enables highly efficient mass join operations in Safehouse. It is also directly
applicable to other tree-based CGKAs like TreeKEM. Chapter 10 introduces the Safehouse protocol
itself. Finally, because Safehouse is applicable to a wide range of applications, Chapter 11 describes
a specific sample secure group messaging tool implemented using Safehouse in order to illustrate
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In this chapter: Protocol Background Implementation Proof Evaluation
O
ne of the main challenges in designing modern secure group messaging protocols is
that participating devices are expected to go offline frequently and without warning.
It is no longer reasonable to expect that all participants can always maintain active
connections, as in the case of an IRC server for users with desktop computers and broadband
Internet connections; the advent of mobile devices like laptops and smartphones that hop between
networks and are often powered off has changed the messaging landscape. To support these use
cases, secure group messaging protocols must allow participants to send messages and perform
operations non-interactively, since there may never be a time when more than one group member
is online simultaneously. Chapter 4 discussed how the ART and TreeKEM protocols approach this
problem. In both cases, the protocols include situations where the participant sending a message
generates a new public key for another group member. The message that they transmit installs
this new public key in the shared group state, and also includes enough information for the other
group member to compute the new private key. This is the fundamental step that allows these
protocols to implement non-interactive operations.
At its core, Safehouse also employs a key encapsulation technique. However, unlike ART
and TreeKEM, Safehouse aims to provide insider security. An important step toward this goal
is allowing outsiders (specifically, the semi-trusted central server) to publicly verify that newly
transmitted public keys were formed correctly. Section 8.1 formally defines the exact primitive
that achieves these goals. This primitive can be instantiated with many different zero-knowledge
proof systems, each offering different performance and security tradeoffs. This chapter discusses
a few specific instantiations. Section 8.2 presents a construction of the new primitive using a
traditional “Schnorr proof” system. Two options are given: a high-performance construction
with an unusual hardness assumption, and a slower variant that relies on only very conservative
assumptions. Section 8.3 describes important factors for practical deployments, and Section 8.4
provides security proofs for the construction. Section 8.5 describes how the primitive could be
constructed using one of the more recent zero-knowledge proof systems. This construction has
significantly different performance characteristics that are advantageous in certain settings, but it
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requires stronger security assumptions. Section 8.6 discusses how to select a construction based
on practical considerations.
8.1 Batch Recursive Attested Key Encapsulation Mechanism
To motivate the new cryptographic primitive presented in this section, consider this scenario:
Two participants, U1 and U2, each have an asymmetric key pair:
U1 knows (pk1, sk1) andU2 knows (pk2, 𝑠𝑘2). U1 andU2 have pre-
viously securely shared their public keys and have performed trust
establishment. Another asymmetric key pair (pk, sk) is known to both
participants (in particular, they both know the private key sk). A simple
two-party secure messaging scheme can be implemented by encrypting
messages to pk, enabling both parties to decrypt the messages using
sk. Suppose that sk has been compromised and the participants want
to replace (pk, sk) with a new shared key pair (pk∗, sk∗) to achieve
post-compromise security. Moreover, they wish to accomplish this non-
interactively (i.e., while the operation is performed by participantU𝑖,
participantU3−𝑖 may be offline). The participant performing the up-
date must non-interactively generate a transmission that can be used
by the other participant at a later time to derive the new key pair, while
preserving key secrecy against passive network adversaries.
This scenario is similar to the problem that is solved by DH ratchets in protocols like OTR.
However, it is slightly unusual in that the shared secret is from an asymmetric cryptosystem, rather
than a typical symmetric shared key. The purpose of this deviation is to assist with achieving
insider security, as will soon become clear.
A first attempt to implement the protocol described in the scenario above might be to use an
asymmetric KEM scheme consisting of the following functions:
• KEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk): Takes as input randomness 𝑠, then outputs a public key pk with
corresponding private key sk.
• KEM.Encapsulate(pk; 𝑠′) → (pk∗, sk∗, 𝐶): Takes as input a public key pk and randomness 𝑠′,
then outputs a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗) and a ciphertext 𝐶.
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• KEM.Decapsulate(pk, sk, pk∗, 𝐶) → (sk∗): Takes as input a key pair (pk, sk), a new public
key pk∗, and a ciphertext 𝐶. Outputs either a private key sk∗ corresponding to pk∗ or the
special symbol ⊥ denoting an error.
This definition of an asymmetric KEM assumes that it is possible to publicly verify that a public key
is valid. A public key pk is valid if there exists some randomness 𝑠 such that KEM.KeyGen(𝑠) →
(pk, sk′) for some sk′.1 Moreover, the KEM definition assumes that every valid public key cor-
responds to exactly one private key: for any public key pk, there exists a unique corresponding
private key sk such that for any randomness 𝑠 with KEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk′), sk′ = sk. A
scheme satisfying these properties (the ability to validate public keys and a unique correspon-
dence between public and private keys) is called admissible, and this chapter restricts its attention
to such schemes. Informally, a secure instantiation of an asymmetric key encapsulation would
provide correctness and key secrecy. Correctness ensures that if KEM.Encapsulate is called for a
valid pk and KEM.Decapsulate is called on the resulting ciphertext with the expected keys, then
both parties will recover sk∗. Key secrecy ensures that it is only possible to learn sk∗ if one knows
sk or was the caller of KEM.Encapsulate. For ease of presentation, all schemes in this chapter are
implicitly parameterized by a security parameter _ that influences the size of all values. As a
notational convenience, this chapter usually omits the randomness parameter in function calls in
order to denote that a random value of the appropriate length is implicitly sampled.
An asymmetric KEM can be used to solve the aforementioned problem as follows: whenU𝑖
wants to update the shared key pair, it calls KEM.Encapsulate(pk3−𝑖) to generate the new key
pair (pk∗, sk∗), then sends 𝐶 to U3−𝑖. If all goes well, when the other participant comes back
online and receives the message, it can call KEM.Decapsulate to recover sk∗.
The solution above allows two participants to non-interactively update a shared asymmetric
key pair. Next, consider a more difficult version of the problem: instead of (pk1, 𝑠𝑘1) and
(pk2, 𝑠𝑘2) corresponding to individual participants, these key pairs themselves are each shared
by a subgroup of participants. In other words, each participant in the group either knows sk
and 𝑠𝑘1, or it knows sk and 𝑠𝑘2. Replacing (pk, sk) with a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗) now requires
encapsulating sk∗ to every participant in the group. Luckily, since each participant knows either
𝑠𝑘1 or 𝑠𝑘2, sk∗ only needs to be encapsulated to these two keys. The asymmetric KEM scheme
above can be modified for this application, resulting in what might be called an (asymmetric)
“dual KEM” (DKEM):
• DKEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk): Takes as input randomness 𝑠, then outputs a public key pk
with corresponding private key sk.
1 ⋏Of course, actually finding 𝑠 given only pk should be computationally infeasible in order for the scheme to be
secure.
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• DKEM.Encapsulate(pk1, pk2; 𝑠′) → (pk∗, sk∗, 𝐶1, 𝐶2): Takes as input public keys pk1 and
pk2, and randomness 𝑠′, then outputs a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗) and ciphertexts 𝐶1 and 𝐶2.
• DKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, pk1, pk2, sk, pk∗, 𝐶) → (sk∗): Takes as input an index 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}, public
keys pk1 and pk2, a private key sk corresponding to pk𝑖, a new public key pk∗, and a ciphertext
𝐶. Outputs either a private key sk∗ corresponding to pk∗ or the special symbol ⊥ denoting an
error.
Assume that pk1 and pk2 have been generated by DKEM.KeyGen and both 𝑠𝑘1 and 𝑠𝑘2 have
somehow been shared among the appropriate participants in the two subgroups. A participant
can call DKEM.Encapsulate(pk1, pk2) to generate a replacement key pair (pk∗, sk∗). 𝐶𝑖 is sent to
participants in the subgroup corresponding to pk𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}. Each participant in the group
can now call DKEM.Decapsulate with the appropriate parameters for their subgroup to recover
sk∗, completing the non-interactive key update.
The problem solved by DKEM above intentionally omits an important detail: how do the two
subgroups establish shared access to 𝑠𝑘1 and 𝑠𝑘2 in the first place? This problem can be solved
recursively. As a base case, two parties can establish a shared key using a simple asymmetric KEM,
resulting in a shared key pair for a subgroup of size two. As the recursive step, two subgroups
can establish a shared key by using the DKEM scheme, resulting in a shared key pair known
by the union of the subgroups. This approach is recognizable as a method to non-interactively
establish a key tree of the type discussed in Section 3.5. However, there is one important
caveat: this approach only works if the key pairs output by the key generation and encapsulation
functions come from the same key space. The standard definition of an asymmetric KEM does
not necessarily provide this property. In this chapter, KEMs that share a key space between key
generation and encapsulation are called recursive. When a scheme satisfies the DKEM definition
given above and is also recursive, it can be called a “dual recursive KEM” (DRKEM).
One additional variation is required to meet the minimum standards for a KEM that can
be used by Safehouse: the scheme must provide insider security. In this context, that means
that the results of the key encapsulation must be publicly verifiable. The scheme must convince
any observer, whether part of the group or not, that all recipient participants will be able to
compute the new private key. Without this verifiability, a malicious participant that calls the key
encapsulation function for a DRKEM scheme could perform attacks like sending 𝐶1 to the first
subgroup as normal, but sending a corrupted value 𝐶′2 to the second subgroup; this attack would
prevent participants in the second subgroup from recovering sk∗, without any honest participants
in the first subgroup noticing a problem. To prevent these attacks, the scheme can be modified
to include verification functions that test the correctness of a key encapsulation. In practice,
these functions can be implemented with NIZKPKs. Modifying the DRKEM definition in this way
produces a “dual recursive attested KEM” (DRAKEM):
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• DRAKEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk): Takes as input randomness 𝑠, then outputs a public key pk
with corresponding private key sk.
• DRAKEM.Encapsulate(pk1, pk2; 𝑠′) → (pk∗, sk∗, 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝜋): Takes as input public keys pk1
and pk2, and randomness 𝑠′, then outputs a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗), two ciphertexts 𝐶1 and
𝐶2, and a correctness proof 𝜋.
• DRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, sk, pk1, pk2, pk∗, 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝜋) → (sk∗): Takes as input an index 𝑖 ∈
{1, 2}, public keys pk1 and pk2, a private key sk corresponding to pk𝑖, a new public key
pk∗, ciphertexts 𝐶1 and 𝐶2, and a correctness proof 𝜋. Outputs either a private key sk∗
corresponding to pk∗ or the special symbol ⊥ denoting an error.
• DRAKEM.Verify(pk1, pk2, pk∗, 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝜋) → 𝑏: Takes as input public keys pk1 and pk2, a new
public key pk∗, ciphertexts 𝐶1 and 𝐶2, and a correctness proof 𝜋. Outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}.
DRAKEM differs from DRKEM by outputting a correctness proof 𝜋 from DRAKEM.Encapsulate.
This proof must be provided to DRAKEM.Decapsulate. The decapsulation function will fail and
output ⊥ with overwhelming probability if the proof is invalid. Otherwise, participants are
assured that any participant in either subgroup will be able to recover sk∗. This property is called
verifiability. Although only one ciphertext is needed to recover the key, both ciphertexts are
provided to the decapsulation function so that it can verify the proof. Additionally, a new function
called DRAKEM.Verify is added to the scheme. This new function allows an outsider to verify that
the key encapsulation was performed correctly, even though the new function does not require
any secret inputs. If the function outputs 𝑏 = 1, then the caller is assured with overwhelming
probability that all participants in the group will be able to recover sk∗. This property is called
public verifiability.
While it is possible to build Safehouse using DRAKEM, an extra tweak to the scheme admits
constructions that are far more efficient in practice. Instead of encapsulating one key to two
subgroups, the scheme can be modified to support encapsulating 𝑚 different keys to independent
subgroups of arbitrary size. This tweak allows constructions to potentially use more efficient
“batching” techniques than could be achieved by repeated application of DRAKEM. The result-
ing scheme is called Batch Recursive Attested Key Encapsulation Mechanism (BRAKEM). The
complete scheme is as follows:
• BRAKEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk): Takes as input randomness 𝑠, then outputs a public key pk
with corresponding private key sk.
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• BRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋): Takes
as input 𝑚 sets of public keys 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚 and randomness 𝑠′, then outputs 𝑚 new key pairs
(pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, ciphertexts 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, and a correctness proof 𝜋.
• BRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → (𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ): Takes as in-
put 𝑚 sets of public keys 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, indices 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 | identifying a public
key in one of the sets, a private key sk corresponding to the identified public key, 𝑚 new
public keys pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, ciphertexts 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, and a correctness proof 𝜋. Outputs either a
private key 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
corresponding to pk∗𝑖 or ⊥.
• BRAKEM.Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏: Takes as input𝑚 sets of public
keys 𝑅𝑖, new public keys pk∗𝑖 , and ciphertexts 𝐶𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, as well as a correctness proof
𝜋. Outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}.
The BRAKEM scheme definition is applicable in contexts beyond secure group messaging, and
its self-contained nature makes it easier to reason about its security. Safehouse uses a slightly
modified version of BRAKEM that is more convenient to use in non-interactive secure group
messaging protocols, but the algorithmic steps remain the same as in the corresponding BRAKEM
construction. This chapter focuses on BRAKEM constructions.
When defining the security properties for BRAKEM, a set of public keys 𝑅𝑖 (called a ring) is valid
if and only if every public key pk𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑖 is valid, as per the earlier definition of admissible KEMs.
𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 denotes the 𝑗th public key in 𝑅𝑖. The variables in each security definition are independent of
other definitions. A secure BRAKEM instantiation has the following properties:
• Correctness: if an honest sender encapsulates keys, then each of the intended recipients can
recover the expected private key, and public observers will accept the encapsulation as valid.
If:
◦ every 𝑅𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 is valid; and
◦ BRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋);
Then:
◦ every pk∗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 is valid;
◦ BRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 for any 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 | such that sk is the private key corresponding to 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗; and
◦ BRAKEM.Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 1.
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• Verifiability: if an honest recipient successfully decapsulates a key, then it is assured that
the ciphertext and proof could have been produced by an honest sender performing the
encapsulation as intended.
If:
◦ every 𝑅𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 is valid; and
◦ BRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 for some
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 | such that sk is the private key corresponding to 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗;
Then:
◦ every pk∗𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 is valid; and
◦ with overwhelming probability there exists an 𝑠′ such that
BRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋).
• Public Verifiability: if an observer successfully verifies an encapsulation, then they are
assured that all of the intended recipients are able to decapsulate the expected keys.
If:
◦ BRAKEM.Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 1;
Then:
◦ 𝑅𝑖 and pk∗𝑖 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 are valid; and
◦ BRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 for any 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 | such that sk is the private key corresponding to 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗.
• Key Secrecy: Any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following game. The
challenger maintains a “challenge table” of key pairs, a “derivation table” that stores Boolean
logic statements about how private keys can be derived, a “corruption log” with Boolean logic
statements about corrupted keys, and a testing case initially set to ⊥.
1. The adversary is given access to an oracle OKeyGen. When called, the oracle computes
BRAKEM.KeyGen()→ (pk, sk), records (pk, sk) in the challenge table, and returns pk.
2. The adversary is given access to an oracle OEncapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚) that computes
BRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋). For
each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, the oracle checks to see if an entry (𝑅𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑗) exists in the challenge
table for each 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |. For a given 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, if there exists a value 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |
such that no entry (𝑅𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑗) exists in the challenge table, then the oracle records
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Corruptpk∗𝑖 = TRUE in the corruption log. For a given 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, if for all values1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 | there exists an entry (𝑅𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑠𝑘𝑖, 𝑗) in the challenge table, then the oracle
records (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) in the challenge table and, for all 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |, it records the statement
Corrupt𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 → Corruptpk∗𝑖 in the derivation table. In any case, the oracle returns
(pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋).
3. The adversary is given access to an oracle OCorrupt(pk). When called, OCorrupt(pk) checks
to see if an entry (pk, sk) exists in the challenge table. If no entry exists, the oracle returns
⊥. Otherwise, it adds Corruptpk = TRUE to the corruption log and returns sk.
4. The adversary outputs a key pair (pk, sk). If an entry (pk, sk) exists in the challenge table
and it is not possible to conclude that Corruptpk = TRUE using the truth tables in the
corruption log and the logical implications in the derivation table, then the adversary
wins.
The definition of verifiability for BRAKEM is stronger than typical definitions for similar
schemes, since it requires that any valid proof must actually be producible by the encapsulation
function. Typically, “verifiability” would only require that decryption yields the same result for the
other recipients,2 which is a weaker requirement. BRAKEM uses the stronger definition because
it is easily provable for the constructions presented in this chapter and it provides better security.
As an added benefit, the definition is also simpler.
The BRAKEM key secrecy game is similar to the widely used extended Canetti-Krawczyk
(eCK) security model for authenticated key exchanges [LLM07] with some modifications. Aside
from the fact that BRAKEM supports batching encryptions to multiple rings simultaneously, the
most significant difference with eCK is that the BRAKEM security definition does not include
authentication, which greatly simplifies the modeling. Rather than defining key secrecy in
terms of Turing machines with protocol sessions and session matching rules, the game-based
definition implicitly represents communicating parties using the OKeyGen and OEncapsulate oracles.
By calling these oracles, the adversary can mimic the behavior of an active network adversary that
can invoke and manipulate multiple parallel BRAKEM protocol sessions. OEncapsulate allows the
adversary to provide adversarially generated keys in the recipient rings, but any such BRAKEM
messages are assumed to be corrupted; nonetheless, this capability may be useful for breaking
weak constructions that leak cross-session secrets to some recipients. As in eCK, the adversary
can corrupt some of the private keys, as long as doing so is not enough to derive the target private
key using BRAKEM.Decapsulate honestly (i.e., the target key is fresh). Unlike eCK, the BRAKEM
security game implicitly encodes the notion of freshness in the challenge and derivation tables
2 ⋏ For example, this is the approach used in the definition of “soundness” for DREAD schemes, as discussed in
Section 5.3.2.
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and the behavior of the oracles. Importantly, it is possible to follow the implications in the tables
in polynomial time when checking to see if the adversary has attacked a fresh key.3 The game also
does not need to differentiate between corruption of long-term keys and corruption of ephemeral
keys because BRAKEM does not provide authentication, and thus requires no long-term identity
keys. The other significant difference from eCK is that the key secrecy game is defined as a
computational problem. This is a weaker guarantee than a decisional version of the game, but it
is sufficient in practice if BRAKEM secret keys are only used as inputs to random oracles (or as
targets of recursive BRAKEM transmissions).
8.1.1 Overview of the General Construction
Ultimately, all of the BRAKEM constructions use the same high-level technique. For each target
ring, the private key is encrypted to each public key in the ring using ElGamal encryption. Two
NIZKPKs are generated for each target ring in order to provide public verifiability. The first
NIZKPK proves that all ElGamal ciphertexts for the ring encrypt the same plaintext. The second
NIZKPK proves that the plaintext is the private key corresponding to the new public key. These
NIZKPKs can be constructed with a variety of different zero-knowledge proof systems, each
providing different performance and security characteristics. In practice, the NIZKPK proving
that the correct private key was encrypted is far more difficult to construct. The remainder of
this chapter presents several options.
8.2 BRAKEM from Double Discrete Logarithms
One method for constructing the NIZKPKs for the BRAKEM scheme is to operate within spe-
cially chosen groups for which it is possible to efficiently prove knowledge of a Double Discrete
Logarithm (DDL). This section describes two constructions using this method, including a novel
NIZKPK for proving the equality of multiple double discrete logarithms. This NIZKPK is complex
and incorporates a number of new techniques of independent interest. For this reason, this
section builds up the necessary techniques slowly by presenting several intermediate NIZKPKs.
3 ⋏ The derivation table encodes a directed acyclic graph with a polynomial number of vertices: the vertex count is
polynomial in the number of calls to OEncapsulate, which is only invoked by the PPT adversary. Checking to see if
the statements in the corruption log imply Corruptpk = TRUE is equivalent to solving the reachability problem for
the graph. This problem can be solved in polynomial time using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm [Flo62], among
others.
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8.2.1 Notation
Let 𝑝0, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, and 𝑝3 be large primes such that the group 𝔾0 = ⟨𝑔0⟩ is a multiplicative subgroup
in ℤ∗𝑝0 with order 𝑝1, the group 𝔾1 = ⟨𝑔1⟩ is a multiplicative subgroup in ℤ∗𝑝1 with order 𝑝2, and
the group 𝔾2 = ⟨𝑔2⟩ is a multiplicative subgroup in ℤ∗𝑝2 with order 𝑝3. The primes should be
large enough that the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is difficult in 𝔾0 and 𝔾1, and the DDH
problem is also difficult in 𝔾2. The primes should have the form 𝑝0 = 2𝑝1 + 1, 𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1, and
𝑝2 = 2𝑞𝑝3+1, where 𝑞 is a large cofactor such that 𝑞 ≥ 24⌈log2 (𝑝3)⌉+1. As an example at the 128-bit
security level, 𝑝3, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, and 𝑝0 may be 256, 3072, 3073, and 3074 bits, respectively. The large
cofactor 2𝑞 is a standard optimization to improve the efficiency of exponentiation in 𝔾2, but it is
also necessary in order to use one of the highly efficient NIZKPKs in this construction.⁴ Finding
secure parameters for 𝑝0, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, and 𝑝3 that meet these constraints is efficient but non-trivial.
Section 8.3.1.2 describes methods for generating appropriate primes. Let “𝔾𝑖” denote a unique
encoding of the definition of group 𝔾𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, 2}, including all relevant parameters.
8.2.2 Previously Known Zero-Knowledge Proofs
This section covers previously known NIZKPK constructions that are either useful in the BRAKEM
constructions, or serve as an intermediate step to understanding the new NIZKPKs introduced
later.
8.2.2.1 DL: Discrete Logarithm
The NIZKPKs used to construct BRAKEM in this setting are composed of simpler NIZKPKs that
all derive from the basic Schnorr protocol [Sch91] for proving knowledge of a DL. Recall that
the Schnorr protocol in 𝔾2 proves the following statement, specified in Camenisch-Stadler nota-
tion [CS97]:
PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥 = 𝑔2𝛼}
In other words, the prover demonstrates to the verifier that it knows a witness 𝛼 such that
𝛼 = dlog𝑔2 (𝑥) for some public 𝑥 ∈ 𝔾2. While the Schnorr protocol itself is interactive, it
can be transformed into the NIZKPK below in the random oracle model using the Fiat-Shamir
transform [FS87]. The prover P proceeds as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟 $←− [2, 𝑝3)
4 ⋏The DDL-based constructions require that 𝑞 is large. Specifically, the approach does not work if 𝑞 = 1, which is
historically a common choice.
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2. Compute 𝑡′← 𝑔2𝑟
3. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻 (“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑡′) where 𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function modeled by a random
oracle
4. Compute 𝑠← 𝑟 − 𝑐′𝛼 (mod 𝑝3)
5. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑥 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. Compute 𝑡 ← 𝑔2𝑠 · 𝑥𝑐
′
3. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑡)
4. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
8.2.2.2 DLEQ: Discrete Logarithm Equality
A simple modification to the DL proof in Section 8.2.2.1 produces a proof that shows that two
discrete logarithms in the same group⁵ are equal. This variant, called a proof of Discrete Logarithm
Equality (DLEQ) and denoted by DLEQ{𝛼 : (ℎ1, 𝑥1) ≈ (ℎ2, 𝑥2)}, proves the following statement:
DLEQ{𝛼 : (ℎ1, 𝑥1) ≈ (ℎ2, 𝑥2)} := PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥1 = ℎ1𝛼 ∧ 𝑥2 = ℎ2𝛼}
In the proof statement, ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 are all publicly known elements of 𝔾2. The first
construction for this proof was proposed by Chaum and Pedersen [CP93]. The prover P proceeds
as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟 $←− [2, 𝑝3)
2. Compute 𝑡1′← ℎ1𝑟 and 𝑡2′← ℎ2𝑟
3. Compute 𝑐′ ← 𝐻 (“𝔾2”∥𝑥1∥𝑥2∥ℎ1∥ℎ2∥𝑡1′∥𝑡2′) where 𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function
modeled by a random oracle
5 ⋏The proof technique also works for two elements from different groups if the groups are known to have the
same order. This chapter focuses on the case where both elements are in 𝔾2.
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4. Compute 𝑠← 𝑟 − 𝑐′𝛼 (mod 𝑝3)
5. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑥1, 𝑥2, ℎ1, ℎ2 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. Compute 𝑡1 ← ℎ1𝑠 · 𝑥1𝑐
′ and 𝑡2 ← ℎ2𝑠 · 𝑥2𝑐
′
3. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾2”∥𝑥1∥𝑥2∥ℎ1∥ℎ2∥𝑡1∥𝑡2)
4. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
8.2.2.3 BDLEQ: Batch Discrete Logarithm Equality
The BRAKEM construction requires a proof that many elements share a common exponent with
respect to different public bases. While it is possible to prove this for 𝑛 discrete logarithms using
𝑛 − 1 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑄 NIZKPKs, it is more efficient to use a “batch proof”. A Batch Discrete Logarithm
Equality (BDLEQ) proof, denoted by BDLEQ{𝛼 : (ℎ1, 𝑥1) ≈ . . . ≈ (ℎ𝑛, 𝑥𝑛)}, is a batch proof of
the following statement:
BDLEQ{𝛼 : (ℎ1, 𝑥1) ≈ . . . ≈ (ℎ𝑛, 𝑥𝑛)} := PK{(𝛼) : ∀𝑖∈[1,𝑛]𝑥𝑖 = ℎ𝛼𝑖 }
The group elements for this statement are all in 𝔾2. The most efficient proof technique for this
statement was introduced by Peng et al. [PBD07, Fig. 4] and later refined using amodified random
multiexponentiation test by Henry [Hen14, Fig. 3.4]. The protocol is implicitly parameterized
by a security parameter _0. The protocol’s soundness error is 2−_0 . While this protocol is not a
Σ-protocol, it is a public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge argument of knowledge, and thus
the Fiat-Shamir transform applies. The prover P produces the NIZKPK as follows:
1. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝑥1∥ℎ1∥ . . . ∥𝑥𝑛∥ℎ𝑛) where 𝐻1 is a cryptographic hash function with _0 · (𝑛−1)
bits of output
2. Split 𝑒 into 𝑛 − 1 parts such that for each 𝑖 ∈ [2, 𝑛], the part 𝑒𝑖 is in [0, 2_0)
3. Choose 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑝3
4. Compute 𝑡′1 ← ℎ𝑟1
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6. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻2(𝑥1∥ℎ1∥ . . . ∥𝑥𝑛∥ℎ𝑛∥𝑡′1∥𝑡′2) where 𝐻2 is a cryptographic hash function with
_0 bits of output modeled by a random oracle
7. Compute 𝑠← 𝑟 − 𝑐′𝛼 (mod 𝑝3)
8. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that ℎ1, 𝑥1, . . . , ℎ𝑛, 𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝑥1∥ℎ1∥ . . . ∥𝑥𝑛∥ℎ𝑛) and split 𝑒 into 𝑒𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ [2, 𝑛]
3. Compute 𝑡1 ← ℎ𝑠1 · 𝑥𝑐
′
1










5. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻2(𝑥1∥ℎ1∥ . . . ∥𝑥𝑛∥ℎ𝑛∥𝑡1∥𝑡2)
6. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
The asymptotic efficiently advantage of this approach over naïvely producing 𝑛 − 1 𝐷𝐿𝐸𝑄 proofs
is due to the ability to quickly compute 𝑡′2 and 𝑡2. The 𝑒𝑖 exponents are all small compared to 𝑝3,
and so the 𝑡′2 and 𝑡2 products can be efficiently computed using a multiexponentiation algorithm.
This proof system is correct, sound, and zero-knowledge. However, Henry’s soundness proof
for this BDLEQ protocol [Hen14, Th. 3.17] contains an oversight. The theorem claims that
the BDLEQ construction is component-wise 2-extractible, but unlike the proofs given for related
schemes, there is no way to actually activate that scenario for the BDLEQ construction. Specifically,
since the 𝑒𝑖 values are determined prior to the prover’s selection of 𝑟, there is no way for an
extractor to rewind the 𝑒𝑖 values while keeping the same 𝑡′1. The proof of soundness should
actually show that the BDLEQ construction is 2-extractible using the same proof technique as
Peng et al. [PBD07, Th. 3]: if the verifier accepts, then the discrete logarithm of each component
with respect to its associated base must be the same. This result can be combined with the
normal knowledge extractor for the Schnorr proof system [Sch91] to show that a shared discrete
logarithm can be recovered with a single rewind of 𝑐′.
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8.2.2.4 DDL: Double Discrete Logarithm
The group definitions in Section 8.2.1 are carefully chosen so that the group operation for 𝔾2 can
performed “in the exponent” of𝔾1. Settings of this type have long been known to lend themselves
to efficient NIZKPKs proving statements about the exponents of 𝔾1 elements. Specifically, it is
possible to produce a NIZKPK of a DDL [Sta96]. DDL{𝛼 : ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑥} denotes a proof of the
following statement:
DDL{𝛼 : ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑥} := PK{(𝛼, 𝛽) : 𝑥 = ℎ1𝛽 ∧ 𝛽 = ℎ2𝛼}
In this equation, ℎ1 and 𝑥 are public elements of 𝔾1 and ℎ2 is a public element of 𝔾2.
Several papers have examined constructions for DDL proofs and their applications. The first
DDL proof technique was introduced by Stadler [Sta96]: a simple cut-and-choose protocol. The
original application for this proof was publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS), which requires
additional machinery. The original proof was used to produce a verifiable ElGamal encryption
of an ElGamal secret key. Camenisch and Stadler [CS97] simplified the proof into one for
the aforementioned DDL statement in order to construct a group signature scheme. Later,
Schoenmakers [Sch99] proposed a method to avoid the overhead of the cut-and-choose protocol
for PVSS, while also noting that the DDL setting prevents the use of more efficient elliptic curve
groups.⁶ Nakanishi et al. [NHS99] used Stadler’s verifiable encryption in an RSA setting to
implement digital cash. Camenisch and Shoup [CS03a] constructed verifiable encryption without
the need for the cut-and-choose proof by relying on the strong RSA assumption. This scheme
is far more efficient, but it is not practical for use in BRAKEM because any recursive scheme
with RSA-based key pairs cannot implement BRAKEM without verifiably generating a secure
RSA modulus; while NIZKPKs to accomplish this are known [CM99a], they are too expensive.
This cost can be eliminated by using a single RSA group produced as part of a trusted setup, but
any such group must be very large; the BRAKEM construction in this section is more efficient.
Konoma et al. [KMS05] were the first to analyze the security of the DDL problem. Their results
show that the DDL problem is at least as hard as the DL problem. Tate and Vishwanathan [TV09]
noted that the cut-and-choose protocol can be eliminated using trusted hardware. D’Souza et
al. [DJMP11] described an alternative PVSS scheme constructed using cryptographic pairings
with a clever variant of ElGamal encryption. Unfortunately, this technique cannot be used to
construct a BRAKEM scheme because it cannot be made recursive.
6 ⋏Using an elliptic curve for the “exponent group” with generator ℎ2 does not work because mapping curve points
to integers breaks the structure necessary for the proof system. While an elliptic curve may be used for the “outer
group” with generator ℎ1, the size of the exponent group negates any performance benefits.
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Consequently, the best previously known technique for constructing DDL proofs for use in
BRAKEM remains the relatively slow cut-and-choose protocol first described in isolation by
Camenisch and Stadler [CS97]. This NIZKPK was constructed using the Fiat-Shamir trans-
form [FS87]. The prover P produces the NIZKPK as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟𝑖






1 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
3. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥ℎ1∥ℎ2∥𝑥∥𝑡′1∥ . . . ∥𝑡′ℓ), where 𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function
with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
4. Compute for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
𝑠𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑟𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑟𝑖 − 𝛼 (mod 𝑝3) otherwise
5. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that ℎ1, 𝑥 ∈ 𝔾1 and ℎ2 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise











3. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥ℎ1∥ℎ2∥𝑥∥𝑡1∥ . . . ∥𝑡ℓ)
4. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
The prover can cheat with probability 2−ℓ, so ℓ must be large enough for the security parameter.
Section 8.2.6 presents a novel technique to dramatically improve the performance of this cut-
and-choose protocol in a manner that preserves its applicability to recursive key encapsulation.
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8.2.2.5 DDLEQ: Double Discrete Logarithm Equality
As part of the BRAKEM construction, the DDL proof in Section 8.2.2.4 must be augmented to prove
that the double discrete logarithm is equal to the (single) discrete logarithm for another element.
A Double Discrete Logarithm Equality (DDLEQ) proof, denoted by DDLEQ{𝛼 : (𝑥, 𝑘) ≈ 𝑦}, is a
proof of the following statement:
DDLEQ{𝛼 : (𝑥, 𝑘) ≈ 𝑦} := PK{(𝛼, 𝛽) : 𝑘 = 𝑔𝛽1 ∧ 𝛽 = 𝑥𝛼 ∧ 𝑦 = 𝑔𝛼2 }
In this proof statement, 𝑥 and 𝑦 are public elements in 𝔾2, and 𝑘 is a public element in 𝔾1. While
the construction can be easily derived from Stadler’s original DDL proof [Sta96], the first time that
this statement was mentioned was by Nakanishi et al. [NHS99]. Unfortunately, it does not appear
to be possible to combine a standard Schnorr discrete log proof [Sch91] with the cut-and-choose
protocol as in the DLEQ construction from Section 8.2.2.2. Chaum’s original cut-and-choose
protocol [CEG88] can be used instead. A similar technique was used by Stadler [Sta96] for
verifiable ElGamal encryption, and Brecher et al. [BBM09, §4.1] later used a construction for this
proof in the context of group key exchanges. The combined proof is produced by the prover P as
follows:
1. Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
2. Compute 𝑡′1,𝑖 ← 𝑔𝑥
𝑟𝑖
1 and 𝑡′2,𝑖 ← 𝑔
𝑟𝑖
2 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
3. Compute 𝑐′ ← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑡′1,1∥𝑡′2,1∥ . . . ∥𝑡′1,ℓ∥𝑡′2,ℓ), where 𝐻 is a cryptographic
hash function with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
4. Compute for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
𝑠𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑟𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑟𝑖 − 𝛼 (mod 𝑝3) otherwise
5. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑘 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
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1 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑘𝑥




2 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑦 · 𝑔𝑠𝑖2 otherwise
3. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑡1,1∥𝑡2,1∥ . . . ∥𝑡1,ℓ∥𝑡2,ℓ)
4. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
8.2.3 CG-DLEQ: Cross-Group Discrete Logarithm Equality
This section discusses a new NIZKPK that is necessary to understand the DDL-based BRAKEM
constructions. Using the DDLEQ NIZKPK described in Section 8.2.2.5, it is possible to verifiably
encrypt the exponent for an element of 𝔾1 using the ElGamal cryptosystem. However, in order
to create a recursive scheme, the proof must also show that the exponent of this 𝔾1 element is
the same as the exponent of a 𝔾2 element, thereby “moving” the secret back into the correct
group. This is called a proof of Cross-Group Discrete Logarithm Equality (CG-DLEQ). One might
be tempted to simply use the DLEQ NIZKPK described in Section 8.2.2.2, proving the following
statement with respect to the group setting defined in Section 8.2.1:
PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥1 = 𝑔1𝛼 ∧ 𝑥2 = 𝑔2𝛼}
At first glance, using the DLEQ construction in Section 8.2.2.2 with ℎ1 = 𝑔1 and ℎ2 = 𝑔2
seems to prove that dlog𝑔1 (𝑥1) = dlog𝑔2 (𝑥2), but this is not the case. Instead, it actually shows
that 𝛼 = dlog𝑔1 (𝑥1) (mod 𝑝2) and 𝛼 = dlog𝑔2 (𝑥2) (mod 𝑝3). This statement is not actually
meaningful, because if the prover knows the discrete logarithms of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2, then it is always
possible to find a value of 𝛼 that satisfies the equations using the Chinese remainder theorem,
even if the discrete logarithms are not “equal”.
Consider the implications of the proof statement for a witness 𝛼 within various ranges.
If 0 ≤ 𝛼 < 𝑝3, then the discrete logarithms are exactly “equal” in the sense that neither
exponentiation “wraps around” its subgroup. If 𝑝3 ≤ 𝛼 < 𝑝2, then the discrete logarithms are
“equal” when the discrete logarithm of 𝑥1 is taken modulo 𝑝3 (i.e., the exponentiation for 𝑥2
“wraps around”, but the exponentiation for 𝑥1 does not). If 𝛼 ≥ 𝑝2, then there is no intuitive
notion of “equality” for the discrete logarithms. Based on these observations, the NIZKPK can be
made useful by adding a range restriction:
PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥1 = 𝑔1𝛼 ∧ 𝑥2 = 𝑔2𝛼 ∧ 0 < 𝛼 < 𝑝3}
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There are two standard techniques for adding this range restriction for 𝛼: use two DLEQ
proofs to show that 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 both have the same discrete logarithm as an element in a group
for which the prover does not know the order (e.g., modulo an RSA number generated by the
verifier or the trusted setup), or use special-purpose “range proofs” to show that 𝛼 is within the
appropriate range [NBMV99; CM99b; Bou00]. Unfortunately, range proofs are too inefficient for
secure group messaging applications. Using a group with the strong RSA assumption is an option,
but it is possible to achieve better performance in the setting for the BRAKEM construction.
The new approach to implement CG-DLEQ described in this section is similar to the pioneering
work of Chan et al. [CFT98, §4], where a similar technique was used to construct range-bounded
commitments. The fact that 𝑝2 ≫ 𝑝3 in the setting of interest (Section 8.2.1) means that it is
acceptable to have a sound proof of a looser range than is used by honest provers. Let ℓ and ℓ′
be security parameters, where ℓ is the security level of the discrete logarithm problem and ℓ′
controls the proof ’s soundness. In typical settings, ℓ′ ≈ 3ℓ; the precise method to find the optimal
value for ℓ′ is discussed after the proof definition. CG-DLEQ denotes a proof of the following
statement:
CG-DLEQ{𝛼 : 𝑥1 ≈ 𝑥2} := PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥1 = 𝑔1𝛼 ∧ 𝑥2 = 𝑔2𝛼 ∧ −2ℓ
′+1 < 𝛼 < 2ℓ′+1}
Since 𝑝2 > 2ℓ
′+2, proving this statement shows that the discrete logarithms are intuitively “equal”
when taken modulo 𝑝3. However, the efficient construction for this statement only provides
statistical zero-knowledge for witnesses that are within the expected range [0, 𝑝3). This is
acceptable for the intended application. To prove the statement, the prover P proceeds as
follows:
1. Choose 𝑅𝑖
$←− ℤ2ℓ′ for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
2. Compute 𝑇1,𝑖′← 𝑔1𝑅𝑖 and 𝑇2,𝑖′← 𝑔2𝑅𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
3. Compute 𝑐′ ← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥1∥𝑥2∥𝑇1,1′∥𝑇2,1′∥ . . . ∥𝑇1,ℓ′∥𝑇2,ℓ′) where 𝐻 is a cryptographic
hash function with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
4. Compute for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
𝑆𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑅𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼 (in ℤ) otherwise
5. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑆ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
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1. Verify that 𝑥1 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑥2 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. Verify that 0 < 𝑆𝑖 < 2ℓ
′+1 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and abort otherwise
3. Compute for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
𝑇1,𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑔1𝑆𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑥1−1 · 𝑔1𝑆𝑖 otherwise
𝑇2,𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑔2𝑆𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑥2−1 · 𝑔2𝑆𝑖 otherwise
4. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥1∥𝑥2∥𝑇1,1∥𝑇2,1∥ . . . ∥𝑇1,ℓ∥𝑇2,ℓ)
5. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
Note that when P computes a response 𝑆𝑖 during step 4 when 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1, the value of 𝑆𝑖 is
computed in ℤ and not modulo 𝑝3. The range check by the verifier in step 2 provides the range
guarantee in the proof statement: given two responses for the same commitment, a knowledge
extractor can subtract them to recover a witness in the range. While the proof statement permits
a wide range for 𝛼, honest provers must only use this proof when 𝛼 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝3 to avoid leaking
information about 𝛼; the proof is sound for 𝛼 ∈ (−2ℓ′+1, 2ℓ′+1), but it is only zero-knowledge for
𝛼 ∈ [0, 𝑝3).
An important consideration to achieve the zero-knowledge property is the size of ℓ′. The
NIZKPK can be shown to be zero-knowledge by constructing a simulator that chooses values for
each 𝑆𝑖 uniformly at random from ℤ2ℓ′ , computes the expected 𝑇′1,𝑖 and 𝑇′2,𝑖 values, and then
programs the random oracle. Camenisch [Cam98, Th. 5.1] showed that the distribution of 𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼
values created by this simulator are statistically indistinguishable from values produced by honest
provers (i.e., provers using 𝛼 ∈ ℤ∗𝑝3) with probability 1 − 2−ℓ when ℓ′ ≥ 𝜐 + 2ℓ, where 𝜐 is
the minimum value satisfying 1 − (1 − 2/2𝜐)ℓ ≤ 2−ℓ. For ℓ = 128, this implies that ℓ′ ≥ 392
must hold in order for the distributions to be statistically indistinguishable. Given that the proof
demonstrates knowledge of 𝛼 within (−2ℓ′+1, 2ℓ′+1) and 𝑝2 ≥ 2ℓ
′+2, 𝛼 cannot be within the range
where the Chinese remainder theorem permits equivocation.⁷
This construction for CG-DLEQ is a cut-and-choose protocol. It is possible to implement it
far more efficiently by adopting the technique used in the basic Schnorr protocol [Sch91], like
the DL proof in Section 8.2.2.1, and adjusting ℓ′ appropriately. This is similar to the approach
used by Chan et al. [CFT98, §4] in their range-bounded commitments. However, this section
presented the cut-and-choose variant because it is amenable to optimization when combined
with the other required NIZKPKs later in this chapter.
7 ⋏Notably, if the groups 𝔾1 and 𝔾2 defined in Section 8.2.1 were instead chosen to use a safe prime 𝑝2, then the
proof would not be applicable.
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8.2.4 BRAKEM Constructions
A general overview of the high-level construction for BRAKEM was given in Section 8.1.1. It
is now possible to describe DDL-based constructions. The constructions are parameterized by
a public key 𝑥 called a “burner key”. 𝑥 is an element of 𝔾2 chosen using a cryptographic hash
of identifying information for a group conversation, and therefore the corresponding private
key is unknown. The presence of 𝑥 improves the practical efficiency of the scheme, because it
allows larger exponentiation tables to be precomputed. The downside is that computing the
discrete logarithm of 𝑥 with respect to 𝑔2 compromises all conversations using the burner key.
If this is a concern for a given application, the protocol can be adjusted to eliminate 𝑥 at the
cost of performance. The single point of failure can be mitigated somewhat by ensuring that
each conversation has a distinct burner key, and possibly replacing the burner key over time.⁸
Section 8.3.1.3 discusses security policies for the burner key in greater depth.
There are two DDL-based constructions discussed in this section. Section 8.2.4.1 introduces a
construction using only standard security assumptions. Section 8.2.4.2 introduces a construction
that is more than twice as efficient, but requires an unusual security assumption. An extremely
optimized variant of the second construction is introduced later in Section 8.2.8.
8.2.4.1 A Conservative Construction: BRAKEM2DDL★
The first DDL-based BRAKEM construction is denoted by BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 , where the parameter
𝑥 is the burner key. In contexts where the chosen burner key does not matter, the scheme is
written as BRAKEM2DDL★ . Recall that the goal of a BRAKEM scheme is to encapsulate new private
keys to several sets of recipients; each of these sets is called a ring. For each ring, BRAKEM2DDL𝑥
generates a random group element of 𝔾2 called 𝑢. It encrypts 𝑢−1 to the burner key 𝑥 using
ElGamal encryption in 𝔾2. It also encrypts 𝑢−1 to each recipient public key in the ring using the
same ElGamal randomness. The ElGamal ciphertexts use 𝑢−1 as the plaintext instead of 𝑢 itself
because this is necessary in order for a subsequent NIZKPK to work. A BDLEQ (Section 8.2.2.3)
proves that all of the ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintext 𝑢−1. Next, it encrypts the inverse of
the square of the new secret key (𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖




)2 , 𝑔2 (𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖
)2 , and 𝑔2𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖 = pk∗𝑖 . A DDLEQ (Section 8.2.2.5) shows that the ciphertexts in 𝔾2
encrypt the inverse exponent for 𝑔1𝑢, and a modified DDLEQ shows that the ciphertext in 𝔾1
encrypts the inverse exponent for 𝑔0 (𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖
)2 . A modified CG-DLEQ (Section 8.2.3) shows that the
exponent of the 𝔾0 element corresponds to the exponent in 𝑔2 (𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖
)2 taken modulo 𝑝3 and that
8 ⋏ Since the purpose of the burner key is to enable larger exponentiation tables to be precomputed, these tables
need to be regenerated for each new burner key.
189
Chapter 8 BRAKEM: Publicly Verifiable Key Encapsulation
𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
is within the expected range for 𝔾2. A DLEQ proof (Section 8.2.2.2) shows that the final two
values in 𝔾2 are related by squaring. This process is repeated for each ring.
Two of the previously discussed NIZKPKs need to be modified to accommodate the presence
of the 𝔾0 group. The modified DDLEQ proof, denoted by DDLEQ𝔾0,𝔾1 , is constructed identically
to the DDLEQ proof in Section 8.2.2.5 except for using 𝔾0 where DDLEQ uses 𝔾1, and 𝔾1 where
DDLEQ uses 𝔾2. Similarly, the modified CG-DLEQ proof, denoted by CG-DLEQ𝔾0 , is constructed
as in Section 8.2.3 except for taking its first input element from 𝔾0 instead of 𝔾1. The value of ℓ′
must be increased for CG-DLEQ𝔾0 to accommodate the witness being from ℤ𝑝32 instead of ℤ𝑝3 .
Once the NIZKPKs are all shown to be correct, sound, and zero-knowledge, the security of
BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 is intuitive. Since 𝑢 is an element of 𝔾2, the ElGamal ciphertexts that transfer it to
the recipients are IND-CPA (under the DDH assumption for 𝔾2) and thus leak no information
about 𝑢. Since 𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1, 𝑥2 is always a group element of 𝔾1 and thus the ElGamal ciphertext
in 𝔾1 is also IND-CPA.⁹ The zero-knowledge property of the NIZKPKs ensures that they do not
leak any information about the secret exponents beyond the statements that they prove.
An additional optimization for this construction is replacing the ElGamal ephemeral key in 𝔾1
with 𝑔1𝑢. This causes the ciphertext to become 𝑔1𝑢
2 · 𝑥−2, avoiding the need to transmit one 𝔾1
element. This optimization is secure if the decisional squaring Diffie-Hellman problem is hard—
given 𝔾1 and 𝑔1𝑢, distinguishing 𝑔1𝑢
2 from a random element of 𝔾1. Maurer and Wolf [MW96,
Th. 2] proved that this problem is hard if DDH is hard in a group with known order, such as 𝔾1.
To summarize, omitting the details of the NIZKPK that proves correctness of the ElGamal
ciphertexts, BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 implements the BRAKEM interface defined in Section 8.1 as follows:
• BRAKEM2DDL★ .KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk):
Choose sk in ℤ𝑝3 using randomness in 𝑠.
Compute pk← 𝑔2sk.
• BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋):
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Choose ElGamal secret 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 .
Choose an element 𝑢𝑖 of 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ← 𝑔2𝑟𝑖 .
9 ⋏Note that this construction requires the DDH problem to be difficult in 𝔾1, which is believed to hold for the
given group definitions.
190
Chapter 8 BRAKEM: Publicly Verifiable Key Encapsulation
Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ1,𝑖 ← 𝑥𝑟𝑖 · 𝑢𝑖−1.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ1,𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗𝑟𝑖 · 𝑢𝑖−1.
}
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .KeyGen().
Compute 𝑈𝑖 ← 𝑔1𝑢𝑖 .












Prove 𝜋1,𝑖 = BDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑔2, 𝑦𝑖) ≈ (𝑅𝑖,1/𝑥, ℎ1,𝑖,1/ℎ1,𝑖) ≈ . . . ≈ (𝑅𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/𝑥, ℎ1,𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/ℎ1,𝑖)}.
Prove 𝜋2,𝑖 = DDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑥, 𝑈𝑖ℎ1,𝑖) ≈ 𝑦𝑖}.
Prove 𝜋3,𝑖 = DDLEQ𝔾0,𝔾1{𝑢𝑖 : (𝑈𝑖, 𝑘1,𝑖ℎ2,𝑖) ≈ 𝑈𝑖}.
Prove 𝜋4,𝑖 = CG-DLEQ𝔾0{𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 2 : 𝑘1,𝑖 ≈ 𝑘2,𝑖}.
Prove 𝜋5,𝑖 = DLEQ{𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 : (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑘2,𝑖) ≈ (𝑔2, pk∗𝑖 )}.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ1,𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ1,𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |, ℎ2,𝑖).
Assign 𝜋𝑖 = (ℎ1,𝑖, 𝑈𝑖, 𝑘1,𝑖, 𝑘2,𝑖, 𝜋1,𝑖, . . . , 𝜋5,𝑖).
}
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚).
• BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 :
if (! ((1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚)&&(1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |))) return ⊥.
Execute 𝑣← BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋)
↩→ and record the interpretation of 𝐶𝑖.
if (𝑣 = 0) return ⊥.
Compute 𝑢← 𝑦𝑖sk/ℎ1,𝑖, 𝑗.
Compute 𝑘← 𝑔1𝑢2/ℎ2,𝑖.
Compute 𝑘1 and 𝑘2, the two square roots of 𝑘 (mod 𝑝3).10
if (pk∗𝑖 = 𝑔2𝑘1) { return 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 = 𝑘1 } else { return 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 = 𝑘2 }.
• BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏:
Interpret 𝐶𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 𝜋 as defined in BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Encapsulate.
if (interpretation of any 𝐶𝑖 or 𝜋 fails) return 0.
10 ⋏Due to the soundness of the underlying NIZKPKs, the successful return of BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .Verify guarantees that
𝑘 is a quadratic residue at this point in the algorithm.
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for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
if (any of 𝜋1,𝑖, . . . , 𝜋5,𝑖 fail to verify) return 0.
}
return 1.
The definition of BRAKEM2DDL𝑥 .KeyGen is independent of the burner key. In other words, key
pairs generated by the system can be reused in the context of different burner keys. However,
decapsulation and verification must always be performed with respect to the same burner key
used for encapsulation.
8.2.4.2 An Efficient Construction: BRAKEMDDL
′
★
The BRAKEM construction in Section 8.2.4.1 relies on only conservative security assumptions.
However, it is quite inefficient due to the presence of the DDLEQ𝔾0,𝔾1 proof, which requires many
expensive exponentiations in 𝔾0 and sending 128 large numbers from ℤ𝑝2 . If it is possible to
safely eliminate this proof, then the construction can be far more efficient.
BRAKEM2DDL★ uses 𝔾2 as the “operating” group where keys are generated, with 𝔾1 and 𝔾0
being used purely for facilitating the NIZKPKs. Eliminating the expensive DDLEQ𝔾0,𝔾1 proof
requires avoiding the need for 𝔾0. This can be done if it is possible to securely encrypt the new
private key (in ℤ𝑝3) using ElGamal in 𝔾2, instead of in 𝔾1. This is the core idea of the following
efficient BRAKEM construction, denoted by BRAKEMDDL′★ :
• BRAKEMDDL′★ .KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk):
Choose sk in ℤ𝑝3 using randomness in 𝑠.
Compute pk← 𝑔2sk.
• BRAKEMDDL′𝑥 .Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋):
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEMDDL
′
𝑥 .KeyGen().
Choose ElGamal secret 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 .






Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑥𝑟𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
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for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗𝑟𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
}
Compute 𝑘𝑖 ← 𝑔1𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖 .
Prove 𝜋1,𝑖 = BDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑔2, 𝑦𝑖) ≈ (𝑅𝑖,1/𝑥, ℎ𝑖,1/ℎ𝑖) ≈ . . . ≈ (𝑅𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/𝑥, ℎ𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/ℎ𝑖)}.
Prove 𝜋2,𝑖 = DDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑥, 𝑘𝑖ℎ𝑖) ≈ 𝑦𝑖}.
Prove 𝜋3,𝑖 = CG-DLEQ{𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 : 𝑘𝑖 ≈ pk∗𝑖 }.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
Assign 𝜋𝑖 = (ℎ𝑖, 𝑘𝑖, 𝜋1,𝑖, 𝜋2,𝑖, 𝜋3,𝑖).
}
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚).
• BRAKEMDDL′𝑥 .Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 :
if (! ((1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚)&&(1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |))) return ⊥.
Execute 𝑣← BRAKEMDDL′𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋)
↩→ and record the interpretation of 𝐶𝑖.
if (𝑣 = 0) return ⊥.
Compute 𝑘← 𝑦𝑖sk/ℎ𝑖, 𝑗.
return 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝑘 (mod 𝑝3).
• BRAKEMDDL′𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏:
Interpret 𝐶𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 𝜋 as defined in BRAKEMDDL
′
𝑥 .Encapsulate.
if (interpretation of any 𝐶𝑖 or 𝜋 fails) return 0.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
if (any of 𝜋1,𝑖, 𝜋2,𝑖, 𝜋3,𝑖 fail to verify) return 0.
}
return 1.
BRAKEMDDL′★ is far more efficient than BRAKEM2DDL★ . However, there is one step that is not





−1 (mod 𝑝2). While at first glance this appears to be a standard
ElGamal ciphertext, ElGamal requires the plaintext space to be equal to the group (in this case,
𝔾2). In other words, ElGamal is only provably IND-CPA secure when encrypting group elements.
Typically, real-world protocols work around this limitation by using ElGamal as part of a hybrid
cryptosystem where the “plaintext” is a randomly chosen group element that is fed into a KDF to
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produce the key for a DEM.11 Another approach suggested by Chevallier-Mames et al. [CPP06]
is to use a clever encoding of the DH shared secret in the ciphertext instead of using it directly.
Unfortunately, the BRAKEMDDL′★ construction requires the DH shared secret to be used “as-is” in
order to make DDLEQ applicable. Similarly, 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
must be used without any encoding in order for
the CG-DLEQ proof to show that it corresponds to pk∗𝑖 . These limitations present a problem for
BRAKEMDDL′★ : because 𝑞 is large, 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 will only be a group element with negligible probability.
ElGamal is provably not IND-CPA when the plaintext is not from the group: the adversary can
win the IND-CPA game by simply dividing the ciphertext by the potential plaintexts and checking
to see if the result is in 𝔾2. Consequently, proving the security of BRAKEMDDL
′
★ requires additional
hardness assumptions. These assumptions and the security proofs are sketched in Section 8.4.
Before discussing the security of BRAKEMDDL′★ , there are additional optimizations that can
be applied to the protocol. These optimizations should be applied before proving the security of
the scheme because they impact the details of the proof technique. Significant performance can
be gained by batching all of the 𝜋2,𝑖 and 𝜋3,𝑖 NIZKPKs into a single large proof. The resulting
proof is very complex and highly application-specific, but the techniques used to develop it
are more generally applicable. The following sections incrementally introduce the combined
NIZKPK, referred to simply as Π0. The modified BRAKEM construction using the optimized proof
is introduced in Section 8.2.8.
8.2.5 CG-DDLEQ: Cross-Group Double Discrete Logarithm Equality
In the construction for BRAKEMDDL′★ in Section 8.2.4.2, the DDLEQ proof in 𝜋2,𝑖 combined with
the CG-DLEQ proof in 𝜋3,𝑖 demonstrate that the ElGamal ciphertext ℎ𝑖 encrypts dlog𝑔2 (pk∗𝑖 ). To
begin the optimization process, these two proofs can be easily combined into a single proof
that uses the same Fiat-Shamir [FS87] challenge. The proofs combine readily since they are
both cut-and-choose constructions. While this standard optimization only saves the transmission
of a single challenge value, it is an important first step for the batching process in subsequent
optimizations. The combined proof is called a Cross-Group Double Discrete Logarithm Equality
(CG-DDLEQ) and it establishes the following statement:
PK{(𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾) : 𝑘ℎ = 𝑔𝛽1 ∧ 𝛽 = 𝑥𝛼 ∧ 𝑦 = 𝑔𝛼2 ∧ 𝑘 = 𝑔1𝛾 ∧ 𝑧 = 𝑔2𝛾 ∧ −2ℓ
′+1 < 𝛾 < 2ℓ′+1}
The security parameters ℓ and ℓ′ are the same as in the CG-DLEQ construction (Section 8.2.3).
The statement differs from the DDLEQ statement in Section 8.2.2.5 in that it explicitly includes
11 ⋏This is the technique that was used in the DREAD construction in Section 5.3.2.
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the public elements 𝑘 ∈ 𝔾1 and ℎ ∈ ℤ𝑝2 corresponding to 𝑘𝑖 and ℎ𝑖 as used in BRAKEMDDL
′
★ . To
prove the statement, the prover P proceeds as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
2. Choose 𝑅𝑖
$←− ℤ2ℓ′ for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
3. Compute 𝑡′1,𝑖 ← 𝑔𝑥
𝑟𝑖
1 and 𝑡′2,𝑖 ← 𝑔
𝑟𝑖
2 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
4. Compute 𝑇′1,𝑖 ← 𝑔
𝑅𝑖
1 and 𝑇′2,𝑖 ← 𝑔
𝑅𝑖
2 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
5. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑘∥ℎ∥𝑥∥𝑦∥𝑧∥𝑡′1,1∥𝑡′2,1∥𝑇′1,1∥𝑇′2,1∥ . . . ∥𝑡′1,ℓ∥𝑡′2,ℓ∥𝑇′1,ℓ∥𝑇′2,ℓ), where
𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
6. Compute for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
𝑠𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑟𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑟𝑖 − 𝛼 (mod 𝑝3) otherwise
𝑆𝑖 ←
{︄
𝑅𝑖 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾 (in ℤ) otherwise
7. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, 𝑆1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ, 𝑆ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑘 ∈ 𝔾1 and ℎ, 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise





1 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑘𝑥




2 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0





1 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0





2 if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
𝑧−1 · 𝑔𝑆𝑖2 otherwise
3. Verify that 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑖 < 2ℓ
′+1 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and abort otherwise
4. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑘∥ℎ∥𝑥∥𝑦∥𝑧∥𝑡1,1∥𝑡2,1∥𝑇1,1∥𝑇2,1∥ . . . ∥𝑡1,ℓ∥𝑡2,ℓ∥𝑇1,ℓ∥𝑇2,ℓ)
5. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
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8.2.6 SDDLEQ: Simultaneous Double Discrete Logarithm Equality
The previously described DDL, DDLEQ, CG-DLEQ, and CG-DDLEQ schemes all suffer from the
same performance flaw: they all require the verifier to perform 𝑂(ℓ) exponentiations in 𝔾1.
These exponentiations are so computationally expensive that they dominate all other CPU time
costs. This section presents a novel proof technique that dramatically improves the performance
of DDLEQ proofs by eliminating most of the required 𝔾1 exponentiations. The technique shares
similarities with both the randommultiexponentiation technique used by Henry [Hen14, Fig. 3.4]
in BDLEQ, and the Unruh transform [Unr15]. Interestingly, although the Unruh transform was
developed to produce NIZKPKs with post-quantum security, a similar approach significantly
improves the performance of DDL proofs in the classical random oracle model.
The modified NIZKPK is an alternate construction for the DDLEQ statement in Section 8.2.2.5,
repeated here for convenience:
DDLEQ{𝛼 : (𝑥, 𝑘) ≈ 𝑦} := PK{(𝛼, 𝛽) : 𝑘 = 𝑔𝛽1 ∧ 𝛽 = 𝑥𝛼 ∧ 𝑦 = 𝑔𝛼2 }
This new construction is called a simultaneous proof of double discrete logarithm equality (SD-
DLEQ). At a high level, the proof operates as follows:
1. The prover commits to all possible responses (for all possible challenge bits).
2. The verifier selects a random multiexponentiation.
3. The prover computes the requested multiexponentiation of committed secrets.
4. The verifier sends the challenge.
5. The prover reveals the selected responses.
This structure remains amenable to the Fiat-Shamir transform, but reduces the number of 𝔾1
exponentiations that the verifier needs to perform to 𝑂(1); this results in a dramatic performance
improvement in practice.
The prover P constructs the proof as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ
2. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, set 𝑠′
𝑖,0 = 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑠′𝑖,1 = 𝑟𝑖 − 𝛼 (mod 𝑝3)
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3. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, set 𝑢′
𝑖
= 𝐻0(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑖∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑠′𝑖,0) and 𝑣′𝑖 = 𝐻1(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑖∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑠′𝑖,1),
where 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 are independent cryptographic hash functions each having at least 2ℓ bits
of output
4. Compute 𝑒′ = 𝐻𝑒(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑢′1∥𝑣′1∥ . . . ∥𝑢′ℓ∥𝑣′ℓ) where 𝐻𝑒 is an independent crypto-
graphic hash function with at least 2ℓ2 bits of output
5. Split 𝑒′ into ℓ values in [2, 𝑝3): 𝑒′1, . . . , 𝑒′ℓ





7. Compute 𝑡′2 ← 𝑔2𝑒
′
1·𝑟1+···+𝑒′ℓ ·𝑟ℓ
8. Compute 𝑐′ ← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑢′1∥𝑣′1∥ . . . ∥𝑢′ℓ∥𝑣′ℓ∥𝑡′1∥𝑡′2), where 𝐻 is a cryptographic
hash function with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
9. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, set 𝑠𝑖 ← 𝑠𝑖,𝑐′[𝑖]
10. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑣′𝑖; otherwise, set 𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑢′𝑖
11. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, 𝑤1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ, 𝑤ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑘 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑢𝑖 ← 𝐻0(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑖∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑠𝑖) and 𝑣𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖
b) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝑢𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 ← 𝐻1(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑖∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑠𝑖)
3. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻𝑒(“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑢1∥𝑣1∥ . . . ∥𝑢ℓ∥𝑣ℓ)
4. Split 𝑒 into ℓ values in [2, 𝑝3): 𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒ℓ
5. Set 𝑡1,0, 𝑡1,1, 𝑡2,0, and 𝐸 to 0
6. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑡1,0 ← 𝑡1,0 + 𝑥𝑒𝑖+𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
b) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝑡1,1 ← 𝑡1,1 + 𝑥𝑒𝑖+𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
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c) In any case, set 𝑡2,0 ← 𝑡2,0 + 𝑒𝑖 · 𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑝3)
d) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝐸← 𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖 (mod 𝑝3)
7. Compute 𝑡1 ← 𝑔1𝑡1,0 · 𝑘𝑡1,1
8. Compute 𝑡2 ← 𝑔2𝑡2,0 · 𝑦𝐸
9. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥𝑥∥𝑘∥𝑦∥𝑢1∥𝑣1∥ . . . ∥𝑢ℓ∥𝑣ℓ∥𝑡1∥𝑡2)
10. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
The correctness of this scheme is tedious but straightforward to prove. Note that in the 𝑡2
case, the value of 𝐸 accumulates all 𝑒𝑖 values when 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1. These are the cases in which 𝑡2,0
will contain an extra 𝑒𝑖 · 𝛼 term. Since the exponent of 𝑦 is 𝛼, multiplying by 𝑦𝐸 will cancel out
these extra terms.
The soundness of the proof is non-trivial to prove. The rewinding knowledge extractor rewinds
the prover and programs the random oracle’s output 𝑐′; 𝐻0 and 𝐻1 are simply cryptographic
hashes that are non-programmable. Given two responses for the same commitments where the
challenges differ in at least one bit position, it can be shown that the extractor can always recover
𝛼 by subtracting the different responses for this bit position. The main intuition required to
prove this statement is that a malicious prover cannot choose any secrets based on the value of 𝑒.
Because the verifier derives 𝑒 from a cryptographic hash of the 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 values, which in turn
derive from hashes of the 𝑠𝑖 values and the proof statement, the prover has no ability to react to
the selection of the 𝑒𝑖 values. Using this fact, it can ultimately be shown that 𝑒1 · (𝑠1,0 − 𝑠1,1 −
dlog𝑔2 (𝑦)) + ··· + 𝑒ℓ · (𝑠ℓ,0 − 𝑠ℓ,1 − dlog𝑔2 (𝑦)) = 0 implies that 𝑠𝑖,0 − 𝑠𝑖,1 = dlog𝑔2 (𝑦) for every
1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ. A similar statement can be made about the double discrete logarithm of 𝑘.
8.2.7 Combined NIZKPK: Π0
Given the definitions of CG-DDLEQ and SDDLEQ in Section 8.2.5 and Section 8.2.6, it is now
possible to discuss the actual NIZKPK used in the optimized BRAKEM construction. The NIZKPK,
called Π0, replaces every 𝜋2,𝑖 and 𝜋3,𝑖 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 in BRAKEMDDL
′
𝑥 (Section 8.2.4.2) with a
single proof. Merging all of these statements into a single NIZKPK provides multiple dimensions
that are amenable to batching optimizations.
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Π0 is a NIZKPK for the following statement:
Π0{(𝛼1, . . . , 𝛼𝑚, 𝛽1, . . . , 𝛽𝑚, 𝛾1, . . . , 𝛾𝑚) : 𝑥, (𝑘1, ℎ1, 𝑦1, 𝑧1) ≈ ··· ≈ (𝑘𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑦𝑚, 𝑧𝑚)} :=
PK{(𝛼1, . . . , 𝛼𝑚, 𝛽1, . . . , 𝛽𝑚, 𝛾1, . . . , 𝛾𝑚) :
𝑘1
ℎ1 = 𝑔1
𝛽1 ∧ 𝛽1 = 𝑥𝛼1 ∧ 𝑦1 = 𝑔2𝛼1 ∧ 𝑘1 = 𝑔1𝛾1 ∧ 𝑧1 = 𝑔2𝛾1 ∧ −2ℓ





𝛽𝑚 ∧ 𝛽𝑚 = 𝑥𝛼𝑚 ∧ 𝑦𝑚 = 𝑔2𝛼𝑚 ∧ 𝑘𝑚 = 𝑔1𝛾𝑚 ∧ 𝑧𝑚 = 𝑔2𝛾𝑚 ∧ −2ℓ
′+1 < 𝛾𝑚 < 2ℓ
′+1}
This proof statement is a combination of the CG-DDLEQ proof from Section 8.2.5 and the
SDDLEQ proof from Section 8.2.6 that has been batched across 𝑚 statements simultaneously. To
simplify, this proof demonstrates that for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚, ℎ𝑖 is an ElGamal ciphertext for the recipient
public key 𝑥 (the burner key) that encrypts the private key in 𝑧𝑖. The implementation of this
proof is a combination of CG-DDLEQ and SDDLEQ with one twist: the random coefficients in the
desired multiexponentiation are composed by multiplying smaller coefficients generated from
a hash of the commitment. This allows related terms to conveniently simplify in the security
proofs.
For a given statement, let “𝔾” = “𝔾1”∥“𝔾2”∥ℓ∥ℓ′∥𝑚∥𝑥∥𝑘1∥ℎ1∥𝑦1∥𝑧1∥ . . . ∥𝑘𝑚∥ℎ𝑚∥𝑦𝑚∥𝑧𝑚.
The prover P constructs the proof as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ𝑝3 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚
2. Choose 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ2ℓ′ for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚
3. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚:
a) Set 𝑠′
𝑖, 𝑗,0 ← 𝑟𝑖, 𝑗
b) Set 𝑆′
𝑖, 𝑗,0 ← 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗
c) Set 𝑠′
𝑖, 𝑗,1 ← 𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 − 𝛼 𝑗 (mod 𝑝3)
d) Set 𝑆′
𝑖, 𝑗,1 ← 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝛾 𝑗 (in ℤ)
4. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, set 𝑢′
𝑖
= 𝐻0(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠′𝑖,1,0∥ . . . ∥𝑠′𝑖,𝑚,0∥𝑆′𝑖,1,0∥ . . . ∥𝑆′𝑖,𝑚,0) where 𝐻0 is an indepen-
dent cryptographic hash function with at least 2ℓ bits of output
5. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ, set 𝑣′
𝑖
= 𝐻1(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠′𝑖,1,1∥ . . . ∥𝑠′𝑖,𝑚,1∥𝑆′𝑖,1,1∥ . . . ∥𝑆′𝑖,𝑚,1) where 𝐻1 is an indepen-
dent cryptographic hash function with at least 2ℓ bits of output
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6. Compute 𝐻𝑒(“𝔾”∥𝑢′1∥𝑣′1∥ . . . ∥𝑢′ℓ∥𝑣′ℓ) where 𝐻𝑒 is an independent cryptographic hash function







1+𝑟1,1 + ... + 𝑥𝑒
′
ℓ





𝑚+𝑟1,𝑚 + ... + 𝑥𝑒
′
ℓ
+ 𝑓 ′𝑚+𝑟ℓ,𝑚 +
𝐹 ′1·(𝑒′1·𝑅1,1 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑅ℓ,1) +
...
𝐹 ′𝑚·(𝑒′1·𝑅1,𝑚 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑅ℓ,𝑚)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭ 𝑇′ = 𝑔2
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
𝑓 ′1·(𝑒′1·𝑟1,1 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑟ℓ,1) +
...
𝑓 ′𝑚·(𝑒′1·𝑟1,𝑚 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑟ℓ,𝑚) +
𝐹 ′1·(𝑒′1·𝑅1,1 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑅ℓ,1) +
...
𝐹 ′𝑚·(𝑒′1·𝑅1,𝑚 + ... + 𝑒′ℓ·𝑅ℓ,𝑚)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
8. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻 (“𝔾”∥𝑢′1∥𝑣′1∥𝑒′1∥ . . . ∥𝑢′ℓ∥𝑣′ℓ∥𝑒′ℓ∥ 𝑓 ′1∥𝐹′1∥ . . . ∥ 𝑓 ′𝑚∥𝐹′𝑚∥𝑡′∥𝑇′), where 𝐻 is a cryp-
tographic hash function with at least ℓ bits of output modeled by a random oracle
9. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑣′𝑖 and for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚, set 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑠′𝑖, 𝑗,0 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆′𝑖, 𝑗,0
b) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝑤𝑖 ← 𝑢′𝑖 and for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚, set 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑠′𝑖, 𝑗,1 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆′𝑖, 𝑗,1
10. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1,1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ,𝑚, 𝑆1,1, . . . , 𝑆ℓ,𝑚, 𝑤1, . . . , 𝑤ℓ)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that 𝑥 ∈ 𝔾2 and for each 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑦 𝑗, 𝑧 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
2. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑢𝑖 ← 𝐻0(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑠𝑖,𝑚∥𝑆𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑆𝑖,𝑚) and 𝑣𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖
b) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝑢𝑖 ← 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 ← 𝐻1(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑠𝑖,𝑚∥𝑆𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑆𝑖,𝑚)
3. Compute 𝐻𝑒(“𝔾”∥𝑢1∥𝑣1∥ . . . ∥𝑢ℓ∥𝑣ℓ) and extract from the hash output ℓ+2𝑚 values in [2, 𝑝3):
𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒ℓ, 𝑓1, . . . , 𝑓𝑚, 𝐹1, . . . , 𝐹𝑚
4. Set 𝑡0, 𝑇0, 𝐸1, 𝐸2 and 𝑡 𝑗 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 to 0
5. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) For each 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: set 𝑡0 ← 𝑡0 + 𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 (mod 𝑝2)
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b) For each 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: set 𝑇0 ← 𝑇0 + 𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗) (mod 𝑝3)
c) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0 then:
i. For 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: set 𝑡0 ← 𝑡0 + 𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 (mod 𝑝2)
d) If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then:
i. For 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: set 𝑡 𝑗 ← 𝑡 𝑗 + 𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 (mod 𝑝2)
ii. Set 𝐸1 ← 𝐸1 − 𝑒𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
iii. Set 𝐸2 ← 𝐸2 + 𝑒𝑖 (mod 𝑝3)
e) Verify that 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 < 2ℓ
′+1 for all 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 and abort otherwise
6. Compute 𝑡 ← 𝑔1𝑡0 ·
∏︁𝑚
𝑗=1 𝑘 𝑗
ℎ 𝑗·𝑡 𝑗+𝐸1·𝐹 𝑗
7. Compute 𝑇 ← 𝑔2𝑇0 ·
∏︁𝑚
𝑗=1(𝑦 𝑗𝐸2· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗−𝐸2·𝐹 𝑗)
8. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻 (“𝔾”∥𝑢1∥𝑣1∥𝑒1∥ . . . ∥𝑢ℓ∥𝑣ℓ∥𝑒ℓ∥ 𝑓1∥𝐹1∥ . . . ∥ 𝑓𝑚∥𝐹𝑚∥𝑡∥𝑇)
9. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
Section 8.4 provides proofs of correctness, soundness, and zero knowledge for this NIZKPK.
8.2.8 An Optimized BRAKEM Construction: BRAKEMDDL★
The highly specific NIZKPK introduced in Section 8.2.7 can replace the DDLEQ and CG-DLEQ
proofs in BRAKEMDDL′★ as defined in Section 8.2.4.2. The resulting BRAKEM construction is called
BRAKEMDDL★ . It operates as follows:
• BRAKEMDDL★ .KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk):
Choose sk in ℤ𝑝3 using randomness in 𝑠.
Compute pk← 𝑔2sk.
• BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋):
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .KeyGen().
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Choose ElGamal secret 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 .






Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑥𝑟𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗𝑟𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
}
Compute 𝑘𝑖 ← 𝑔1𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖 .
Prove 𝜋𝑖 = BDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑔2, 𝑦𝑖) ≈ (𝑅𝑖,1/𝑥, ℎ𝑖,1/ℎ𝑖) ≈ . . . ≈ (𝑅𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/𝑥, ℎ𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/ℎ𝑖)}.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Prove 𝜋0 = Π0{(𝑟1, . . . , 𝑟𝑚, 𝑥𝑟1 , . . . , 𝑥𝑟𝑚 , 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚) :
𝑥, (𝑘1, ℎ1, 𝑦1, pk∗1) ≈ ··· ≈ (𝑘𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑦𝑚, pk∗𝑚)}.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
• BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 :
if (! ((1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚)&&(1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |))) return ⊥.
Execute 𝑣← BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋)
↩→ and record the interpretation of 𝐶𝑖.
if (𝑣 = 0) return ⊥.
Compute 𝑘← 𝑦𝑖sk/ℎ𝑖, 𝑗.
return 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝑘 (mod 𝑝3).
• BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏:
Interpret 𝐶𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 𝜋 as defined in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate.
if (interpretation of any 𝐶𝑖 or 𝜋 fails) return 0.
if (𝜋0 fails to verify) return 0.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
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8.2.9 On the Need for CG-DLEQ
GKEs built with DH exchanges in tree arrangements are typically based on the pioneering work
of Kim et al. [KPT00; KPT04]. This original scheme and derivations such as ART [CCG+18] (as
described in Section 4.1) use a clever trick to avoid the need for two different groups: they use
a group with prime order 𝑞 for which group elements can be mapped to integers in [1, 𝑞]. Kim
et al. [KPT04, §A.1] define such a group, 𝔾, with generator 𝑔 = 2 and prime order 𝑞 such that
𝑝 = 2𝑞 + 1 is a (safe) prime. The group operation · is defined as 𝑎 · 𝑏 = 𝑓 (𝑎 × 𝑏 (mod 𝑝)), where
× denotes multiplication and 𝑓 (𝑥) is defined as follows:
𝑓 (𝑥) =
{︄
𝑥 if 𝑥 ≤ 𝑞
𝑝 − 𝑥 if 𝑞 < 𝑥 < 𝑝
The function 𝑓 is a bijection when 𝑝 ≡ 3 (mod 4), which is the case when 𝑝 = 2𝑞 + 1. The
inclusion of 𝑓 in the group operation ensures that each element of 𝔾 can be written in [1, 𝑞].
This group can also be written as 𝔾 = ℤ∗𝑝/⟨−1⟩, which contains elements of the form {−𝑖, 𝑖} for
𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑞] and uses multiplication modulo 𝑝, ignoring the sign, as the group operation. One can
use 𝔾 to easily compute values like 𝑔𝑔𝑥 𝑦 , which enables efficient “recursive” DH exchanges for
use in tree-based GKEs. Groups of this type were first described by Chaum [Cha90].
Unfortunately, while these “Chaum groups” are useful for constructing GKEs, the Schnorr proof
system [Sch91] and derivatives cannot prove statements about them. Brecher et al. [BBM09]
erroneously attempted to use Chaum groups to add insider security to a GKE.12 They use a DDLEQ
proof, nearly the same as the one described in Section 8.2.2.5, to prove that a DH exchange
was correctly used to derive a shared public key. Their proof statement [BBM09, §4.1] is as
follows: given Chaum group 𝔾 with generator 𝑔 and public group elements 𝑦, ˜︁𝑦1, and ˜︁𝑦2, prove
PK{(𝑥) : ˜︁𝑦1 = 𝑔𝑥 ∧ ˜︁𝑦2 = 𝑔𝑦𝑥 }. This proof fails in a Chaum group because the function 𝑓 does not
have the required ring structure. Although exponentiation can be implemented through repeated
application of the custom group operator, the effect on the value “in the exponent” will still be
multiplication modulo 𝑞. Since this is not the group operation, the prover and verifier will end
up computing different values.
The mismatch in the scheme defined by Brecher et al. occurs in cases where the 𝑖th challenge
bit is 1: the prover computes 𝑡2,𝑖 = 𝑔𝑦
𝛼𝑖 , but the verifier computes ?̄?2,𝑖 = ˜︁𝑦2 𝑦𝑠𝑖 . In a Chaum group,
12 ⋏While Brecher et al. never fully describe the group used in their setting, they specify a group generated by a
quadratic residue modulo a safe prime for which there exists an efficient non-discrete-logarithm bijective mapping
to positive integers up to the group order. Since they cite the previous work by Kim et al. for this group definition,
they are presumably referring to a Chaum group.
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𝑡2,𝑖 ≠ ?̄?2,𝑖. In the honest case, the verifier’s value expands as follows:
?̄?2,𝑖 = ˜︁𝑦2 𝑦𝑠𝑖 = (𝑔𝑦𝑥 ) 𝑦𝑠𝑖 = 𝑔𝑦𝑥×𝑦𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑞)
Under normal circumstances, the expansion would continue:
𝑔𝑦






However, 𝑦𝑥 × 𝑦𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑞) ≠ 𝑦𝑥+𝑠𝑖 in a Chaum group because 𝑦𝑥 × 𝑦𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑞) ≠ 𝑦𝑥 · 𝑦𝑠𝑖 .
Consequently, the verification will fail and the protocol is incorrect.
Since Chaum groups cannot be used, the DDL-based BRAKEM constructions in this chapter
use the “double-decker” group construction defined in Section 8.2.1, and a CG-DLEQ proof to
move between groups.
8.3 Implementing BRAKEMDDL★
Section 8.1 presented multiple BRAKEM constructions—with the most notable construction being
BRAKEMDDL★ as described in Section 8.2.8—in the form of abstract cryptographic protocols. Un-
fortunately, protocols that are defined in an abstract form in the literature often leave developers
stranded, requiring them to figure out all of the implementation details. This is a reasonable prac-
tice, since particular protocol constructions come into and fall out of favor over time (e.g., group
settings, primitive algorithms, and parameter sizes), and some cryptographic work is mainly in-
tended to be an existence proof or to lay the groundwork for future protocols. However, protocols
like Safehouse (and therefore BRAKEMDDL★ ) are intended to be used in real-world deployments.
These types of protocols can benefit immensely from proof-of-concept implementations that are
developed alongside the design of the protocol. Results from the implementation can feed back
into the design in order to improve it—a notable example is the ostensibly redundant presence
of “burner keys” in BRAKEMDDL★ , which result in a large performance improvement in practice
due to the real-world tradeoffs between different types of modular exponentiation algorithms.
Details like these often cannot be discovered until a scheme has been implemented, and yet
solving them requires changing the abstract protocol. Additionally, a working prototype ensures
that the protocol design does not hide factors that would prevent real-world deployments, such
as unreasonably large constants in time or space complexities.
This section describes important details concerning the practical deployment of BRAKEMDDL★ .
Section 8.3.1 describes how to generate the group parameters required by BRAKEMDDL★ , and
Section 8.3.2 discusses performance optimizations that are used by the prototype implementation.
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8.3.1 Generating Group Parameters
In order to instantiate BRAKEMDDL★ , one must first set up the groups described in Section 8.2.1.
Recall that these groups require a set of parameters with a very specific structure:
log2(𝑝3) ≈ 256
log2(𝑝2) ≈ 3072
𝑝2 = 2𝑞𝑝3 + 1
𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1
𝑝0 = 2𝑝1 + 1 (optional)
𝑝3, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0 are all prime
Note that 𝑝0 is not required for BRAKEMDDL★ —it is only needed for BRAKEM2DDL★ . There are two
important aspects to consider when selecting these parameters: the parameters must be valid,
and it must be computationally feasible to find them. Section 8.3.1.1 explains what goes wrong
if the parameters are invalid or maliciously chosen, and what steps can be performed to validate
parameters supplied by others. Section 8.3.1.2 presents an efficient algorithm to compute suitable
parameters, which was used in the implementation of the prototype. Section 8.3.1.3 describes
techniques to ensure that the burner key 𝑥 in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 is used securely. Finally, Section 8.3.1.4
provides sample parameters.
8.3.1.1 Parameter Validation
The security of BRAKEMDDL★ , which is proven in Section 8.4, depends on the DDH problem being
hard in 𝔾2 and the DL problem being hard in 𝔾1. The protocol defines these groups to be
subgroups of ℤ∗𝑝2 (resp.ℤ∗𝑝1) generated by 𝑔2 (resp. 𝑔1) with prime order 𝑝3 (resp. 𝑝2). There
are several pitfalls that can undermine the security of DDH in practice: [DCE17; VAS+17]
• Wrong generator order: If the generator generates the full multiplicative group (rather than
a subgroup), then the DDH problem is easy to solve. For example, if 𝑔1 has order 2𝑝2 instead
of 𝑝2, then 𝔾1 = ℤ∗𝑝1 instead of an order 𝑝2 subgroup of ℤ∗𝑝1 . In this case, an attacker can
learn a bit of the discrete logarithm by testing to see if an element is a quadratic residue.
• Small group order: When the order of the group is small, both Pollard’s rho algorithm [Pol75]
and the baby-step giant-step algorithm [Sha71] can efficiently solve the DL problem.
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• Composite group order: If the order of the group is a smooth composite number with a
known prime factorization, then the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [PH78] can efficiently solve
the DL problem.
• Short exponents: If the exponent for a particular DL problem instance lies within a known
small range, Pollard’s kangaroo algorithm [Pol00] can efficiently solve the problem.
• Small modulus: If the modulus for the group is small, then index calculus methods like the
General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) can efficiently solve the DL problem. It is important to
note that the majority of the computation for the attack depends only on the group definition,
and not the particular group elements in a DL instance. This allows an attacker to perform
a large precomputation for a specific modulus and then subsequently solve the DL problem
very quickly for elements of the group as many times as desired [ABD+15].
• Composite modulus trapdoor: If the modulus for the group is composite, then it is pos-
sible for the parameters to be chosen in such a way that a trapdoor for the DL problem
exists [DCE17]. An attacker with possession of the trapdoor can efficiently solve the DL
problem, but the problem still remains hard for those without access to the trapdoor.
• Small subgroup attacks: If a participant can be tricked into performing group operations in
a small subgroup (i.e., not the intended subgroup), then this can undermine the security of
the scheme. For example, if the DH shared secret for an ElGamal ciphertext in BRAKEMDDL★
is drawn from a small subgroup, the attacker can perform a small group order attack to
recover the plaintext. Attackers can attempt a small subgroup confinement attack by sending
elements outside of the intended subgroup to victims. A small subgroup key recovery attack
can occur if the victim exponentiates elements from several small subgroups with the same
secret exponent—an attacker can compute the discrete logarithm in each small subgroup
and then use the Chinese remainder theorem to reconstruct the full secret. If the sender did
not check for it, then this attack could occur in BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate if the receiver public
keys for a given ring were elements of distinct small subgroups.
• Number field sieve backdoor: If the group parameters are chosen maliciously, then it is
possible to construct a prime modulus that enables an accelerated Special Number Field
Sieve (SNFS) attack against the DL problem when given access to the trapdoor relationship
between two polynomials [FGHT17]. Moreover, it is feasible to hide this special prime form.
Asymptotically, the attack reduces the security of the DL problem from 𝑂(2_) to 𝑂(2_/2)
against an attacker armed with the backdoor, but the sizes used in practice are too small for
the asymptotic bounds to be accurate [FGHT17, §6].
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• Long-term key reuse across security contexts: If an attacker compromises a DH public key
by solving the DL problem, they will be able to decrypt any ElGamal ciphertexts encrypted
for that key. In the context of BRAKEMDDL𝑥 , compromising the burner key 𝑥 would undermine
all keys encapsulated using the scheme.
In order to prevent all of these attacks, the following constraints must be satisfied:13
• Correct generator orders: 𝑔2 must have order 𝑝3, 𝑔1 must have order 𝑝2, and 𝑔0 must have
order 𝑝1. This condition can be validated as follows:
◦ the required structure of (𝑞, 𝑝3, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0) holds;
◦ 𝑔2 ≠ 1; 𝑔1 ≠ 1; 𝑔0 ≠ 1;
◦ 𝑔2𝑝3 = 1 (mod 𝑝2); 𝑔1𝑝2 = 1 (mod 𝑝1); and 𝑔0𝑝1 = 1 (mod 𝑝0).
This condition prevents attacks against DDH due to wrong generator orders.
• Large group order: log2(𝑝3) ≈ 256. This provides a 128-bit security level against Pollard’s
rho algorithm and the baby-step giant-step algorithm. Given the required relationship be-
tween the parameters, this automatically implies that 𝔾1 and 𝔾0 have extremely large orders
that also prevent this attack.
• Prime group order: If 𝑝3, 𝑝2, and 𝑝1 are all prime, then the orders of 𝔾2, 𝔾1, and 𝔾0 are all
prime. This prevents the use of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm.
• Full-range exponents: In any security proof where the DL problem must be hard, the
exponents for the group elements in question must be selected uniformly at random from
the whole range up to the group order. This applies mainly to the private keys produced by
BRAKEMDDL★ .KeyGen and the ElGamal randomness generated by BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate.
This condition provides at least a 128-bit security level against Pollard’s kangaroo algorithm.
• Large moduli: log2(𝑝2) ≈ 3072. This is commonly believed to provide a 128-bit security level
against index calculus methods for solving the DL problem. Given the required relationship
between the parameters, this automatically implies that 𝑝1 and 𝑝0 are also large enough
to prevent the attack in their respective groups. The size of 𝑝2 is also believed to be large
enough to prevent GNFS precomputations in practice, even if all of the attacker’s resources
are dedicated to a single 𝑝2 reused across many security contexts [ABD+15]. Additionally,
13 ⋏Constraints involving 𝑝0 and 𝑔0 are only necessary for BRAKEM2DDL★ and not for BRAKEMDDL★ . They are included
here for completeness.
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this size of 𝑝2 is resistant to SNFS backdoors in the event that 𝑝2 was chosen maliciously,
since the acceleration provided by the backdoor is insufficient to solve the DL problem in
practice (although 𝔾2 would not provide the claimed 128-bit security level against such an
attacker). The general problem of preventing backdoors (including but not limited to SNFS
backdoors) from being hidden in the parameters is revisited later in this section.
• Prime moduli: If 𝑝2, 𝑝1, and 𝑝0 are all prime, then 𝔾2, 𝔾1, and 𝔾0 all have prime moduli.
This prevents the presence of a backdoor based on a maliciously chosen composite modulus.
• Prime 𝑞: If 𝑝3, 𝑝2, and 𝑞 are all prime and 𝑝2 = 2𝑞𝑝3 +1, then all of the subgroups in 𝔾2 have
an order ≥ 𝑝3, with the lone exception of the subgroup {1, 𝑝2 − 1} of order 2. This means
that 𝔾2 contains no small subgroups in which to conduct small subgroup confinement or key
recovery attacks, aside from the required subgroup of order 2.1⁴ If 𝑝1 is prime, 𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1,
and 𝑝0 = 2𝑝1 + 1, then the same is true for 𝔾1 and 𝔾0.
• Group membership tests: When receiving alleged group elements, the receiver must verify
that they belong to the subgroup with the expected order (and in particular, not to the
subgroup of order 2). When combined with the previous condition, these checks fully prevent
small subgroup attacks.
• Secure burner keys: Although the other conditions ensure that the DL problem is considered
too difficult to solve for even one instance, reusing the same burner key 𝑥 in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 for
all deployments would still present an unnervingly large and lucrative attack target. At a
minimum, each deployment should use a different burner key. A new burner key can also be
generated more frequently (e.g., for each communication context, or each time epoch). In
the extreme case, the burner key can be omitted from the scheme entirely, with BRAKEMDDL𝑥
adjusted accordingly to perform the Π0 NIZKPK for the first true recipients from each ring.
When a burner key is used, precautions must be taken to ensure that adversaries cannot
learn the discrete logarithm without solving the DL problem itself; Section 8.3.1.3 discusses
a method to accomplish this.
All of the parameter validation steps mentioned above are trivial to verify, with the exception
of the constraints that 𝑝3, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0, and 𝑞 must be prime. How can a verifier check that a given
parameter is prime? Trial division becomes intractable long before reaching numbers as large as
𝑝3 (which itself is astronomically smaller than 𝑞), so it is not an option. An efficient alternative
is a probabilistic primality testing algorithm such as the Fermat or Miller-Rabin [Mil76] tests.
14 ⋏Technically, the minimal condition to prevent these attacks is that 𝑞 contains no prime factors smaller than 𝑝3.
For simplicity and because there is no good reason to do otherwise, the group parameters in this chapter use a
prime 𝑞.
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However, these tests are sound but not complete: they either conclusively identify that a number is
composite, or return an inconclusive result. Consequently, the tests are typically executed multiple
times (with fresh randomness for each execution) in order to decrease the probability that they
fail to identify a composite number. In an adversarial settings, maliciously chosen composite
numbers can cause the accuracy of the tests to degrade to the worst-case scenario [AMPS18;
GMP19]. This means that these tests must be run enough times to become confident that an
“inconclusive” results indicates primality when accounting for worst-case accuracy.1⁵ The Baillie-
PSW test [PSW80] is more robust: there are no currently known Baillie-PSW pseudoprimes (i.e.,
composite numbers that pass the test). While it is conjectured that there are no Baillie-PSW
pseudoprimes for numbers less than a few thousand bits, it is also known that there are infinitely
many such pseudoprimes [Pom84]. In practice, performing the Baillie-PSW test or sufficiently
many iterations of the Miller-Rabin test provides sufficient confidence of primality in adversarial
settings. However, it is possible to do better: with modern tools, it is possible to verify that a
cryptographically large number is prime with certainty.
In contrast to probabilistic primality tests, there are various methods to prove that a number
is prime [Ber04]. These methods output a primality certificate that contains values used as input
to a theorem about prime numbers. A verifier can use the contents of a primality certificate and
the associated theorems to efficiently show that a number is prime.
There are two main techniques that are used to generate primality certificates in prac-
tice: Pocklington’s theorem [Poc1914], and the Elliptic Curve Primality Proving (ECPP) algo-
rithm [AM93; Mor98]. Pocklington’s theorem can be used in a recursive primality proving
algorithm. For a given candidate 𝑁, the algorithm must find a large prime factor 𝜌 of 𝑁 − 1
such that 𝜌 ≥
√
𝑁 and 𝜌 satisfies some other criteria. The factor 𝜌 is then proven to be prime
recursively. Unfortunately, this algorithm does not work for all primes: if at any point it en-
counters an input 𝑁 such that all of the prime factors of 𝑁 − 1 are <
√
𝑁, then the theorem
cannot be applied. There is a generalized form of Pocklington’s theorem that does not require
a single large prime factor 𝜌. Instead, the generalized version can work with any partial prime
factorization 𝐴 = ∏︁𝑚
𝑖=1 𝜌𝑖
𝑒𝑖 such that 𝐴 ≥
√
𝑁 and 𝐴𝐵 = 𝑁−1 for some integer 𝐵, which need not
be factored. This version of the theorem is more flexible, but still requires the algorithm to find a
large prime factor of 𝑁 − 1 if one exists (otherwise 𝐴 will not be large enough). The SafeCurves
website [BL14] provides primality certificates for various standard elliptic curve parameters
using the generalized form of Pocklington’s theorem exclusively. The ECPP algorithm is also
recursive, but it is far more efficient than Pocklington’s theorem in practice. Efficiently executing
the algorithm requires constructing elliptic curves with a given number of points using complex
multiplication, where the number of points is a multiple of a smaller prime. A proof certificate
15 ⋏ In the worst-case scenario (which occurs in adversarial settings), the Miller-Rabin test must be run 64 times in
order to declare a number to be prime with an error probability of 2−128 [Mil76].
209
Chapter 8 BRAKEM: Publicly Verifiable Key Encapsulation
for the smaller prime is generated recursively. Unlike Pocklington’s theorem, the ECPP method is
able to produce primality certificates even when a candidate 𝑁 has large prime factors in 𝑁 − 1
that cannot be found efficiently (e.g., in cases where 𝑁 − 1 is an RSA number).
When verifying group parameters for BRAKEMDDL★ , verifiers should require primality certifi-
cates for 𝑝3, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0, and the factors of 𝑞; equivalently, a verifier may merely require that
the certificates can be efficiently generated at verification time. The closed-source Primo soft-
ware [Mar15] generates and verifies primality certificates using Pocklington’s theorem (in the
non-generalized form) and ECPP. The Primo certificate format is supported by several open-
source software projects,1⁶ making it the most widely supported primality certificate format
currently in use.
One final challenge remains: even if all of the aforementioned constraints are verified, this
does not guarantee that the parameters are free from backdoors. For example, parameters that
are generated using the hidden SNFS technique [FGHT17] cannot be detected. While the SNFS
acceleration may not be enough to break the 3072-bit prime modulus 𝑝2 in practice, it would
certainly be better to prevent this acceleration. Moreover, the SNFS backdoor is illustrative of a
more general problem: if a malicious parameter generator is aware of an attack against DL (or
DDH) that only applies to a subset of possible parameters, then it can choose parameters that
enable its (potentially trapdoor-based and undetectable) attack. To mitigate this weakness, either
the parameters must come from a trusted parameter generator, or the parameter generator’s
flexibility when choosing the parameters must be sufficiently constrained to make it very unlikely
that the parameters are vulnerable to their attack. There are several common ways to accomplish
this restriction [BCC+15]:
• The generator may be required to provide a “seed” that, when input into a cryptographic
hash function, outputs an uncontrollable value. The output of the hash is translated into the
structured parameters according to a defined algorithm.
• The generator may be required to construct the parameters using a “nothing-up-my-sleeve”
number such as 𝜋 or 𝑒. For example, the prime numbers for the scheme might be chosen based
on some initial digits of 𝜋 plus some small value 𝜖. Alternatively, a “nothing-up-my-sleeve”
number might be chosen as the seed for the hash-based approach.
• The generator may be required to select the “minimal” parameters. For example, the prime
numbers for the scheme might be the smallest possible primes that satisfy the requirements.
16 ⋏ PARI/GP (https://pari.math.u-bordeaux.fr/) can generate Primo certificates, but not verify them.
CoqPrime (https://github.com/thery/coqprime) and ecpp-verifier (https://github.com/tomato42/
ecpp-verifier) can verify Primo certificates, but not generate them.
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All of these approaches are still subject to manipulation to varying degrees. For example, if the
parameters are required to be the output of a hash function, a malicious parameter generator
could try many seeds and hash functions until they find one that generates parameters subject
to their attack. Similarly, an adversary can try many plausible “nothing-up-my-sleeve” numbers
and encoding procedures until they generate vulnerable parameters. Of the three approaches,
restricting the parameter generator to choosing the “minimal” parameters removes the most, but
not all, adversarial flexibility [BCC+15, §6]. The remaining flexibility includes the prime size
and the prime “shape” (e.g., “ordinary” primes, pseudo-Mersenne primes, “Montgomery-friendly”
primes, among others).
To limit the likelihood that a malicious parameter generator can generate weak BRAKEMDDL★
parameters, the following constraints should be verified:
• 𝑝3 should be equal to the order of a standardized elliptic curve that is suitable for ElGamal
encryption (i.e., DDH should be hard). Translation from 𝔾2 into an elliptic curve group is
used by Safehouse to accelerate certain features. When the groups have the same order, it
is possible to efficiently prove the correctness of this translation using a DLEQ NIZKPK. This
requirement is not necessary for general use of BRAKEMDDL★ .
• 𝑞 should be the smallest prime such that the other constraints are satisfied.
• 𝑔1 and 𝑔0 should be the smallest values strictly greater than 1 with the correct order: 𝑔1𝑝2 =
1 (mod 𝑝1) and 𝑔0𝑝1 = 1 (mod 𝑝0).
• 𝑔2 should be 𝑧2𝑞 (mod 𝑝2) for the smallest 𝑧 such that 𝑧2𝑞 ≠ 1 (mod 𝑝2). This ensures that
𝑔2 will be in the subgroup of order 𝑝3.
A malicious parameter generator’s only flexibility given these constraints is the selection of the
elliptic curve group, which determines 𝑝3. Of course, the list of constraints presented in this
section are themselves a flexibility: they are only one of many possible “reasonable” methods
for parameterizing BRAKEMDDL★ . Ultimately, this is an inherent limitation of trust in parameter
generation. For this particular set of parameters, the set of possible “reasonable” constraints
is likely small enough that a malicious parameter generator would require an attack that is
applicable to a very large proportion of typical finite-field DH setups.
Note that log2(𝑞) = log2(𝑝2) − log2(𝑝3) − 1 by definition. When 𝑞 is a prime this large,
𝑞 − 1 is likely to contain large prime factors that preclude the use of Pocklington’s algorithm to
prove that 𝑞, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, or 𝑝0 are prime. Luckily, ECPP is still efficient enough to produce primality
certificates for primes of this size.
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8.3.1.2 Finding Primes
Section 8.3.1.1 described the steps required to verify BRAKEMDDL★ group parameters. However, it
remains to be shown how to find suitable parameters in the first place. With careful consideration,
finding appropriate parameters can be done efficiently. The performance of the parameter
generation algorithm is particularly important for BRAKEM2DDL★ , which requires the extra prime
𝑝0—the time required to locate appropriate values is exponential in the number of primes that
must be found. A parameter generation program was developed as part of this work. With the
algorithm described in this section, the generation program is able to find appropriate parameters
for BRAKEM2DDL★ within hours using an academic-grade computing cluster. In contrast, finding
parameters for BRAKEMDDL★ on a consumer-grade desktop computer using the algorithm can
usually be done within several minutes. The large size of 𝑞 is a significant contributing factor to
the runtime cost of the algorithm.
Recall that the following equations must be satisfied, where all variables are prime:
log2(𝑝3) ≈ 256
log2(𝑝2) ≈ 3072
𝑝2 = 2𝑞𝑝3 + 1
𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1
𝑝0 = 2𝑝1 + 1 (optional)
As noted in the previous section, 𝑝3 is provided as an input to the parameter generation algorithm
in order to accelerate certain features of Safehouse.
An efficient way to generate the remaining parameters is to generate a prime 𝑞 with the
correct number of bits. Note that 𝑝3 and 𝑞 fully determine the other parameters. After generating
a prime 𝑞, the other parameters can be tested using the Fermat and Baillie-PSW [PSW80] tests
to see if they are prime. The algorithm terminates when all parameters are prime. The Fermat
primality test is much more efficient than the Baillie-PSW test, so it should be run first in order
to speed up elimination of obviously composite candidates.1⁷
Blindly generating 𝑞 at random and running the primality test on the resulting parameters is
too inefficient. To make this process practical, an extra layer must be added to quickly eliminate
many candidates before they reach the primality tests. This is where prime number sieves
are useful. When searching for primes of this size using modern processor architectures, it is
17 ⋏The Baillie-PSW begins with a single application of the Miller-Rabin test, which essentially includes a Fermat
test. However, since the algorithm searches for multiple primes simultaneously, it is more efficient to test all of
the candidates with a Fermat test before incurring the cost of even a single full Baillie-PSW test.
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Algorithm 8.1 A segmented prime sieve. (Refs: 213 a b)
Subroutine Segmented Prime Sieve in [𝑛1, 𝑛2]
Find all primes in [2, 𝑘), P, using a prime sieve.
Initialize 𝐴, an array of 𝑛2 − 𝑛1 + 1 bits initially set to 1.
for each (𝑝′ ∈ P) {




for each (𝐴[𝑖] such that 𝐴[𝑖] = 1) {
if (IsPrime(𝐴[𝑖])) Output 𝐴[𝑖].
}
best to use a segmented sieve [BH77]. The general structure of a segmented prime sieve is
shown in Algorithm 8.1. The preprocessing step of finding all primes in [2, 𝑘) for some 𝑘 can be
implemented using a traditional prime sieve. After finding these “small” primes, the data can
be reused to eliminate candidates from multiple segments in parallel. Each processor core 𝑖 can
search its own segment [𝑛𝑖,1, 𝑛𝑖,2] with the desired bit length for the prime. After preprocessing is
complete, the sieve becomes a very efficient mechanism for eliminating candidates before having
to run the comparatively expensive primality tests.
While the combination of a segmented sieve with a primality test is already quite efficient,
a significant performance improvement can be achieved by using a wheel. This technique was
first described in detail by Pritchard [Pri82]. It begins with the observation that sieves like the
segmented sieve in Algorithm 8.1 do not need to consider even numbers, which cannot be prime
(aside from 2, which is typically outside the search range). Consequently, the array 𝐴 only needs
to store half of the bits, and 𝑚𝑝′ can be ignored when 𝑚 is a multiple of 2. However, there is no
need to stop at 2: multiples of 3 can also be excluded from the memory layout and candidate
elimination passes. When combined with a segmented prime sieve, the resulting construction is
called a segmented wheel sieve [Pri83]. In general, a “factor base” of primes F = { 𝑓1, 𝑓2, . . . , 𝑓𝑚}
eliminates a pattern of prime candidates that repeats after every multiple of ℎ = ∏︁1≤𝑖≤𝑚 𝑓𝑖.
This can be visualized as a “wheel” with segments corresponding to [1, ℎ] on its circumference,
where segments are “spokes” if and only if they correspond to a number that is coprime to every
element of the factor base. As this wheel “rolls” along the number line, all integers that did not
contact a “spoke” are eliminated from the sieve’s memory layout. Figure 8.1 depicts a wheel with
factor base {2, 3, 5} on the number line.
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Figure 8.1 A small prime sieving wheel on the number line. The wheel’s factor base is {2, 3, 5}.
Filled segments are provably composite and are not represented in the prime sieve’s memory layout.
(Refs: 213, 215, and 216)
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The location of spokes in a wheel and the distance between them can be precomputed,
making it easy to look up the next spoke position and index given a value modulo ℎ. As an
additional optimization, the initial Fermat primality test can be modified to use ℎ as the base.
This ensures that gcd(ℎ, 𝑛) = 1 for a candidate 𝑛, since 𝑛 has already survived the sieve at the
time of the test; if 𝑛 is not a Carmichael number, then the test will eliminate a composite 𝑛 half
of the time. Several aspects of the segmented wheel sieve are also simplified by ensuring that
segments always start and end on multiples of ℎ.
An application-specific optimization performed by the BRAKEMDDL★ parameter generator
program is to make the segmented wheel sieve aware of the required prime relationships,
eliminating even more candidates during the relatively inexpensive sieving process. Consider
the small prime 𝑝′ ∈ P and a candidate 𝑛. Normally, the sieve eliminates 𝑛 if 𝑛 = 0 (mod 𝑝′).
However, when the overall algorithm is sieving for 𝑞 using a segmented wheel sieve, there are
other applicable constraints:
𝑞 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑝2 = 2𝑞𝑝3 + 1 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑝1 = 2(2𝑞𝑝3 + 1) + 1 = 4𝑞𝑝3 + 3 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑝0 = 2(2(2𝑞𝑝3 + 1) + 1) + 1 = 8𝑞𝑝3 + 7 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑝′) (optional)
During the sieving step with each of the small primes, three (for BRAKEMDDL★ ) or four (for
BRAKEM2DDL★ ) passes through the segment are performed. Each pass eliminates candidates that
would cause one of {𝑞, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0} to be divisible by 𝑝′. Since 𝑝3 is given as an input to the
program, an initial preprocessing step can cache the constraints for each small prime 𝑝′:
𝑞 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑞 ≠ (−2𝑝3)−1 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑞 ≠ −3 · (4𝑝3)−1 (mod 𝑝′)
𝑞 ≠ −7 · (8𝑝3)−1 (mod 𝑝′) (optional)
This technique is an extended form of an approach that can be used to find safe primes [Wie03].
When implementing a segmented wheel sieve, it is important to take advantage of the wheel
structure. When sieving with a small prime 𝑝′ in segment [𝑛1, 𝑛2], it is possible to quickly compute
all multiples of 𝑝′ that lie on a spoke within the segment—in Figure 8.1, these correspond to
unfilled values on the number line that are also a multiple of 𝑝′. These are the values that
must be eliminated during the sieve. An important observation is that any multiple 𝑚𝑝′ of 𝑝′
lies on a wheel spoke if and only if 𝑚 lies on a wheel spoke (𝑝′ always lies on a wheel spoke
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because by definition it cannot be divisible by any prime in the factor base). To begin the sieving
process for 𝑝′, the initial multiplier 𝑚0 = ⌊𝑛1/𝑝′⌋ is computed. The wheel is then consulted to
find the subsequent spokes 𝑚1, 𝑚2, . . . , where 𝑚1 = 𝑚0 if 𝑚0 itself is already on a spoke. The
sequence 𝑚1𝑝′, 𝑚2𝑝′, . . . will contain all of the candidates to be eliminated by the sieve. The
loop can terminate for 𝑝′ as soon as it encounters an 𝑚𝑖𝑝′ > 𝑛2. Another optimization is to only
store 𝑛2−𝑛1+1/ℎ bits when sieving a segment; efficient mapping from a candidate 𝑛 to a memory
position can be done by computing the number of wheel rotations 𝑛−𝑛1/ℎ and the spoke index of
𝑛 − 𝑛1 (mod ℎ), then mapping these two values to a bit and byte position.
When performing a sieving step with a prime 𝑝′ and a constraint 𝑞 ≠ 𝑟 (mod 𝑝′), the
aforementioned procedure is performed as described if 𝑟 = 0. For the three constraints where
𝑟 ≠ 0, the procedure must be slightly adjusted. Rather than finding multipliers 𝑚1, 𝑚2, . . .
on wheel spokes in the usual way, the wheel is first “rotated” so that the spokes are offset by
𝑟′ = 𝑟/𝑝′ (mod ℎ). For example, the spoke at position 11 in Figure 8.1 would move to position 3 if
𝑟′ = 8. This solution works because if a candidate 𝑞 is equal to the remainder 𝑟 (mod 𝑝′) and 𝑞
also falls on a wheel spoke in the sieving segment, then:
𝑞 = 𝑟 (mod 𝑝′) ⊲ Formula for a constraint violation
𝑞 = 𝑚𝑝′ + 𝑟 ⊲ Rewrite mod in terms of a multiple of 𝑝′
∀ 𝑓∈F 𝑚𝑝′ + 𝑟 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑓 ) ⊲ 𝑞 must lie on a spoke
∀ 𝑓∈F 𝑚 + 𝑟 · 𝑝′−1 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑓 ) ⊲Multiply by 𝑝′−1
∀ 𝑓∈F 𝑚 + 𝑟′ ≠ 0 (mod 𝑓 ) ⊲ Definition of 𝑟′
The inverse of 𝑝′ modulo 𝑓 for any 𝑓 ∈ F is guaranteed to exist because 𝑝′ is coprime to
𝑓 . The final constraint that ∀ 𝑓∈F 𝑚 + 𝑟′ ≠ 0 (mod 𝑓 ) is exactly the definition of finding a value
𝑚′ = 𝑚 + 𝑟′ on a wheel spoke modulo ℎ; 𝑞 can then be computed as 𝑞 = (𝑚′ − 𝑟′) · 𝑝′ + 𝑟.
Alternatively, the constraint can be viewed as finding 𝑚 on the wheel after it has been rotated by
𝑟′. This means that candidates satisfying 𝑞 = 𝑟 (mod 𝑝′) and ∀ 𝑓∈F 𝑞 ≠ 0 (mod 𝑓 ) can be found
by finding multipliers 𝑚1, 𝑚2, . . . that fall on spokes in the rotated wheel. The candidates to be
eliminated by the sieve will be 𝑚1𝑝′ + 𝑟, 𝑚2𝑝′ + 𝑟, and so on. Note that the value of 𝑟′ depends
only on 𝑟 and 𝑝′, so it can be precomputed for all constraints and reused across all sieves.
Once appropriate prime parameters have been discovered, the generators 𝑔1 ∈ 𝔾1 and
𝑔0 ∈ 𝔾0 can be found with a simple linear search checking candidates 𝑧 for 𝑧𝑝2 = 1 (mod 𝑝1)
or 𝑧𝑝1 = 1 (mod 𝑝0). This search will terminate quickly because the cofactor is very small (the
cofactor for both groups is 2). A similar approach does not work for finding a generator 𝑔2 ∈ 𝔾2
because of its large cofactor. Instead, a generator can be found by choosing a 𝑧 ∈ [2, 𝑝2) and
eliminating the component from the cofactor subgroup: 𝑔2 = 𝑧2𝑞 (mod 𝑝2).
The overall approach used by the parameter generator is summarized in Algorithm 8.2. The
parameters produced by this algorithm pass all of the validation tests described in Section 8.3.1.1.
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Algorithm 8.2 The group parameter generator algorithm. (Ref: 216)
Subroutine ParameterGenerator(𝑝3) → (𝑝3, 𝑞, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0, 𝑔2, 𝑔1, 𝑔0, 𝜋)
Input requirement: 𝑝3 is a prime and log2(𝑝3) ≈ 256.
Find all primes in [2, 𝑘), P, using a prime sieve.
Compute the four constraints for each prime in P given 𝑝3.
while (true) {
Let ℓ = 3072 − log2(𝑝3) − 1.
Perform a parallel segmented wheel prime sieve in [2ℓ, 2ℓ+1) with the constraints.
for each (candidate 𝑞 that survives the sieving process) {
𝑝2 ← 2𝑞𝑝3 + 1
𝑝1 ← 2𝑝2 + 1
𝑝0 ← 2𝑝1 + 1
if (!FermatPrime(𝑞, ℎ) | | !FermatPrime(𝑝2, ℎ)) continue
if (!FermatPrime(𝑝1, ℎ) | | !FermatPrime(𝑝0, ℎ)) continue
if (!BailliePSW(𝑞) | | !BailliePSW(𝑝2)) continue
if (!BailliePSW(𝑝1) | | !BailliePSW(𝑝0)) continue
Find smallest 𝑔1 > 1 such that 𝑔1𝑝2 = 0 (mod 𝑝1).
Find smallest 𝑔0 > 1 such that 𝑔0𝑝1 = 0 (mod 𝑝0).
Find smallest 𝑧 > 1 such that 𝑧2𝑞 ≠ 1 (mod 𝑝2).
𝑔2 ← 𝑧2𝑞.
Produce primality proofs 𝜋 for 𝑝3, 𝑞, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, and 𝑝0 using the ECPP algorithm.
return (𝑝3, 𝑞, 𝑝2, 𝑝1, 𝑝0, 𝑔2, 𝑔1, 𝑔0, 𝜋).
}
}
However, care must be taken to ensure that the parallelized segmented sieve scans the segments
in sequential order so that the resulting 𝑞 is minimal. If a solution is found in a greater segment
before a lesser segment has been completely processed, the parameter generator should not
output the solution until all unfinished segments have been scanned; this ensures that the minimal
solution is returned.
There are several parameters to tune for optimal performance in the parameter generator
algorithm. Larger values of 𝑘 eliminate more candidates during the sieve, but consume more
memory, increase the sieving time, suffer from diminishing returns, and harm memory locality.
Increasing the size of the factor base F eliminates more candidates, but it increases complexity,
harms cache locality in several tight loops, and is subject to diminishing returns. Increasing
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the segment length consumes more memory and increases latency, but it reduces the overall
cost of the sieving process due to reducing the frequency at which the small primes need to be
“aligned” with the segment—computing the initial multiplier 𝑚0 is expensive for numbers as
large as 𝑞. The parameter generation program developed as part of this work uses 𝑘 = 218,
F = {2, 3, 5, 7, 11}, ℎ = 2310, and a segment length of 99 999 900. While this exceeded the
capacity of the processor’s L2 cache, there was a net benefit to performance due to starting new
sieves less frequently.
8.3.1.3 Burner Key Security
The presence of the burner key 𝑥 in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 is an important optimization that improves the
performance of Π0. However, it can also become a security weakness if it is not handled properly:
if an adversary learns dlog𝑔2 (𝑥), then the confidentiality of the scheme is compromised until the
burner key changes.
To avoid this problem, 𝑥 should be set to an element of 𝔾2 chosen uniformly at random.
As long as the adversary cannot force 𝑥 to equal an element for which they know the discrete
logarithm, then they cannot break the scheme by attacking 𝑥 without solving the DL problem in
𝔾2. An easy way to prevent an adversary from assigning 𝑥 to a chosen value is to derive it from
the output of a cryptographic hash function. Even if the adversary has control over the input
to the hash function, its preimage resistance prevents them from choosing an input that would
produce their desired element.
Given a cryptographic hash function 𝐻 that maps strings to values in ℤ∗𝑝2 , the recommended
scheme for choosing 𝑥 is to use 𝐻 with a common reference string 𝑠 as input and then mapping the
output into the correct subgroup. The string 𝑠 does not need to be random, but it must be known
by all participants in the scheme and it should capture the “security context” of the conversation.
For example, 𝑠 might be an identifier for the conversation, or the name of the service that has
deployed BRAKEMDDL𝑥 . The participants can derive 𝑥 from 𝑠 in order to instantiate BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .
To map the hash output, which is in ℤ∗𝑝2 , into the correct subgroup 𝔾2, the safest option is to
eliminate the portion of the value that comes from the multiplicative subgroup with order 2𝑞
(i.e., the cofactor). In summary, 𝑥 is computed from 𝑠 as follows:
𝑥 = 𝐻 (𝑠)2𝑞·( (2𝑞)
−1 (mod 𝑝3)) (mod 𝑝2)
This function ensures that the distribution of 𝑥 in 𝔾2 is uniformly random, and that an adversary
cannot force 𝑥 to equal a specific value, even with full control over 𝑠. Developers should take
care to ensure that the distribution of the output of 𝐻 is uniform. It is easy to implement 𝐻 using
an Extendable Output Function (XOF), such as SHAKE-128, using rejection sampling: generate
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⌈log2(𝑝2)⌉ bits of output from XOF(𝑠), interpret it as a number, and if the result is ≥ 𝑝2 then
try again with subsequent output bits. Implementing 𝐻 using a standard hash function 𝐻′, such
as SHA2-256, is similar but slightly trickier: 𝐻′ can be called repeatedly with input 𝑠∥𝑐 for an
incrementing counter 𝑐 in order to generate enough bits to perform rejection sampling. This
transformation of a hash into a pseudorandom function is a simplified form of the HKDF scheme
introduced by Krawczyk [Kra10].
8.3.1.4 Sample Parameters
The following sample parameters were found by the parameter generation program described in
Section 8.3.1.2 when setting 𝑝3 to the order of the Curve25519 [Ber06] elliptic curve group:1⁸
𝑝3 = 0x1000000000000000000000000000000014DEF9DEA2F79CD65812631A5CF5D3ED




















18 ⋏ These values are intended to demonstrate that the algorithm is capable of producing a valid solution. Developers
should always validate parameters using the techniques described in Section 8.3.1.1 when using parameters
provided by others.
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8.3.2 Performance Optimization
The prototype implementation of BRAKEMDDL★ that was developed as part of this work is intended
to demonstrate a reasonable bound on the real-world performance of the system. As such,
although the prototype does not use all of the techniques available to a production-ready library,
it does employ many of the most important performance optimizations that would be used in
practice. The prototype was written in the Go programming language,1⁹ since it provides a good
mix of concurrency primitives, math and cryptography libraries, safety, the ability to include
assembly (for targeted performance gains at the cost of safety), and an ecosystem that can support
the higher-level features required by Safehouse.
Optimizing a BRAKEMDDL★ implementation is important in order to achieve reasonable run-
ning times: since the system uses “finite-field” DH groups, it is significantly slower than the
elliptic curve techniques that have become the norm for real-world cryptography. The size of the
BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate proofs can be marginally decreased by merging the Fiat-Shamir [FS87]
challenges: by combining all of the random oracle inputs within the NIZKPKs into a single call
and reusing the output, only one hash value needs to be transmitted. Aside from this standard
optimization, there is no way to decrease the size of the encapsulations. However, the running
time can be improved far beyond what a naïve implementation can accomplish.
Almost all of the running time for the BRAKEMDDL★ functions is spent performing modular
exponentiation in some form. Modular exponentiation is implemented as a sequence of modular
multiplications. The length of this sequence is proportional to the bit length of the exponent.
This is particularly expensive for any modular exponentiations in 𝔾1 since these involve 3072-bit
exponents.
Aside from the naïve and intractable solution of computing 𝑣𝑦 by multiplying 𝑦 − 1 times, the
most basic modular exponentiation algorithm is the “square-and-multiply” algorithm shown in
Algorithm 8.3. This algorithm is easy to implement given an algorithm for modular multiplication
with the required bit length. However, there are many ways to drastically outperform this basic
algorithm; since modular exponentiation has widespread importance in cryptography, optimizing
it has been the subject of many research efforts. Optimizations fall into two categories: speeding
up the modular multiplication operation, and more efficient exponentiation algorithms. The
largest speed improvements in the latter category come from taking advantage of special cases,
such as when the base or exponent are known long in advance, allowing precomputation to be
performed.
This section covers the optimizations employed by the BRAKEMDDL★ prototype, based on the
exact operations that need to be performed:
19 ⋏ https://golang.org/
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Algorithm 8.3 Square-and-multiply modular exponentiation.
(Refs: 221, 227 a b, 228, 231, 234, and 281)
Subroutine ModExp(𝑣, 𝑦, 𝑝) → 𝑧
Output: 𝑧 = 𝑣𝑦 (mod 𝑝).
𝑧 ← 1.
for (bit 𝑏 in 𝑦 from most to least significant) {
𝑧 ← 𝑧 · 𝑧 (mod 𝑝).
if (𝑏 = 1) {




1. Section 8.3.2.1 discusses how to speed up the modular multiplication function, which is
needed by all exponentiation methods.
2. Section 8.3.2.2 discusses optimizing modular squaring, which is a special case of multiplica-
tion. Modular squaring constitutes the bulk of the time spent for most modular exponentia-
tions.
3. Section 8.3.2.3 discusses a faster technique than square-and-multiply for “ordinary” modular
exponentiation where no special-case optimizations are applicable. This is only required for
the calculation of 𝑡′1 and 𝑡′2 when producing a BDLEQ proof (see Section 8.2.2.3), or 𝑡1 and 𝑡2
when verifying the proof. It is also used by several higher-level functions in Safehouse. Due
to the careful design of BRAKEMDDL★ , all other modular exponentiations can be optimized
with one of the special cases.
4. Section 8.3.2.4 discusses an improved modular exponentiation technique when the exponent
is fixed (i.e., available for precomputation). This is used whenever it is necessary to check
group membership in 𝔾2, such as for each 𝑦 𝑗 and 𝑧 𝑗 in Π0 (see Section 8.2.7). An element 𝑎
is in 𝔾2 if 𝑎𝑝3 = 1 (mod 𝑝2), so precomputations can be performed to optimize for the fixed
exponent 𝑝3. Using this method also works to verify membership in 𝔾1, but it is far more
expensive because 𝑝2 is much larger than 𝑝3. However, since 𝑝1 = 2𝑝2 + 1, 𝔾1 is actually the
set of quadratic residues inℤ∗𝑝1 . This means that group membership𝔾1 can be checked almost
instantly using the Legendre symbol: 𝑣 ∈ 𝔾1 if and only if Legendre(𝑣/𝑝1) = 1. Consequently,
the “fixed exponent” special case is used only for 𝔾2 membership checks.
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5. Section 8.3.2.5 discusses an improved modular exponentiation technique when the base is
fixed. This is by far the most widely used optimization in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 for fixed bases 𝑔2, 𝑔1,
and 𝑥 (the burner key). Exponentiation of 𝑔1 is used by both Π0 and BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate.
Exponentiation of 𝑔2 is used commonly throughout the whole system, beginning with the
BRAKEMDDL★ .KeyGen function. Exponentiation of 𝑥 is used by the Π0 prover to compute 𝑡′ and
the verifier to compute 𝑡, and by BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate to compute ℎ𝑖 (see Section 8.2.8).
In total, a call to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate requires 𝑚 · (ℓ + 1) exponentiations of 𝑥, which
is a very large amount. In large Safehouse groups, typical values are 𝑚 = 10 and ℓ = 128,
resulting in 1290 exponentiations of 𝑥 for a single encapsulation. This underscores the
importance of the burner key, which enables the “fixed base” special case optimizations.
6. Section 8.3.2.6 discusses an improved modular exponentiation technique for when the result
of several exponentiations must be multiplied together. This technique is used to verify a Π0
proof when computing 𝑡 and 𝑇 . It is also used to compute 𝑡′2 when producing a BDLEQ proof,
and 𝑡2 when verifying it.
7. Section 8.3.2.7 discusses opportunities for parallelism throughout the scheme. There are
many parts of the system that can take advantage of modern multi-core processors.
All benchmarks presented in this section were performed 100000 times using all Skylake
cores on an Intel Core i7-6700K CPU (four physical cores with hyper-threading enabled), with
all core frequencies pinned to 4.0GHz and Intel Turbo Boost disabled.
8.3.2.1 Fast Modular Multiplication
Speeding up modular multiplication is greatly beneficial because it is the primitive operation at
the core of modular exponentiation methods. The most straightforward approach to computing
𝑎 · 𝑏 (mod 𝑝) is to compute the product 𝑎𝑏 and then divide by 𝑝, taking the remainder. This
approach is relatively slow because the division step is expensive. It is possible to improve the
performance by considering the intended use: modular exponentiation requires a long sequence
of multiplications. Consequently, it is beneficial to spend some extra time doing pre- or post-
computation if it enables a faster multiplication step.
Montgomery multiplication [Mon85] is a well-known technique to accelerate modular multi-
plication within an exponentiation algorithm. The technique takes advantage of the fact that it is
very efficient to divide numbers by powers of two: 𝑎/2𝑠 is equivalent to 𝑎 bit-shifted right by 𝑠 bits.
Given a parameter 𝑅 = 2𝑠 such that gcd(𝑅, 𝑝) = 1 (which is always true for a prime modulus
𝑝 > 2) and an input 𝑎, the Montgomery reduction algorithm (also known as REDC) produces
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REDC𝑝(𝑎) = 𝑎𝑅−1 (mod 𝑝). REDC is very efficient because it only performs operations modulo 𝑅
instead of modulo 𝑝, and 𝑅 ≪ 𝑝 for cryptographic applications. Additionally, since 𝑅 is a power
of two, computing a value modulo 𝑅 merely involves discarding the uppermost bits. REDC𝑝 makes
use of the value −𝑝−1 (mod 𝑅), which can be precomputed for a given 𝑝.
To implement multiplication modulo 𝑝, the algorithm can compute 𝑎𝑏 and return REDC𝑝(𝑎𝑏).
Note that this procedure returns 𝑎𝑏𝑅−1 (mod 𝑝) instead of the desired 𝑎𝑏 (mod 𝑝), which may ini-
tially seem unhelpful. This challenge can be overcome by converting the inputs into Montgomery
form by multiplying them by 𝑅 beforehand:
MM𝑝(𝑎𝑅, 𝑏𝑅) := REDC𝑝((𝑎𝑅) · (𝑏𝑅)) = (𝑎𝑅𝑏𝑅) · 𝑅−1 (mod 𝑝) = 𝑎𝑏𝑅 (mod 𝑝)
The Montgomery multiplication function MM𝑝 is stable: given inputs in Montgomery form, it
returns the product modulo 𝑝 in Montgomery form. Converting a regular integer 𝑎 to Montgomery




. Converting 𝑎 in Montgomery form back
into a regular integer can be done by computing MM𝑝(𝑎, 1). Since exponentiation involves a
long sequence of modular multiplications, the inputs can be converted to Montgomery form at
the start of the sequence and then converted back at the end of the sequence.
In practice, the cryptographically large numbers being multiplied are too large to fit into a
single machine word (typically 64 bits). The Montgomery multiplication process can be extended
to support arbitrary precision integers—values stored as a sequence of machine words called
limbs. When using Montgomery multiplication, the limbs are typically saturated—all bits in each
limb are used to store the value.2⁰ An additional performance improvement can be gained by using
“almost” Montgomery multiplication [Gue12]. In the standard case, numbers in Montgomery
form are guaranteed to be less than 𝑝 due to a conditional subtraction at the end of REDC𝑝.
Numbers in “almost Montgomery form” are instead guaranteed to be less than 2𝑛 for a parameter
𝑛. The only difference is that the condition for the subtraction in REDC𝑝 is faster to check with
this optimization. Values in “almost Montgomery form” remain stable.
Finally, it is also possible to optimize the initial computation of the product (𝑎𝑅) · (𝑏𝑅) on
the Intel x86-64 architecture by taking advantage of the ADX and BMI2 instruction set exten-
sions [OGGF12]. ADX provides the ability to perform two add-with-carry chains simultaneously
with the ADCX and ADOX instructions, and the MULX instruction provided by BMI2 enables mul-
tiplication without affecting the source operands or the flags. Together, these can be used to
implement an extremely efficient arbitrary precision “multiply and add” operation. The CPUID
20 ⋏ It may be possible to further accelerate the performance of BRAKEMDDL★ by using unsaturated limbs with partial
modular reductions if the primes 𝑝2, 𝑝1, and 𝑝0 are chosen to have a special structure. Erbsen et al. [EPG+19]
describe several such approaches; exploring these is left to future work.
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feature of the Intel architecture can be used to probe for ADX and BMI2 support (which is now
commonly available) and fall back to standard MUL and ADC chains with flag storage if necessary.
The Go standard library includes support for arbitrary precision integers. It implements
modular exponentiation using almost Montgomery multiplication [Gue12, Fig. 3] and ADX/BMI2-
enabled assembly. Rather than using these functions directly, the prototype implementation of
BRAKEMDDL★ uses a modified copy of the code. This enables two important optimizations: caching
the precomputed Montgomery parameters (including −𝑝−1 (mod 𝑅)) between exponentiation
calls, and keeping values in Montgomery form for longer. The latter optimization is beneficial for
the more advanced exponentiation special cases.
8.3.2.2 Fast Modular Squaring
When working with very large exponents, particularly numbers with low Hamming weights like
the sample primes in Section 8.3.1.4, the majority of execution time during an exponentiation is
spent performing modular squaring. Luckily, modular squaring can be performed more quickly
than modular multiplication by taking advantage of redundancy in the operands.
When computing 𝐴 × 𝐵 with arbitrary precision integers, each limb in 𝐴 must be multiplied
with each limb in 𝐵. These intermediate double-width products are then added to the result
in the correct bit position: the double-width product 𝐴𝑖 × 𝐵 𝑗 is added to limbs 𝑆𝑖+ 𝑗 and 𝑆𝑖+ 𝑗+1
(for the low and high word, respectively) in the result 𝑆. In the squaring case, 𝐴 = 𝐵, so both
𝐴𝑖 × 𝐴 𝑗 and 𝐴 𝑗 × 𝐴𝑖 are added to 𝑆𝑖+ 𝑗 (for both low words) and 𝑆𝑖+ 𝑗+1 (for both high words).
Since multiplication is commutative, this means that time can be saved in every case where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
by computing the intermediate product once and adding it to the result twice; this is far more
efficient than performing two multiplications.
Ozturk et al. [OGG13] outlined a fast squaring procedure for x86-64 using the ADX and BMI2
extensions. However, their abstract presentation is not immediately translatable to an algorithm.
Figure 8.2 depicts a modified version of their diagram for squaring a 512-bit 8-limb operand 𝐴,
producing 𝑆 = 𝐴2, in an arrangement that makes the loop indices clear.
The BRAKEMDDL★ prototype implements this fast squaring procedure using hand-written
assembly.21 To implement modular squaring, an operand in (almost) Montgomery form is squared
using the fast squaring procedure and then reduced using REDC𝑝. The intermediate products 𝐴𝑖2
are computed using an ordinary (non-ADX) MUL instruction and moved into place in the buffer
21 ⋏Go provides an inline pseudo-assembly language that is slightly more portable than native x86-64 assembly. It
provides light abstractions that help to integrate with the rest of language, while also allowing the entry of raw
machine code if desired. See https://golang.org/doc/asm for details.
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Figure 8.2 Arbitrary precision fast squaring procedure. This figure is adapted from Intel’s
white paper [OGG13, Fig. 4]. It depicts a 512-bit input value 𝐴 being squared to produce a 1024-bit
output value 𝑆 = 𝐴2. Vertical rules denote word boundaries, and vertical alignment indicates which
words are added together. The two different shades for the double-width products on the diagonals
indicate the two different mechanisms for computing operand indices. (Refs: 225 and 227 a b)
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for 𝑆. Each diagonal in Figure 8.2 is computed using a MULX/ADCX/ADOX chain. This operation
is similar to the one in Section 8.3.2.1 (and described by Ozturk et al. [OGGF12]), except that
the operands are changed partway through the diagonal. For an input integer with 𝑚 limbs,
diagonal 𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑚/2) begins by multiplying 𝐴𝑖 with 𝐴𝑖+1, . . . , 𝐴𝑚−1, at which point it resumes the
chain by multiplying 𝐴(𝑚/2)+𝑖 with 𝐴𝑚/2, . . . , 𝐴(𝑚/2)+𝑖−1. The products from each of these diagonals
are added to a buffer 𝑆′. Finally, 𝑆′ is added to 𝑆 twice. This can also be sped up using the
ADCX and ADOX instructions: adding 𝑆′
𝑖
to 𝑆𝑖 with each instruction loads the appropriate carry bit
into both CF and OF, automatically handling adding the carry bit twice. The final Montgomery
reduction step can also be simplified: since 𝐴2 is already stored in 𝑆, the result can be multiplied
by −𝑝−1 (mod 𝑅) without having to multiply the input values simultaneously. However, the carry
bit of this multiplication must still be propagated through 𝑆 correctly; this is done most efficiently
using a simple ADC and INC loop.
There is an edge case that occurs in this squaring procedure when the number of limbs in
the operand is odd. When this occurs, the first (i.e., bottom-rightmost) diagonal depicted in
Figure 8.2 contains an extra product, and the chains do not switch operands until diagonal 2
(instead of diagonal 1).
8.3.2.3 Exponentiation: Variable Base and Exponent
As discussed in Section 8.3.2, BDLEQ requires an implementation of modular exponentiation
with a variable base and variable exponent. Since both the base and exponent change for
each exponentiation, no precomputation involving these values is possible; only the modulus is
available to precomputation techniques. For this application, the exponent is drawn uniformly at
random from [2, 𝑝3).
A simple way to implement modular exponentiation is to use Algorithm 8.3 with Montgomery
multiplication (see Section 8.3.2.1) and squaring (see Section 8.3.2.2). Montgomery parameters,
including 𝑅, are precomputed for the (fixed) modulus 𝑝. When asked to compute an expo-
nentiation 𝑧 = 𝑣𝑦 (mod 𝑝), the variable base 𝑣 is first converted into Montgomery form using
𝑣 ← MM𝑝(𝑣, 𝑅2). The algorithm then proceeds as normal, setting 𝑧 ← 𝑅 initially, then using
MM𝑝(𝑧, 𝑣) to perform multiplication and MM𝑝(𝑧, 𝑧) to perform squaring (with the optimized
square computation described in Section 8.3.2.2). Finally, the result is converted to regular form
by returning MM𝑝(𝑧, 1).
This approach works, but it is not the only way to implement exponentiation. In fact, it
is typically one of the least efficient options for the BDLEQ use case. Good summaries of the
available options are given in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [MOV97, §14.6.1], The
Art of Computer Programming [Knu97, §4.6.3], and by Gordon [Gor98]. Algorithm 8.3 is often
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Figure 8.3 Example of fixed-window exponentiation. This is the computation of 𝑣50971 using a
window size of 𝑘 = 4. The exponent is written in binary and partitioned into 𝑘-bit chunks. Each
window 𝑦𝑖 defines the partial product 𝑣𝑦𝑖 . These products are multiplied into the accumulator from
most- to least-significant bit. The accumulator is squared 𝑘 times between multiplications.
(Refs: 228, 230, and 231)
called the “binary method”, since it interprets the exponent in binary form and determines when
to multiply the accumulator by scanning the individual bits. A natural generalization is to write






Given this representation of 𝑦 with terms 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑚), the “𝑚-ary method” initially computes
the powers 𝑣2, . . . , 𝑣𝑚−1, replaces the squaring in Algorithm 8.3 with exponentiation by 𝑚, and
replaces the multiplication when 𝑏 = 1 with multiplication by 𝑣𝑦𝑖 . Consequently, the 𝑚-ary
method processes the exponent in “chunks” of size 𝑚, rather than one bit at a time. The powers
of 𝑣 that are computed initially are called the dictionary.
When 𝑚 = 2𝑘, the implementation of the 𝑚-ary method becomes more convenient, since
computing 𝑧𝑚 is equivalent to squaring the accumulator 𝑘 times, and computing the components
𝑦𝑖 can be done with efficient bitwise operations. The resulting algorithm can be viewed as
breaking the exponent 𝑦 into “windows”, each containing 𝑘 bits. For this reason, the 2𝑘-ary
method, which was first proposed by Brauer [Bra39], is often called the “fixed window” method.
Figure 8.3 depicts an exponentiation using the fixed-window method. When combined with
Montgomery multiplication, the fixed window method is efficient enough for a practical BDLEQ
implementation.
The final improvement that is discussed in this section is a natural extension of the fixed
window method based on the observation that the windows do not need to be adjacent to
each other. The “sliding window” method [Thu73] places variable-width windows freely within
the binary representation of the exponent. Figure 8.4 depicts an exponentiation using the
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Algorithm 8.4 Sliding window modular exponentiation. The dictionary dict is a map from
integers to group elements. dict[𝑛] denotes the entry in the dictionary indexed by integer 𝑛.
𝑦 [𝑖] denotes the 𝑖th bit of the binary representation of 𝑦, where the least significant bit has index
0. 𝑦 [𝑖.. 𝑗] denotes the bits of 𝑦 indexed between 𝑖 and 𝑗 (inclusive) extracted as an integer (e.g.,
if 𝑦 = 12, then 𝑦 [3..2] = 3). (Ref: 230)
Subroutine SlidingWindowModExp𝑘(𝑣, 𝑦, 𝑝) → 𝑧
Output: 𝑧 = 𝑣𝑦 (mod 𝑝).
dict[1] ← 𝑣. ⊲ Form the dictionary.
dict[2] ← 𝑣 · 𝑣 (mod 𝑝).
for (𝑖← 3; 𝑖 < 2𝑘; 𝑖← 𝑖 + 2) {
dict[𝑖] ← dict[𝑖 − 2] · dict[2] (mod 𝑝).
}
𝑧 ← 1. ⊲ Begin processing windows.
𝑖← ⌈log2(𝑦)⌉ − 1.
while (𝑖 ≥ 0) {
while (𝑦 [𝑖] = “0”) { ⊲ Skip zeroes between windows.
𝑧 ← 𝑧 · 𝑧 (mod 𝑝).
𝑖← 𝑖 − 1.
if (𝑖 < 0) return 𝑧.
}
ℓ← 𝑘 − 1. ⊲ Compute window length ℓ.
while (𝑖 − ℓ < 0 | | 𝑦 [𝑖 − ℓ] = “0”) {
ℓ← ℓ − 1.
}
repeat (ℓ + 1 times) { ⊲ Make space for the window.
𝑧 ← 𝑧 · 𝑧 (mod 𝑝).
}
𝑧 ← 𝑧 · dict[𝑦 [𝑖..𝑖 − ℓ]] (mod 𝑝). ⊲ Multiply the window.
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Figure 8.4 Example of sliding-window exponentiation. This is the computation of 𝑣50971 with
a maximum window size of 𝑘 = 4, constructed by scanning from most- to least-significant bit. The
number of times that the accumulator is squared after a multiplication varies with the window
placement: one squaring is performed for each “0” bit between the windows, and one squaring is
performed for each bit contained in the subsequent window. Figure 8.3 depicts the fixed-window
version of the same example. (Refs: 228 and 232)
sliding-window method. While the windows no longer need to be adjacent, they still need to be
non-overlapping. Each window is at least one bit long and at most 𝑘 bits long. Every window
always ends with a “1” bit, since trailing “0” bits can be omitted by shortening the window. This
means that unlike the fixed window method, which must initially compute all powers of 𝑣 less
than 2𝑘 for its dictionary, the sliding window method only needs to construct odd powers of 𝑣
less than 2𝑘: 𝑣, 𝑣3, . . . , 𝑣2𝑘−1. A high-level overview of the sliding window algorithm is given in
Algorithm 8.4.
The prototype BRAKEMDDL★ implementation uses the sliding window method with 𝑘 = 4.
This was empirically found to be the most efficient approach for the BDLEQ exponentiations with
the given group parameters. For the 253-bit 𝑝3 defined in Section 8.3.1.4, the method uses at
most 64 windows for an exponent in [2, 𝑝3). Since the dictionary contains eight odd powers
of 𝑣 and each window contains an odd 4-bit integer selected uniformly at random, every entry
of the dictionary will usually be accessed—this means that there is no practical advantage to
pruning the dictionary based on the actual window contents. More sophisticated exponentiation
algorithms are available that theoretically require fewer multiplications, but they typically require
more expensive computation when deciding what values to multiply; this additional expense
undermines their theoretical performance benefits in this setting.
8.3.2.4 Exponentiation: Fixed Exponent
All of the methods for exponentiation discussed in Section 8.3.2.3 are ultimately just methods
for determining what multiplications to perform. Consider one of the fundamental identities of
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exponentiation, which also applies to modular arithmetic:
𝑣𝑦1 · 𝑣𝑦2 = 𝑣𝑦1+𝑦2
All of the exponentiation algorithms involve multiplications with a single base, 𝑣. This means that
an alternative view is that they are algorithms for determining which exponents to add. When two
powers of 𝑣 are multiplied as part of the sequence, they yield a new power of 𝑣 whose exponent is
the sum of the two original exponents. This means that the sequence of multiplications dictated
by the exponentiation algorithm corresponds to a sequence of exponents, where each value is the
sum of two values that appeared previously in the sequence. This is exactly the definition of an
addition chain. Consequently, minimizing the number of multiplications required to compute 𝑣𝑦
(and therefore computing the result as quickly as possible) is equivalent to the problem of finding
the minimum addition chain for 𝑦. Since squaring is more efficient than general multiplication
in this setting (see Section 8.3.2.2), the minimization problem can be further adjusted to treat
squaring operations (corresponding to adding a previous value to itself in the addition chain) as
less expensive.
To see the relationship between exponentiation and addition chains, consider the running
example 𝑣50971 (mod 𝑝) from Section 8.3.2.3. Note that the binary representation of 50971 is
1100011100011011. The binary method (see Algorithm 8.3) computes the result as follows:
𝑣50971 = (((((((𝑣2 · 𝑣)24 · 𝑣)2 · 𝑣)2 · 𝑣)24 · 𝑣)2 · 𝑣)22 · 𝑣)2 · 𝑣
Examining the exponents as they accumulate reveals that this multiplication sequence is associated
with the following addition chain:
(1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 24, 48, 49, 98, 99, 198, 199, 398, 796, 1592, 3184, 3185, 6370, 6371,
12742, 25484, 25485, 50970, 50971)
Note that each value in the chain is the sum of two previous values.22 In contrast, the fixed
window method depicted in Figure 8.3 produces this addition chain:
(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 24, 48, 96, 192, 199, 398, 796, 1592, 3184,
3185, 6370, 12740, 25480, 50960, 50971)
22 ⋏The binary method produces addition chains where each value is either the previous value added to itself, or
the previous value added to 1.
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The underlined values indicate values that are involved in the construction of the dictionary. The
sliding window method depicted in Figure 8.4 produces this addition chain:
(1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 24, 48, 96, 192, 199, 398, 796, 1592, 3184, 6368, 12736,
25472, 25485, 50970, 50971)
Note that for the sliding window method, the dictionary contains only odd values (and 2, which
is used to generate the dictionary).
While these addition chains are not minimal, the algorithms that generate the chains are
extremely efficient. This is important for “ordinary” exponentiation where chain generation must
be done as part of the exponentiation algorithm, but it is not important when the exponent
is known in advance. In this case, it is possible to spend a long time searching for a short
addition chain. This chain can then be cached. As discussed in Section 8.3.2, exponentiation
by a fixed exponent is used in BRAKEMDDL★ to test for membership in 𝔾2. If an integer in ℤ∗𝑝2
equals 1 (mod 𝑝2) after exponentiation by 𝑝3, then it is a member of 𝔾2. Consequently, this
membership test can be accelerated by finding an addition chain for 𝑝3 that is shorter than the
one produced by the sliding window algorithm with 𝑘 = 4.23
Short addition chains for use in fixed-exponent exponentiation are traditionally found by
hand, which is a long and tedious process that may not produce good results. The Handbook of
Applied Cryptography [MOV97, §14.6.2] and the Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve
Cryptography [CFA+05, §9.2] both provide rudimentary summaries of automated techniques
for finding these chains. The publicly available addchain software [McL20] incorporates a wide
variety of published techniques to find short addition chains, and it often matches or surpasses
hand-generated chains. Several open-source contributions to the addchain project were made
as part of this work.
addchain was able to find a variety of short addition chains for 𝑝3. The efficiency of addition
chains for exponentiation can be measured in terms of the number of doublings and non-doublings
they perform, corresponding to squarings and multiplications in the exponentiation algorithm,
respectively. Empirical measurements of the prototype implementation showed that in 𝔾2, the
fast squaring method described in Section 8.3.2.2 completes in approximately 90% of the time
required for a multiplication. Using this weighting, the best addition chain found by addchain
requires 251 squarings and 31 multiplications. This chain was found using the sliding window
method with 𝑘 = 8 to identify terms to include in the dictionary [CFA+05, §9.2.2]. The chain
was then built from the dictionary using the “continued fractions” method [BBBD89] with the
“binary” strategy [BBB94].
23 ⋏This is the chosen algorithm for “ordinary” exponentiation, as discussed in Section 8.3.2.3.
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The output of addchain is a program in a domain-specific language describing the squarings
and multiplications to perform. The language is very simple: it assigns values to variables based
on additions, doublings, and bit shifts (representing multiple doublings) of previous variables or
1, and finally returns the target value. This program can be parsed by the addchain library. The





























This addition chain program corresponds to an exponentiation algorithm. As part of the pro-
totype implementation, the program was converted into native Go code that performs modular
multiplication and squaring as needed. Table 8.1 presents a comparison between three meth-
ods for exponentiating by 𝑝3: the Go standard library’s modular exponentiation function, the
optimized variant in Section 8.3.2.3, and the fixed exponent method using the aforementioned
addition chain. The optimized addition chain provides a small but measurable performance
improvement.
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Table 8.1 A performance comparison of fixed-exponent exponentiation algorithms.
The fixed exponent used in the comparison is 𝑝3. Standard deviations are in parentheses. (Ref: 233)
Algorithm Time [ms]
Go standard library 0.95 (0.01)
“Ordinary” (Section 8.3.2.3) 0.674 (0.009)
Fixed exponent (Section 8.3.2.4) 0.661 (0.006)
8.3.2.5 Exponentiation: Fixed Base
Of all of the operations performed by BRAKEMDDL★ , it is most important to optimize modular
exponentiation of a fixed base (i.e., a base for which precomputations are applicable). Precom-
putation should be performed to accelerate exponentiation of three fixed bases: 𝑔2, 𝑔1, and the
burner key 𝑥 for BRAKEMDDL𝑥 . Accelerating exponentiation of 𝑔1 is particularly important, since
exponents for 𝔾1 are 3072 bits long.
Section 8.3.2.4 described how exponentiation algorithms correspond to addition chains. A
fixed-base exponentiation algorithm operates by precomputing powers of the fixed base, and
then reusing these cached results to perform exponentiations. This process can be viewed
in terms of addition chains: the precomputed powers are formed using an addition chain,
and then a subset of this chain can be included in subsequent chains for free (i.e., without
inducing any multiplications). In theory, the optimal exponentiation algorithm corresponds to
the minimum-length addition chain that contains all of the outputs that are ever requested.
Fixed-base exponentiation is therefore closely associated with the multi-exponentiation problem:
computing (𝑔𝑦1 , . . . , 𝑔𝑦ℓ) more efficiently than performing ℓ independent exponentiations.
The academic history of multi-exponentiation algorithms is complex; attribution for many of
the ideas is controversial [Ber02]. Yao [Yao76] was among the first to describe an exponentiation
algorithmwith amuchmore efficient addition chain than the “binarymethod” (see Algorithm 8.3).
Yao’s algorithm is related to the “𝑚-ary method” discussed in Section 8.3.2.3 through an algorithm
transposition process [Ber02, §5]. The algorithm was later presented with minor improvements
(eliminating unnecessary elements at the start of the chain and an improved summation method
for elements at the end of the chain) as a textbook exercise answer by Knuth [Knu97, answer to
§4.6.3 exercise 9]. Contemporaneously with Yao’s publication, Pippenger [Pip76] presented a
constructive proof of a lower bound for the multi-exponentiation problem, followed by several
improvements [Pip78; Pip80]. Pippenger’s algorithm2⁴ is nearly optimal, but it remains largely
overlooked—subsequent reinventions of various aspects of the technique are cited far more
24 ⋏ Pippenger’s algorithm refers to the algorithm implicitly associated with the constructive proof. Interested readers
should refer to Henry [Hen10] for the most accessible definition of the algorithm.
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frequently. Yao’s algorithm is often misattributed to Brickell et al. [BGMW93], hereafter referred
to as BGMW. However, unlike the previous presentations of the algorithm, BGMW explicitly
noted that the algorithm was amenable to precomputation—the start of the addition chain is
independent of the desired exponent. Moreover, the BGMW algorithm is a generalization of Yao’s
algorithm: it includes an additional parameter called 𝑀, a set of multipliers. The variant of Yao’s
algorithm described by Knuth is exactly equal to the BGMW algorithm when 𝑀 = {1}. A patent
was granted in the USA for the BGMW algorithm; this patent expired in 2012.
The aforementioned algorithms all include parameters that control a time-vs-space tradeoff:
precomputing more powers of the fixed base uses more storage space, but can help to shorten
the per-exponent fragments of the addition chain. The 1993 BGMW extended abstract included
a table of suggested parameters [BGMW93, Tbl. 2] that control this tradeoff. In an unpublished
1995 version of the paper, Brickell et al. included additional rows in the table [BGMW95, Tbl. 2].
The new final row contains a set of parameters that fundamentally alters the algorithm in order
to achieve the fastest exponentiation with the most storage space. While this configuration
was likely included as a theoretical exercise to illustrate extreme behavior,2⁵ it also happens
to represent the best parameter shape for modern machines implementing BRAKEMDDL★ . When
Brickel et al. first suggested these parameters, typical personal computers owned by consumers
contained between 1 and 128MB of RAM. In 2021, a typical smartphone or PC is likely to contain
8 or 16GB of RAM, with operating system services, web browsers, and browser-based messaging
applications allocating several gigabytes of virtual memory in order to provide basic functionality.
Consequently, it is acceptable and worthwhile for modern secure messaging applications to
allocate hundreds of megabytes for precomputed group elements if doing so accelerates messaging
interfaces and lowers battery use by computing exponentiations more quickly.
The algorithm used by the BRAKEMDDL★ prototype to implement fixed-base exponentiation is
much easier to describe than it is to attribute. The algorithm is parameterized by a block size 𝑘.
The exponentiation algorithm is simply the 2𝑘-ary method (also known as the “fixed window”
method) described in Section 8.3.2.3. The number of blocks is ℓ = ⌈⌈log2 (𝑝)⌉/𝑘⌉, where every
exponent 𝑦 is in [0, 𝑝). For a given base 𝑔, the algorithm precomputes all of the following values:
{(𝑔𝛾)2
𝑖 ·𝑘
| 0 ≤ 𝑖 < ℓ ∧ 1 ≤ 𝛾 < 2𝑘}







25 ⋏The text in the paper does not reference these parameters at all.
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Table 8.2 A performance comparison of fixed-base exponentiation algorithms. The
algorithms were used to compute 𝑧 = 𝑔𝑦 (mod 𝑚) where 𝑦 ∈ [0, 𝑝). (Refs: 236 and 239)
𝑔 𝑝 𝑚 𝑘 ℓ |𝑔 | [B] Mem [MiB] Time [ms]
𝑔1 𝑝2 𝑝1 11 280 392 214.3 0.21 (0.02)
𝑔2 𝑝3 𝑝2 11 23 384 17.3 0.050 (0.007)
Burner key (client) 𝑝3 𝑝2 11 23 384 17.3 0.050 (0.007)
Burner key (server) 𝑝3 𝑝2 6 43 384 1.0 0.07 (0.01)
Sliding window, 𝑔1 𝑝2 𝑝1 - - - 0 8.82 (0.06)
Sliding window, 𝑔2 𝑝3 𝑝2 - - - 0 0.72 (0.01)
Standard deviations are in parentheses. |𝑔 | denotes the size of group elements in memory. “Mem” denotes the total
storage space for all precomputed values. The “sliding window” rows represent the sliding window algorithm with a
maximum window size of 4, as described in Section 8.3.2.3, with no precomputation.
This is equivalent to partitioning the binary representation of 𝑦 into ℓ 𝑘-bit blocks with the most
significant window shortened if 𝑘 does not divide ⌈log2(𝑝)⌉. The result can then be written as:





When asked to compute 𝑧 = 𝑔𝑦, the appropriate cached values are simply multiplied together.
Every exponentiation can be computed with at most ℓ − 1 multiplications using this approach
(any 𝑦𝑖 = 0 can be ignored). This algorithm is equivalent to the one described by Brickell et
al. [BGMW95, §3] with 𝑏 = 2𝑘, 𝑀 = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 2𝑘 − 1} and ℎ = 1.2⁶
The prototype implementation of BRAKEMDDL★ uses different values of 𝑘 for the different fixed
bases. Since 𝑔2 and 𝑔1 are constant for all group conversations in a deployment, a large amount
of precomputation can be performed. Both the client and server set 𝑘 = 11 for these bases.
Since the burner key for BRAKEMDDL𝑥 varies between conversations when following the advice in
Section 8.3.1.3, a client will likely need to exponentiate a few fixed burner keys at any given time,
while a server will need to exponentiate far more (one for each group conversation it manages).
Consequently, clients use 𝑘 = 11 for burner key precomputations, while servers reduce this to
𝑘 = 6. Table 8.2 shows the relevant sizes and memory usage for the precomputation tables. With
these settings, a client uses (231.6 + 17.3𝑛)MiB of memory when connected to 𝑛 groups, and
a server uses (231.6 + 𝑛)MiB of memory to manage 𝑛 groups. In exchange for this memory
use, exponentiations of 𝑔2 and 𝑥 are an order of magnitude faster, and exponentiations of 𝑔1 are
26 ⋏ Yao’s algorithm [Yao76] corresponds to the “basic strategy” described by Brickell et al. [BGMW95, §2]. In the
notation of the full BGMW algorithm, this corresponds to 𝑏 = 2𝑘, 𝑀 = {1}, and ℎ = 2𝑘 − 1.
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approximately 4 times faster. For a deployment scenario with different memory requirements,
the value of 𝑘 can be adjusted, or a different fixed-base exponentiation algorithm can be used.
Each call to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate performs multiple independent fixed-base exponen-
tiations: 𝑔2, 𝑔1, and 𝑥 are each exponentiated once to produce Π0, and once for each ring of
receivers. Pippenger’s algorithm [Pip76] could theoretically improve this performance even
further. Unfortunately, Pippenger’s algorithm only performs well when configured with appro-
priate parameters, and it is not easy to find these parameters for realistic problems [Hen10, §4].
Consequently, Pippenger’s algorithm is not yet practical for real-world applications.
8.3.2.6 Product of Exponentiations
As discussed in Section 8.3.2, several algorithms in BRAKEMDDL★ involve computing a product of
exponentiations.2⁷ Given group elements (𝑣1, . . . , 𝑣𝑛) and exponents (𝑦1, . . . , 𝑦𝑛), the following





The obvious way to compute this quantity is to use the “ordinary” exponentiation discussed in
Section 8.3.2.3 to evaluate each 𝑣𝑖 𝑦𝑖 term, and then to multiply the results. This is a reasonable
approach, but it turns out that there is a better method. Straus [Str64] was the first to note that
Brauer’s 2𝑘-ary exponentiation method [Bra39] could be generalized to compute a product of
exponentiations more efficiently than computing the terms separately. ElGamal [ElG85, §V.B]
popularized the technique when he described a special case of Straus’ algorithm for the purpose
of speeding up his signature scheme.
Straus’ algorithm takes advantage of the fact that the naïve approach performs up to ⌈log2(𝑝)⌉
squaring operations for each term, where exponents are drawn from [0, 𝑝), only for the final
results to be multiplied at the end. Time can be saved by “reusing” squarings for all of the
terms. As an example this approach, consider the problem of computing 𝑣15 · 𝑣26. Sliding window









This approach requires 4 squarings and 3 multiplications. Consider this alternative:(︂
(𝑣1 · 𝑣2)2 · 𝑣2
)︂2
· 𝑣1
27 ⋏ This problem is sometimes referred to as “multi-exponentiation”, but this term also refers to the general problem
of efficiently performing multiple independent exponentiations (i.e., without restricting attention to their product).
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The alternative approach requires only 2 squarings and 3 multiplications. Note that the savings
come from multiple intermediate products, including both 𝑣12
2 and 𝑣22
2 , being incorporated into
the final result “simultaneously”.
Straus’ algorithm is parameterized by a window size 𝑘. It begins by computing a dictionary





|︁|︁|︁|︁ ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑛 0 ≤ 𝑒𝑖 < 2𝑘}︄
The algorithm then proceeds similarly to the 2𝑘-ary method: the exponents are broken into 𝑘-bit
windows and processed from the most significant bits to the least significant bits. During each
iteration, the contents of the windows for each of the 𝑛 exponents are examined simultaneously.
This yields a vector ⃗⃗𝑦 = {𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒𝑛}, where 𝑒𝑖 contains the 𝑘-bit piece of 𝑦𝑖 within the window.
⃗⃗
𝑦
is then used to look up the corresponding product in the dictionary. This value is multiplied into
the running result. The result is then squared 𝑘 times to move to the next window.
When implementing BRAKEMDDL★ , it is necessary to compute the product of exponentiations
in several cases:
• 𝑛 ≤ 10 in practice, 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2, 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [2, 𝑝3) (computing 𝑇 and 𝑇′ in Π0);
• 𝑛 ≤ 10 in practice, 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝔾1, 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [2, 𝑝2) (computing 𝑡 and 𝑡′ in Π0); and
• 𝑛 = 128, 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2, 𝑦𝑖 ∈ [2, 2128) (computing 𝑡2 and 𝑡′2 in BDLEQ).
In all of these cases, the most efficient approach in practice is to use Straus’ algorithm with 𝑘 = 1.
Larger values of 𝑘 cause too much time to be spent filling the dictionary with terms that are never
used. Even if the algorithm is modified to compute dictionary values “on-demand”, too many
intermediate values must still be computed to make the larger 𝑘 worthwhile [Ber02, §3]. Like
the 2𝑘-ary method, Straus’ algorithm can also be transformed into a “sliding window” version
by skipping the multiplication step when the window is zero for all exponents. This is also not
useful for BRAKEMDDL★ : 𝑛 is large enough that this event is very rare, so the benefits from the
additional complexity are negligible.2⁸ Pippenger’s algorithm [Pip76] can also theoretically solve
this problem with fewer operations, but as mentioned in Section 8.3.2.5, it is not clear that the
algorithm can perform well in practice.
28 ⋏Although a 2−10 probability of skipping a multiplication in Π0 with 𝑘 = 1 is not negligible in cryptographic
terms, the benefit is rare enough that careful profiling would be required to ensure that the extra conditional
statement does not negate the benefits due to branch misprediction. This could be particularly costly if the same
code was used to implement the 𝑛 = 128 case for BDLEQ.
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8.3.2.7 Parallelism
To achieve maximum performance on modern processors, algorithms must be parallelized. This
section points out multiple opportunities for parallelism in BRAKEMDDL★ implementations.
When designing a parallelized workflow, it is important to consider the performance charac-
teristics of the chosen concurrency mechanisms. If there is a high cost associated with starting a
parallel thread of execution, then the concurrency should be arranged so that each thread executes
a larger work unit. Since the prototype implementation was written in Go, it is relatively inex-
pensive to launch concurrent tasks.2⁹ The prototype takes advantage of this concurrency model
by using two strategies: parallelizing the exponentiation algorithms, and high-level parallelism.
Implementations using traditional threading libraries may not see any benefit from parallelizing
exponentiations, in which case more focus should be placed on high-level parallelism.
There is no worthwhile way to parallelize an individual exponentiation with a variable
base, such as the “ordinary” exponentiation described in Section 8.3.2.3 or the fixed-exponent
exponentiation described in Section 8.3.2.4. In both cases, almost all of the running time is spent
evaluating an addition chain. The addition chain produced by the sliding window method is a
Brauer chain (also known as a star chain): each term in the chain references the immediately
preceding term. The fixed chain for 𝑝3 is nearly a Brauer chain. Evaluating a Brauer chain is an
inherently serial process, since each new term has a strict dependency on the previous term, so
these methods cannot be meaningfully parallelized.
The fixed-base exponentiation method described in Section 8.3.2.5 is much easier to par-
allelize. Since ℓ ∈ {23, 43, 280} (see Table 8.2), the number of cached powers that must be
multiplied usually exceeds the number of logical processor cores. Additionally, the order in which
the values are multiplied does not matter, since there are no squaring operations to perform.
Each core can be assigned to compute the product of a subset of terms. Once all of the work
is complete, the final values computed by each thread of execution can then be “reduced” by
multiplying them together. In the case of ℓ = 280 on an 8-core machine, this would involve
8 parallel threads, each performing 34 multiplications, yielding 8 partial products, followed
by 7 serial multiplications. These final multiplications can also be partially parallelized for an
additional small performance boost if the overhead of the concurrency primitives is very small.
29 ⋏ The Go language includes support for concurrency in the form of goroutines, which are very lightweight threads
of execution that are multiplexed onto actual OS-level threads. One of the reasons that goroutines are inexpensive
to launch is that Go’s memory model makes it safe to dynamically resize the stack, enabling goroutines to start
with very small stacks.
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Computing the product of exponentiations, as described in Section 8.3.2.6, can also be


















Each sub-problem can be can be solved using Straus’ algorithm [Str64] in parallel, followed by a
(potentially parallelized) reduction of the partial products to a single final result. Unfortunately,
dividing the problem in this way undermines the benefit of Straus’ algorithm, since squarings
must be performed for each term. The extreme case of splitting the problem into 𝑛 sub-problems
effectively transforms the computation into the naïve algorithm. The best way to divide the
problem into sub-problems depends on the value of 𝑛, the size of the exponents (which determines
the number of squarings), and the performance characteristics of the processor. For the scenarios
described in Section 8.3.2.6, empirical measurements using an Intel Core i7-6700K determined
that it was most efficient to break the problem into two sub-problems when 𝑛 ≤ 10, and to break
the problem into 8 (the number of logical cores) sub-problems when 𝑛 = 128.
Finally, there are many opportunities for parallelization at higher layers of abstraction. These
opportunities are easily found using a critical path analysis.3⁰ The following high-level computa-
tions can benefit from parallelism:
• In the BDLEQ prover (see Section 8.2.2.3), 𝑡′1 and 𝑡′2 (steps 4 and 5) can be computed in
parallel.
• In the BDLEQ verifier, the two terms for 𝑡1 (step 3) and the two terms for 𝑡2 (step 4) can all
be computed in parallel.
• In BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate (see Section 8.2.8):
◦ The calculations for each ring of receivers, including the BDLEQ proof, can be performed
in parallel.
◦ Within a ring:
■ The ElGamal ciphertexts can be computed in parallel.
■ 𝑘𝑖 can be computed at the same time as the ciphertexts.
• In BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify (see Section 8.2.8), all of the NIZKPKs can be verified in parallel. Note
that if the Fiat-Shamir challenges are merged into a single hash output to save space (as
30 ⋏ For Go code, the go tool trace program can quickly find these bottlenecks.
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suggested in Section 8.3.2), then the implementation should take care to ensure that the
computed commitments are hashed in the correct order despite being computed in parallel.
• When producing a Π0 proof (see Section 8.2.7):
◦ The computation of 𝑡′ (step 7) can be partially parallelized. The first ℓ ·𝑚 terms in the ex-
ponent of 𝑡′ involve fixed-base exponentiations of the burner key 𝑥. These exponentiations
can be computed in parallel, followed by a (potentially parallelized) summation. The other
terms in the exponent (and for the exponent of 𝑇′) involve only modular multiplications
and are not worth parallelizing.
◦ 𝑡′ and 𝑇′ (step 7) can be computed in parallel.
• When verifying a Π0 proof:
◦ 𝑡0, 𝑇0, 𝐸1, 𝐸2, and every 𝑡 𝑗 are all the sums of various terms computed in a loop with
ℓ = 128 iterations (step 5). These can be parallelized with the same technique used to
compute the exponent for 𝑡′ in the prover. Each thread of execution is responsible for
processing a subset of the loop iterations and accumulating partial sums. The final sums
can be computed with a (potentially parallelized) reduction.
◦ 𝑡 and 𝑇 (steps 6 and 7) can be computed in parallel.
◦ When computing 𝑡 (step 6), 𝑔1𝑡0 can be computed at the same time as the product of the
other terms.
◦ When computing 𝑇 (step 7), 𝑔2𝑇0 can be computed at the same time as the product of the
other terms.
The prototype implementation of BRAKEMDDL★ incorporates all of these techniques for parallelism.
As a result, a typical BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate or BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify operation is able to easily
saturate the 8 available logical cores.
8.4 Security of BRAKEMDDL★
This section discusses the security of the BRAKEMDDL★ scheme presented in Section 8.2.8. Sec-
tion 8.4.1 proves the security of the Π0 NIZKPK described in Section 8.2.7, which is the core
sub-protocol used by the BRAKEM construction. Section 8.4.2 sketches the security of the overall
BRAKEM construction. Security proofs for the other DDL-based constructions discussed in Sec-
tion 8.2.4—BRAKEM2DDL★ and BRAKEMDDL
′
★ —can be easily formulated using the same approach.
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Proving that Π0 is secure is mostly straightforward, but the algebraic transformations require
careful management of loop indices in order for the appropriate terms to cancel out. This
section walks through the algebra in great detail for readers that would like to check the work.
Proving that BRAKEMDDL★ is secure requires the introduction and justification of new hardness
assumptions, followed by a carefully constructed sequence of games. Readers that do not wish to
verify the security proofs for the construction may wish to skip to Section 8.5.
8.4.1 Security of Π0
8.4.1.1 Proof of Correctness
If both the prover and the verifier are honest and the statement is true, then the verifier will
always accept the proof. Consider verifier step 2 in this scenario. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ: if 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0
then 𝑢𝑖 is computed exactly as 𝑢′𝑖 in prover step 4 and 𝑣𝑖 is set to 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑣′𝑖 due to prover step 9.b; if
𝑐′[𝑖] = 1 then 𝑣𝑖 is computed exactly as 𝑣′𝑖 in prover step 5 and 𝑢𝑖 is set to 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑢′𝑖 due to prover
step 9.a. Therefore 𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢′𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣′𝑖 in all cases. This means that the input to 𝐻𝑒 in verifier
step 3 is identical to the input used by the prover in prover step 6, and therefore both the prover
and verifier use the same values for 𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒ℓ, 𝑓1, . . . , 𝑓ℓ, 𝐹1, . . . , 𝐹𝑚.
Let ∑︁𝑖 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and ∑︁ 𝑗 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚. Let∑︁ denote the combined summation ∑︁𝑖 ∑︁ 𝑗. Let ∑︁𝑐[𝑖]=𝑏 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ when
𝑐[𝑖] = 𝑏. Let∏︁ 𝑗 denote multiplication across 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚.





(𝑘 𝑗ℎ 𝑗·𝑡 𝑗+𝐸1·𝐹 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 6
= 𝑔1
∑︁(𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑆𝑖, 𝑗)+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (∑︁ 𝑗 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 )) ·∏︂
𝑗
(𝑘 𝑗ℎ 𝑗·𝑡 𝑗+𝐸1·𝐹 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 5
= 𝑔1






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 ))+
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑆𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁










𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 ))+
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁










𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))+
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁




𝑗 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )) ⊲ Split 𝑘 𝑗 exponent
242






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 )) · 𝑘 𝑗
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁














𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁














𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁




𝑗 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 ))
+∑︁ 𝑗 (𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))+𝛾 𝑗·∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖)·𝐹 𝑗)
}︃





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗)))+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )
+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))+𝛾 𝑗·∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖)·𝐹 𝑗)
}︃







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗))+𝛾 𝑗·
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖))
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))
)︂







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝛾 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗·(−𝑒𝑖)))
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))
)︂







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )
+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼𝑗 ))
)︂







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(
∑︁







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )+𝑥𝛼𝑗 ·(
∑︁







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )+
∑︁







𝑖 (𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 )) ⊲ Collapse into conditionless ∑𝑖
= 𝑔1
∑︁(𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+∑︁(𝑥𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 ) ⊲ Simplify using ∑ definition
= 𝑡′ ⊲ Prover step 7





(𝑦 𝑗𝐸2· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗−𝐸2·𝐹 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 7
= 𝑔2






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑠𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑆𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖)·𝐹 𝑗)
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𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑔2𝛾 𝑗·
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁






𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗·
∑︁





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))+
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·(𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼 𝑗)+𝐹 𝑗·(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗))))
+∑︁ 𝑗 (𝛼 𝑗·∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗·∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖)·𝐹 𝑗)
}︃





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗))
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖·( 𝑓 𝑗·(𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝛼 𝑗)+𝐹 𝑗·(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗)))
+𝛼 𝑗·
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗·
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖)·𝐹 𝑗
)︂





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝛼 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝛾 𝑗)
+𝛼 𝑗·
∑︁
𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖)· 𝑓 𝑗+𝛾 𝑗·
∑︁







𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝛼 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝛾 𝑗)
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝛼 𝑗)+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (−𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝛾 𝑗)
)︂





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)
+∑︁𝑐 [𝑖]=1 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗−𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝛼 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝛾 𝑗+𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝛼 𝑗−𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝛾 𝑗)
)︂





𝑐 [𝑖]=0 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)+
∑︁





𝑖 (𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗)) ⊲ Collapse into conditionless ∑𝑖
= 𝑔2
∑︁(𝑒𝑖· 𝑓 𝑗·𝑟𝑖, 𝑗+𝑒𝑖·𝐹 𝑗·𝑅𝑖, 𝑗) ⊲ Simplify using ∑ definition
= 𝑇′ ⊲ Prover step 7
This shows that all of the inputs to 𝐻 in verifier step 8 are identical to the inputs to 𝐻 in prover
step 8. Therefore, 𝑐 = 𝑐′ and the verifier will accept the proof.
8.4.1.2 Proof of Zero Knowledge
The next task is to show that the Π0 NIZKPK is statistically 𝑐-simulatable [Hen14, Def. 9]
in the ROM. Concretely, there exists a simulator that takes as input the public values in the
proof statement and a challenge 𝑐 and, using a programmable random oracle 𝐻, produces a
proof transcript with challenge 𝑐 such that no PPT algorithm can distinguish this simulated
transcript from an honestly generated transcript; the probability that any given transcript can
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be distinguished from a real one is bounded by a negligible function of the security parameter,
and so a PPT distinguisher would need to sample a super-polynomial number of transcripts. The
existence of this simulator shows that the protocol is “zero-knowledge”, because a PPT verifier
cannot learn any information from an honest prover that it could not also learn from the simulator
(without access to the witness).
The simulator for Π0 can be constructed by simply choosing the responses uniformly at
random from their allowable range, and then proceeding as an honest verifier would:
1. Take as input the public values in the statement (i.e., 𝑚, 𝑥, 𝑘 𝑗, 𝑦 𝑗, and 𝑧 𝑗 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚) and
the desired challenge 𝑐
2. Verify that 𝑥 ∈ 𝔾2 and for each 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: 𝑘 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾1 and 𝑦 𝑗, 𝑧 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 and abort otherwise
3. For 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚: choose 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ𝑝3 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ2ℓ′
4. For each 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ:
a) If 𝑐[𝑖] = 0 then set 𝑢𝑖 ← 𝐻0(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑠𝑖,𝑚∥𝑆𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑆𝑖,𝑚) and choose 𝑣𝑖 to be a
random value with the same bit-length as 𝐻0’s output space
b) If 𝑐[𝑖] = 1 then set 𝑣𝑖 ← 𝐻1(“𝔾”∥𝑖∥𝑠𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑠𝑖,𝑚∥𝑆𝑖,1∥ . . . ∥𝑆𝑖,𝑚) and choose 𝑢𝑖 to be a
random value with the same bit-length as 𝐻1’s output space
5. Compute 𝑒1, . . . , 𝑒ℓ, 𝑓1, . . . , 𝑓𝑚, 𝐹1, . . . , 𝐹𝑚 as in verifier step 3
6. Compute 𝑡0, 𝑇0, 𝐸1, 𝐸2 and 𝑡 𝑗 as in verifier step 5 (using 𝑐 as the challenge)
7. Compute 𝑡 as in verifier step 6
8. Compute 𝑇 as in verifier step 7
9. Program the random oracle to output 𝑐 given the input to 𝐻 as in step 8
10. The simulated proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐, 𝑠1,1, . . . , 𝑠ℓ,𝑚, 𝑆1,1, . . . , 𝑆ℓ,𝑚, 𝑤1, . . . , 𝑤ℓ)
Note that the simulated 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 values perfectly match the real distribution for an honest prover,
since an honest prover chooses 𝑟𝑖, 𝑗 uniformly at random from the entire range modulo 𝑝3.
The 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 values are statistically indistinguishable from those sent by an honest prover. This
can be shown by using a statistical result proven by Camenisch [Cam98]; this same result was
previously referenced in Section 8.2.3 as justification for a choice of ℓ′.
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Consider an honest prover with a witness 𝛾 𝑗 ∈ ℤ2ℓ and a value 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 chosen uniformly at
random from ℤ2ℓ′ . If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 0, then 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗; since this is independent of 𝛾 𝑗, the simulator
perfectly matches this distribution and no distinguisher can possibly exist. If 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1, then
𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝛾 𝑗 (in ℤ) and thus it is theoretically possible for a distinguisher to exist. There are
three possible cases when 𝑐′[𝑖] = 1:
1. 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 < 2ℓ
2. 2ℓ ≤ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ≤ 2ℓ
′
3. 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 > 2ℓ
′
In the second case, there are exactly 𝑝3 possible (𝛾 𝑗, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗) pairs that can produce any particular
value for 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗. Consequently, the probability that 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 takes on any value in the second case is
uniform. The first and last cases both leak information about 𝛾 𝑗, because there are fewer than 𝑝3
possible (𝛾 𝑗, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗) pairs that yield the values in these regions (in the extreme cases, 𝛾 𝑗 is uniquely
determined). Camenisch [Cam98, Th. 5.1] showed that the probability that 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ends up in these
bad regions in at least one of 𝑛 runs is upper-bounded by:
Pr[𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∉ [2ℓ, 2ℓ
′]] ≤ 1 − (1 − 2−(ℓ′−ℓ)+1)𝑛
For ℓ runs with ℓ = 128 and ℓ′ = 392, this probability is upper-bounded by 2−ℓ, which is
negligible. Therefore, Π0 is statistically 𝑐-simulatable for witnesses 0 < 𝛾 𝑗 < 𝑝3 < 2ℓ.
8.4.1.3 Proof of Soundness
To show soundness, it must be shown that if an honest verifier accepts a proof, then with
overwhelming probability the prover “knows” the correct witnesses. This idea is formalized by
defining a rewinding extractor that can, given two responses for a proof with the same Fiat-
Shamir [FS87] random oracle input, efficiently recover the associated witnesses. This excludes
dishonest provers that can cheat with probability 2−ℓ by guessing the random oracle output when
choosing the statement or their commitments. If the extractor functions for two random oracle
outputs that are chosen uniformly at random, then soundness is proved for all other possible
cheating provers.
Assume that an honest verifier has accepted the proof. Verifier step 1 ensures that 𝑥, 𝑘 𝑗, 𝑦 𝑗,
and 𝑧 𝑗 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 are all valid group elements, and thus verifier steps 6 and 7 show that 𝑡
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and 𝑇 are valid group elements. From the group definitions, it is then possible to uniquely write:
𝑘 𝑗 = 𝑔1
kj
𝑦 𝑗 = 𝑔2
yj






In other words, every element 𝑘 𝑗 and 𝑡 have a unique discrete logarithm with respect to 𝑔1 in
ℤ𝑝2 , and every element 𝑦 𝑗, 𝑧 𝑗, and 𝑇 have a unique discrete logarithm with respect to 𝑔2 in
ℤ𝑝3 (although the prover may not necessarily know these discrete logarithms). These discrete
logarithms are denoted using boldface font, as shown above.
The rewinding extractor runs the prover to produce a proof for a Fiat-Shamir challenge 𝑐1,
rewinds the prover to the point of random oracle invocation, and then resumes the prover with a
different challenge 𝑐2. The extractor then has access to two proofs with the same statement and
commitments.
8.4.1.3.1 Notation
The soundness proof for Π0 uses the following notation:
• Let ∑︁𝑖 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ and ∑︁ 𝑗 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚.
• Let ∑︁ denote the combined summation ∑︁𝑖 ∑︁ 𝑗.
• Let ∑︁𝑐[𝑖]=𝑏 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ when 𝑐[𝑖] = 𝑏.
• Let∏︁ 𝑗 denote multiplication across 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚.
• Let ∑︁∗
𝑖
denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ for which 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 𝑐2 [𝑖].
• Let ∑︁∗
𝑐[𝑖]=𝑏 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ for which 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 𝑏.
• Let ∑︁∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ for which 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 1 and 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 0.
• Let ∑︁∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1 denote summation across 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ for which 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 1 and 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 0.
• For values 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖]:
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◦ Denote responses from the run 𝑟 where 𝑐𝑟 [𝑖] = 0 as 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0.
◦ Denote responses from the run 𝑟′ = 1 − 𝑟 where 𝑐𝑟′ [𝑖] = 1 as 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1.
• For values 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 𝑐2 [𝑖], denote the (identical) responses as 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗.
When 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 𝑐2 [𝑖], it must be the case that 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 for all 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚. These
equalities hold because 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 are used in verifier step 2 to determine 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣 𝑗 using hashes
𝐻0 and 𝐻1, which are in turn input into the computation of 𝑐 in verifier step 8; any variation
between the responses for positions 𝑖 with 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 𝑐2 [𝑖] would necessarily produce differing
random oracle outputs, causing the verifier to fail—a contradiction.
8.4.1.3.2 Subtracting 𝑡 Responses
Consider the value 𝑡 computed in verifier step 6. When the verifier accepts an individual proof





(𝑘 𝑗ℎ 𝑗·𝑡 𝑗+𝐸1·𝐹 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 6
t = 𝑡0 +
∑︂
𝑗







(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗) +
∑︂
𝑐[𝑖]=0(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 5
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗) −
∑︂
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))
The verifier accepts the response for 𝑐1, so the equation can be rewritten in that context. In
anticipation of causing terms to cancel out, the summations can also be split into conditional







(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗) +
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=0(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗)
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗) −
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
+
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))







(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗) +
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=0(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗)
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗) −
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
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+
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1) +
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))
Subtracting the equation for the 𝑐1 scenario from the equation for the 𝑐2 scenario cancels out the






𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1) +
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
−
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)
− kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))






𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑒𝑖 · 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1) ⊲Merge cases
+
∑︂∗




𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0) ⊲ Rearrange
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗 ⊲ Factor out kj
− ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+ 𝑓 𝑗+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) +
∑︂∗




(𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)) ⊲ Factor out 𝐹 𝑗
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0)))






𝑒𝑖+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗
+ kj · (𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 · ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) ⊲ Factor out 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗
− 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 · ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1)
+
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗 −
∑︂∗




(𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1))
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0)))
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+ 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 · kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) ⊲ Factor out 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗
− ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1))








(𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)) ⊲Merge 𝐹 𝑗 terms
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))











𝑒𝑖+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0) ⊲Merge 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 terms
+ kj · (ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1)
− ℎ 𝑗 ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥




(𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗





𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) − kj · 𝑒𝑖)) ⊲Merge ∑
∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1 case
+ 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖+𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑒𝑖 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1) ⊲Merge ∑∗𝑐1 [𝑖]=1 case
−
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥




(𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + kj)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑒𝑖
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj)))
+ 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑥




𝑒𝑖 · (kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0))))
However, it must be the case that every yj, kj, 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,★, and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,★ value was chosen independently of
every 𝑒𝑖, 𝑓𝑖, and 𝐹 𝑗 value. This must be the case because the 𝑒𝑖, 𝑓 𝑗, and 𝐹 𝑗 values are computed in
verifier step 3 from a hash 𝐻𝑒 with input that depends on the other values: the hash depends
on yj and kj because 𝑦 𝑗 and 𝑘 𝑗 are included in “𝔾” by definition and “𝔾” is an input to the hash;
and the hash depends on every 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,★ and 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,★ value used in the above equation because every
𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 value computed in verifier step 2 is also an input to the hash. The only way to make
these variables dependent would be to predict the output of the hash—any such prediction would
be incorrect with overwhelming probability. The 𝑒𝑖, 𝑓 𝑗, and 𝐹 𝑗 values are drawn uniformly at
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random from [2, 𝑝3) and are variously added and multiplied modulo 𝑝3 to form ℓ ·𝑚 terms. The





It is easy to see that the probability of collisions is negligible in ℓ when 𝑚 is set to a practical value
(e.g., Safehouse typically sets 𝑚 ≤ 10). If Π0 is used to prove a statement with an impractically
large 𝑚 ≥ √𝑝3/ℓ, then the probability that the ℓ · 𝑚 terms contain a collision becomes larger
than 2−ℓ. However, in this situation it also becomes overwhelmingly improbable that a malicious
prover could correctly predict which terms collide: the probability of correctly predicting the
location of colliding terms in this scenario is always less than 1/√𝑝3 ≈ 2−ℓ. A proof created
by a malicious prover will fail to verify if the prover mispredicts which terms will collide and
chooses any corresponding values dishonestly, so a large value of 𝑚 is not helpful to a malicious
prover. Consequently, for any value of 𝑚, the simplified equation implies with overwhelming
probability that the terms multiplied by 𝐹 𝑗 and 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 are both zero. The following sections discuss
the implications of the terms being zero: it is possible to extract witnesses for the proof statement.
8.4.1.3.3 𝐹 𝑗 Term in 𝑡 Response
The 𝐹 𝑗 term in the simplified equation from Section 8.4.1.3.2 shows that:
0 =
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + kj)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj))
Since these summations are over disjoint sets, all 𝑒𝑖 terms are distinct random values from [2, 𝑝3).
As before, this implies that all terms multiplied by an 𝑒𝑖 are zero with overwhelming probability.
For every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 1, this implies:
0 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + kj
Likewise, for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 1, this implies:
0 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj
In all cases, kj = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 when 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖].
8.4.1.3.4 𝑥 𝑓 𝑗 Term in 𝑡 Response




𝑒𝑖 · (𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1)) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑥
𝑒𝑖 · (kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0))
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For the same reason as before, the 𝑥𝑒𝑖 values are distinct, large, and chosen independently of
the inner terms. With overwhelming probability, this implies that for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where
𝑐1 [𝑖] = 1:
0 = 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1
Likewise, for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 1, this implies:
0 = kj · ℎ 𝑗 · 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0
In all cases, ℎ 𝑗 · kj = 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0−𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 when 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖].
8.4.1.3.5 Extracting Witnesses from 𝑡
Section 8.4.1.3.3 and Section 8.4.1.3.4 showed that for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖], the
extractor can with overwhelming probability extract the following witnesses:
• kj = 𝛾 𝑗 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0;
• 𝛽 𝑗 = 𝑥𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0−𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1; and
• 𝛼 𝑗 = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 (mod 𝑝3).
Moreover, verifier step 5.e ensures that 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 < 2ℓ
′+1 and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 < 2ℓ
′+1. Therefore, the
witness 𝛾 𝑗 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 is in the range (−2ℓ
′+1, 2ℓ′+1) as required by the proof statement.
8.4.1.3.6 Subtracting 𝑇 Responses
The next step is to consider the value 𝑇 computed in verifier step 7. When the verifier accepts an





(𝑦 𝑗𝐸2· 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑧 𝑗−𝐸2·𝐹 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 7
T = 𝑇0 +
∑︂
𝑗







(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗)) + yj · (
∑︂
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) ⊲ Verifier step 5
+ zj · (−
∑︂
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))
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(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗)) + yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) + zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
+
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))
+ yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) + zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))







(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗)) + yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) + zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐[𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
+
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1))
+ yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) + zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))






𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1))
+ yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) + zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗)
−
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)) −
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))
− yj · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝑓 𝑗) − zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) · 𝐹 𝑗))






𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0) ⊲Merge cases
− 𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1))
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)
− 𝑒𝑖 · ( 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))
+ 𝑓 𝑗 · (yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) − yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑓 𝑗
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (zj · (−
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖)) − zj · (−
∑︂∗






𝑐1 [𝑖]=1( 𝑓 𝑗 · (𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑒𝑖
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1))) ⊲ Factor out 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑒𝑖
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1( 𝑓 𝑗 · (𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑒𝑖
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+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))) ⊲ Factor out 𝐹 𝑗 · 𝑒𝑖
+ 𝑓 𝑗 · (yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) − yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖))
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (zj · (−
∑︂∗






( 𝑓 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑓 𝑗
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0))
+ yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖) − yj ·
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖))
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1)) ⊲ Factor out 𝐹 𝑗
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0))
+ zj · (−
∑︂∗






( 𝑓 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗





𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0) + yj · 𝑒𝑖)) ⊲Merge ∑
∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1 case
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗











( 𝑓 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − yj)) ⊲ Factor out 𝑓 𝑗 · 𝑒𝑖
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + yj)))
+ 𝐹 𝑗 · (
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + zj))
+
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − zj))))
The same logic as in Section 8.4.1.3.3 can be applied to the simplified equation: since the 𝑓 𝑗
and 𝐹 𝑗 terms are large and must be independent of the prover’s responses, with overwhelming
probability all of the terms multiplied by these random coefficients must be zero to satisfy the
equation. The following sections discuss how to extract witnesses based on the requirement that
each term is zero.
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8.4.1.3.7 𝑓 𝑗 Term in 𝑇 Response
The 𝑓 𝑗 term in the simplified equation from Section 8.4.1.3.6 shows that:
0 =
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − yj)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + yj))
Once again, these 𝑒𝑖 terms are large, independent of the 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,★ values, and disjoint. With over-
whelming probability, this implies that for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 1:
0 = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − yj
Likewise, for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 1, this implies:
0 = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 + yj
In all cases, yj = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 when 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖].
8.4.1.3.8 𝐹 𝑗 Term in 𝑇 Response
The 𝐹 𝑗 term in the simplified equation from Section 8.4.1.3.6, shows that:
0 =
∑︂∗
𝑐1 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + zj)) +
∑︂∗
𝑐2 [𝑖]=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − zj))
With overwhelming probability, this implies that for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] = 1:
0 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 + zj
Likewise, for every 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐2 [𝑖] = 1, this implies:
0 = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 − zj
In all cases, zj = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 when 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖].
8.4.1.3.9 Extracting Witnesses from 𝑇
Section 8.4.1.3.7 and Section 8.4.1.3.8 showed that for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ where 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖], the
extractor can with overwhelming probability extract the following witnesses:
• yj = 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,0 − 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗,1 = 𝛼 𝑗 (mod 𝑝3); and
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• zj = 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,1 − 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗,0 = 𝛾 𝑗 (mod 𝑝3).
8.4.1.3.10 Extractor Construction
When 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 differ, by definition they must differ in at least one bit position 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ ℓ.
Section 8.4.1.3.5 and Section 8.4.1.3.9 showed that the extractor can recover witnesses 𝛼 𝑗, 𝛽 𝑗,
and 𝛾 𝑗 for 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑚 from the responses 𝑠𝑖,★,★ and 𝑆𝑖,★,★ for any 𝑖 such that 𝑐1 [𝑖] ≠ 𝑐2 [𝑖].
The aforementioned sections also show that these witnesses satisfy all conditions in the proof
statement defined in Section 8.2.7.
This extractor excludes the possibility of cheating provers that can successfully reply to two
arbitrary but differing challenges for the same commitment. Therefore, a cheating prover can
convince the verifier for at most one challenge for a given commitment. Since 𝐻 is a random
oracle, the probability that this challenge is chosen is negligible: 2−ℓ.
8.4.2 Security of BRAKEM Construction
This section sketches a proof that the BRAKEMDDL★ construction in Section 8.2.8 satisfies the
security properties defined in Section 8.1.
8.4.2.1 Correctness, Public Verifiability, and Verifiability
Correctness of the scheme is straightforward to see, assuming that the NIZKPKs are correct. The
correctness of the BDLEQ NIZKPKs in ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝜋𝑖 are clear, and the correctness of Π0 was shown
in Section 8.4.1.1.
To show public verifiability, it must be shown that if a call to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Verify succeeds,
then every public key set 𝑅𝑖 is valid, all of the new public keys pk∗𝑖 are valid, and any correct call to
BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate would return the correct 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 . If verification succeeds, then verification
of 𝜋0 and ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝜋𝑖 has succeeded. Step 1 in the verification procedure for Π0 (see Section 8.2.7)
ensures that the burner public key 𝑥 and all of the pk∗𝑖 public keys are in 𝔾2. Step 1 in the
verification procedure for BDLEQ (see Section 8.2.2.3), which succeeds for each 𝜋𝑖, ensures that
𝑅𝑖, 𝑗/𝑥 is in 𝔾2 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |. Since 𝑥 is already confirmed to be in 𝔾2, this
means that 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 must also be in 𝔾2, and thus all 𝑅𝑖 are valid. It remains to be shown that any
correct BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate call would return the correct 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 . The call to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Verify
within BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate succeeds due to the premise, so the only requirement is that
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sk/ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 (mod 𝑝3) for sk corresponding to 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 = 𝑔2sk. Since 𝜋0 is valid, the definition of the
proof statement for Π0 (see Section 8.2.7) ensures that this equality holds.
To show verifiability, it must be shown that if every public key set 𝑅𝑖 is valid and a correct call
to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate outputs 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 corresponding to pk∗𝑖 , then all of the new public keys are
valid and the ciphertexts and proofs could have been created by a call to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate.
Since the BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate call did not output ⊥, the BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Verify call within must
have succeeded, and thus the proofs 𝜋0 and ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝜋𝑖 verified successfully. Π0 ensures that all
of the new public keys ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑚pk∗𝑖 are valid, so this immediately satisfies the first requirement.
For the second requirement, the random coins 𝑠′ passed to BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate are only
used for three purposes: generating 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
for all 𝑖, generating the ElGamal secrets 𝑟𝑖 for all 𝑖, and
generating the randomness for the NIZKPKs. Since all of the pk∗𝑖 are valid and therefore must
have discrete logarithms in 𝔾2 with respect to 𝑔2, there must exist corresponding private keys
that could be derived from 𝑠′. The same argument holds ∀𝑦𝑖 = 𝑔2𝑟𝑖 , since Π0 ensures that each
𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 and thus there must exist ElGamal secrets that could be derived from 𝑠′. Since all of
the NIZKPKs are valid, the soundness of the proof systems ensures that there exists randomness
derived from 𝑠′ that could produce 𝜋0 and ∀1≤𝑖≤𝑚𝜋𝑖 with overwhelming probability.
8.4.2.2 Key Secrecy
The most challenging property to prove for BRAKEMDDL★ is the key secrecy property. While the key
secrecy proof for BRAKEM2DDL★ requires only standard assumptions, the unusual use of ElGamal
in BRAKEMDDL★ requires unusual hardness assumptions. Section 8.4.2.2.1 defines the relevant
assumptions, and the security proof is sketched in Sections 8.4.2.2.2, 8.4.2.2.3, and 8.4.2.2.4.
8.4.2.2.1 Hardness Assumptions
Proving the security of BRAKEMDDL★ requires two new hardness assumptions. The first required
assumption is the discrete logarithm hidden subgroup assumption:
Definition 1 The discrete logarithm hidden subgroup assumption
Given a multiplicative subgroup 𝔾2 of order 𝑝3 in ℤ∗𝑝2 with primes 𝑝3, 𝑝2, and 𝑞 such that
𝑝2 = 2 · 𝑝3 · 𝑞 + 1, a group 𝔾1 of order 𝑝2, and elements 𝑔1 ∈ 𝔾1 and ` ∈ 𝔾1, it is
computationally infeasible for a PPT adversary to decide if dlog𝑔1 (`) ∈ 𝔾2 with non-negligible
advantage. (Refs: 265 and 503)
It would be quite surprising if the discrete logarithm hidden subgroup assumption did not hold
in the groups defined in Section 8.2.1. Since the DDH assumption is assumed to be hard in
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𝔾1, it is typical to assume that an adversary can only perform a few select operations “in the
exponent”: multiplying by a constant (by exponentiating `), adding a value (by multiplying `
with another 𝔾1 element), or brute-force testing for discrete logarithms from a small subset of
possibilities with negligible size with respect to the security parameter. It is not clear how these
operations could be used to construct a membership test for 𝔾2 “in the exponent”. Typically, a
value a ∈ [1, 𝑝2) is tested for membership in 𝔾2 by checking a𝑝3 = 1 (mod 𝑝2). This method
cannot be used because modular exponentiation would require modular multiplication, but this
cannot be done “in the exponent” without already knowing dlog𝑔1 (`). A successful adversary
would require a different method. These reasons are similar to the reason that the DDL problem
is hard in groups where the DL problem is hard.
The second new assumption is more unusual. Given the groups defined in Section 8.2.1 and a
value 𝑥 ∈ [1, 𝑝2), let Φ(𝑥) compute the component of 𝑥 belonging to the multiplicative subgroup
of order 2𝑞. Specifically:
Φ(𝑥) = 𝑥 𝑝3 (𝑝−13 (mod 2𝑞)) (mod 𝑝2)
The multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers assumption is defined as follows:
Definition 2 The multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers assumption
Given the values Φ(𝑥), 𝑔1𝑥 , and 𝑔2𝑥 , it is computationally infeasible for a PPT adversary to
distinguish the world where 𝑥 was sampled uniformly at random from [0, 𝑝3) from the world
where 𝑥 was sampled uniformly at random from [0, 𝑝2𝑝3). (Refs: 263 and 503)
The difficulty of the multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers problem is not immediately
obvious. However, there are good reasons to suspect that the problem is hard. It is strongly
related to the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem defined by Boneh et al. [BJN00, §2]:
Definition 3 The multiplicative subgroup rounding problem
Let 𝑧 ∈ 𝔾2 and Δ ∈ [1, 2𝑚). Given 𝑢 = 𝑧 · Δ (mod 𝑝2), find 𝑧.
When the order of 𝔾2 is significantly smaller than 𝑝2, Δ is uniquely determined with high
probability (this is true in the BRAKEMDDL★ setting, where 𝑞 is extremely large). Boneh et al.
introduced the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem in order to demonstrate that when 𝑚 is
small, ElGamal encryption of non-group elements is insecure. They presented several algorithms
that can recover 𝑧 with a time complexity of 𝑂(2𝑚/2). These attacks are not practical when
2𝑚 becomes cryptographically large, as is the case in BRAKEMDDL★ where 𝑚 ≈ 256. In these
settings, the known algorithms that solve the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem have
the same asymptotic running time as generic group attacks against the DL problem in terms of
𝑚. Consequently, undermining the security of BRAKEMDDL★ would require the development of
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asymptotically superior algorithms for solving the multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers
problem.
It is relatively easy to see that the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem is difficult in
a generic group model with the parameters used by BRAKEMDDL★ . Consider the case where the
subgroup 𝔾2 is distributed within [1, 𝑝2) uniformly at random, rather than being a multiplicative
subgroup, and the adversary is given one oracle to test for subgroup membership and a second
oracle to generate a subgroup member uniformly at random. The only attacks available to
such an adversary are brute-forcing Δ and calling the membership testing oracle for 𝑢 · Δ−1, or
generating a random group element 𝑧 and checking to see if 𝑢/𝑧 is in [1, 2𝑚), both of which are
infeasible when 𝑚 is large. Consequently, a successful attack would require taking advantage of
the structure of the multiplicative subgroup. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no
known algorithm that can exploit the subgroup structure in this way.
Consider a variant of the multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers problem in which
onlyΦ(𝑥) is provided (i.e., 𝑔1𝑥 and 𝑔2𝑥 are omitted). This variant is essentially a decisional version
of the multiplicative subgroup rounding problem: given an element 𝐻 from the multiplicative
subgroup of order 2𝑞 inℤ∗𝑝2 , decide if 𝐻 = Φ(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ [0, 2𝑚). The equivalence is that 𝑝3 ≈ 2𝑚,
𝐻 = 𝑢 · 𝑧−1, and 𝑥 = Δ. Since 𝑝3 is cryptographically large, this is good reason to believe that
this problem variant is hard.
It remains to be considered how the aforementioned variant relates to the overall multiplicative
subgroup rounding with verifiers problem. The availability of 𝑔1𝑥 and 𝑔2𝑥 certainly grants
additional tools to the adversary. At a minimum, these group elements act as verification oracles
modulo their respective group orders. Concretely, the adversary can check to see if a candidate
solution 𝑥′ = 𝑥 (mod 𝑝2) by checking if 𝑔1𝑥
′
= 𝑔1𝑥 . Likewise, it can check if 𝑥′ = 𝑥 (mod 𝑝3) by
checking if 𝑔2𝑥
′
= 𝑔2𝑥 . This information cannot be learned from Φ(𝑥) alone. It is possible that
more information could be learned from the group elements, but due to the hardness of DDH in
both individual groups, any extra information revealed should not be helpful. It is not clear how
adversaries could make use of these extra verification oracles. The structure of the multiplicative
subgroup is unlikely to be helpful for the same reason that the multiplicative subgroup rounding
problem seems to be difficult.
8.4.2.2.2 Proof Overview
The key secrecy security theorem for BRAKEMDDL★ can be expressed in terms of the hardness
assumptions given in Section 8.4.2.2.1:
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Theorem 7 BRAKEMDDL★ is secure
If the DDH problem is hard in 𝔾2, the DL problem is hard in 𝔾1, and the discrete logarithm
hidden subgroup and multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers problems are hard for
the groups, then BRAKEMDDL★ provides BRAKEM key secrecy (as defined in Section 8.1).
(Refs: 260 a b, 267, and 503)
The key secrecy game for BRAKEM is complex, generating many different group elements
and NIZKPKs. To prove Theorem 7, it is necessary to tame this complexity. One way to do this is
to express the proof as a sequence of games [Sho04]. The first game in the sequence is played
by the actual challenger (i.e., BRAKEMDDL★ ), and the last game is trivially shown to be secure. By
showing that each game transition is indistinguishable (or else an efficient adversary could be
constructed to attack a problem that is presumed to be hard), the proof demonstrates that an
adversary attacking BRAKEMDDL★ has negligible advantage compared to an adversary attacking
the trivially secure scheme. This is a well known proof technique for complex cryptographic
primitives and protocols.
Proving Theorem 7 requires a two-step approach. First, Section 8.4.2.2.3 uses a sequence
of games to show key secrecy for a specific new public key when all of the recipient public keys
in the call to OEncapsulate can be controlled by the reduction. Given this result, Section 8.4.2.2.4
shows how to prove key secrecy for the whole construction.
8.4.2.2.3 Encapsulation Game Sequence
This section uses a sequence of games to prove an intermediate step. Consider the following
game:
Game 0
1. The challenger chooses 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, where each 𝑅𝑖 is a set of public keys in 𝔾2. These values
are sent to the adversary.
2. The challenger executes BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚). The adversary is sent the new
public keys pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, ciphertexts 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, and the proof 𝜋.




This game can be viewed as a specific case within the overall BRAKEM key secrecy game defined
in Section 8.1 played against BRAKEMDDL𝑥 with burner public key 𝑥: the case when the adversary
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calls OEncapsulate with recipient public keys that have been defined by the challenger. After showing
that the adversary’s advantage in this game is negligible, this result can be used in the overall key
secrecy proof. In this initial game, the encapsulation operates exactly as defined in Section 8.2.8.
Game 1
This is the same as the previous game, except that all of the NIZKPKs are replaced by simulations.
Specifically, in BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate, 𝜋0 is replaced by a simulated version of Π0, and each
𝜋𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 is replaced by a simulated version of BDLEQ.
The security proofs showing that the NIZKPKs are zero-knowledge define the procedures
for the simulations. Henry [Hen14, §3.2.3] sketches a simulator for the interactive form of the
BDLEQ construction. This simulator can be transformed into one for the non-interactive form
using the standard technique for Fiat-Shamir [FS87] proofs: programming the random oracle to
return the selected challenge 𝑐 for a commitment calculated by the simulator. A simulator for Π0
is defined in Section 8.4.1.2.
Since any PPT adversary’s advantage for distinguishing between simulated and real proofs
is negligible for both NIZKPKs, any PPT adversary also has negligible advantage distinguishing
Game 0 from Game 1.
Game 2
This game is the same as Game 1 except that BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate is modified to produce
ElGamal ciphertexts using a random 𝔾2 element instead of the DH shared secret. The new
encapsulation process operates as follows:
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .KeyGen().
Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.






Choose 𝑆𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑆𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2). ⊲ Replaced 𝑥𝑟𝑖 with new variable 𝑆𝑖
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2). ⊲ Replaced 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗𝑟𝑖 with new variable 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗
}
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Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
It must be shown that distinguishing Game 2 from Game 1 is at least as hard as the DDH
problem in 𝔾2, which is assumed to be hard. Given a PPT adversary A that can distinguish the
games with non-negligible advantage, it is possible to construct a PPT adversary that solves the
DDH problem with the same advantage. Given an input problem instance (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶), the new
adversary must return “1” if and only if 𝐶 = 𝑔2dlog𝑔2 (𝐴)·dlog𝑔2 (𝐵). The new adversary runs A, but
modifies the challenger as follows:
Choose 𝛼𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Choose 𝑚 and |𝑅𝑖 | to send to A as usual, but set 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝐴𝛼𝑖, 𝑗 . ⊲ Blinded 𝐴 as recipient
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .KeyGen().
Choose 𝛽𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ← 𝐵𝛽𝑖 . ⊲ Blinded 𝐵 as ElGamal public key
Choose 𝛾𝑖






Compute 𝑆𝑖 ← 𝐶𝛾𝑖 .
Compute ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑆𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2). ⊲ Blinded 𝐶 as DH shared secret
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝛾𝑖, 𝑗
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝐶𝛾𝑖, 𝑗 .
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
}




Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
Send (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) to A.
if (A outputs “Game 1”) return “1”.
if (A outputs “Game 2”) return “0”.
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This procedure behaves identically to Game 1 when 𝐶 = 𝑔2dlog𝑔2 (𝐴)·dlog𝑔2 (𝐵), so A returns
“Game 1” with its usual advantage. In the other case, the values in the modified game are
distributed identically to Game 2, so A returns “Game 2” with its usual advantage.
Game 3
This game is the same as Game 2 except that the private keys are generated from a larger range.
In Game 2, each new key pair is generated as follows as part of BRAKEMDDL𝑥 .KeyGen:
Choose 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute pk∗𝑖 ← 𝑔2𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖 .
In Game 3, 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
is chosen from [0, 𝑝2𝑝3) instead.
It must be shown that distinguishing Game 2 from Game 3 is at least as hard as the multi-
plicative subgroup rounding with verifiers problem (see Definition 2), which is assumed to be
hard. Given a PPT adversary A that can distinguish the games with non-negligible advantage, it
is possible to construct a PPT adversary that solves the multiplicative subgroup rounding with
verifiers problem with the same advantage. Given an input problem instance 𝜙 = Φ(𝑧), `1 = 𝑔1𝑧,
and `2 = 𝑔2𝑧, the new adversary runs A, but modifies the challenger to behave as follows:
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Assign pk∗𝑖 ← `2. ⊲ `2 verifier as the new public key
Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ← 𝑔2𝑟𝑖 . ⊲ Normal ElGamal public key generation
Choose 𝑆𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑆𝑖 · 𝜙−1. ⊲ Ciphertext with 𝜙 as order-2𝑞 component
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 · 𝜙−1. ⊲ Ciphertext with 𝜙 as order-2𝑞 component
}
Assign 𝑘𝑖 ← `1. ⊲ `1 verifier as the 𝔾1 public key
Simulate 𝜋𝑖.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
Send (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) to A.
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if (A outputs “Game 2”) return “World [0, 𝑝3)”.
if (A outputs “Game 3”) return “World [0, 𝑝2𝑝3)”.
Let Ψ(𝑧) represent the 𝔾2 component of 𝑧, just like Φ(𝑧) represents the component from the
order-2𝑞 subgroup. Concretely:
Ψ(𝑧) = 𝑧2𝑞((2𝑞)−1 (mod 𝑝3)) (mod 𝑝2)
Any element can be written as 𝑧 = Ψ(𝑧)Φ(𝑧) (mod 𝑝2). It is now easy to see that the modified
encapsulation algorithm above produces values with the same distribution as either Game 2 or
Game 3:
ℎ𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 · 𝜙−1
ℎ𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 · (Φ(𝑧))−1
= 𝑆𝑖 · Ψ(𝑧) · (Ψ(𝑧))−1 · (Φ(𝑧))−1
= 𝑆𝑖 · Ψ(𝑧) · 𝑧−1
Since Ψ(𝑧) ∈ 𝔾2 and 𝑆𝑖 is sampled from 𝔾2 uniformly at random, this implies that 𝑆𝑖 · Ψ(𝑧) is
also uniformly distributed in 𝔾2. Consequently, ℎ𝑖, 𝑘𝑖, and pk∗𝑖 correctly correspond to the case
where 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝑧. A similar calculation works for the ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ciphertexts. pk∗𝑖 is identically distributed in
both cases, because the uniform distribution over [0, 𝑝3) is the same as the uniform distribution
over [0, 𝑝2𝑝3) when taken modulo 𝑝3. Theoretically, 𝑘𝑖 could be distributed differently when
dlog𝑔1 (𝑘1) is in [0, 𝑝3) instead of [0, 𝑝2𝑝3). However, distinguishing between these distributions
would be the same as determining whether or not the high bits of the discrete logarithm are
zero—in the group setting for BRAKEMDDL★ , this would mean deciding whether roughly 2816
bits are zero. It is known31 that this problem is hard when the DL problem is hard in 𝔾1, so it is
computationally infeasible forA to notice a change in the distribution of 𝑘𝑖. A therefore guesses
the correct range for 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝑧 with its usual advantage, and so the new adversary inherits the
advantage for attacking multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers.
Game 4
This game is the same as Game 3 except that ℎ𝑖 is sampled uniformly at random from [0, 𝑝2),
and the ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 values are adjusted accordingly. The new encapsulation process operates as follows:
31 ⋏Håstad and Näslund [HN04, Th. 10.2] provide one proof of this statement. Others have proven similar statements
about the difficulty of learning groups of discrete logarithm bits.
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for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Choose 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
$←− [0, 𝑝2𝑝3) uniformly at random. ⊲ Key generation as in Game 3




$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ← 𝑔2𝑟𝑖 .
Choose ℎ𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑝2) uniformly at random. ⊲ Replaced 𝑆𝑖 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 · ℎ𝑖. ⊲ Replaced 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 × 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
}




Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
It must be shown that distinguishing Game 4 from Game 3 is at least as hard as the discrete
logarithm hidden subgroup problem (see Definition 1), which is assumed to be hard. Given a
PPT adversary A that can distinguish the games with non-negligible advantage, it is possible
to construct a PPT adversary that solves the discrete logarithm hidden subgroup problem with
the same advantage. Given an input problem instance ` ∈ 𝔾1, the new adversary runs A, but
modifies the challenger to behave as follows:
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Compute pk∗𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Choose a in the multiplicative subgroup of order 2𝑞 in ℤ𝑝2 uniformly at random.
Choose 𝑆𝑖 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖 ← 𝑆𝑖 · a.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 · a.
}
Compute 𝑘𝑖 ← `a. ⊲ Blinded ` as the 𝔾1 public key
Simulate 𝜋𝑖.
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Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
Send (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) to A.
if (A outputs “Game 3”) return “1”.
if (A outputs “Game 4”) return “0”.
Let 𝛼 = dlog𝑔1 (`). In the case where 𝛼 ∈ 𝔾2, the values sent to A are identically distributed
to Game 3. Consider the value ℎ𝑖:
ℎ𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 · a
= 𝑆𝑖 · 𝛼−1 · 𝛼 · a
= (𝑆𝑖 · 𝛼−1) · (𝛼 · a)





Note that since 𝛼 ∈ 𝔾2, these values are all identically distributed to Game 3 for the case where
𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝛼 · a + 𝛿𝑝2 for some 𝛿 < 𝑝3 such that 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 = dlog𝑔2 (pk∗𝑖 ) (mod 𝑝3). An appropriate value
for 𝛿 is guaranteed to exist due to the Chinese remainder theorem.
In the case where 𝛼 ∉ 𝔾2, the game is identically distributed to Game 4. There still exists
a value 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
= 𝛼 · a + 𝛿𝑝2 that matches the distribution of Game 4 for 𝑘𝑖 and pk∗𝑖 . However, the
ℎ𝑖 and ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 values will be uniformly random values in [0, 𝑝2) that do not correspond to this 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ,
which is exactly the case in Game 4.
Game 5
This game is the same as Game 4 except that 𝑘𝑖 is replaced by an element of 𝔾1 sampled
uniformly at random, and 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
is once again sampled uniformly from [0, 𝑝3). The resulting game
is as follows:
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Choose 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖
$←− [0, 𝑝3) uniformly at random. ⊲ Now sampled from [0, 𝑝3)
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Choose 𝑟𝑖
$←− ℤ𝑝3 uniformly at random.
Compute 𝑦𝑖 ← 𝑔2𝑟𝑖 .
Choose ℎ𝑖 ∈ [0, 𝑝2) uniformly at random.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Choose 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝔾2 uniformly at random.
Compute ℎ𝑖, 𝑗 ← 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 · ℎ𝑖.
}
Choose 𝑘𝑖 ∈ 𝔾1 uniformly at random. ⊲ Replaced 𝑔1𝑠𝑘
∗
𝑖 with a random value
Simulate 𝜋𝑖.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Simulate 𝜋0.
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
The 𝑘𝑖 and pk∗𝑖 values in the game are identically distributed to Game 4, because they always
correspond to some other sk′ ∈ [0, 𝑝2𝑝3) due to the Chinese remainder theorem. Consequently,
any adversary that attacks Game 5 can also attack Game 4 with equal advantage.
Summary
It is clear to see that any PPT adversary attacking Game 5 has negligible advantage. The game is
trivially reduced to the DL problem in 𝔾2 by setting pk∗𝑖 to the problem instance and randomly
generating the other values, which are fully decoupled from dlog𝑔2 (pk∗𝑖 ). As a result of the
indistinguishability between each step of the game sequence, any adversary attacking Game 0
also has negligible advantage.
8.4.2.2.4 Overall Game Sequence
Given the intermediate result from Section 8.4.2.2.3, it is now possible to prove Theorem 7.
Consider the key secrecy game as defined in Section 8.1. The adversary is given access to three
oracles: OKeyGen generates new public keys, OEncapsulate encapsulates new public keys to sets of
recipients, and OCorrupt reveals a private key generated by one of the other oracles. The only way
for the adversary to win is to perform some sequence of oracles calls and to correctly guess a
private key that it should not be authorized to learn.
For any sequence of oracle calls made by the adversary in the game, there is an associated
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that represents the legitimate ways to learn the private keys. Each
vertex in this DAG corresponds to an entry in the challenge table, and each edge corresponds to
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a statement in the derivation table. For example, consider an adversary that makes the following
oracle calls:
1. OKeyGen(), generating (pk1, 𝑠𝑘1)
2. OKeyGen(), generating (pk2, 𝑠𝑘2)
3. OEncapsulate({pk1, pk2}), generating (pk3, 𝑠𝑘3), (pk4, pk4)
4. OKeyGen(), generating (pk5, 𝑠𝑘5)
5. OCorrupt(pk5)
6. OEncapsulate({pk1}, {pk3, pk5}), generating (pk6, 𝑠𝑘6), (pk7, 𝑠𝑘7)
7. OEncapsulate({pk′}, {pk4}), generating (pk8, 𝑠𝑘8), (pk9, 𝑠𝑘9)
8. OEncapsulate({pk2, pk4}), generating (pk10, 𝑠𝑘10)
9. OEncapsulate({pk1, pk3}, {pk10}), generating (pk11, 𝑠𝑘11), (pk12, 𝑠𝑘12)
After these calls, the corruption log contains entries for pk5, pk6, pk7, pk8, and pk9. The DAG
constructed from the call sequence is visualized in Figure 8.5.
To continue the proof, it is necessary to define the height of a challenge table entry in the key
secrecy game. The height of the entry produced by a call to OKeyGen is zero. If a challenge table
entry has an associated entry in the corruption table, then the height of the entry is undefined.
The height of an uncorrupted entry produced by a call to OEncapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚) is max(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗) + 1
where the maximum value is taken over all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |. In the aforementioned
example, {pk1, pk2} have height 0, {pk3, pk4} have height 1, pk10 has height 2, and {pk11, pk12}
have height 3. Note that the height is defined immediately when OEncapsulate is called, but a
subsequent call to OCorrupt may cause it to become undefined. However, the height can only
transition from being defined to being undefined in the case where the height for each 𝑅𝑖, 𝑗 was
defined at the time of the OEncapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚) call, but one of these heights became undefined
after a subsequent corruption.
The proof proceeds as a sequence of games. Game 0 is the BRAKEM key secrecy game played
against BRAKEMDDL𝑥 for some burner public key 𝑥. Game 1 is the same as Game 0 except the
intermediate result from Section 8.4.2.2.3 is used to indistinguishably replace all OEncapsulate calls
producing challenge entries of height 1. This is possible because the recipient public keys for an
encapsulation of height 1 must all be associated with entries of height 0—in other words, the
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Figure 8.5 A BRAKEM key secrecy derivation graph. The DAG corresponds to the derivation table in
a BRAKEM key secrecy game. Each public key pk𝑖 corresponds to an entry (pk𝑖, 𝑠𝑘𝑖) in the challenge
table. Each edge represents an implication in the derivation table. Edge shading is for ease of
presentation and has no other meaning. Public keys with a E symbol have an entry in the corruption
log. (Ref: 268)
output of calls toOKeyGen. Height 0 entries are fully controllable in a reduction, so the intermediate
result applies. Consequently, all entries with height 1 also become fully controllable. The games
proceed in this pattern. Game 𝑖 is the same as Game 𝑖 − 1 except that all encapsulations for
entries with height 𝑖 are indistinguishably replaced using the intermediate result.
If the adversary wins Game 𝑖, then they must have chosen to attack an uncorrupted challenge
table entry (pk, sk). In the DAG associated with the oracle calls, this means that the subtree rooted
at pk contains no nodes with entries in the corruption log. The key pairs for all of these entries
have been generated according to the intermediate result from Section 8.4.2.2.3 by definition of
the game, and so any PPT adversary has negligible advantage guessing sk in Game 𝑖. The total
number of games in this sequence depends on the height of the entry for pk, which depends on
the oracle calls made by the adversary. In the worst-case scenario, a PPT adversary can only
win in a scenario where the height of the entry to attack is equal to the total number of calls
to OEncapsulate, which is polynomially bounded. Consequently, the probability of distinguishing
Game 0 from Game 𝑖 is 𝑖 times a negligible value, which remains negligible. This completes the
proof sketch.
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8.5 BRAKEM from zk-SNARKs
Section 8.1.1 presented a general construction for BRAKEM, and Section 8.2 described a con-
struction that is based on special-purpose zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of double discrete
logarithms. However, Schnorr proofs [Sch91] and derivatives are only one method for building
NIZKPKs—many other proof systems exist. Zero-knowledge proof systems come in many forms,
each with differences in terms of which statements they can prove, performance characteristics,
security assumptions, and setup requirements. The general construction for BRAKEM can use
one of these alternative proof systems in order to achieve different performance and security
properties. This section provides a BRAKEM construction that uses a more recent proof system.
8.5.1 Recent Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
When choosing a zero-knowledge proof system, the following properties of the proof system are
important considerations:
• Prover time complexity: the time that it takes to prove a statement with the system. In the
context of BRAKEM, this is how long it takes to complete a BRAKEM.Encapsulate call. If it
takes a long time to perform encapsulation, then this ultimately restricts the rate at which the
Safehouse group state can be updated, thereby limiting the maximum practical group size.
• Verifier time complexity: the time that it takes to verify a statement with the system. In
the context of BRAKEM, this is how long it takes to complete a BRAKEM.Verify call. Since
BRAKEM.Decapsulate uses BRAKEM.Verify as a subroutine, it is also affected by the verifier
time complexity. BRAKEM is used to share private keys with many recipients, so there are
usually far more calls to BRAKEM.Verify than to BRAKEM.Encapsulate. This means that it is
very important to minimize the cost of verifying proof statements.
• Communication complexity: the transmission size of proofs. In the context of BRAKEM, this
impacts the size of 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, and 𝜋. Some zero-knowledge proof systems have an interesting
property called succinctness. A succinct proof system always generates proof of a constant
size with respect to the security parameter, regardless of the size of the proof statement. It
is important for the proof sizes to be small for typical BRAKEM statements because many
proofs will need to be transmitted during the course of a normal Safehouse conversation.
• Long-term storage requirements: the amount of data in long-term storage that is needed
to use the proof system. Some zero-knowledge proof systems require large amounts of static
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data storage in order to prove or verify statements. It is important to consider the practical
implications of these requirements, especially since Safehouse is intended to be used in
mobile communication scenarios. Smartphones—particularly low-cost devices—often have
very limited non-volatile storage space available for applications that do not come with the
operating system, so secure messaging tools that require several gigabytes of data to be
permanently stored would likely frustrate users.
• Trusted setup requirements: some proof systems require some sort of trusted setup to be
performed before they can be used. Some systems merely require the existence of an unstruc-
tured common reference string that has been chosen uniformly at random from some set. A
trusted random value like this can be used as input to a “nothing up my sleeve” procedure that
derives other parameters, such as the primes required to set up the groups for BRAKEMDDL★
in Section 8.2.1. Other proof systems require a trusted party to perform a complex proce-
dure that outputs structured data, which may include securely erasing intermediate values
(sometimes called “toxic waste”). To somewhat mitigate the weakness of this requirement,
it is often possible to use a cryptographic protocol to break up a trusted party into multiple
participants in such a way that the trusted setup as a whole remains secure as long as some
proportion of the participants behaved honestly.
• Security assumptions: the problems that must be difficult in order for the proof system
to be secure. A secure proof system is sound (which prevents a prover from proving a
statement unless they can compute a valid witness) and zero-knowledge (which prevents
a verifier from learning anything about the witness). The generic BRAKEM construction
in Section 8.1.1 requires only the DDH problem in the public key group to be difficult,
so any additional requirements needed by the proof system (e.g., the additional hardness
assumptions in Section 8.4.2.2.1 required by BRAKEMDDL★ ) will expand the assumption set
for the final construction.
In recent years, many powerful new zero-knowledge proof systems have emerged. This
proliferation has largely been driven by the needs of cryptocurrencies, which often use sophis-
ticated cryptography to differentiate themselves from established competitors and generate
lucrative speculation. Motivations notwithstanding, most of these proof systems have solid
theoretical foundations, highly optimized implementations, support for a wide range of proof
statements, and unprecedented performance characteristics. Particularly interesting proof sys-
tems that have recently emerged include: Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-interactive Arguments
of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs), the most prominent of which are the systems from Gennaro et
al. [GGPR13], Groth [Gro16], and their derivatives; Zero-Knowledge Succinct Transparent Ar-
guments of Knowledge (zk-STARKs) [BBHR19]; and Bulletproofs [BBB+18]. These systems all
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Table 8.3 A comparison of zero-knowledge proof systems for BRAKEM. 𝑛 refers to the
number of gates in the circuit that implements the proof statement. (Refs: 272, 273, and 284)
zk-SNARKs zk-STARKs Bulletproofs
Prover time 𝑂(𝑛 log(𝑛)) 𝑂(𝑛 polylog(𝑛)) 𝑂(𝑛 log(𝑛))
Verifier time 𝑂(1) 𝑂(polylog(𝑛)) 𝑂(𝑛)
Communication 𝑂(1) 𝑂(polylog(𝑛)) 𝑂(log(𝑛))
Long-term storage 𝑂(𝑛) 𝑂(1) 𝑂(𝑛)
Trusted setup with waste Yes No No







represent the statement to prove in terms of an arithmetic or boolean circuit, allowing them to
prove arbitrary statements from a large class of languages. Table 8.3 provides a brief comparison
of these proof systems.
zk-SNARKs are notable due to being succinct, so the verification time complexity and commu-
nication size for a zk-SNARK are always constant for any statement. They are also more efficient
than zk-STARKs in terms of proving time. One weakness of zk-SNARKs is that they require large
long-term “proving” and “verifying” master keys to be stored on the device, and these keys are
specific to the circuit. Another problem with zk-SNARKs is that they require a trusted setup in
which the trusted entity must securely erase “toxic waste” values; an adversary with access to
these values can undermine the security of the scheme. The difficulty of handling toxic waste
values has caused real-world vulnerabilities: the original zk-SNARK system used by the Zcash
cryptocurrency accidentally exposed too many values [Gab19], leading to counterfeiting vulner-
abilities in several projects.32 Finally, the security of zk-SNARKs relies upon stronger hardness
assumptions than other schemes. zk-SNARK constructions rely not only on the finite-field and
elliptic curve DL problems, but also pairing-based cryptographic assumptions.33 These pairing as-
sumptions are not yet as mature as DL assumptions in traditional groups; parameter adjustments
to mitigate attacks have been required relatively recently [KB16]. A more troubling concern is
that zk-SNARKs rely on an extremely powerful assumption called the Knowledge of Exponent
Assumption (KEA) [Dam92; HT98; BP04], which states that certain group elements cannot be
computed without “knowledge” of a particular exponent. In other words, the KEA states that for
32 ⋏This vulnerability was eliminated in Zcash eight months later by accelerating a planned move to a different
zk-SNARK system and deleting the trusted setup transcript under the guise of a false cover story. [SWB19]
33 ⋏ zk-SNARKs use variants of the DH assumption in bilinear groups. See the ECRYPT II report [BBC+13, §6] for
an overview of pairing assumptions.
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every adversary that can compute certain elements, there exists an extractor program that can
recover a particular exponent. This assumption is problematic because it is not “falsifiable” in the
traditional cryptographic sense: disproving the assumption requires showing that no extractor
can possibly exist for a particular adversary [BP04]. It appears that the succinctness property of
zk-SNARKs cannot be achieved without unfalsifiable assumptions like the KEA [GW11; BCCT12].
zk-STARKs appear to provide better security than zk-SNARKs. They abandon succinctness,
scaling proof size polylogarithmically in terms of the gate count, in exchange for avoiding a
trusted setup with toxic waste or storing large per-circuit keys. Moreover, their security relies
only on the existence of collision-resistant hashes, which is considered to be a very safe assump-
tion.3⁴ Unfortunately, zk-STARKs have the greatest proving time complexity of the three systems.
Bulletproofs provide yet another point in the security-performance space. Like zk-STARKs, they
do not require a trusted setup with toxic waste, and they rely only on the DL problem. Compared
to zk-STARKs, they take longer to verify and require more long-term storage, but take less time
to prove and produce smaller proofs.
In the context of BRAKEM and its usage within Safehouse, the properties listed in Table 8.3
are the most important considerations. Based on the current state of systems in terms of both
academic research and implementation maturity, zk-SNARKs are the most viable alternative to
application-specific DDL proofs. They also provide substantially different performance character-
istics that may be useful in certain secure group messaging settings. The next section describes
how to build a BRAKEM implementation using a zk-SNARK library. However, research into new
zero-knowledge proof systems is currently progressing at a very fast pace, and superior imple-
mentations are emerging on a yearly basis. Interested readers should consult a living reference
document such as https://zkp.science/ to follow the latest advancements in this field.
8.5.2 Jubjub
The DDL-based construction of BRAKEM presented in Section 8.2 used “double decker” subgroups
of finite fields, as described in Section 8.2.1. It was necessary to work within these groups in order
to use the application-specific DDL NIZKPKs derived from the original Schnorr protocol [Sch91];
these NIZKPKs require that the group operation is modular multiplication, which allows the proof
system to compute values “in the exponent”. zk-SNARKs operate in a completely different way and
have no such constraints. Consequently, constructions based on zk-SNARKs are free to use more
efficient key spaces, such as elliptic curve groups. However, some proof systems are optimized to
34 ⋏This also makes zk-STARKs quantum-resistant, which is one of their major selling points. However, this is
irrelevant in the context of BRAKEM since it relies on the DL problem, which is expected to be easy for quantum
computers to break with current group parameters.
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prove statements about elements from particular groups more efficiently than others. This means
that it is important to choose a system that has been architected with the intended application in
mind. For a BRAKEM construction, the proof system must be able to efficiently prove that the
secret plaintext for a publicly known ElGamal ciphertext corresponds to a publicly known public
key. A perfect candidate is Groth’s zk-SNARK [Gro16] instantiated with the BLS12-381 curve and
used to prove statements about points on the Jubjub twisted Edwards curve [Ele19]. This system
was specifically designed to optimize proofs about Pedersen commitments [Ped91] in elliptic
curve groups. This optimization means that the zk-SNARK provides very good performance for
secret scalar multiplication, which is exactly what is needed for proofs about ElGamal ciphertexts.
The prototype implementation of Safehouse includes an implementation of BRAKEM using this
proof system as implemented by the gnark library [BGP20].
This section uses additive notation for points in elliptic curve groups. For an elliptic curve
point 𝑃, the 𝑥 coordinate is denoted 𝑃.𝑥, and the 𝑦 coordinate is denoted 𝑃.𝑦.
zk-SNARKs are very complicated and a full explanation of their construction is outside the
scope of this work. Nonetheless, it is important to give a quick overview of the BLS12-381 and
Jubjub interaction to give context to the BRAKEM scheme. BLS12-381 [Ele17] is a pairing-friendly
elliptic curve constructed according to the BLS formula [BLS03]. Its main curve is defined in the
field 𝔽𝑞. The curve equation is:
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 4
The field modulus is a 381-bit prime:
𝑞 = 0x1a0111ea397fe69a4b1ba7b6434bacd764774b84f38512bf6730d2a0f6b0f624
1eabfffeb153ffffb9feffffffffaaab
The pairing function is defined in terms of two source groups, 𝐺1 and 𝐺2, and a target group,
𝐺𝑇 . All three groups have the same 255-bit prime order:
𝑟 = 0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d80553bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001
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𝐺2 is defined as a subgroup of the following curve in 𝔽𝑞2 , which is the sextic twist of the curve
equation for 𝐺1 in 𝔽𝑞12 with basis {1, 𝑢}:
𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 4(1 + 𝑢)









𝐺𝑇 is a finite field group in 𝔽𝑞12 . The pairing function is defined according to the BLS for-
mula [BLS03]. These parameters are sufficient to instantiate Groth’s zk-SNARK [Gro16] and
produce proofs about values in 𝔽𝑟.
Jubjub [Ele19] is a twisted Edwards elliptic curve [BBJ+08] with field modulus 𝑟, meaning
that its point coordinates are values within the “exponent” field of BLS12-381. This means that
the zk-SNARK can efficiently prove statements about Jubjub point coordinates. Jubjub is defined
by the following curve equation in 𝔽𝑟:





In the BRAKEM construction, BRAKEM keys and ElGamal ciphertexts all take place in a subgroup
on the Jubjub curve. This subgroup has a 252-bit prime order:
𝑠 = 0xe7db4ea6533afa906673b0101343b00a6682093ccc81082d0970e5ed6f72cb7
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The cofactor of the subgroup generated by 𝐵 is 8. In other words, 8𝑠 = #Jubjub.
8.5.3 ElGamal on Jubjub
To implement BRAKEM, ElGamal must be instantiated using the Jubjub subgroup in order to
securely transmit private keys. This is mostly straightforward, except that plaintexts encrypted
with ElGamal must be group elements. Moreover, any encoding that is applied to the private keys
in order to transform them into group elements must be provable using Groth’s zk-SNARK system
on BLS12-381. The encoding must also be efficiently invertible, because the original private key
must be recovered during decryption; this excludes typical “hash to curve” techniques, which do
not need to decode points back into the original values [FSS+20]. Luckily, unlike in the DDL
setting (where this problem is handled as described in Section 8.2.4.2), a simple and inexpensive
solution is available in the zk-SNARK setting.
Algorithm 8.5 presents a procedure that encodes an input value 𝑧 as a point (𝑥, 𝑦) in the
Jubjub subgroup. The encoding takes a parameter ℓ that controls a tradeoff between security of
the overall BRAKEM construction and probability of encoding failure. It begins by setting the
𝑥 coordinate of a test point to 𝑧 · 2ℓ. Next, the curve equation is rearranged to express the 𝑦
coordinate in terms of the 𝑥 coordinate:






From the rearranged curve equation, if 𝛾 happens to be a quadratic residue modulo 𝑟, then there
are two points (𝑥, 𝑦) and (𝑥,−𝑦) on the Jubjub curve with 𝛾 = (±𝑦)2 (mod 𝑟); otherwise, there
are no curve points with the given 𝑥 coordinate. The encoding algorithm tests both potential
points to see if either one is part of the Jubjub subgroup (not just on the curve). This is done by
scalar multiplying the point with the group order, 𝑠, and checking to see if the result is the identity
element. If the 𝑥 coordinate does not correspond to a subgroup element (either because there are
no corresponding points or because neither is in the subgroup), then Algorithm 8.5 increments
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Algorithm 8.5 Message encoding for ElGamal on Jubjub. 𝑂 denotes the identity element. ℓ is an
implicitly specified parameter. (Refs: 276 a b, 277 a b, and 279)
Subroutine PointEncode(𝑧) → (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑜)
Compute 𝑥0 ← 2ℓ · 𝑧.
for (𝑜← 0; 𝑜 < 2ℓ; 𝑜++) {











if (Jacobi symbol of 𝛾 is 1) {
Find 𝑦 = √𝛾 (mod 𝑟) using Tonelli-Shanks.
if (𝑠 · (𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑂) return (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑜).




the 𝑥 coordinate and tries again. This linear scan continues through the range [𝑧 · 2ℓ, (𝑧 + 1) · 2ℓ)
to locate a subgroup element. If no element is found, the algorithm fails.
When the PointEncode algorithm succeeds, the output point will have an 𝑥 coordinate equal
to 𝑧 · 2ℓ + 𝑜, where 𝑜 is an offset in [0, 2ℓ). Decoding a point 𝑃 = (𝑥, 𝑦) back into 𝑧 is as simple as
discarding the lower ℓ bits: 𝑧 = ⌊𝑥/2ℓ⌋. The modular square root that is computed in Algorithm 8.5
can be found using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm since 𝑟 = 1 (mod 8).
To prevent the point encoding procedure from failing in practice, it is important to choose a
large enough ℓ so that the failure probability is negligible. Each of the 𝑟 possible 𝑥 coordinates
corresponds to either zero or two curve points, so a total of #Jubjub/2 ≈ 𝑟/2 choices will have
corresponding points on the curve. Of the points on the curve, 1/8 of them are in the subgroup.
Unfortunately, precisely determining the overall probability that the point encoding procedure
succeeds requires knowledge of the distribution of subgroup elements in terms of 𝑥 coordinates.
While several bounds are known (e.g., the results from Fouque et al. [FJT13]), more theoretical
work must be done before an exact probability can be derived. In the meantime, it is easy to
empirically estimate the failure probability of Algorithm 8.5 by testing many 𝑧 values drawn
uniformly at random and tabulating the resulting offsets (i.e., the return value 𝑜). Figure 8.6
shows the distribution of offsets required to encode 80,000,000 values selected randomly in
an experiment. These values almost perfectly fit a geometric distribution with probability 𝑝 =
1/8 according to a 𝜒2 statistical test. The X2 test statistic for the experimental data was 153
when comparing to the geometric distribution with 1023 degrees of freedom (for ℓ = 10), so
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Figure 8.6 Distribution of offsets for encoding uniformly random values as points.
Each bar shows, on a logarithmic scale, the proportion of the 80,000,000 sampled 𝑥 coordinates with
the given offset to the first subgroup element. The results approximate the true probability density
function. The dashed line is an interpolation of the geometric distribution for success probability
𝑝 = 1/8. The largest offset observed in the experiment was 142. The logarithmic 𝑦 axis emphasizes
errors in smaller proportions, such as the ones on the right of the graph. (Ref: 277)
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Algorithm 8.6 A cryptosystem for private keys using ElGamal on Jubjub. The system
uses the PointEncode function to encode plaintexts in [2, 𝑡). The functions return additional
information in order to facilitate the use of zk-SNARKs. (Ref: 279)
Subroutine EGRand() → (𝑤, 𝐶1)
Choose 𝑤 $←− [2, 𝑠).
Compute 𝐶1 ← 𝑤 · 𝐵.
return (𝑤, 𝐶1).
Subroutine EGEnc(RPK, 𝑤, sk∗) → (𝐶2, 𝑦, 𝑜)
if (sk∗ ∉ [2, 𝑡)) { return ⊥ }
Execute (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑜) ← PointEncode(sk∗).
Compute 𝐶2 ← 𝑤 · RPK + (𝑥, 𝑦).
return (𝐶2, 𝑦, 𝑜).
Subroutine EGDec(rsk, 𝐶1, 𝐶2) → sk∗
Compute 𝐷 = rsk · 𝐶1.
Compute 𝑃 = 𝐶2 − 𝐷.
Compute sk∗ = ⌊𝑃.𝑥/2ℓ⌋.
return sk∗.
the distributions match with overwhelming confidence. This means that 𝑥 coordinates drawn
uniformly at random from any small range [𝑧 · 2ℓ, (𝑧 + 1) · 2ℓ) correspond to a subgroup element
with essentially a uniform probability of 1/8. When ℓ = 10, this suggests that the failure probability
of the point encoding function is (7/8)1024 = 2−197, which can be safely ignored.
Let 𝑡 = ⌊𝑟/2ℓ⌋. Since PointEncode needs ℓ reserved bits to reduce the probability of its failure
condition, the encoded cryptosystem can only encrypt numeric values in the range [0, 𝑡). If the
goal is to encrypt private keys, then the private keys must be sampled from [2, 𝑡) instead of
[2, 𝑠). This is why greater values of ℓ reduce the discrete logarithm security of keys in the overall
BRAKEM construction. Fortunately, since 𝑠 < 𝑟, the security level is actually reduced by fewer than
ℓ bits. When drawing from [2, 𝑡) instead of [2, 𝑠), private key sizes will use log2(𝑠/𝑡) fewer bits.
When ℓ = 10, private keys are approximately 7 bits smaller, leading to a loss of approximately
3.5 bits of security.
Algorithm 8.6 depicts the ElGamal cryptosystem defined on Jubjub and using PointEncode to
derive the plaintexts. The interface is defined at a very low level because the overall BRAKEM
construction reuses ElGamal randomness 𝐶1 for multiple ciphertexts. EGRand creates a new
ElGamal ephemeral key pair with the secret 𝑤 sampled from the full [2, 𝑠) range. A new private
key sk∗ can then be encrypted to a recipient public key RPK using EGEnc, which employs the
point encoding function from Algorithm 8.5. Only the ciphertext (𝐶1, 𝐶2) needs to be transmitted
in order for the recipient to call EGDec and recover sk∗. However, EGEnc returns the low level
information 𝑦 and 𝑜 so that it can be used by the caller as input to a zk-SNARK.
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8.5.4 Verifiable ElGamal NIZKPK: Π1
The next step in the BRAKEM construction is to introduce a method to publicly verify the
correctness of an ElGamal ciphertext. Given a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗) such that sk∗ ∈ [2, 𝑡)
and pk∗ = sk∗ · 𝐵, and a recipient public key RPK, a sender can produce an ElGamal ciphertext
by calling (𝑤, 𝐶1) ← EGRand() and then (𝐶2, 𝑦, 𝑜) ← EGEnc(RPK, 𝑤, sk∗). A proof must be
generated that shows that (𝐶1, 𝐶2) is a valid encryption of the private key corresponding to pk∗
using PointEncode. This proof, denoted Π1, corresponds to the following statement, given in
Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97]:
Π1{(𝑤, sk∗, 𝑜, 𝑦) : pk∗ ∼ (𝐶1, 𝐶2) ∼ RPK} :=
PK{(𝑤, sk∗, 𝑜, 𝑦) : pk∗ = sk∗ · 𝐵 ∧
𝐶1 = 𝑤 · 𝐵 ∧
0 ≤ 𝑜 < 2ℓ ∧
(sk∗ · 2ℓ + 𝑜, 𝑦) is on the curve ∧
𝐶2 = 𝑤 · RPK + (sk∗ · 2ℓ + 𝑜, 𝑦) }
It is not strictly necessary for Π1 to verify that the ElGamal plaintext is in the correct subgroup—
verifying that it is on the curve is sufficient. If the plaintext is maliciously on the curve but outside
the subgroup, the recipient will still decrypt sk∗ correctly. Although such a ciphertext would leak
information about sk∗, a malicious prover is free to simply send sk∗ to whomever it wishes in any
case.
Efficiently implementing Π1 requires a very powerful proof system, such as a zk-SNARK.
Implementations of Groth’s proof system [Gro16] like the gnark library typically allow the
developer to specify the proof statement in terms of an arithmetic circuit with a mix of public
(known to both the prover and verifier) and private (known to the prover only) inputs. Values
in this circuit come from 𝔽𝑟, which is the field in which Jubjub is defined. The developer can
then add arithmetic constraints in the circuit that must be satisfied by the prover’s witness. Some
of these constraints may yield intermediate values that can then be used as inputs to further
constraints.
To implement Π1, the following constraints must be encoded in the circuit, where all variables
are elements in 𝔽𝑟:
• 𝑎 = 𝑏.
• 𝑎 ≤ 𝑏.
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• 𝑎 = −𝑏 (mod 𝑟).
• 𝑎 = 𝑏 + 𝑐 (mod 𝑟).
• 𝑎 = 𝑏 · 𝑐 (mod 𝑟).
• 𝑎 ∈ {0, 1}.
• If 𝑎 = 0 then 𝑏 = 𝑐. If 𝑎 = 1 then 𝑏 = 𝑑.
• 𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏𝑚 are the 𝑚-bit binary representation of 𝑎, where 𝑚 is public.
• (𝑥, 𝑦) is a point on the Jubjub curve.
• (𝑥′, 𝑦′) + (𝑥′′, 𝑦′′) = (𝑥, 𝑦).
• 𝑎 · 𝐵 = (𝑥, 𝑦), where 𝐵 is the Jubjub base point.
• 𝑎 · (𝑥′, 𝑦′) = (𝑥, 𝑦).
Some of these constraints can be constructed using the earlier ones. Testing to see if a point is
on the curve can be done using the curve equation (see Section 8.5.2) and the basic modular
arithmetic constraints. The final three constraints involve point addition. The fact that Jubjub
is a twisted Edwards curve means that a complete point addition formula is available [BBJ+08,
§6]. This means that point addition can be implemented using the basic arithmetic constraints
without any special cases. Scalar multiplication by fixed or variable bases can be implemented
from the point addition circuit using the standard “double-and-add” algorithm: the scalar is first
expanded into its binary form, and then the conditional selection circuit is used to determine
when to perform point addition based on the corresponding bit.3⁵ The gnark library implements
all of the required circuits off-the-shelf. With this library of circuits, all of the required constraints
in Π1 can be specified and proven by the zk-SNARK system.
8.5.5 A BRAKEM Construction using zk-SNARKs
It is now possible to define a complete BRAKEM construction given the ElGamal cryptosystem in
Section 8.5.3 and the Π1 NIZKPK in Section 8.5.4. The overall approach is simply the general
construction from Section 8.1.1: for each ring of receivers, encrypt a new private key to each of
them using EGEnc, reusing a single call to EGRand for the whole ring to improve performance.
35 ⋏This is effectively Algorithm 8.3 written in additive notation and performed within the zk-SNARK.
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For each ring, the Encapsulate function uses Π1 to produce a proof that the ciphertext sent to
the first receiver is valid and corresponds to the new public key. A secondary proof shows that all
ciphertexts for the ring encrypt the same plaintext.
To show that multiple ElGamal ciphertexts in the Jubjub subgroup encrypt the same plain-
text, it is possible to use another zk-SNARK. However, it makes more sense to use a Schnorr
proof [Sch91] for this NIZKPK. Although the proof size is larger than a zk-SNARK, the size advan-
tage is minimal compared to the significantly improved proving time (unlike for Π1, whose only
alternative is a very large DDL proof). If the ring only has two elements, then this is essentially a
DLEQ proof (see Section 8.2.2.2) adapted to an elliptic curve setting. When the ring has more
than two elements, then the proof is a BDLEQ proof (see Section 8.2.2.3) adapted to an elliptic
curve setting. Let Elliptic Curve Plaintext Equality (EC-PTEQ) denote this conditional proof using
the same input and output parameters as BDLEQ, but simply performing a DLEQ proof when
the ring has only two recipients. Note that DLEQ and BDLEQ were previously defined using
exponential notation in finite fields, but they operate equivalently in elliptic curve groups using
additive notation.
The resulting BRAKEM construction is called BRAKEMZK. It operates as follows:
• BRAKEMZK.KeyGen(𝑠′) → (pk, sk):
Choose sk in [2, 𝑡) using randomness in 𝑠′.
Compute pk← sk · 𝐵.
• BRAKEMZK.Encapsulate(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚; 𝑠′) → (pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝑠𝑘∗1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋):
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Generate key pair (pk∗𝑖 , 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 ) ← BRAKEMZK.KeyGen().
Execute (𝑤𝑖, 𝐶1,𝑖) ← EGRand().
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |) {
Execute (𝐶2,𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑦𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑜𝑖, 𝑗) ← EGEnc(𝑅𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑤𝑖, sk∗).
}
Prove 𝜋1,𝑖 = Π1{(𝑤𝑖, 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 , 𝑜𝑖,1, 𝑦𝑖,1) : pk∗𝑖 ∼ (𝐶1,𝑖, 𝐶2,𝑖,1) ∼ 𝑅𝑖,1}.
Prove 𝜋2,𝑖 = EC-PTEQ{𝑤𝑖 : (𝐵, 𝐶1,𝑖) ≈
↩→ (𝑅𝑖,2 − 𝑅𝑖,1, 𝐶2,𝑖,2 − 𝐶2,𝑖,1) ≈ ··· ≈ (𝑅𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 | − 𝑅𝑖,1, 𝐶2,𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 | − 𝐶2,𝑖,1)}.
Assign 𝐶𝑖 = (𝐶1,𝑖, 𝐶2,𝑖,1, . . . , 𝐶2,𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |).
}
Assign 𝜋 = (𝜋1,1, 𝜋2,1, . . . , 𝜋1,𝑚, 𝜋2,𝑚).
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• BRAKEMZK.Decapsulate(𝑖, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑠𝑘∗𝑖 :
if (! ((1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚)&&(1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅𝑖 |))) return ⊥.
Execute 𝑣← BRAKEMZK.Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋)
↩→ and record the interpretation of 𝐶𝑖.
if (𝑣 = 0) return ⊥.
Compute 𝑠𝑘∗
𝑖




• BRAKEMZK.Verify(𝑅1, . . . , 𝑅𝑚, pk∗1, . . . , pk∗𝑚, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏:
Interpret 𝐶𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚 and 𝜋 as defined in BRAKEMZK.Encapsulate.
if (interpretation of any 𝐶𝑖 or 𝜋 fails) return 0.
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
if (𝜋1,𝑖 fails to verify) return 0.
if (𝜋2,𝑖 fails to verify) return 0.
}
return 1.
Since zk-SNARKs are succinct, the size of 𝜋 can be further reduced by coalescing multiple
Π1 statements into a single circuit. This is similar to the core idea of Π0 (see Section 8.2.7), but
without any special batching techniques. This also reduces the verification time to 𝑂(1) instead
of 𝑂(𝑚), since all zk-SNARKs using Groth’s system take the same amount of time to verify. The
major downside of this approach is that a new proving and verifying key (output by a trusted
setup) must be stored for each possible value of 𝑚. In practice, this storage requirement grows
quadratically and quickly becomes problematic, especially for storage-constrained mobile devices.
The prototype implementation caches circuits for values of 𝑚 between 1 and 5, requiring 72MiB
of storage space. When 𝑚 > 5, the rings are greedily partitioned into chunks of maximum size,
with an appropriately sized zk-SNARK for each chunk.
8.6 Choosing a BRAKEM Construction
A Safehouse implementation requires a BRAKEM implementation. This chapter presented three
main constructions: BRAKEM2DDL★ (see Section 8.2.4.1), BRAKEMDDL★ (see Section 8.2.8), and
BRAKEMZK (see Section 8.5.5). The main considerations for choosing a BRAKEM construction
are security and performance.
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BRAKEM2DDL★ is far less efficient than the other two options. It is always preferable to use
BRAKEMDDL★ instead of BRAKEM2DDL★ with the possible exception of extremely high security
applications in which performance is not a consideration. The main reason to use BRAKEM2DDL★
would be if BRAKEMDDL★ is shown to be insecure for efficient parameter sizes, which would likely
require a break of either the discrete logarithm hidden subgroup or multiplicative subgroup
rounding with verifiers assumptions (see Section 8.4.2).
Choosing between BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK is more difficult. These two constructions
have very different security assumptions. While the security assumptions for BRAKEMDDL★ seem
to be inherently safer than the ones for BRAKEMZK, such as the unfalsifiable KEA, the zk-SNARK
setup used by BRAKEMZK is also used by cryptocurrencies that would lose large amounts of
financial securities if the proof system was broken. In theory, this should bring increased expert
scrutiny upon the BRAKEMZK assumptions. In any case, the BRAKEMZK proof system requires
a trusted setup with “toxic waste” in order to instantiate the system, which is more difficult to
accomplish than the setup for BRAKEMDDL★ . This can be an important consideration for some
deployments.
The asymptotic performance of various proof systems was compared in Table 8.3. How-
ever, the DDL-based proof system used by BRAKEMDDL★ is not directly comparable because it is
application-specific and does not express the proof statement in terms of gates. The best way
to compare the performance of these systems is to perform empirical measurements with real
implementations. Table 8.4 compares the performance of the prototype BRAKEMDDL★ imple-
mentation described in Section 8.3 with the prototype BRAKEMZK implementation described in
Section 8.5. The evaluation includes various dimensionalities for the recipient public key sets
input to BRAKEM.Encapsulate.
Several differences between the two schemes are readily apparent. Encapsulation with
BRAKEMDDL★ is at least 20 times faster than BRAKEMZK for the same input parameters. This is to be
expected, since slow proving times are the primary weakness of current zk-SNARK constructions.
In contrast, verification with BRAKEMZK is roughly five times faster than BRAKEMDDL★ in the
1 × 1 scenario (i.e., a single encapsulation to a single recipient). This also makes sense, since
the large modular exponentiations in 𝔾1 required by BRAKEMDDL★ are far more expensive than
the zk-SNARK verification function. It is particularly interesting to note the scalability of the
verification function for the two schemes. BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify takes almost the same amount of
time for the 1×1 and 1×10 (i.e., a single encapsulation to 10 recipients) scenarios, which shows
that the cost of verifying Π0 dominates the cost of verifying the BDLEQ proof. As the number
of encapsulations increases, BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify scales linearly, but with a slope less than one.
This shows that the batching technique used in Π0, which dominates the verification time, is
more effective than performing multiple proofs. In contrast, BRAKEMZK.Verify takes significantly
longer in the 1 × 10 scenario compared to the 1 × 1 scenario, showing that the cost of verifying
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Table 8.4 A performance comparison of BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK. (Ref: 284)
BRAKEMDDL★ BRAKEMZK
Encapsulation time [ms] 1×1 4.8 (0.2) 190 (2)
1×10 7.0 (0.4) 195 (4)
2×10 13.2 (0.5) 346 (6)
5×10 32 (1) 767 (10)
Verification time [ms] 1×1 12.5 (0.4) 2.5 (0.2)
1×10 13.1 (0.4) 5.5 (0.3)
2×10 18 (2) 7.8 (0.7)
5×10 33 (3) 13.1 (0.7)
Decapsulation time [ms] 1×1 13.4 (0.5) 2.5 (0.2)
1×10 13.9 (0.5) 5.6 (0.2)
2×10 19 (2) 7.9 (0.6)
5×10 38 (3) 13.7 (0.5)
Communication [B] 1×1 16 449 322
1×10 19 905 642
2×10 35 682 1 058
5×10 83 013 2 306
Long-term storage [B] Raw 0 75 727 164
7-Zip 0 40 210 973
The exponentiation tables for BRAKEMDDL★ were precomputed on startup. zk-SNARK circuits for up to 5 recipients
were established for BRAKEMZK. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 𝑛 × 𝑚 denotes that BRAKEM.Encapsulate
was called with 𝑛 sets of receivers, each containing 𝑚 receiver public keys.
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the EC-PTEQ proof dominates the cost of verifying Π1. This also makes sense, since zk-SNARKs
are much faster to verify than Schnorr proofs. This was a tradeoff made by BRAKEMZK to avoid
increasing the cost of BRAKEMZK.Encapsulate even further by using a zk-SNARK for the plaintext
equality. This also explains why BRAKEMZK.Verify scales linearly with a slope that is much closer
to one: since a single zk-SNARK verification is needed in all scenarios and the proof system is
succinct, the increased cost of verification is solely due to more EC-PTEQ proofs. Decapsulation is
marginally slower than verification for both schemes, since it is essentially a verification followed
by an inexpensive ElGamal decryption in a small group.
The communication cost also varies substantially between the two schemes. BRAKEMDDL★
requires roughly 16KiB of data for each Π0, and this cost increases linearly with the number of
recipient rings. This is due to the low soundness of the cut-and-choose protocol, requiring 128
repetitions of the underlying NIZKPK to compensate. In terms of the proof components described
in Section 8.2.7, the 𝑠𝑖, 𝑗 values require 4096 bytes, the 𝑆𝑖, 𝑗 values require 6272 bytes, and the
𝑤𝑖 values require 4096 bytes. The remainder of the size comes from the other components of
BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate, such as the ElGamal ciphertexts themselves. In contrast, BRAKEMZK
uses roughly 0.5 KiB for each recipient ring. This space is almost entirely used for the ElGamal
ciphertexts, since the zk-SNARK always uses a small constant amount of space. The EC-PTEQ
proof is also constant size in terms of the number of recipients in a ring, but one such proof must
be included for each ring in the encapsulation.
Finally, no additional storage is required on the device for BRAKEMDDL𝑥 . Additional storage
may optionally be used to cache exponentiation tables for the burner key 𝑥, but this is not
required—a client can also generate these tables in memory dynamically. Moreover, it is often
faster for modern hardware to recompute the exponentiation tables from scratch instead of loading
them from a storage device. In the event that additional storage is used for the exponentiation
tables, it is up to the developer to decide how much storage to allocate. In contrast, BRAKEMZK
requires storage for the proving and verifying keys produced by the zk-SNARK trusted setup. In
order for the prototype to store keys for circuits up to five recipients—which is what facilitates
the good scalability seen in the results—the device required roughly 72MiB of storage for the
raw data. Luckily, this limitation can be mitigated by using data compression: the 7-Zip utility
was able to compress the data to roughly 38MiB using the LZMA2 algorithm. This shows that
larger circuit sizes might be feasible to store on mobile devices, but note that the raw size scales
quadratically with the maximum ring count.
Given these results, the choice of BRAKEM implementation requires careful consideration of
the target deployment. Assuming that a developer is comfortable with the security assumptions
of both schemes, the decision becomes primarily driven by performance. A typical Safehouse
group update requires many BRAKEM encapsulations. In large groups, multiple encapsulations
in 5 × 10 or 3 × 64 recipient ring scenarios are typical, depending on the protocol configuration.
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For these situations, the large encapsulation time cost for BRAKEMZK may become prohibitively
expensive, especially for mobile devices. All participants in a Safehouse conversation will need to
perform these operations periodically (e.g., on a weekly basis). On the other hand, participants
will need to verify BRAKEM proofs constantly. BRAKEMZK excels at this task. In combination with
its small message sizes, this may make BRAKEMZK more viable for very large groups for which
members verify far more NIZKPKs than they produce. Ultimately, the BRAKEM implementations
will need to be evaluated in the context of a deployment scenario to determine if any of these
performance factors become untenable. The topic of selecting a BRAKEM implementation is
revisited in Section 10.13, which presents the results of a performance evaluation in which several
Safehouse configurations were used to simulate realistic conversation transcripts.
8.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced BRAKEM, a new cryptographic primitive. This primitive is similar to a
KEM, except that multiple secrets are transmitted to multiple sets of recipients. Moreover, these
secrets are the private keys corresponding to public keys that can be used as targets for subsequent
BRAKEM operations (i.e., the scheme is recursive), and the correctness of the encapsulation is
publicly verifiable. This chapter presented multiple BRAKEM constructions: constructions based
on application-specific DDL NIZKPKs, and an alternative construction based on zk-SNARKs. This
chapter also described a prototype implementation along with detailed performance optimization
advice, and proved the security of the DDL-based constructions.
Section 8.1 defined the BRAKEM scheme. Section 8.2 introduced a construction based on
DDL NIZKPKs. This approach is ultimately based on Schnorr proofs [Sch91]; it provides strong
security and very efficient proving and verifying times (dozens of milliseconds), at the cost of
relatively large ciphertexts (approximately 20KiB of data to send a private key to 10 recipients).
Section 8.2.2 covered previously known Schnorr-based NIZKPKs that are useful for the construc-
tion. Section 8.2.3 presented a new cut-and-choose variant of a cross-group DLEQ NIZKPK that
can be efficiently integrated into the rest of the design. Section 8.2.4.1 introduced a very conser-
vative construction of BRAKEM relying on only standard DL security assumptions. Section 8.2.4.2
proposed a far more efficient construction of BRAKEM that relies on unusual but reasonable se-
curity assumptions: the discrete logarithm hidden subgroup and multiplicative subgroup rounding
with verifiers assumptions—these were defined and discussed in Section 8.4.2.2.1. Section 8.2.5
combined previously introduced NIZKPKs into useful but inefficient DDL-based NIZKPK that
can be used to build verifiable encryption. Section 8.2.6 introduced a novel proof technique
reminiscent of the Unruh transform [Unr15] that greatly accelerates the performance of DDL
NIZKPKs. Section 8.2.7 defined a large NIZKPK that unifies all of the proof statements required
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to implement BRAKEM from DDL assumptions. Section 8.2.8 defined the BRAKEM construction
that is actually expected to be used in practice, BRAKEMDDL★ : a DDL-based construction using the
unified NIZKPK and unusual security assumptions.
Section 8.3 described a prototype implementation of BRAKEMDDL★ and all of the details re-
quired to actually use the construction. Section 8.3.1 covered how to generate and verify group
parameters for the scheme—a non-trivial topic that is often overlooked when describing crypto-
graphic constructions. Section 8.3.1.1 outlined attacks against “finite field” DH groups, and how to
generate and verify group parameters to avoid or mitigate the attacks. Section 8.3.1.2 presented
algorithms for generating large primes with the required structure to implement BRAKEMDDL★ ,
which can be prohibitively expensive without the proper optimizations. Section 8.3.1.3 discussed
security considerations surrounding the “burner key” technique that is used in BRAKEMDDL★ to
greatly accelerate encapsulation and decapsulation. Section 8.3.1.4 offered sample group param-
eters to instantiate BRAKEMDDL★ . Section 8.3.2 provided detailed coverage of the performance
optimizations included in the prototype implementation. Primarily, this coverage consisted of pre-
viously known techniques to accelerate modular exponentiation, along with empirically optimized
parameters for the BRAKEMDDL★ construction and its intended use. Section 8.3.2.2 described a
fast modular squaring technique for Intel processors with greater clarity than can be found in
Intel white papers. Section 8.3.2.4 provided a highly optimized addition chain for fixed-exponent
modular exponentiation with the aforementioned sample parameters. Section 8.3.2.7 pointed
out the locations in BRAKEMDDL★ for which parallel computation is the most beneficial.
Section 8.4 provided detailed security sketches for the DDL-based BRAKEM construction.
Section 8.4.1 included a security proof for the unified NIZKPK. The soundness proof makes use
of the novel NIZKPK technique to ensure that certain responses are identical after the extractor
rewinds the prover; the use of this assumption appears in Section 8.4.1.3. Section 8.4.2 sketched
the security of BRAKEMDDL★ as a whole. Notably, Section 8.4.2.2 sketched the key secrecy proof
as a nested sequence of games using the new hardness assumptions.
Section 8.5 introduced a completely separate construction for BRAKEM, BRAKEMZK, derived
from zk-SNARKs. Section 8.5.1 compared recently introduced proof systems that could be used to
construct BRAKEM, and explained the rationale for selecting zk-SNARKs. Section 8.5.4 described
how to implement the ElGamal cryptosystem [ElG85] on the Jubjub Edwards curve [Ele19].
This curve can be instantiated within BLS12-381 [Ele17] for efficient integration with Groth’s
zk-SNARK scheme [Gro16]. Section 8.5.4 described the constraints that must be checked in a
zk-SNARK circuit to implement BRAKEM. Section 8.5.5 presented the actual zk-SNARK-based
BRAKEM construction. This construction has very small ciphertexts (approximately 0.6 KiB of data
to send a private key to 10 recipients) and very fast verification times (a few dozen milliseconds
or fewer), but it comes with very expensive proving times (hundreds of milliseconds).
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The prototype developed as part of this work includes implementations of both BRAKEMDDL★
and BRAKEMZK in the Go programming language. Section 8.6 provided a performance com-
parison between the two implementations and discussed how to choose between them for a
deployment.
The BRAKEM primitive forms the core of the Safehouse secure group messaging protocol.
The next chapter introduces the final prerequisite: a new interactive group key exchange protocol





TKLL: A New Interactive Group
Key Exchange
In this chapter: Protocol
M
odern secure group messaging protocols are often implemented using CGKA pro-
tocols, as discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, protocols like MLS arrange their
key graphs in tree structures, where private keys corresponding to nodes are known
by the participants with corresponding leaf nodes in the subtree. Safehouse uses a key tree
for similar purposes, even though Safehouse is a conversation security protocol that does not
strictly fit the interface of a CGKA. Chapter 3 pointed out that supporting a “mass join” operation,
which allows multiple participants to efficiently join the group simultaneously, can help a secure
group messaging protocol to support larger groups. This chapter introduces a new interactive
GKE protocol called TKLL that can be used to implement the “mass join” operation for group
messaging protocols with tree-based states. TKLL can be immediately applied to the design of
MLS and Safehouse, but it is also a contribution of independent interest.
As discussed in Chapter 7, in order to join a Safehouse group, members must explicitly consent
by interacting with the protocol; it is not possible to unilaterally add someone to a group without
their involvement. A member joins the group by receiving an invitation containing secret key
material, performing some cryptographic operations using this secret key material, and then
sending the output of these cryptographic operations to the server for subsequent distribution
to other group members.1 It is safe to assume that a member is online during the time that
they perform these cryptographic operations and deliver the results to the server.2 Therefore,
when several members attempt to join the group at nearly the same time, it is possible for
these members to perform an interactive protocol in order to efficiently complete a “mass join”
operation. TKLL can be used to prepare a “mass join” message that is then non-interactively sent
to the existing members for later processing. The interactive protocol can be subject to relatively
1 ⋏Chapter 10 describes the Safehouse protocol. It covers the details concerning this secret key material, the
cryptographic operations, the delivery mechanism, and how other members process the output.
2 ⋏However, there may be a long delay between the time that the party receives the invitation and the time that
they decide to use the invitation to join the group by performing the cryptographic operations.
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short deadlines; if one of the participants in the interactive protocol goes offline or misbehaves,
the protocol can simply restart without the problematic participant. In practice, a server can
efficiently aggregate requests to join the group: when new members have queued to join the
group, a new TKLL session is started as soon as the previous one has concluded and produced a
“mass join” message.
TKLL is an interactive protocol between multiple participants. The protocol takes a key tree
as input; this tree describes what key pairs should be established and which participants should
learn each private key. The new participants then execute the TKLL protocol interactively. Once
complete, each participant receives as output a set of private keys determined by their location
in the key tree. TKLL also outputs a ciphertext that can be non-interactively sent to the existing
participants in the group. This ciphertext can be processed to verify the correctness of the key
tree, effectively “importing” it into the tree-based group state. The overall protocol (which may
be a CGKA or a part of Safehouse) can then “merge” the new tree into the existing group state in
a protocol-specific manner.
The key insight of the TKLL protocol is that a key tree can be established efficiently using a
derivative of the BD GKE, as discussed in Section 3.4. Among the GKE families, the BD protocol
family can interactively establish a group key using a minimum number of rounds, which is the
most important performance metric for protocols performed over the Internet, where round-trip
times are high. TKLL essentially performs a custom variant of the BD protocol for each tree
node simultaneously, quickly establishing shared keys for every node in the tree. The key pairs
generated by TKLL ultimately need to come from key spaces that are suitable for DH exchanges
as part of the overall secure messaging protocol. In the case of Safehouse, the key pairs must
be usable as BRAKEM targets (see Chapter 8). Luckily, the BD GKEs involved in TKLL can be
performed independently of the target cryptosystem. The shared secret keys produced by the
GKEs can input into a KDF to derive a corresponding private key for the target cryptosystem. In
practice, the TKLL construction described in this chapter uses elliptic curve groups for the key
exchanges. This chapter uses additive notation for elliptic curve groups: 𝐵 denotes the group
generator, 𝑠𝑃 denotes scalar multiplication of point 𝑃 by scalar 𝑠, and 𝑃 + 𝑄 denotes the elliptic
curve group operation (point addition) with points 𝑃 and 𝑄. 𝑞𝐸 denotes the order of 𝐵.
Section 9.1 defines the key tree notation used by the remainder of the chapter. Section 9.2
introduces a new GKE in the BD family that is used as a sub-protocol by TKLL; it implements the
required properties as simply as possible. Section 9.3 describes an unauthenticated version of
TKLL. Section 9.4 extends the previous result to introduce the complete TKLL protocol, including
the desired authentication properties.
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Figure 9.1 An example of a key tree. The rectangles are 𝑘-nodes and the circles are 𝑢-nodes.
(Refs: 292 and 293 a b c)
9.1 Key Tree Notation
Key trees and their history were presented in Section 3.5. Wong et al. [WGL00] originally
proposed general notation for symmetric key graphs; this chapter adopts their notion of 𝑘-nodes
and 𝑢-nodes in the context of asymmetric key trees. Key trees are visualized in this chapter using
the same conventions as in Chapter 4.
Figure 9.1 depicts an example of a generic key tree for six participants, each with an associated
𝑢-node (labeled 𝑢𝐴 through 𝑢𝐹). Each 𝑘-node (labeled 𝐴 through 𝐾) is associated with a key
pair. All of the public keys for 𝑘-nodes are publicly known as part of the key tree data structure.
A participant knows the private key associated with a 𝑘-node if there is a path from their 𝑢-node
to that 𝑘-node (equivalently, if their 𝑢-node is in the subtree rooted at the 𝑘-node). The user set
associated with a 𝑘-node 𝑣 contains all of the participants with knowledge of the private key
(i.e., the set of participants with 𝑢-nodes in the subtree rooted at 𝑣). The user set of 𝑣 in key
tree 𝑇 is denoted by userset𝑇 (𝑣). As a natural extension of this notation, userset(𝑇) denotes
all of the participants with 𝑢-nodes in the key tree 𝑇 . Similarly, the key set associated with a
participant 𝑈𝑥 contains all of the 𝑘-nodes with private keys known to 𝑈𝑥 (i.e., for every 𝑘-node
that can be reached from the 𝑢-node 𝑢𝑥). The key set for a participant 𝑈𝑥 in key tree 𝑇 is denoted
by keyset𝑇 (𝑈𝑥). A valid key tree 𝑇 must not have userset𝑇 (𝑣) = ∅ for any 𝑘-node 𝑣 in 𝑇 (i.e., it
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must not contain any 𝑘-nodes for which no member knows the private key). It is not required
for 𝑘-nodes in a valid key tree to have unique user sets. For example, the two distinct 𝑘-nodes
labeled 𝐹 and 𝐽 in Figure 9.1 have the same user set {𝑢𝐹}. While keys with identical user sets
may appear to be redundant, they can be useful for algorithms that use the 𝑘-nodes for different
purposes after the TKLL protocol has completed.
Since the key trees given to TKLL are intended to be used in a secure group messaging
protocol in which any subset of participants may leave the group, all key trees in this chapter are
assumed to have at least one 𝑘-node known exclusively to any given participant—that 𝑘-node
is called the participant’s personal key. In terms of the key tree, this means that every 𝑢-node is
connected to exactly one 𝑘-node that has no other incoming edges. This property can be seen in
the example shown in Figure 9.1—the personal keys are 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸, and 𝐹.
This chapter also makes use of standard tree definitions in the context of key trees. The
unique parent node of a node 𝑣 in key tree 𝑇 is denoted by parent𝑇 (𝑣). The parent of the root
node is denoted by the special symbol ⊤. The parent of a node is always either a 𝑘-node or ⊤ (i.e.,
𝑢-nodes are always leaves). The set of children of a node 𝑣 in key tree 𝑇 are nodes in a set denoted
by children𝑇 (𝑣). In general, this set may contain both 𝑘-nodes and 𝑢-nodes. For any 𝑢-node 𝑣
in key tree 𝑇 , children𝑇 (𝑣) = ∅. Note that for any 𝑣′ ∈ children𝑇 (𝑣), parent𝑇 (𝑣′) = 𝑣. The set of
sibling nodes of a node 𝑣 in key tree 𝑇 , including 𝑣 itself, is denoted by sibling𝑇 (𝑣). Note that
sibling𝑇 (𝑣) = children𝑇 (parent𝑇 (𝑣)) if 𝑣 is not the root node, and that sibling𝑇 (𝑣) = {𝑣} if 𝑣 is
the root node. The depth of a node 𝑣 in key tree 𝑇 is an integer denoted by depth𝑇 (𝑣). The depth
of the root node is zero. For each non-root node 𝑣, depth𝑇 (𝑣) = depth𝑇 (parent𝑇 (𝑣)) + 1. The
height of a key tree 𝑇 , denoted by height(𝑇), is the height of the tree formed by the 𝑘-nodes.
Equivalently, height(𝑇) is the maximum value of depth𝑇 (𝑣) for any 𝑢-node 𝑣 in 𝑇 .3 For example,
a key tree with a single 𝑘-node has a height of one.
Using the key tree 𝑇 depicted in Figure 9.1 as an example:
• userset(𝑇) = {𝑈𝐴, 𝑈𝐵, 𝑈𝐶 , 𝑈𝐷, 𝑈𝐸}. Note that these refer to the labels for participants and not
to 𝑘-nodes or 𝑢-nodes.
• userset𝑇 (𝐺) = {𝑈𝐴, 𝑈𝐵} and userset𝑇 (𝐼) = {𝑈𝐴, 𝑈𝐵, 𝑈𝐶 , 𝑈𝐷, 𝑈𝐸}.
• keyset𝑇 (𝑈𝐹) = {𝐹, 𝐽, 𝐾} and keyset𝑇 (𝑈𝐷) = {𝐷, 𝐻, 𝐼, 𝐾}
• parent𝑇 (𝑢𝐴) = 𝐴, parent𝑇 (𝐻) = 𝐼, and parent𝑇 (𝐾) = ⊤.
• children𝑇 (𝐹) = {𝑢𝐹}, children𝑇 (𝐻) = {𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸}, and children𝑇 (𝑢𝐸) = ∅.
3 ⋏The deepest node in a valid key tree is always a 𝑢-node, since empty user sets are not permitted.
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• sibling𝑇 (𝐷) = {𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐸}, sibling𝑇 (𝐾) = {𝐾}, and sibling𝑇 (𝑢𝐴) = {𝑢𝐴}.
• depth𝑇 (𝐾) = 0, depth𝑇 (𝐺) = 2, and depth𝑇 (𝑢𝐸) = 4.
• height(𝑇) = 4.
9.2 Simplified Kim-Lee-Lee
The TKLL protocol involves performing an interactive GKE for each 𝑘-node in the given key tree 𝑇 .
For a given 𝑘-node 𝑣, the GKE takes place between participants with one representative for each
node in children𝑇 (𝑣). This section describes a simple GKE from the BD protocol family called
Simple KLL that can perform this task. The full KLL protocol introduced by Kim et al. [KLL04]
and described in Section 3.4 provides functionality that is not required in this context. Simple
KLL eschews the dynamism, authentication, and keying byte mechanisms. Essentially, Simple
KLL is the original BD protocol [BD94] using the XOR operator (denoted by ⊕) from KLL. One
practical benefit of this approach is that mature cryptographic libraries designed to perform
DH key exchanges can be used to compute intermediate values without modification. The XOR
approach is slightly slower than the original BD protocol, but the tiny performance penalty is
insignificant in practice.⁴ The Simple KLL protocol does not provide authentication or public
verifiability, because these properties are implemented in a higher protocol layer; these properties
are revisited in Section 9.4.
When a protocol description in this chapter indicates that a participant “broadcasts” amessage,
this refers to the participant transmitting the message to all other participants using a reliable
transmission mechanism. When implemented in practice over the Internet, this normally means
that the participant sends the message to a central server that in turn retransmits the message
to the other participants, all using a reliable TCP-based network protocol. If a participant fails
to successfully broadcast a message, then the protocol will time out and abort; Safehouse is
designed to accommodate this potential outcome. It is important to note that this definition
of “broadcast” is not as strong as the definition used by broadcast protocols [CKPS01], which
additionally require that each participant is assured that the same message was delivered to
all other participants. The authenticated version of TKLL introduced in Section 9.4 will detect
misbehavior such as equivocation (i.e., if a malicious participant sends different messages to
different recipients) and abort the protocol in response.
4 ⋏ The BD protocol requires one scalar inversion and one scalar multiplication to “mix” the shared secrets, whereas
KLL requires two scalar multiplications. For groups on elliptic curves like Curve25519, inversions are marginally
faster than scalar multiplications, but not by enough to matter in practice for this use case.
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Figure 9.2 A Simple KLL key exchange with four participants. Shaded values are internally
computed and are not sent over the network. Given knowledge of all unshaded values and any one
of the DH private keys in {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4}, one can compute the group key (depicted in the central
shaded rectangle). (Refs: 296 a b)
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Simple KLL establishes a shared secret in only two rounds of communication:
1. The participants logically arrange themselves into a circle. All participants broadcast a DH
public key. Upon receipt of all other keys, each participant computes the DH shared secret with
their two neighbors in the circle; these are the “left” and “right” secrets for the participant.
2. All participants broadcast the XOR of their “left” and “right” secrets. Upon receipt of this
information, each participant can recover all of the DH shared secrets by using one of their
own shared secrets to recursively “undo” a neighbor’s XOR. The group key is a KDF of all of
the DH shared secrets.
Figure 9.2 depicts the keys involved in this procedure for a Simple KLL performed between four
participants. From the perspective of a single participant (𝑈1), the protocol example in Figure 9.2
proceeds as follows:
1. The four participants are unambiguously labeled as 𝑈1 through 𝑈4 as input to the protocol.
This example is written in the perspective of participant𝑈1, but the other cases are symmetric.
2. 𝑈1 generates a random scalar 𝑥1 in the field for the elliptic curve group, then computes the
DH public key 𝑋1 = 𝑥1𝐵.
3. 𝑈1 sends 𝑋1 to 𝑈2 and 𝑈4. 𝑈1 receives 𝑋2 from 𝑈2 and 𝑋4 from 𝑈4.⁵ The points are checked
to ensure that they are in the elliptic curve group.
4. 𝑈1 computes the “left” secret 𝑡4,1 = 𝑥1(𝑥4𝐵) and the “right” secret 𝑡1,2 = 𝑥1(𝑥2𝐵). It then
computes 𝑌1 = 𝑡4,1 ⊕ 𝑡1,2. In practice, this involves compressing the two elliptic curve points
into a binary encoding before computing the XOR operation.
5. 𝑈1 broadcasts 𝑌1 and receives 𝑌2, 𝑌3, and 𝑌4 in return.
6. 𝑈1 computes all unknown DH shared secrets as follows:
a) 𝑡2,3 = 𝑌2 ⊕ 𝑡1,2.
b) 𝑡3,4 = 𝑌3 ⊕ 𝑡2,3.
c) As a sanity check, 𝑈1 ensures that 𝑡4,1 = 𝑌4 ⊕ 𝑡3,4.
7. 𝑈1 computes the group key 𝐻 (𝑡1,2∥𝑡2,3∥𝑡3,4∥𝑡4,1), where 𝐻 denotes the KDF function.
5 ⋏ In Simple KLL, it is only necessary for participants to exchange DH public keys with their neighbors. When
the protocol is used in the authenticated version of TKLL, the DH public keys must be broadcast to all other
participants in the Simple KLL exchange, because all of the DH public keys will be digitally signed.
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Algorithm 9.1 Simple KLL step 1. A new DH key pair is generated. (Refs: 297 and 313)
Subroutine Simple-KLL1(𝑖, 𝑛) → (𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)
if (𝑖 > 1) { Let 𝑙 = 𝑖 − 1 } else { Let 𝑙 = 𝑛 }
if (𝑖 < 𝑛) { Let 𝑟 = 𝑖 + 1 } else { Let 𝑟 = 1 }
Choose 𝑥𝑖
$←− [2, 𝑞𝐸).
𝑋𝑖 ← 𝑥𝑖 · 𝐵.
return (𝑙, 𝑟, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑋𝑖).
The computations performed by the other participants are symmetric.
The precise steps for Simple KLL can be written as three generalized subroutines. The first
step is to compute the caller’s position in the circle and to generate a DH key pair in the elliptic
curve group. This procedure is defined in Algorithm 9.1. Simple-KLL1 takes as input the number
of participants 𝑛 and the caller’s participant number 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]. It outputs the indices of the “left”
and “right” neighbors (𝑙 and 𝑟, respectively), the DH private key 𝑥𝑖, and the DH public key 𝑋𝑖.
The next step is to compute the “left” and “right” secrets and the XOR of their compressed
forms. This procedure is defined in Algorithm 9.2. In practice, the inputs 𝑙, 𝑖, 𝑟, and 𝑥𝑖 are
the same as in Simple-KLL1, and the neighbors’ DH public keys 𝑋𝑙 and 𝑋𝑟 are received over the
network. The function outputs the secrets shared with the “left” and “right” neighbors (𝑡𝑙,𝑖 and
𝑡𝑖,𝑟, respectively) and their XOR value 𝑌𝑖. Internally, Simple-KLL2 makes use of a function called
Compress𝐸 (𝑃) → 𝐷. This function takes a point 𝑃 on the elliptic curve 𝐸 as input and outputs
𝐷, a binary representation of this point. The inverse function is Decompress𝐸 (𝐷) → 𝑃.
The final step is to compute all of the other DH secrets and to compute the group key. This
procedure is defined in Algorithm 9.3. The input
⃗⃗⃗
𝑌 is a vector of all 𝑛 XOR values; 𝑛 − 1 of these
must be received from the other participants. 𝑌𝑖 refers to the XOR value produced by participant
𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]. In practice, the other inputs to the function are the same as in the previous steps.
The output of the function, 𝑧, is a shared secret called the group key preimage that is learned by
all participants. To produce the group key, the group key preimage is given as input to 𝐻, the
KDF. Note that the definition of 𝑧 does not include the secret 𝑡𝑛,1. Including this extra term is
not necessary for security. Omitting the term causes the scheme to reduce to a standard DH key
exchange in the event that 𝑛 = 2. This property simplifies the construction of TKLL.
The prototype implementation instantiates the elliptic curve 𝐸 with Curve25519 [Ber06].
The implementation performs ECDH on Curve25519 using a standard X25519 library for Go.
X25519 defines several security and performance optimizations, including storing points as only
𝑥 coordinates. This lossy compression method drops the 𝑦 coordinate, but this does not affect
the correctness of ECDH. This is also not a problem for Simple KLL, since it is not necessary for
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Algorithm 9.2 Simple KLL step 2. The “left” and “right” DH shared secrets are computed and the XOR of
their compressed forms is derived. (Refs: 297, 315, and 318)
Subroutine Simple-KLL2(𝑙, 𝑖, 𝑟, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑋𝑙, 𝑋𝑟) → (𝑡𝑙,𝑖, 𝑡𝑖,𝑟, 𝑌𝑖)
𝑡𝑙,𝑖 ← 𝑥𝑖 · 𝑋𝑙.
𝑡𝑖,𝑟 ← 𝑥𝑖 · 𝑋𝑟.
𝑌𝑖 ← Compress𝐸 (𝑡𝑙,𝑖) ⊕ Compress𝐸 (𝑡𝑖,𝑟).
return (𝑡𝑙,𝑖, 𝑡𝑖,𝑟, 𝑌𝑖).
Algorithm 9.3 Simple KLL step 3. All of the DH shared secrets are computed and the group key preimage
𝑧 is derived. The group key is 𝐻 (𝑧). (Refs: 297 and 318)
Subroutine Simple-KLL3(𝑙, 𝑖, 𝑛,
⃗⃗⃗
𝑌, 𝑡𝑙,𝑖, 𝑡𝑖,𝑟) → (𝑧)
for ( 𝑗 ∈ [0, 𝑛 − 1) in ascending order) {
if (𝑖 + 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛) { Let 𝑎 = 𝑖 + 𝑗 } else { Let 𝑎 = 𝑖 + 𝑗 − 𝑛 }
if (𝑎 < 𝑛) { Let 𝑏 = 𝑎 + 1 } else { Let 𝑏 = 1 }
if (𝑏 < 𝑛) { Let 𝑐 = 𝑏 + 1 } else { Let 𝑐 = 1 }
if (𝑏 ≠ 𝑙) {
𝑡𝑏,𝑐 ← Decompress𝐸 (Compress𝐸 (𝑡𝑎,𝑏) ⊕ 𝑌𝑏).
} else {
𝑡𝑙,𝑖 ← Decompress𝐸 (Compress𝐸 (𝑡𝑎,𝑙) ⊕ 𝑌𝑙).
}
}
if (𝑡𝑙,𝑖 ≠ 𝑡𝑙,𝑖) Abort with 𝑧 = ⊥.
𝑧 ← Compress𝐸 (𝑡1,2)∥Compress𝐸 (𝑡2,3)∥ . . . ∥Compress𝐸 (𝑡𝑛−1,𝑛).
return 𝑧.
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Decompress𝐸 to be a true inverse of Compress𝐸: it is only necessary for all participants to recover
the same compressed DH secrets (and therefore the same value of 𝑧). Formally, it is only necessary
that:
∀𝑃∈𝐸 Compress𝐸 (Decompress𝐸 (Compress𝐸 (𝑃))) = Compress𝐸 (𝑃)
It is easy to see that Simple KLL provides key secrecy against passive network adversaries
when the CDH assumption holds in the ROM. Specifically, the adversary cannot distinguish 𝐻 (𝑧)
from a random value of the appropriate length when 𝐻 is modeled by a random oracle: doing
so would require knowledge of 𝑧, which is a concatenation of all DH shared secrets. The same
game-based approach used by Kim et al. [KLL04] to prove that KLL is secure can be used to
reduce an adversary that can recover 𝑧 to a CDH adversary.
9.3 Unauthenticated Tree Kim-Lee-Lee
This section describes an unauthenticated version of the TKLL protocol. The main purpose of
TKLL is to interactively establish a given key tree using as few rounds of communication as
possible. The structure of the key tree is given as an input to TKLL. When TKLL is used as part of
Safehouse, the protocol for “mass join” operations determines the shape of the key tree that TKLL
must instantiate. The key tree is structured so that the resulting keys can be used to efficiently
add the participants into a group conversation as part of a cryptographic operation that is sent to
existing group members non-interactively.
Each TKLL participant can generate the key pair for their own personal key in the given key
tree independently. Internal 𝑘-nodes in the tree with more than one child are more difficult to
establish: the corresponding private key must be learned by every participant in the node’s user
set (i.e., every participant with a 𝑢-node in the subtree). TKLL accomplishes this by performing
Simple KLL (as defined in Section 9.2) between one representative participant for each child
𝑘-node; these representatives all learn the private key for the 𝑘-node.
In order for all participants in a user set to learn the private key used by their representative,
each representative sends the DH private key that they used in the Simple KLL protocol to all of
the other participants in their subtree—this allows the other participants to follow along with
the Simple KLL execution. To preserve security, this DH private key is encrypted to one of the
DH shared secrets in the representative’s subtree using a symmetric cryptosystem, where Enc
denotes the encryption function and Dec denotes the decryption function; correctness ensures
that Dec(^, Enc(^, 𝑚)) = 𝑚 for a key ^ and message 𝑚. The shared secret that is used as the
key for the ciphertext is known to all of the intended recipients, and it is already known to the
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representative after the first round of communication; this allows the ciphertext to be sent as
part of the second communication round. A KDF denoted KDF1 transforms the shared secret into
a key suitable for use by Enc.
There are two important edge cases when generating key pairs for internal 𝑘-nodes: 𝑘-nodes
with exactly one or two children. When a 𝑘-node has only one child, the next step depends on
whether the child is the participant’s personal key or not. If the 𝑘-node’s only child is not the
participant’s personal key, then the group key preimage for the 𝑘-node is derived from the child’s
group key preimage using a KDF denoted KDF2. If the 𝑘-node’s only child is the participant’s
personal key, then the group key preimage for the 𝑘-node is generated randomly. When a 𝑘-node
has two children, the Simple KLL protocol reduces to a two-party DH exchange, as discussed in
Section 9.2. In this case, it is not necessary for the representatives to actually send the XOR value
computed in Simple-KLL2 over the network, since the value will always be 0. When the 𝑘-node
has more than two children, the protocol proceeds as in the general case.
Once the key exchanges are complete, each 𝑘-node will have an associated group key preimage
generated by Simple KLL, derived from another group key preimage with KDF2, or generated
randomly, based on the position of the 𝑘-node in the tree. The group key preimages produced
are given as input to 𝐻 (the KDF defined in Section 9.2) to derive group keys for the 𝑘-nodes.
These group keys are then provided as seeds for the key generation function of the target
cryptosystem (e.g., the key space used by a BRAKEM scheme defined in Chapter 8). This key
generation function, denoted by KeyGen(𝑠), takes a seed 𝑠 as input and deterministically produces
a key pair (pk, sk) from the seed as output. Passing all of the group key preimages through 𝐻
before providing them to KeyGen ensures that the resulting private keys are independent. Using
this procedure, key pairs for the entire tree can be generated after only two communication
rounds, regardless of the tree’s size or complexity. In a third and final communication round, the
representative for each 𝑘-node sends its public key to participants that are not in its user set.
A formal definition of TKLL is postponed until Section 9.4, since the inclusion of authentication
mechanisms changes several important protocol details. In this section, the unauthenticated
form of TKLL is best understood through a specific example. Figure 9.3 depicts a sample key
tree that may be used as an input to TKLL. Given an ordered list of participants 𝑈1, . . . , 𝑈6 (with
corresponding 𝑢-nodes labeled 𝑢1, . . . , 𝑢6) and a target key generation function KeyGen(𝑠), the
six participants are expected to instantiate the key tree with a key pair for each 𝑘-node. To
summarize the prior description of the protocol, the participants will accomplish this feat in three
rounds of communication:
1. For each 𝑘-node that is not a personal key (𝑘′1, 𝑘′′1 , 𝑘234, 𝑘56, 𝑘′56, and 𝑘123456 in the example)
and has at least two children (𝑘234, 𝑘56, and 𝑘123456 in the example), the leftmost participant
in each child node’s user set is unambiguously chosen as the representative for that child
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Figure 9.3 A sample key tree used as input to unauthenticated TKLL. The rectangles are
𝑘-nodes and the circles are 𝑢-nodes. (Refs: 300, 302, 303, and 304)
node. For example, in the GKE that will establish the key for 𝑘123456, the representatives for
the subtrees rooted at 𝑘′′1 , 𝑘234, and 𝑘′56 are 𝑈1, 𝑈2, and 𝑈5, respectively. For each 𝑘-node that
is not a personal key and has at least two children, the representatives perform Simple-KLL1
and broadcast their newly generated DH public keys to all participants in the user set for
the 𝑘-node. Although the representatives are responsible for computing and sending the
messages of the GKE, all participants in the subtree rooted at the node for the GKE (not only
the representatives) must receive the messages, because they must follow along with the
progress of the GKE. For example, 𝑈2 will broadcast its new DH public key in the exchange
for 𝑘234 to 𝑈3 and 𝑈4. 𝑈2 will additionally broadcast its (distinct) new DH public key in the
exchange for 𝑘123456 to the five other participants. Similar broadcasts are made by the other
participants.
2. In each GKE, the representatives, having received the DH public keys from the other repre-
sentatives, each perform Simple-KLL2 and broadcast the newly computed XOR values to the
other participants in the user set for the 𝑘-node. Moreover, each representative for a child
node that has participants other than the representative in its user set must also encrypt its
DH private key from the first round to those other participants. The representative traverses
down the subtree to find the shallowest 𝑘-node (i.e., the closest 𝑘-node to the root) with two
or more children—this will be the 𝑘-node in the represented subtree that is the closest to
the root and has also completed the first round of a Simple KLL GKE. The DH private key
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is encrypted to the “first” DH shared secret in the circle for this Simple KLL protocol, which
will always be available to the representative at the time that the ciphertext is created. For
example, 𝑈2 will encrypt the DH private key it used in the GKE for 𝑘123456 to the DH shared
secret between 𝑈2 and 𝑈3 in the GKE for 𝑘234; 𝑈3 can decrypt this ciphertext immediately,
whereas 𝑈4 will be able to decrypt it once the round is complete. As another example, 𝑈5 will
encrypt the DH private key it used in the GKE for 𝑘123456 to the DH shared secret between
𝑈5 and 𝑈6 in the GKE for 𝑘56. These are the only two ciphertexts that are sent for the key
tree in this example.
3. Each participant traverses the tree in order from their 𝑢-node to the root of the tree. For
each 𝑘-node with multiple children on the path, the participants execute Simple-KLL3 to
compute the group key preimage. When a 𝑘-node with only one child is encountered during
the traversal and the child is not a personal key, the group key preimage for the node is
computed by applying a KDF denoted KDF2 to the child node’s group key preimage. When
a 𝑘-node with only one child is encountered and the child is a personal key, the participant
generates the group key preimage randomly. In any case, if the participant is represented by
another participant in the GKE for the parent node, then the ciphertext sent in the previous
step is decrypted using the newly recovered “first” DH shared secret. In this example, 𝑈1
generates the key for 𝑘′1 randomly. The key for 𝑘′′1 is derived from the key for 𝑘′1 with KDF2,
and the key for 𝑘′56 is similarly derived from the key for 𝑘56. After these operations, group
key preimages have been established for all of the 𝑘-nodes. For each group key preimage 𝑧,
participants in the user set compute the associated key pair using KeyGen(𝐻 (𝑧)) → (pk, sk).
For each 𝑘-node, the “leftmost” participant in the user set broadcasts the new public key to
all participants in the protocol (e.g., 𝑈5 broadcasts the final public key for 𝑘′56 to the other
five participants). The key tree is now established.
Figure 9.4 depicts all of the keys that are involved in unauthenticated TKLL for the sample key
tree 𝑇 in Figure 9.3. The notation for the trees is the same as in the Simple KLL functions defined
in Section 9.2, but with added superscripts that indicate which node in the key tree they apply
to. A superscript “(𝑣)” indicates that the value applies to the GKE for parent𝑇 (𝑣). Using the child
node in the superscript simplifies the pseudo-code for TKLL. Since this superscript is different
for each participant based on which child subtree their 𝑢-node belongs to, Figure 9.4 depicts all
possible superscripts for each value separated by vertical bars. For each Simple KLL execution,
the indices of the participants are expressed relative to the user set for the node instead of in
absolute terms. For example, the values associated with 𝑈2 in the GKE for 𝑘234 are given the
index 1, since 𝑈2 is the “first” participant in userset𝑇 (𝑘234). To summarize the notation:
• 𝑥 (𝑣)
𝑖
denotes the DH private key generated by Simple-KLL1 for participant 𝑖 in the GKE for
𝑘-node parent𝑇 (𝑣), and 𝑋 (𝑣)𝑖 is the associated DH public key.
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Figure 9.4 An example of keys involved in unauthenticated TKLL execution. These values
are generated by the protocol to establish the key tree in Figure 9.3. Shaded values are not sent
over the network. Arrows indicate data dependencies. An arrow from 𝑈1, . . . , 𝑈6 indicates that the
participant generates the specified key. Superscripts of the form (𝑘1 |𝑘2) indicate that the value might
have superscript 𝑘1 or 𝑘2 depending on the perspective: each client uses different superscripts for
keys in its local state based on the position of its 𝑢-node in the tree. (Refs: 302 a b and 304)
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• 𝑡(𝑣)
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• 𝑧(𝑣) is the group key preimage for 𝑘-node parent𝑇 (𝑣). Based on the key tree structure, it is
either generated randomly, derived using KDF2, or output by Simple-KLL3.







associated public key is pk(𝑣) .
It can be illuminating to work through the example from the perspective of a single participant.









using Simple-KLL1. It sends 𝑋 (𝑘6)2 to 𝑈5.
2. 𝑈6 receives 𝑋 (𝑘6)1 from 𝑈5. It also receives 𝑋
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3. 𝑈6 computes 𝑡(𝑘6)1,2 using Simple-KLL2. 𝑈6 has no XOR values to broadcast because it is not the
representative for any 𝑘-node with more than two children.
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𝑈6 broadcasts pk(𝑢6) to the other five participants.
8. 𝑈6 receives all other public keys from the other participants:
• 𝑈1 sends the public keys for 𝑘1, 𝑘′1, and 𝑘′′1 .
• 𝑈2 sends the public keys for 𝑘2 and 𝑘234.
• 𝑈3 sends the public key for 𝑘3.
• 𝑈4 sends the public key for 𝑘4.
• 𝑈5 sends the public key for 𝑘5.
9.4 Authenticated Tree Kim-Lee-Lee
This section augments the unauthenticated TKLL protocol described in Section 9.3 with authen-
tication mechanisms, yielding the final protocol definition.
9.4.1 Design Overview
Authentication mechanisms for GKEs in the BD family (such as Simple KLL) were previously
described in Section 3.4. The simplest approach would be to apply the Katz-Yung compiler [KY03]
to TKLL, digitally signing all messages with a long-term key; this is essentially the approach
used by Dutta and Barua [DB08]. This method is inefficient and is not general enough for the
intended use in Safehouse. The original BD protocol [BD94] essentially included a NIZKPK in
the first message flow to prove knowledge of the DL of both the ephemeral DH private key and a
long-term private key. KLL [KLL04] and the protocol from Yang and Tan [YT10] include “keying
bytes” to achieve contributiveness, and use long-term keys to digitally sign both the keying bytes
and the ephemeral DH public keys—this provides authentication and defends against active
network adversaries.
TKLL’s authentication mechanisms differ from all of the aforementioned protocols. The
mechanisms must achieve three goals: establish and authenticate long-term identities, defend
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against active network adversaries, and prevent insider attacks such as equivocation (where a
participant causes other participants to derive different group keys).
The authentication mechanism to establish and authenticate long-term identities varies based
on the Safehouse configuration. Specifically, different mechanismsmust be used based on whether
deniability or non-repudiation is desired. Since this mechanism is defined by the higher-level
protocol (i.e., Safehouse) but the data interacts with the rest of the TKLL protocol, TKLL is
parameterized by two functions that handle identification and authentication:
• Compute-ID(𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) → 𝐼 generates a long-term identity 𝐼 once TKLL has established the key
tree 𝑇 . 𝑃∗ is a mapping from 𝑘-nodes in 𝑇 to public keys, and 𝑄∗ is a mapping from 𝑘-nodes
in 𝑇 to private keys. 𝑃∗ and 𝑄∗ are only required to have mappings for 𝑘-nodes on the path
to the caller’s 𝑢-node; this is sufficient for the intended application, and it allows long-term
identities to be established in an early communication round.
• Prove-ID(𝐼∗, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) → 𝜋 produces a NIZKPK that authenticates the calling participant. 𝑃∗
and 𝑄∗ are mappings for public keys and private keys in the tree, as in the definition for
Compute-ID. 𝐼∗ is a mapping from participants to their identities, as produced by Compute-ID.
The output 𝜋 is the proof that authenticates the caller’s identity.
Defending against active network adversaries is accomplished using a digital signature
scheme. The approach is similar to the outcome of applying the Katz-Yung compiler to TKLL.
Unlike the unauthenticated version of TKLL described in Section 9.3, the authenticated version
does not internally generate key pairs for the participants’ personal keys. The public keys for
all participants’ personal keys and the private key for the caller’s personal key are accepted as
an input to the algorithm; this allows the personal key pairs to be used for other authentication
tasks prior to the invocation of TKLL. The personal key pairs are used with a digital signature
scheme to authenticate TKLL transmissions. As part of the second round of TKLL, each participant
signs all of the other data that it sent in the first two rounds using its personal private key. In
particular, the DH public keys and XOR values are signed. Participants verify these signatures
upon receipt. Assuming that the personal public keys were distributed to all participants correctly,
these signatures prevent attacks by active network adversaries, since any modification of the
transmitted data would require forging a signature. TKLL is parameterized by a signing function
Sig(pk, sk, 𝑚) → 𝜎 that produces a digital signature 𝜎 for message 𝑚 using the personal key pair
(pk, sk), and a corresponding verification function SVerif(pk, 𝑚, 𝜎) → {0, 1} that outputs 1 if
and only if the signature 𝜎 on message 𝑚 is valid for the public verification key pk.
In general, this means that the authenticated form of TKLL involves keys from three different
public-key cryptosystems:
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1. The DH key pairs generated as part of the Simple KLL subprotocol come from a group in
which DH key exchanges are secure and efficient, such as Curve25519 [Ber06].
2. The key pairs associated with personal 𝑘-nodes come from a group defined by the higher-level
protocol. These keys are used in the digital signature scheme defined by the Sig and SVerif
functions provided by the higher-level protocol. As discussed later in this section, these keys
are also used in a multi-signature scheme.
3. The key pairs associated with internal 𝑘-nodes belong to the target key space. These keys
are generated by the KeyGen function provided by the higher-level protocol, which takes as
input a seed produced by the 𝐻 KDF.
In general, these three key spaces can be distinct. When TKLL is used by Safehouse in practice,
the second and third key spaces (associated with personal and internal 𝑘-nodes) are the same
key space used by the BRAKEM construction; key pairs from this space are used both as BRAKEM
encapsulation recipients and to produce digital signatures.
To defend against insider attacks such as equivocation, it is necessary to ensure that all
participants derive the same final state. The easiest way to accomplish this is to have each
participant digitally sign the final state (i.e., the key tree structure, the final public keys for the
𝑘-nodes, and the list of participants). While it would be possible to do this using a standard
digital signature scheme, the interactive nature of TKLL enables the use of a multi-signature:
an interactively generated signature of constant size that attests to a message being signed by
all of the participants. TKLL uses the MS-BN multi-signature scheme proposed by Bellare and
Neven [BN06]. MS-BN was chosen because it is a simple and highly efficient three-round multi-
signature scheme that is suitable for use with the key spaces defined by the BRAKEM constructions
in Chapter 8, it fits easily within TKLL’s communication rounds, and it does not require additional
security assumptions or additional key generation steps.⁶ The MS-BN implementation used in
TKLL must operate in the same key space as the one for the Sig and SVerif digital signature
scheme (i.e., the key space for personal keys), which is defined by the higher-level protocol.
6 ⋏There are many newer multi-signature schemes that provide superior features compared to MS-BN, such
as MuSig [MPSW19], MuSig2 [NRS20], and FROST [KG20], among others. However, all of these schemes
provide improved functionality by sacrificing performance or security in some regard, and none of the improved
functionality is necessary in this setting: MuSig and MuSig2 both require the “one-more discrete logarithm”
security assumption in the ROM, rather than the DL assumption already required by BRAKEM and TKLL; MuSig2
additionally requires the transmission of 𝑂(𝑁2) group elements (compared to 𝑂(𝑁) group elements for MS-
BN), where 𝑁 is the number of signers, in order to complete one round sooner; and FROST is a more general
threshold signature scheme that requires an interactive key setup. Given the simplicity of MS-BN and the lack of
improvement in its exact setting over the past 15 years, it seems likely that MS-BN will remain the best option for
use in TKLL for the foreseeable future.
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Consequently, TKLL is additionally parameterized by the following functions that implement
MS-BN in the target key space:
• MSBN.Sign1() → (𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1) implements round 1 of MS-BN. This function generates a ran-
dom DH key pair with private key 𝑟1 and public key 𝑅1, as well as a hash of 𝑅1 called 𝑡1. The
value 𝑡1 is expected to be sent to the other participants.
• Round 2 of MS-BN is implemented within TKLL and does not need to be provided as a function








𝑅, 𝑟1, 𝑥1, 𝑚) → (𝑠1) implements round 3 of MS-BN.
⃗⃗
𝐿 is a sequence of public
keys for the participants, including the caller, in arbitrary order.⁷ ⃗𝑡 is a sequence of 𝑡 values
received from the other participants, with 𝑡𝑖 being received from participant 𝐿𝑖. Likewise,
⃗⃗⃗
𝑅 is
a sequence of 𝑅 values with 𝑅𝑖 being received from participant 𝐿𝑖. 𝑟1 is the secret generated
by MSBN.Sign1, and 𝑥1 is the private key corresponding to 𝐿1. 𝑚 is the message to sign. The
output of the function is a response 𝑠1 that should be sent to the other participants, or ⊥ if










𝑅 are defined as in MSBN.Sign3. The sequence ?⃗? contains 𝑠 values such
that 𝑠𝑖 was received from participant 𝐿𝑖. The output of the function is a signature 𝜎 that





𝐿, 𝑚, 𝜎) → (𝑏) verifies an MS-BN multi-signature 𝜎. It returns 𝑏 = 1 if 𝜎 is a valid
signature produced by all private keys corresponding to the public keys in
⃗⃗
𝐿 on message 𝑚,
or 𝑏 = 0 otherwise.
It is relatively straightforward to implement these functions for a given key space using Bellare
and Neven’s definitions [BN06, §5]. For example, Algorithm 9.4 shows how to implement the
functions for the BRAKEMDDL key space using the group notation defined in Section 8.2.1.
To summarize, authentication in TKLL is achieved with three mechanisms: the externally
defined identification and authentication functions, digital signatures on the Simple KLL trans-
missions, and a multi-signature on the final state of the key tree. The unauthenticated version
of TKLL in Section 9.3 used three rounds of communication. The Compute-ID function cannot
7 ⋏MS-BN does not require that participants prove knowledge of their private keys. However, this occurs implicitly
in TKLL in practice, since all participants produce and broadcast digital signatures using their personal key pairs
prior to the completion of the MS-BN protocol.
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Algorithm 9.4 MS-BN multi-signature functions for the BRAKEMDDL key space. 𝐻0 and
𝐻1 are distinct cryptographic hash functions modeled by random oracles.
(Refs: 308, 310, 313, 320, and 321 a b)
Function MSBN.Sign1() → (𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1)
Choose 𝑟1
$←− [2, 𝑝3).
Compute 𝑅1 ← 𝑔2𝑟1 .
Compute 𝑡1 ← 𝐻0(𝑅1).







𝑅, 𝑟1, 𝑥1, 𝑚) → (𝑠1)
for (2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |
⃗⃗
𝐿|) {
if (𝑡𝑖 ≠ 𝐻0(𝑅𝑖)) { return ⊥ }
}
Compute 𝑅←∏︁ | ⃗𝐿 |
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 (mod 𝑝2).
Compute _, a unique encoding of
⃗⃗
𝐿.
Compute 𝑐1 ← 𝐻1(𝐿1∥𝑅∥_∥𝑚).






𝑅, ?⃗?) → (𝜎)
Compute 𝑅←∏︁ | ⃗𝐿 |
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑖 (mod 𝑝2)
↩→ (MSBN.Sign3 can cache 𝑅 for efficiency.)
Compute 𝑠← ∑︁ | ⃗𝐿 |
𝑖=1 𝑠𝑖 (mod 𝑝3).
return 𝜎 = (𝑅, 𝑠).
Function MSBN.Vf(
⃗⃗
𝐿, 𝑚, 𝜎) → (𝑏)
Interpret 𝜎 = (𝑅, 𝑠), returning 0 if decoding fails.
Compute _, a unique encoding of
⃗⃗
𝐿.
for (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |
⃗⃗
𝐿|) {
Compute 𝑐𝑖 ← 𝐻1(𝐿𝑖∥𝑅∥_∥𝑚).
}
Compute 𝐴 = 𝑔2𝑠.
Compute 𝐵 = 𝑅 ·





if (𝐴 ≠ 𝐵) { return 0 }
return 1.
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produce a long-term identity until key pairs have been established for all 𝑘-nodes on the path to
the calling participant’s 𝑢-node. This occurs after the second round, so the long-term identities
are generated and broadcast during the third round. Since Prove-ID requires the identities for
all participants, the authenticating NIZKPKs are generated and broadcast during a fourth round.
The digital signatures for the DH public keys and XOR values can be sent in the second round,
which is the earliest that these values are all known. These signatures are sufficient to protect
key secrecy against active network adversaries. The multi-signatures cannot be produced until
the key tree has been fully established. This occurs at the end of the third round, after the public
keys for all 𝑘-nodes have been distributed. Consequently, MSBN.Sign4 is called after the third
round, and the results are broadcast in the fourth round. The other parts of the multi-signature
scheme must take place earlier. The hashes produced by MSBN.Sign1 are distributed in the first
round, the commitments are distributed in the second round, and the responses produced by
MSBN.Sign3 are distributed in the third round. This completes the changes required to implement
the authentication mechanisms.
9.4.2 Formal Definition
The authenticated form of TKLL takes the following input parameters:
•
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗
ID: a sequence of numeric identifiers for the participants with the calling participant’s identifier
in the first position.
•
⃗⃗
𝐿: a sequence of personal public keys for the participants, in the same order as
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗
ID.
• 𝑇: the key tree to instantiate. The personal keys in 𝑇 will be populated with the keys in
⃗⃗
𝐿.
• sk: the private key corresponding to 𝐿1.
• An identification function Compute-ID and an authentication function Prove-ID.
• An implementation of a digital signature scheme given as two functions: Sig and SVerif.
• An implementation of MS-BN given as the following functions: MSBN.Sign1, MSBN.Sign3,
MSBN.Sign4, and MSBN.Vf (see Algorithm 9.4 for an example).
The function parameters are given implicitly; they are hard-coded in a real implementation with
a fixed key space. Participant 𝑖 is denoted 𝑈𝑖, where the index 𝑖 refers to the same order as
⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗
ID.
The output from TKLL contains the following values:
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• 𝑃∗: a mapping from 𝑘-nodes to public keys.
• 𝑄∗: a mapping from 𝑘-nodes to private keys, with one entry for every 𝑘-node on the path to
the 𝑢-node for 𝑈1.
• 𝐼∗: a mapping from participants to their identities, as produced by Compute-ID.
• Π∗: a mapping from participants to NIZKPKs authenticating their identities.
• 𝜎: a multi-signature proving that all participants accept the instantiation of the key tree given
by the other outputs.
Once TKLL has been performed, a “ciphertext” message containing (𝑇, 𝑃∗, 𝐼∗,Π∗, 𝜎) can be
prepared. This message can be sent to a set of recipients non-interactively. Once the recipients
verify that 𝜎 and the proofs in Π∗ are correct, they can “import” the key tree 𝑇 with public keys
𝑃∗ and identities 𝐼∗ into their state. This is the basis for the “mass join” operation in Safehouse.
TKLL requires four rounds of communication. Each round has a “prep” function that prepares
the required state, a “send” function that sends the required broadcasts for the round, and a
“receive” function that updates the state with the broadcasts received from other participants.
The rounds perform the following operations:
1. The first round of Simple KLL is performed for relevant 𝑘-nodes. The first round of MS-BN is
performed.
2. The second round of Simple KLL is performed. The second round of MS-BN is performed.
Representatives encrypt DH private keys to their subtrees.
3. The final key pairs are derived for each 𝑘-node. Representatives broadcast public keys for
𝑘-nodes to participants in other subtrees. The third round of MS-BN is performed. Identities
are generated and broadcast.
4. The fourth round of MS-BN is performed. Identity NIZKPKs are generated and broadcast.
The TKLL protocol is fully specified in Algorithm 9.5. The functions for each round are
defined by individual algorithms: round one in Algorithms 9.6, 9.7, and 9.8; round two in
Algorithms 9.9, 9.10, and 9.11; round three in Algorithms 9.12, 9.13, and 9.14; and round four
in Algorithms 9.15, 9.16, and 9.17. The generalized version of TKLL given by these algorithms
also works correctly for the edge case in which there is only one participant; 𝑇 must be a path
graph in this case. When there is only one participant, that participant unilaterally generates key
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pairs for all 𝑘-nodes without any transmissions and signs the result using the digital signature
scheme instead of MS-BN. For clarity, the TKLL pseudocode omits some validation of incoming
data. Real implementations should verify that incoming values are from valid ranges and that
elliptic curve points are contained in the expected group.
The TKLL pseudocode uses some notational conventions that extend the key tree notation
from Section 9.1:
• idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) denotes the index of 𝑣 in sibling𝑇 (𝑣), with 1 ≤ idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) ≤ |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) |.
• repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) is TRUE if 𝑣 is a 𝑘-node in 𝑇 such that the participant with personal 𝑘-node 𝑝
is represented by another participant in the GKE for parent𝑇 (𝑣). Otherwise, repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) is
FALSE. In other words, repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) is TRUE if and only if |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | ≥ 2 and the participant
with personal 𝑘-node 𝑝 is not associated with the “leftmost” 𝑢-node in the subtree rooted at
𝑣.
• path𝑇 (𝑝) denotes the sequence of 𝑘-nodes on the path from personal 𝑘-node 𝑝 (inclusive) to
the root of 𝑇 (exclusive). This sequence will contain depth𝑇 (𝑝) entries.
• 𝑁 denotes |userset(𝑇) |, the total number of participants.
• The “object” 𝑉 represents a convenient way to store complex state information between
function calls; this greatly simplifies the definitions. 𝑉 behaves like an object in Javascript:
when the code references a field 𝑉.field for the first time, this value is instantiated as an
“empty” version of the appropriate type (based on the context).
The prototype implementation of TKLL uses Curve25519 [Ber06] to implement Simple KLL
(as discussed in Section 9.2). The implementation includes two MS-BN instantiations for the key
spaces used by BRAKEMDDL and BRAKEMZK. The implementation instantiates Sig and SVerif for
the BRAKEMDDL key space using the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch91] and for the BRAKEMZK
key space using EdDSA.
Formal security proofs for TKLL are left as future work. Informally, the security of Simple KLL
and DH exchanges when the CDH problem is hard in the ROM ensures that honest participants
do not leak the new keys to adversaries. When the Enc cryptosystem is IND-CCA2 secure, the
DH private keys are also protected. Active network adversaries are defeated due to the digital
signatures applied to all DH and Simple KLL exchanges; this essentially follows from the security
of the Katz-Yung compiler. The only attacks that can be performed by malicious insiders are
equivocation-like attacks that result in honest participants reaching different states. However, the
multi-signature will only be valid if all honest participants agree about the final state, including
public keys that were established for 𝑘-nodes outside of their key sets. This mechanism prevents
insider attacks against any 𝑘-node that contains an honest user in its user set.
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𝐿, 𝑇, sk) → (𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗,Π∗, 𝜎)
Let 𝑉 be an empty object that can store GKE states.
Let 𝑝 be the personal key in 𝑇 for the caller (𝑈1).
(𝑉, 𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1) ← TKLL.Prep1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉).
Call TKLL.Send1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, 𝑡1).
(𝑉,
⃗
𝑡) ← TKLL.Receive1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, 𝑡1).
𝑉 ← TKLL.Prep2(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉).
Call TKLL.Send2(
⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗
ID, 𝐿1, 𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, sk).
𝑉 ← TKLL.Receive2(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉,
⃗⃗
𝐿).
(𝑉, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗) ← TKLL.Prep3(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉).





𝑡, 𝑃∗, 𝐼∗, 𝑅1).








𝑅, 𝑟1, sk, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗).
Call TKLL.Send4(𝑇,Π∗, 𝑠1).






𝑅, 𝑃∗,Π∗, 𝜎, 𝑠1).
return (𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗,Π∗, 𝜎).
Algorithm 9.6 TKLL round 1 preparation. The participant chooses a DH key pair and prepares the
multi-signature commitment. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Prep1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉) → (𝑉, 𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1)
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if (repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { break }
if ( |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | < 2) { continue }
𝑖← idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣).(︂






← Simple-KLL1(𝑖, |children𝑇 (𝑣) |).
}
(𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1) ← MSBN.Sign1().
return (𝑉, 𝑟1, 𝑅1, 𝑡1).
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Algorithm 9.7 TKLL round 1 outgoing transmissions. The participant sends compressed DH
public keys for each GKE and a hash of its multi-signature commitment. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Send1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, 𝑡1)
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if (repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { break }








to others in userset𝑇 (parent𝑇 (𝑣)).
}
if (𝑁 > 1) {
Broadcast 𝑡1 to others in userset(𝑇).
}
Algorithm 9.8 TKLL round 1 incoming transmissions. The participant decompresses the incoming
DH public keys and receives the hashes of the multi-signature commitments.
(Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Receive1(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, 𝑡1) → (𝑉,
⃗
𝑡)
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if ( |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | < 2) { continue }
for (𝑣′ ∈ sibling𝑇 (𝑣) with sibling index 𝑖) {
if (𝑖 = idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) && !repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { continue }







for (2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) {
Receive 𝑡𝑖 from 𝑈𝑖.
}
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Algorithm 9.9 TKLL round 2 preparation. The participant computes the “left” and “right” Simple KLL
DH shared secrets and the XOR values for each GKE. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Prep2(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉) → 𝑉
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if (repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { break }
if ( |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | < 2) { continue }
𝑖← idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣).
𝑙 ← 𝑉.𝑙(𝑣) .
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Algorithm 9.10 TKLL round 2 outgoing transmissions. The participant sends its Simple KLL XOR
values. The participant encrypts and sends the DH private keys for each GKE in which it is a
representative. It then signs all outgoing Simple KLL transmissions. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Send2(
⃗⃗⃗⃗ ⃗
ID, 𝐿1, 𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉, sk)
^← ⊥.
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if (repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { break }
if ( |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | < 2) { continue }
𝑖← idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣).

























to others in userset𝑇 (parent𝑇 (𝑣)).
}











Chapter 9 TKLL: A New Interactive Group Key Exchange
Algorithm 9.11 TKLL round 2 incoming transmissions. The participant receives the Simple KLL
XOR values, the DH private key ciphertexts sent by the participant’s representatives, and the
signatures for Simple KLL transmissions. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Receive2(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉,
⃗⃗
𝐿) → 𝑉
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if ( |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) | < 2) { continue }
for (𝑣′ ∈ sibling𝑇 (𝑣) with sibling index 𝑖) {
if (𝑖 = idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) && !repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { continue }
Let 𝑗 be the index in
⃗⃗
𝐿 for the representative for 𝑣′.

















if (!SVerif(𝐿 𝑗, ID 𝑗∥𝑉.𝑋 (𝑣)𝑗 , 𝜎
(𝑣)
𝑗
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Algorithm 9.12 TKLL round 3 preparation. The participant derives the final key pairs for 𝑘-nodes on
its path and computes an identity. (Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Prep3(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑉) → (𝑉, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗)
𝑧 ← ⊥. ^← ⊥.
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
Let 𝑛 = |sibling𝑇 (𝑣) |.
if (𝑛 < 2) {
if (𝑧 = ⊥) {
Generate a random group key preimage and store it in 𝑉.𝑧 (𝑣) .
} else {
𝑉.𝑧 (𝑣) ← KDF2(𝑧).
}




if (𝑖 > 1) { Let 𝑙 = 𝑖 − 1 } else { Let 𝑙 = 𝑛 }












does not correspond to 𝑉.𝑋 (𝑣)
𝑖






















if (𝑌 ′ ≠ 𝑉.𝑌 (𝑣)
𝑖

























if (𝑉.𝑧 (𝑣) = ⊥) { Abort }
𝑧 ← 𝑉.𝑧 (𝑣) .
^← 𝑉.𝑡 (𝑣)1,2 .
}
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(︁𝐻 (︁𝑉.𝑧 (𝑣) )︁ )︁ .
Add mapping parent𝑇 (𝑣) → pk to 𝑃∗ and parent𝑇 (𝑣) → sk to 𝑄∗.
}
Add mapping 𝑈1 → Compute-ID(𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) to 𝐼∗.
return (𝑉, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗).
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Algorithm 9.13 TKLL round 3 outgoing transmissions. The participant distributes the public keys
for 𝑘-nodes that it represents, then broadcasts its identity and multi-signature commitment.
(Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Send3(𝑇, 𝑝, 𝑃∗, 𝐼∗, 𝑅1)
for (𝑣 ∈ path𝑇 (𝑝)) {
if (parent𝑇 (𝑣) is the root of 𝑇) { continue }
if (repped𝑇,𝑝(𝑣)) { continue }
if (idx𝑇,𝑝(𝑣) ≠ 1) { continue }
Locate parent𝑇 (𝑣) → pk in 𝑃∗.
Broadcast mapping parent𝑇 (𝑣) → pk to others in userset(𝑇) \ userset𝑇 (parent𝑇 (𝑣)).
}
Locate 𝑈1 → 𝐼 in 𝐼∗.
Broadcast 𝐼∥𝑅1 to others in userset(𝑇).
Algorithm 9.14 TKLL round 3 incoming transmissions. The participant receives the public keys
for 𝑘-nodes outside its path, the other participants’ identities, and the multi-signature com-
mitments.
(Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Receive3(𝑇,
⃗
𝑡, 𝑃∗, 𝐼∗, 𝑅1) → (𝑃∗, 𝐼∗,
⃗⃗⃗
𝑅)
for (𝑘-node 𝑣 in 𝑇 such that 𝑈1 ∉ userset𝑇 (𝑣)) {
Let 𝑈𝑖 be the participant with the “leftmost” 𝑢-node in the subtree rooted at 𝑣.
Receive mapping 𝑣→ pk from 𝑈𝑖.
Add mapping 𝑣→ pk to 𝑃∗.
}
for (2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) {
Receive 𝐼𝑖∥𝑅𝑖 from 𝑈𝑖.
Add mapping 𝑈𝑖 → 𝐼𝑖 to 𝐼∗.
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Algorithm 9.15 TKLL round 4 preparation. The participant finalizes the multi-signature to approve









𝑅, 𝑟1, sk, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗, 𝐼∗) → (Π∗, 𝜎, 𝑠1)
Let 𝑚 be a unique encoding of
(︁ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗ID, ⃗⃗𝐿, 𝑇, 𝑃∗)︁ .
Add 𝑈1 → Prove-ID(𝐼∗, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) to Π∗.
if (𝑁 < 2) {














return (Π∗, 𝜎, 𝑠1).
Algorithm 9.16 TKLL round 4 outgoing transmissions. The participant broadcasts its multi-
signature contribution and its proof of identity.
(Refs: 311 and 313)
Subroutine TKLL.Send4(𝑇,Π∗, 𝑠1)
if (𝑁 ≥ 2) {
Locate 𝑈1 → 𝜋1 in Π∗.
Broadcast 𝑠1∥𝜋1 to others in userset(𝑇).
}
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Algorithm 9.17 TKLL round 4 incoming transmissions. The participant receives the other par-
ticipants’ multi-signature contributions and identity proofs. It derives and verifies the final







𝑅, 𝑃∗,Π∗, 𝜎, 𝑠1) → (Π∗, 𝜎)
for (2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁) {
Receive 𝑠𝑖∥𝜋𝑖 from 𝑈𝑖.
Add mapping 𝑈𝑖 → 𝜋𝑖 to Π∗.
}
if (𝑁 ≥ 2) {








Let 𝑚 be a unique encoding of
(︁ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗ID, ⃗⃗𝐿, 𝑇, 𝑃∗)︁ .
if (MSBN.Vf(
⃗⃗




Chapter 9 TKLL: A New Interactive Group Key Exchange
9.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced TKLL, a new interactive GKE. While GKEs typically establish a single
shared key for all participants, TKLL creates multiple key pairs to instantiate a given key tree.
This procedure takes only four rounds of communication, no matter how complex the key tree is.
Section 9.1 introduced notation for key trees that will be used in subsequent chapters. Section 9.2
introduced a sub-protocol called Simple KLL: this is an unauthenticated two-round GKE that
is essentially the BD protocol [BD94] using the “XOR” operator as in KLL [KLL04]. Section 9.3
introduced the unauthenticated version of TKLL and worked through a specific example. TKLL
operates by performing a Simple KLL GKE for each 𝑘-node in the key tree. For 𝑘-nodes closer
to the root, the Simple KLL protocol is executed by representatives for each subtree. These
representatives efficiently encrypt the private key material for the GKE to the other participants in
their subtree. The protocol covers several edge cases in order to operate correctly and efficiently
for any key tree shape. Section 9.4 formally defined TKLL with authentication mechanisms
incorporated. The full TKLL protocol is secure against active network adversaries and insider
attacks. The participants also exchange identities and authenticate themselves as part of the
protocol. The identification functions are given by the higher-level protocol in order to support
arbitrary identification schemes, including schemes that generate dynamic identities based on
partial TKLL results. The output of TKLL is a set of values that can be sent to existing participants
in a secure group messaging scheme in order to non-interactively prove that the key tree was
established correctly and that all participants have the same view of the final state.
The TKLL protocol can be used to efficiently implement the “mass join” operation in Safehouse.
BRAKEM (defined in Chapter 8) and TKLL are the two core sub-protocols required to define





Secure Group Messaging Solution
In this chapter: Protocol Evaluation
S
afehouse is a new cryptographic protocol designed to solve the difficult cryptographic
problems at the heart of any secure groupmessaging scheme, allowing the developer to
concentrate on the desired high-level functionality.1 Chapter 7 outlined the objectives
of the Safehouse protocol’s design and explained how these objectives were derived from usability
studies and the current group messaging landscape. This chapter presents the Safehouse protocol,
which makes heavy use of BRAKEM (see Chapter 8) and TKLL (see Chapter 9). To achieve its
objectives, Safehouse provides several features that enable the construction of protocols for the
target applications described in Chapter 7. At its core, Safehouse establishes an internal secret
group key that is shared by all members of the group. Safehouse provides an interface for the
developer to derive application-specific shared keys from the group key. It also optionally provides
sender-specific signing keys, an invitation mechanism, authentication of long-term identities with
anonymity preservation, and authenticated storage of arbitrary developer-supplied attributes
with optional encryption. The developer can choose which features to use based on hard-coded
rules in their application, or based on authenticated group attributes. Notably, Safehouse does
not impose a protocol for the actual transmission of payload messages; it is up to the developer
to use keys derived from the group key and signing keys in any way they wish. This makes
Safehouse equally suitable for sending encrypted text messages with strong reliability guarantees
and broadcasting time-sensitive multimedia data in interactive video conferences. However,
developers are strongly encouraged to use IND-CCA2 cryptosystems to encrypt payload messages
in order to detect misbehavior by the server.
Section 10.1 introduces notation and provides an overview of Safehouse’s design. Sec-
tions 10.2–10.8 discuss algorithms used internally by Safehouse. Sections 10.9.2, 10.9.3, and
10.10 introduce the interface for Safehouse; the functions in these sections are used by the devel-
oper to actually implement a secure group messaging protocol. Section 10.11 discusses a modular
component of Safehouse that is a target for future algorithmic optimization work. Section 10.12
1 ⋏The latest version of the Safehouse protocol will be published at safehouse.im.
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describes how the developer is expected to use the functions exposed by Safehouse’s interface.
Finally, Section 10.13 presents the results of a performance evaluation in which Safehouse was
used to simulate realistic conversation transcripts.
10.1 Safehouse Design Overview
This section provides an overview of the Safehouse protocol design and how it securely provides
the functionality described in Chapter 7. Section 10.1.1 defines core terminology and describes
how the various parties interact in the Safehouse protocol, Section 10.1.2 summarizes the data
stored by participants, and Section 10.1.3 outlines the major subsystems in Safehouse and their
responsibilities. The remaining sections discuss the purpose of the data listed in Section 10.1.2
and the subsystems associated with each field.
10.1.1 Agents and Transmissions
The parties that participate in the Safehouse protocol are called agents. This excludes the
adversary and other outsiders. The participants that are in the group and have access to the
group key are called members. The semi-trusted server that relays transmissions between the
members is also an agent. Together, the one or more members and the one server constitute all
of the agents.
Each execution of the Safehouse protocol is called a session. Sessions are independent. At
any point in time, a session is associated with a specific set of members. Members may join and
leave a session over the course of its lifetime. If a developer wants to implement a system that
supports simultaneous group conversations with different sets of members, they must create a
separate Safehouse session for each conversation. Only the members’ long-term identities persist
between sessions—and only if the developer has chosen to enable long-term authentication.
Each member is identified by a numeric identifier called an agent ID. Every member must
have a unique agent ID in the context of a session. In particular, the same agent ID may refer to
different members that are in the session at different times, as long as no two members share an
agent ID simultaneously at any point. Moreover, since each Safehouse session is independent,
an agent that is a member in multiple sessions may have a different agent ID in each session.
The developer controls how agent IDs are assigned when new members join a session. From
Safehouse’s perspective, agent IDs are opaque tokens. The intention is that agent IDs can be
used to link entities in the Safehouse session with other data in the higher-level protocol.
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Each agent stores a public state and a private state for the Safehouse session. The combination
of an agent’s public state and private state is called a group state. The server’s private state is
always empty, whereas members’ private states contain cryptographic secrets that must not be
disclosed. In particular, members’ private states contain the group key. Agents do not need to
store any historical states.
An agent’s group state changes over time, and the group key changes every time that the
group state is updated. An old group state is transformed into a new group state by a special data
blob called a commit (and in no other way).2 Commits are created by members and consumed by
agents. To create a commit, a member begins by locally initializing a performer context with the
old group state. Within the performer context, the member performs one or more operations that
modify the group state in specific ways (e.g., issuing invitations or removing members from the
group).3 Once it has performed all of the desired operations, the member finishes the performer
context; this procedure produces a commit and the corresponding new group state with all of
the operations applied. To consume a commit, an agent locally initializes a receiver context with
the old group state and the commit. The agent then performs one or more operations within
the receiver context. Once complete, the agent applies the receiver context.⁴ If the operations
performed in the receiver context exactly match the operations performed in the performer
context that produced the commit, then applying the receiver context yields the corresponding
new group state with all of the operations applied; otherwise, the receiver context will report an
error and completely discard the pending changes to the group state.
The typical data flow in the Safehouse protocol is that a member creates a commit and
sends it to the server, the server applies the commit, the server relays the commit to the other
members, and then the other members apply the commit. Note that all agents, including the
server, apply commits using receiver contexts, but the server cannot create commits—the server
cannot initialize a performer context. Commits can only be created by existing members or by
new members that are authorized to join the group.⁵ Commits are always digitally signed. In
2 ⋏ Safehouse commits are analogous to CGKA commits, as defined in Section 4.4.
3 ⋏ Safehouse operations are analogous to CGKA proposals, as defined in Section 4.4
4 ⋏The Safehouse receiver context is analogous to the CGKA “process” function, as defined in Section 4.4.
5 ⋏This differs from MLS, which allows designated outsiders to initiate group state updates in certain situations.
For example, MLS can be configured to allow servers authenticated with pre-approved signing keys to add or
remove group members [BBM+20, §10.1.4]. A developer can achieve a similar result with Safehouse in some
situations by making the server collaborate with a member: when the server wants a commit to be performed,
it can refuse to relay commits (and possibly payloads) from members until one of them performs the required
commit. The developer can introduce a signaling mechanism for these desired commits and configure the client
so that it automatically responds to the server’s requests. However, it remains true that a Safehouse server can
never unilaterally initiate group updates. This approach is limited to situations in which the server can verify that
a commit performed its requested operations.
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most cases, a commit is signed by an ephemeral key known only to the specific group member
that created the commit. In certain situations where anonymity (among the group members) is
required, a commit may be signed by an ephemeral key that is shared by all group members. In
either case, the signature cryptographically prevents outsiders from producing commits.
Most operations in the Safehouse protocol accept parameters (e.g., the data to add to the
group attributes or the expiry date for a new invitation). The notion of performer and receiver
contexts is quite powerful because it does not specify the source of these parameters. Moreover,
parameter data is not included in commits. The developer is responsible for deciding which
members create commits, what operations they perform, what parameters they use, and when
this occurs. The developer specifies these rules as an algorithm called the group policy. In many
applications, the arguments used for the parameters and the timing of operations is derived from
transmissions in a higher-level protocol such as XMPP or a proprietary messaging platform. When
this is not the case, the developer can choose to encode operation lists and arguments alongside
Safehouse commits without issue; an active network adversary cannot modify arguments attached
to a commit without causing the receiver contexts to fail to apply the commit, which is equivalent
to simply dropping the commit entirely.
The group state is updated when a performer context is finished or when a receiver context
is applied. In both cases, the agent performs operations within a context. In this chapter, the
operations are defined in terms of a generic update context. In practice, the update context
is either a performer context or a receiver context. The operation definitions occasionally use
conditional statements based on whether the update context is a performer or receiver context.
In either case, the agent executing the operation is referred to as the processing agent. This
method of definition is convenient because the algorithm for an operation is nearly identical for
both performers and receivers: the only difference is that data is written to a commit within
a performer context, whereas it is read from a commit within a receiver context. In fact, it
is beneficial for operations in real Safehouse implementations to use the same code for both
contexts. The operations defined in this chapter refer to the member that executed the performer
context as 𝑈perf, and to the agent executing the update context (regardless of whether it is a
performer context or a receiver context) as 𝑈proc. Note that a commit is produced by a single
member 𝑈perf, whereas every agent applying the commit has a different identifier 𝑈proc.
Readers may notice that the “commit” terminology is reminiscent of the git version control
system. This is no accident: group states in Safehouse behave similarly to common git work-
flows.⁶ When Safehouse agents begin with the same public state and apply the same sequence of
commits, they will always end up with the same public state. However, honest members always
6 ⋏The process is similar to a git workflow in which users push commits to an authoritative central server that is
configured to only accept fast-forwards.
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have different private states; although the private states may include some common private key
material, each member always knows at least one private key that is not known by any other
entity. The server is responsible for ensuring that all members apply the same commits in the
same order. When the server applies a commit to its own public state, it must store the commit
and send it to members upon request. This is how Safehouse provides non-interactivity: members
can disconnect from the server for a period of time and then receive the sequence of commits that
they missed upon reconnecting. Once the commits are applied, the member ends up with the
same public state as other up-to-date members. However, the server should not store commits
indefinitely, because the maximum length of time that commits are available sets an upper bound
on the forward secrecy period: if the adversary corrupts a member’s private state, they will be
able to recover the group keys for all subsequent states by applying the appropriate commits.
The forward secrecy period is the maximum amount of time before group keys can no longer
be compromised due to the adversary compromising a private state. In practice, the developer
configures the forward secrecy period, all members automatically delete their private state when
they have not been able to connect to the server within the forward secrecy period, and the server
only stores past commits that were sent within the forward secrecy period. Lengthening the
forward secrecy period allows members to be disconnected for longer periods of time without
having to rejoin the group, but it also allows the adversary to compromise more messages when
corrupting an offline member.
The server is “semi-trusted” because it is responsible for storing and forwarding commits,
ensuring the application of a consistent sequence of commits, and automatically deleting commits
older than the forward secrecy period. If a malicious server refuses to forward commits, then it
essentially performs a denial-of-service attack; keys derived from the group key for one group
state will not match keys derived from the group key for a different group state, preventing the
successful transmission of messages that have been encrypted using a derived key.⁷ A similar effect
occurs if a malicious server delivers a different sequence of commits to different members, except
that Safehouse guarantees that there is no possible recovery in this scenario: it is intentionally
impossible to “merge” group states that have diverged due to a misbehaving server. These attacks
that “fork” the group can be made more difficult by replacing the “server” with a set of non-
colluding servers that implement the same functionality using a Byzantine fault-tolerant protocol:
the honest subset of servers will be able to detect misbehaving servers that do not correctly apply
commits in the expected order. Implementing this approach is outside the scope of this work. An
honest-but-curious server that stores old public states is not helpful to an adversary; the adversary
can learn confidential information only by compromising group members that were entitled to
access the confidential information.
7 ⋏ The messages will be immediately rejected if the developer encrypts payloads using an IND-CCA2 cryptosystem,
as suggested. Otherwise, payloads will be malleable and can be altered by an active adversary.
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The public state stored by the server is considered to be the authoritative “current” public
state for the session. Members are only able to communicate if they have the same public state
(and therefore matching group keys in their private states). Since the server has access to the
same public state as the members, the developer-provided group policy that determines which
operations can be applied and by whom is able to use all elements of the public state as input.
When all agents, including the server, are configured with a consistent group policy, the server
is able to reject commits from malicious clients that violate the rules. Consequently, protocols
using Safehouse can rely on an honest server to reject malicious group updates before they are
forwarded to other group members. If a malicious server forwards the invalid commits anyway,
the members will still reject them. The ability to drop malicious commits at the server reduces
the bandwidth cost of blocking insider attacks.
10.1.2 Group State
The public state for a Safehouse session, PS, contains a variety of information stored in 11 named
fields. Safehouse ensures that the contents of the public state are authenticated and that all
members eventually derive the same public state. The following fields are stored in the public
state:
• PS.𝐻: a state hash, discussed in Section 10.1.3.
• PS.𝐺: the key graph, discussed in Section 10.1.4.
• PS.𝑃: the public key map, discussed in Section 10.1.4.
• PS.𝑋: the exhausted key set, discussed in Section 10.1.5.
• PS.𝑆: the superfluous edges, discussed in Section 10.1.5.
• PS.𝑀: the developer mode, discussed in Section 10.1.6.
• PS.𝐴: the public label-value store,⁸ discussed in Section 10.1.7.
• PS.𝐸: the confidential label-value store, discussed in Section 10.1.7.
• PS.𝐼: the identity table, discussed in Section 10.1.8.
8 ⋏Data structures of this type are normally described as “key-value tables”. Since the word “key” already has many
other meanings in the context of Safehouse, the data structures are referred to herein as “label-value stores”
containing “label-value pairs” for clarity.
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• PS.𝑈: the unblinding ciphertext table, discussed in Section 10.1.8.
• PS.𝐿: the layaway table, discussed in Section 10.1.9.
Key trees—a special case of a key graph in which the graph is a tree structure—were described in
depth in Section 9.1. Where applicable, this chapter reuses the key tree notation in the context
of key graphs when discussing PS.𝐺.
The private state for a session is denoted SS. Generally speaking, the information contained
in a private state is different for each member. The private state contains data in the following
structures:
• SS.𝐾: the group key.
• SS.𝑄: the private key map, discussed in Section 10.1.4.
• SS.𝐸: the label-value secrets, discussed in Section 10.1.7.
• SS.𝑈: the unblinding secrets, discussed in Section 10.1.8.
Establishing the group key stored in the private state, SS.𝐾, is the main goal of Safehouse. SS.𝐾
is a secret key shared by all members. It is not directly exposed to developers. Instead, Safehouse
exposes a function that uses a KDF to derive an application-specific shared secret key from SS.𝐾
in the context of a given domain separation string. The developer can use derived keys for any
purpose. Typically, a derived key is used to encrypt payload messages.
10.1.3 Operational Layers
The design of Safehouse incorporates several interconnected subsystems. Figure 10.1 depicts
these subsystems and the functional dependencies between them. This section provides a brief
overview of the subsystems and how they interact.
Section 10.1.1 discussed the notion of update contexts. Developers are expected to store the
group state (as outlined in Section 10.1.2) for each agent, and to modify the group state using
update contexts. The developer-visible operations that are performed in these update contexts
are part of the “MLS layer” of the design. While these operations have nothing to do with the
IETF MLS protocol discussed in Section 4.3, they are named this way because they effectively
provide the same “message security” functionality (in addition to Safehouse’s extra features).
Each operation performed in an update context alters the group state in some way. Consequently,
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Developer’s Application
Interface functions
Section 10.9 (5 pages)
MLS
Section 10.10 (17 pages)
LVSM
Section 10.7 (22 pages)
KGM
Section 10.5 (10 pages)
BRAKEM
Contextual BRAKEM: Section 10.2 (5 pages)
Single BRAKEM: Section 10.3 (2 pages)
Contextual KeyGen: Section 10.4 (1 page)
Constructions: Chapter 8 (120 pages)
KC
Overview: Section 10.6 (4 pages)
Constructions: Section 10.11 (23 pages)
Authentication NIZKPKs
Section 10.8 (20 pages)
TKLL
Chapter 9 (33 pages)
Figure 10.1 Safehouse subsystems. Directed edges indicate dependencies. For ease of presentation,
this figure omits direct dependencies that are already captured by the transitive relationships. The
KGM layer depends on the interface provided by the KC subsystem, but KC constructions depend on
operations provided by the KGM layer. (Ref: 329)
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update contexts that include more than one operation will implicitly result in an intermediate
group state between operations. The context keeps track of the current intermediate group state
as operations are performed. Operations in the MLS layer are guaranteed to begin and end
with a safe group state—a state that can be used to encrypt payloads while providing all of the
expected security guarantees. Since the only operations that the developer can perform are from
the MLS layer, the developer can only interact with safe group states. The set of MLS operations
is covered in Section 10.10.
The public API of Safehouse consists of the aforementioned MLS-layer operations (which
modify the group state), and several interface functions that interact with the group state without
modifying it. The interface functions in the API are used to derive keys from the group key,
serialize and deserialize group states, and sign messages. Section 10.9 describes the interface
functions.
The state hash, PS.𝐻, helps to ensure that divergent group states can never be “merged” by
the adversary. After each MLS operation, PS.𝐻 is set to a hash of the previous value and the
commit that caused the group state to change. Consequently, PS.𝐻 is derived from the entire
history of the group state. All MLS operations partially derive the new group key from the new
value of PS.𝐻. This ensures that members with diverging group state histories will never be able
to communicate, which is an important aspect of Safehouse’s insider security guarantees.
The operations in the MLS layer are quite complex. Internally, most of these operations are
implemented using developer-inaccessible operations from lower layers of the design. The Key
Graph Manipulation (KGM) layer is an internal subsystem consisting of various operations that
alter the key graph in the group state. These operations primarily replace keys associated with
𝑘-nodes by performing BRAKEM transfers (introduced in Chapter 8) and including the resulting
ciphertext and NIZKPKs in the commit. Unlike MLS-layer operations, KGM-layer operations are
not required to produce intermediate group states that can securely encrypt payloads. Many KGM-
layer operations produce unsafe group states. All MLS-layer operations ensure that the group
state is safe after performing KGM-layer operations; this procedure is discussed in Section 10.1.5.
The set of KGM operations is covered in Section 10.5.
Similarly to the KGM layer, the Label-Value Store Manipulation (LVSM) layer contains internal
operations that modify the label-value store in the group state. These operations create, update,
or delete values in either the public (PS.𝐴) or confidential (PS.𝐸) label-value stores, along with
their corresponding secrets. In addition to modifying the data stored in the state by the developer,
the LVSM layer also includes operations to modify the unblinding ciphertext table (PS.𝑈). The
LVSM layer is covered in Section 10.7.
Finally, one of the most important components of Safehouse is the Key Control (KC) subsystem.
The KC subsystem is responsible for controlling the shape of the key graph in the group state
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as members are added to and removed from the session. The shape of the key graph greatly
impacts the performance of the scheme: more 𝑘-nodes in the graph tends to lead to more efficient
BRAKEM transfers (because fewer recipients are needed to provide the required user set), but
more keys to update over time and as the session’s membership changes. The Safehouse prototype
includes several different implementations of the KC API, each causing the key graph to take on a
different shape. The best key graph shape to use depends on which MLS operations the developer
performs; in general, finding the optimal KC implementation for a given application is a difficult
problem that is left to future work. The API provided by the KC subsystem is responsible for
six features: initializing the key graph for a new group, keeping track of the structure as KGM
operations are performed, efficiently encoding and decoding the group state, identifying the
minimal set of 𝑘-nodes that contain all members in the union of their user sets, performing an
interactive protocol as part of the mass join feature that produces a data blob called a joining
commit, and implementing an operation that takes a joining commit as a parameter in an update
context and adds members to the session. The KGM layer uses the KC API to guide some of
its modifications to the group state. In turn, actual implementations of the KC API perform
operations provided by the KGM layer. A more detailed description of the KC subsystem is given
in Section 10.11.
10.1.4 The Key Graph
The key graph for the group, PS.𝐺, is defined as a set of 𝑢-nodes, a set of 𝑘-nodes, and the set
of directed edges (which all have a 𝑘-node as a destination). This key graph is what provides
the core functionality of Safehouse: establishing a shared group key for a group with dynamic
membership. At a minimum, for each member in the session, the key graph PS.𝐺 contains one
𝑢-node for the member and an attached 𝑘-node called a personal key. The personal key has exactly
one incoming edge from a 𝑢-node. 𝑘-nodes that are not personal keys are called non-personal
keys or intermediate 𝑘-nodes. The labels for the 𝑢-nodes in the key graph are the agent IDs for the
members, while the labels for 𝑘-nodes are arbitrarily assigned distinct numbers. The personal
key associated with a 𝑢-node 𝑈 is denoted by personal(𝑈). PS.𝑃 is a bijection from the 𝑘-nodes
in PS.𝐺 to their corresponding public keys. As a notational convenience, the public key in PS.𝑃
associated with a personal key is called the personal public key, and the corresponding private
key is called the personal private key. In general, the key graph is altered by using a BRAKEM
scheme to introduce new key pairs as part of a commit. When a new set of members joins the
group, they first use TKLL (introduced in Chapter 9) to establish a key tree that is merged into
the existing key graph. The group key, SS.𝐾, can be updated using new key material that is sent
to the whole group using BRAKEM, but SS.𝐾 itself is a separate secret key that is not directly
represented in the key graph.
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SS.𝑄 contains all of the private keys in the key graph known to the member. It is a map from
a subset of the 𝑘-nodes in PS.𝐺 to their corresponding private keys. There is exactly one entry
in the map stored by member 𝑈 for every 𝑘-node such that 𝑘 ∈ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈)⁹ or (𝑈, 𝑘) ∈ PS.𝑆.
The contents of PS.𝑆 are discussed in the next section.
During normal operation, Safehouse does not create multiple 𝑘-nodes associated with the
same public key. Malicious insiders can easily cause this to occur, but doing so does not undermine
the security properties: the effects are equivalent to the malicious member sending private keys
to honest members or to the adversary. In any case, any public keys chosen by malicious insiders
(for which the associated private keys may have been improperly shared) are guaranteed to be
replaced with fresh key material when the malicious insiders are removed from the group.
For ease of presentation, the algorithms described in this chapter sometimes refer to 𝑘-nodes
based on the public key associated with them in PS.𝑃. This avoids the need to assign separate
names to the keys and the 𝑘-nodes in contexts where the meaning is always clear. This is purely a
notational convenience; actual Safehouse implementations keep track of 𝑘-nodes based on node
identifiers instead of the associated public keys, thereby preventing confusion in the event that a
malicious insider forces multiple 𝑘-nodes to have the same public key.
10.1.5 Superfluous and Exhausted Keys
In some circumstances, it is necessary for a member𝑈 to perform an operation that replaces a pub-
lic key pk in PS.𝑃 with a new one, even though the associated 𝑘-node may not be in keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈).
Since the caller of BRAKEM.Encapsulate learns the new private key sk∗, an operation like this
results in a private key being learned by a member that should not know it. This fact needs to
be stored in the public state; otherwise, a subsequent attempt to evict 𝑈 from the session might
fail to replace all private key material known to 𝑈, potentially allowing a malicious 𝑈 to covertly
decrypt new ciphertexts. PS.𝑆 is a bipartite graph that contains superfluous edges recording this
information. Each edge contained in PS.𝑆 connects a 𝑢-node to a 𝑘-node in PS.𝐺; if the edge
connects the 𝑢-node for 𝑈 to the 𝑘-node labeled 𝑘, then it is said that 𝑈 has superfluous knowledge
of the private key corresponding to 𝑘. In other words, 𝑈 has knowledge of the private key, but
this is undesirable. In this sense, the key graph in PS.𝐺 encodes the desired state of private
key knowledge, while PS.𝑆 encodes the difference between the desired state and reality. Some
operations create superfluous edges, and others eliminate them. The concept of superfluous
edges is very similar to the “tainted key” notion used in TTKEM, as discussed in Section 4.5.
9 ⋏This notation was defined in Section 9.1 along with other functions related to key graphs. Recall that
keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈) denotes all 𝑘-nodes in PS.𝐺 known to 𝑈 (i.e., 𝑘-nodes which can be reached from 𝑈 ’s 𝑢-node).
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As part of the algorithms to perform operations in an update context, members typically
perform one or more BRAKEM transfers. The BRAKEM ciphertexts are stored in the commit,
which is eventually transmitted over an adversarially controlled network. If the adversary records
a BRAKEM ciphertext, the adversary subsequently corrupts a member, and that member has a
private key in SS.𝑄 corresponding to one of the BRAKEM recipients, then the adversary will be
able to compromise the transferred private key. This type of attack can damage forward secrecy
in certain situations; in particular, without additional mitigations, this attack would continue to
be applicable for the entire forward secrecy period under most circumstances, because that is
the maximum time until all BRAKEM targets must be replaced. Luckily, it is possible to thwart
the attack much more quickly, because there is an inexpensive way to non-interactively, publicly
verifiably, and irreversibly replace a key pair with a new one, as long as the user set for the
associated 𝑘-node does not change.
Whenever an operation performs a BRAKEM transfer, the recipient 𝑘-nodes are added to
the exhausted key set, PS.𝑋 . An “exhausted key” is a key that needs to be replaced at the
end of the commit in order to preserve forward secrecy. The group state is unsafe (as defined
in Section 10.1.3) whenever PS.𝑋 ≠ ∅, so any MLS-layer operation must replace the keys
associated with the 𝑘-nodes in PS.𝑋 before completing; there is no such requirement for KGM-
layer operations. Efficiently replacing all of these keys can be done as long as the key space used
by the BRAKEM scheme supports the following functions:
• MixPK(pk, pk∗) → pk′ takes two public keys as input, pk and pk∗, and produces a “mixed”
public key pk′.
• MixSK(sk, sk∗) → sk′ takes two private keys as input, sk and sk∗, and produces a “mixed”
private key sk′. Given public keys pk and pk∗ with associated private keys sk and sk∗, if
MixPK(pk, pk∗) → pk′ and MixSK(sk, sk∗) → sk′, then (pk′, sk′) is a valid key pair.
These functions are trivial to implement for the BRAKEM constructions defined in Chapter 8. For
BRAKEMDDL★ (see Section 8.2.1 for notation):
• MixPK(𝑔2𝑥1 , 𝑔2𝑥2) → 𝑔2𝑥1 · 𝑔2𝑥2 .
• MixSK(𝑥1, 𝑥2) → 𝑥1 + 𝑥2.
For BRAKEMZK (see Section 8.5.2 for notation):
• MixPK(𝑥1𝐵, 𝑥2𝐵) → 𝑥1𝐵 + 𝑥2𝐵.
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• MixSK(𝑥1, 𝑥2) → 𝑥1 + 𝑥2.
At the end of every MLS operation, if PS.𝑋 ≠ ∅, then the performer performs a BRAKEM transfer
to all members. The newly transferred public key is used to update all 𝑘-nodes in PS.𝑋 by using
MixPK. Members with associated private keys in SS.𝑄 use MixSK with the newly transferred
private key to derive the updated private keys. PS.𝑋 is then set to ∅, and all members discard the
newly transferred private key. Since the newly transferred private key is never stored by honest
members, the adversary cannot recover a private key that was previously used as a BRAKEM
target by corrupting a member that has applied the commit. In other words, the exhausted key
mechanism is necessary to ensure that the adversary cannot recover private keys that were used
only prior to the corrupted member’s stored group state.
10.1.6 Configurable Behavior
In order to satisfy all of the requirements discussed in Chapter 7, several aspects of Safehouse’s
behavior can be configured by the developer. As discussed in Section 10.1.3, the developer is
responsible for choosing a BRAKEM construction and a KC implementation. These settings are
unchangeable during the lifetime of a Safehouse session. The choice of a BRAKEM construction
establishes the key space used by Safehouse, which affects the implementation of multiple
subsystems. For example, the BRAKEM construction dictates the implementation of theMixPK and
MixSK functions (discussed in Section 10.1.5), the label-value store (discussed in Section 10.1.7),
the identification system (discussed in Section 10.1.8), and the authentication system (discussed
in Section 10.1.9). Typically, the BRAKEM and KC systems to use are hard-coded as part of the
secure messaging tool.
There are four additional Safehouse settings that the developer must specify: the deniability
mode, the authentication ephemerality, whether invitations are issued anonymously, and whether
post-compromise security is enabled. Safehouse can operate in a non-repudiable mode (where it
is possible to cryptographically prove message authorship to third parties), an offline deniable
mode, or a strongly deniable mode (with both offline and online deniability).1⁰ In terms of
authentication, members in the group can either be associated with long-term identities (blinded
for anonymity preservation), or ephemeral identities that are unlinkable between sessions.
Invitations must always be issued by group members, but depending on the configuration, the
issuing member may be identified to the other members, or they may be anonymous (other than
the fact that they are a member in the session). Post-compromise security can be disabled in
order to improve performance. The four configurable settings are specified by the developer and
10 ⋏Offline and online deniability were defined in Section 2.4.
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can change over the lifetime of a session. The developer specifies a group policy that determines
the settings based on PS.𝑀, an opaque binary string that can be modified through an MLS-layer
operation. Typically, either the developer will store some flags in PS.𝑀 that are used by the
group policy to determine the settings, or PS.𝑀 will be left empty and the group policy will
choose hard-coded settings. Note that in any case, all agents must derive the same deniability
and authentication ephemerality settings from the same public state or else the group will be
forked. There is one incompatible configuration: when long-term identities are disabled, the
deniability is always set to “strongly deniable” mode.11 To implement the configuration, the
developer must implement the following function:
• SessionConfig(𝑀) → (Deniability, LongTermIDs, InviteAnonymity, PCS): given a mode
string 𝑀, returns the session configuration. Deniability is one of “non-repudiable”, “offline
deniable”, or “strongly deniable”. LongTermIDs is true if long-term identities are enabled,
or false if all identities are ephemeral. InviteAnonymity is true if invitations are issued by
anonymous members, or false if invitations are issued by identified members. PCS is true if
post-compromise security is enabled.
As discussed in Section 10.1.1, in addition to determining the configurable settings, the
developer’s group policy is also responsible for determining whether a given member may perform
a given operation. Whenever an MLS-layer operation is performed in an update context, the
group policy is consulted with the intermediate public state, the performing member’s agent
ID, a description of the operation about to be performed, and the operation’s arguments. The
group policy returns whether or not the operation is permitted. In addition, the group policy is
consulted when a performer context is finished or when a receiver context is applied. In either
case, the group policy is given a description of all operations performed in the commit, and it
must return whether or not the commit is permitted. These decisions may be made based on
hard-coded logic, or based on data stored in the public state. For example, the developer might
store a custom moderation mode setting in PS.𝑀, or member-specific access privileges in PS.𝐴
(discussed in Section 10.1.7). If any of the agents use diverging group policies, then the group
will be forked.
10.1.7 Label-Value Stores
PS.𝐴 is an associative array that contains arbitrary developer-specified label-value pairs. Both
the labels and the values are opaque binary strings that are stored unencrypted. Since all agents,
11 ⋏Unauthenticated protocols are strongly deniable by default.
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including the server, are able to read the contents of PS.𝐴, it may be referenced by the developer-
specified group policy that controls what commits may be performed. Like all data in the public
state, the integrity of PS.𝐴 is protected by Safehouse, preventing alteration by adversaries. This
is what distinguishes PS.𝐴 from external data that is simply stored alongside the group state.
Typical uses of PS.𝐴 include storing publicly accessible group descriptions, moderation policies,
and data that connects the session to other protocols used by the secure group messaging tool.
PS.𝐸 contains an associative array that is like PS.𝐴, except that the values are stored as
ciphertexts that can only be decrypted by members. The server cannot decrypt the values in PS.𝐸
and so they cannot be used by the group policy. As in PS.𝐴, the labels are not encrypted. New
members are able to decrypt the values in PS.𝐸 immediately upon joining the session. Typical
uses of PS.𝐸 include conversation-specific member attributes, pinned messages, and confidential
tokens linking the conversation to other protocols. PS.𝐸[label] denotes the encrypted value
identified by “label” in the associative array. There are data fields other than the associative
array contained in PS.𝐸 that are used to implement the encryption scheme.
SS.𝐸 contains the private keys necessary to decrypt the contents of PS.𝐸. It also contains
an associative array that maps the labels from PS.𝐸 to the decrypted plaintexts. SS.𝐸[label]
denotes the decrypted value identified by “label” in the associative array. There are data fields
other than the associative array contained in SS.𝐸 that are used to implement the encryption
scheme.
The contents of the public and confidential label-value stores are modified through the use of
MLS-layer operations. Since the values are encrypted in PS.𝐸, the group policy cannot dictate
the structure of data stored in the values; developers must design their secure messaging tool to
tolerate corrupted values with unexpected contents. The operation of PS.𝐴 and PS.𝐸, including
details about the encryption mechanism, is covered in greater detail in Section 10.7.
10.1.8 Identification
Safehouse provides a mechanism for a member to identify itself with a long-term public key
called its identity public key, also known as its long-term identity. This mechanism can be enabled
or disabled by the developer, as discussed in Section 10.1.6. Members authenticate their identity
through a separate mechanism discussed in Section 10.1.9. The identity public keys can be used
in a trust establishment scheme (see Section 2.6.1) in order to bind the cryptographic identities
to a user’s conceptualization of those identities. Members can compare the identity public keys
for a session to locally stored trust establishment results.
When long-term identification is enabled, each member provides their identity when first
joining the group (or, for the first member in the session, when the group is created). Safehouse
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always provides anonymity preservation, so these identities must be hidden from the server and
other outsiders. Consequently, the identity public keys are blinded in such a way that only other
members can recover them. The blinding process is specific to the selected BRAKEM construction.
The following functions are required:
• Blind(pk, bpk, bsk) → pk takes as input a public key pk and a key pair (bpk, bsk), then
produces a blinded public key pk. bpk is called the blinding public key and bsk is called the
blinding private key; together they form the blinding key pair.
• Unblind(pk, bpk, bsk) → pk takes as input a blinded public key pk and a blinding key pair
(bpk, bsk). If Blind(pk, bpk, bsk) → pk, then Unblind(pk, bpk, bsk) → pk. Otherwise, the
output of Unblind is a random public key with an undefined probability distribution.
These functions are easy to implement for the BRAKEM constructions defined in Chapter 8. For
BRAKEMDDL★ :
• Blind(pk, bpk, bsk) → pkbsk.




• Blind(pk, bpk, bsk) → bsk · pk.
• Unblind(pk, bpk, bsk) → bsk−1 · pk.
While neither of these instantiations make use of bpk, it is conceivable that alternative BRAKEM
instantiations might benefit from the accessibility of this parameter.
PS.𝐼 stores blinded identity public keys for all members, as well as the blinding public keys
used to produce them. The same blinding key pairs can be used to blind identities for multiple
members. For efficiency, Safehouse tries to alter the group state over time in order to minimize
the number of blinding key pairs in use. PS.𝐼 is a mapping from agent IDs to tuples of the
form (pk, bpk). Each member’s agent ID appears exactly once in PS.𝐼. PS.𝑈 contains a variety of
ciphertexts that can be decrypted to recover the blinding private key corresponding to any blinding
public key appearing in PS.𝐼. These ciphertexts can be decrypted immediately by new members
upon joining the session. The implementation of PS.𝑈 is very similar to the implementation of
the confidential label-value store discussed in Section 10.1.7. For this reason, the details are
presented in Section 10.7. SS.𝑈 contains the decrypted private keys recovered from PS.𝑈.
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To achieve stronger post-compromise security, Safehouse provides amechanism for an existing
member to change their long-term identity. Identity changing commits include a proof that the
change was authentic. Like other operations in the MLS layer, the group policy defined by the
developer determines when identity changes are permitted, if at all. When long-term identities
are disabled by the developer, PS.𝐼, PS.𝑈, and SS.𝑈 are all empty.
10.1.9 Invitations and Authentication
There is an inherent conflict between identification, non-interactivity, and anonymity preserva-
tion. When members use long-term identities, it is desirable for new members to be able to learn
other members’ identities immediately upon joining the group. To support non-interactivity, this
must be possible without interacting with existing members; in practice, it might be a while
before they come back online. Moreover, to achieve anonymity preservation, the adversary
must not be able to learn these identities. These requirements lead to the conflict: how can the
protocol allow new members to non-interactively learn existing identities, while preventing an
honest-but-curious server from doing the same? The only solution is to ensure that new members
possess a cryptographic key that is unknown to the adversary. This is the reason that invitations
are mandatory in Safehouse: invitations contain private key material that is never shared with
the server. This private key material can be used to unblind existing members’ identities (as
discussed in Section 10.1.8) and to decrypt the contents of the confidential label-value store (as
discussed in Section 10.1.7).
Members must be invited to join a Safehouse session. In the first step, an existing member (if
permitted by the group policy) performs a commit that creates an invitation. The invitation is
a secret blob of data that is returned to the developer after finishing the performer context.12
The operation that creates the invitation adds a record of its existence to PS.𝐿. This record of the
invitation is called a layaway. The developer (or, more likely, the user) is responsible for securely
transmitting the invitation to an entity that wishes to join the group; this out-of-band transmission
process is outside the scope of Safehouse. A new member in possession of an invitation can join
the session by claiming the associated layaway, even if no existing members are available for
interactive communication.
Safehouse supports two types of invitations: bearer invitations and individual invitations. Both
types of invitations may optionally have approximate expiry dates that are stored in the layaway;
agents will refuse to accept an invitation that has expired, and all members are permitted to
perform an operation that deletes expired layaways. Bearer invitations may optionally have a
limited number of uses stored in the layaway. If the number of remaining uses is finite, it is
12 ⋏ Safehouse invitations are analogous to “welcome messages” in CGKAs, as defined in Section 4.4.
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decremented every time that a new member claims the layaway. The layaway is removed as part
of the joining process if its remaining uses decreases to zero. Individual invitations are always
limited to exactly one use. Moreover, individual invitations are locked to a specific identity public
key and may only be used by a new member that provably knows the required identity private
key. The required identity is stored in the layaway for individual invitations; this identity is
blinded in order to provide anonymity preservation.
While Safehouse mandates the use of invitations to resolve the anonymity preservation
conflict, developers can choose to work around the limitation if they wish to implement “open”
group conversations. To accomplish this, the developer can have the first member in the session
issue a bearer invitation with unlimited uses and no expiry date, and then implement a group
policy that prevents the layaway from being deleted. The invitation can then be published in
a location that makes it available to all agents who might want to join the “open” group. Note
that this approach undermines anonymity preservation and the confidentiality of the confidential
label-value store if the invitation is accessible to the adversary. For example, if an honest-but-
curious server obtains the invitation, then it could simulate the honest procedure to join the group
using the invitation, but not update the group state or distribute the resulting commit. Unlike
a scenario in which the adversary uses the invitation to honestly join the group, suppression of
the resulting commit by the server allows the compromise to remain invisible to the existing
members. In effect, the join operation never actually “happens”, but the server nonetheless learns
the unblinded identity public keys and the values in the confidential label-value store. Note
that since the server does not update the group state, this covert attack does not allow it to
decrypt payloads—it only undermines anonymity preservation and the confidential label-value
store. This is an inherent limitation that comes from simultaneously supporting confidential
data storage in the public state and non-interactive joins that can immediately recover the
confidential data: keeping the data confidential requires a cryptographic mechanism of some
sort to differentiate legitimate members from adversaries, and if the adversary bypasses the
mechanism, then confidentiality can be covertly undermined. The adversary can continue to
covertly unblind newly added identity public keys and recover updated confidential values for as
long as the layaway associated with the compromised invitation private key remains in PS.𝐿; in
this approach for implementing “open” groups, the layaway persists indefinitely.
Each invitation contains an invitation private key that corresponds to an invitation public key
in the associated layaway within PS.𝐿. Both PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 contain a ciphertext for each layaway.
In both cases, the invitation private key can be used to decrypt this ciphertext to recover an
anchor private key (the anchor private keys used by PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 are distinct). Each value
stored in PS.𝐸 can be decrypted using the anchor private key for the confidential label-value
store. Likewise, every blinding private key used to blind an identity in PS.𝐼 can be decrypted
using the anchor private key and ciphertexts stored in PS.𝑈. This is the mechanism that allows
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new members to immediately learn these confidential values. Note that this mechanism requires
PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 to be updated every time that a layaway is added to or removed from PS.𝐿. The
encryption mechanism is described in greater detail in Section 10.7.
PS.𝐿 is a set of layaways, where each layaway is a tuple (iid, ipk, 𝑒, bpk, pk, 𝑢) containing the
following data:
• iid: a unique numeric identifier for the invitation. In practice, this is used to reference the
invitation in operations and from other parts of the group state.
• ipk: the invitation public key.
• 𝑒: an approximate expiry date for the invitation, or ⊥ to indicate that it does not expire based
on time.
• bpk: a blinding public key to provide as input to the Blind function (see Section 10.1.8) for
individual invitations. For bearer invitations, bpk = ⊥.
• pk: a blinded public key for the only member that is permitted to use the invitation. For
bearer invitations, pk = ⊥.
• 𝑢: an integer indicating how many new members may join the session using the invitation.
If 𝑢 = ⊥, then the invitation has unlimited remaining uses. For individual invitations, 𝑢 is
always implicitly equal to 1.
An invitation is a tuple (iid, ipk, isk, bpk, 𝑝𝑘), where the values are defined as in the layaway,
except that isk is the invitation private key.
Invitations allow new members to immediately learn the other members’ identities, but these
mechanisms do not provide authentication of the identities. Implementing this functionality
non-interactively while offering anonymity preservation would require storing encrypted authen-
tication data in the public state. However, this method conflicts with deniability: the available
constructions that provide deniable authentication require members to know the identities of
the members that are verifying their credentials. This topic is revisited in Section 10.8. Even
when Safehouse is configured to provide non-repudiation (i.e., no deniability), storing encrypted
authentication data imposes expensive performance costs. For these reasons, authentication of
long-term identities in Safehouse is achieved through a separate, semi-interactive mechanism.
When long-term identities are enabled, new members authenticate to existing members
immediately as part of the joining procedure. This authentication is an operation that is performed
as part of the same commit that adds the member to the session. This means that a member in
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a Safehouse session can always immediately identify and authenticate members that join after
it, even if it was offline at the time. In contrast, new members do not immediately receive any
authentication for existing members when joining. Instead, existing members authenticate to
new members as soon as they can by performing an authentication operation and sending the
resulting commit to the server.
Since existing members are not immediately authenticated to new members, there is a period
of time after joining a session in which a member may know claimed identities for existing
members, but without any proof that these identities are correct. Developers that use long-term
identities in their Safehouse sessions must design their secure messaging tool to handle this
distinction between “identified” and “authenticated” states, in addition to implementing a trust
establishment scheme.
When deniability is active for a Safehouse session, the aforementioned authentication op-
erations (both to existing or new members) may be forged using an appropriate set of private
keys. The exact deniability mechanism is discussed in Section 10.8. In order to account for this
possibility, the data used to prove a member’s identity is referred to as the identity witness. This
witness may be the identity private key in the honest case, or it may be a set of specific other
private keys when forging a transcript as part of a deniability scenario.
The Safehouse deniability mechanism allows authentication operations to be simulated by
the forger even without access to an invitation private key, which may have been generated by an
online judge. Since the invitation private key is normally used to decrypt the confidential label-
value store and unblind long-term identities (if applicable), a forger without an invitation private
key cannot recover these values in the normal way. An offline forger will already have access to
the data since they forge the entire history of the session. An online forger (i.e., a misinformant)
can copy the data from an existing private state under their control.13 A state unlocker is an object
that contains the secrets necessary to decrypt the contents of PS.𝐸 and unblind the identities in
PS.𝐼. In the honest case, the state unlocker contains an invitation identifier and an invitation
private key. In the forging case when deniability is enabled, the state unlocker contains the
already-decrypted values copied from another private state.
13 ⋏A misinformant in the online deniability scenario can instantiate a simulated Safehouse session if the online
judge requires them to join a new session, rather than compromising an existing session. Regardless of whether
the session is newly created or already existed, the misinformant will have access to the decrypted contents of the
confidential label-value store and unblinded long-term identities as part of its private state for one of the session
members.
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10.2 Contextual BRAKEM
The BRAKEM definition presented in Chapter 8 works well as a standalone primitive that is
applicable to protocols outside of secure group messaging. It is a self-contained definition that
allows for a game-based proof of security, which is much easier to specify and understand than
a composable security proof in a framework like GUC. Safehouse can be entirely implemented
using the BRAKEM functions defined in Section 8.1. However, the performance of Safehouse
can be significantly improved by defining a lower level interface. Specifically, Safehouse benefits
from being able to provide the new key pair to transfer as an input (instead of being generated
by the BRAKEM scheme), and being able to sequentially perform transfers to individual sets of
recipients, while still aggregating the NIZKPKs for performance. This section defines Contextual
BRAKEM (CBRAKEM), which performs the exact same computations as the general BRAKEM
construction in Section 8.1.1, except broken down into more granular functions.
A CBRAKEM scheme consists of the following functions:
• CBRAKEM.KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk): Takes as input randomness 𝑠, then outputs a public key
pk with corresponding private key sk.
• CBRAKEM.PerformerContext() → ctx: Creates a new “performer context”, ctx, which can
perform a sequence of encapsulations.
• CBRAKEM.ReceiverContext(𝑇) → ctx: Creates a new “receiver context”, ctx, which can
perform a sequence of decapsulations or verifications. Takes as input a commit 𝑇 that was
produced by a performer context.
• CBRAKEM.Encapsulate(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗, sk∗; 𝑠′) → ctx′: Takes as input a performer context ctx, a
set of public keys 𝑅, a new key pair (pk∗, sk∗), and randomness 𝑠′, then outputs a modified
context ctx′. If ctx is not a performer context, the function returns ⊥.
• CBRAKEM.Decapsulate(ctx, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅, pk∗) → (ctx′, sk∗): Takes as input a receiver context ctx,
a set of public keys 𝑅, an index 𝑗 identifying a public key in 𝑅, a private key sk corresponding
to the identified public key, and a new public key pk∗. Outputs either a modified context ctx′
and a private key sk∗ corresponding to pk∗, or ⊥.
• CBRAKEM.Verify(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗) → (ctx′, 𝑏): Takes as input a receiver context ctx, a set of public
keys 𝑅, and a new public key pk∗. Outputs a modified context ctx′ and a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}.
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• CBRAKEM.Finish(ctx; 𝑠′′) → 𝑇: Finalizes the transfers made in a performer context ctx
using randomness 𝑠′′. Outputs a commit 𝑇 that can be used to receive the same sequence of
transfers.
• CBRAKEM.Apply(ctx) → 𝑏: Finalizes the transfers that were decapsulated or verified in
a receiver context ctx. Outputs a bit 𝑏 ∈ {0, 1} indicating if all of the previously received
transfers are valid and no unread transfers remain in the commit.
This version of BRAKEM is similar to the update contexts used by the other operational layers
in Safehouse, as discussed in Section 10.1.3. When the performer context is finished, the caller
is given a commit 𝑇 . This opaque blob contains all of the ciphertexts for the encapsulations that
were performed, all of the NIZKPKs, and an aggregated Fiat-Shamir challenge for the NIZKPKs.
This commit is given as the input to a receiver context. As decapsulations and verifications
are performed in the receiver context, the ciphertexts are read from the commit stored in the
context. CBRAKEM.Apply returns 𝑏 = 1 if and only if the sequence of transfers in the receiver
context match the encapsulations in the performer context. There are a few important differences
between CBRAKEM and BRAKEM as defined in Section 8.1:
• In BRAKEM, the Encapsulate, Decapsulate, and Verify functions all take a set of sets of public
keys, allowing them to transfer 𝑚 private keys to 𝑚 sets of recipients simultaneously. This
allows BRAKEM to batch the various NIZKPKs into 𝑚+1 proofs; BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK
use the Π0 and Π1 NIZKPKs, respectively, in order to efficiently batch the terms in the proof
statements. In CBRAKEM, the functions only transfer one private key to one set of recipients.
The same NIZKPKs are still produced, but this occurs during the call to CBRAKEM.Finish
instead of during the CBRAKEM.Encapsulate calls. The performer context keeps track of the
information necessary to produce these NIZKPKs when the context is finished.
• In BRAKEM, the new key pairs (pk∗, sk∗) are generated within the construction and returned
to the caller. In CBRAKEM, the caller provides the key pair as input. This does not alter the
actual steps of the algorithm, but it does raise the possibility that sk∗ could be leaked if it
is mishandled by the caller. Safehouse is carefully designed to preserve the BRAKEM key
secrecy property when using CBRAKEM. There is only one place in Safehouse where a new
private key sk∗ is used for a secondary purpose: the “share key” operation in the KGM layer,
presented in Section 10.5.10. This operation is only used in situations where sk∗ is the output
of a TKLL protocol execution, which also provides key secrecy.
• In CBRAKEM receiver contexts, CBRAKEM.Decapsulate immediately returns new private keys,
even though the associated NIZKPKs are not verified until a later call to CBRAKEM.Apply.
This means that a malicious prover can cause invalid private keys to be used in subsequent
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operations. However, this is not a problem for Safehouse: no matter what operations are
performed using a malicious private key, the misbehavior will eventually be identified when
CBRAKEM.Apply is called. When CBRAKEM.Apply returns 0 to indicate malicious behavior,
the caller will reject the entire commit, discarding any computations that were performed.
A CBRAKEM receiver context completes successfully only if no Decapsulate call returns ⊥, no
Verify call returns 𝑏 = 0, and the Apply call returns 𝑏 = 1. It is the caller’s responsibility to abort
processing as soon as a Decapsulate or Verify call fails; continuing to use the original or updated
context after a failure results in undefined behavior. When Safehouse encounters an error during
CBRAKEM decapsulation or verification, it immediately aborts the MLS-layer receiver context
and rejects the associated commit.
It is straightforward to transform a BRAKEM construction into a CBRAKEM construction if it
follows the design introduced in Section 8.1.1. The context must track the transfers that have
occurred, and the NIZKPKs are moved into the Finish or Apply functions. This method can be
used to transform BRAKEMDDL★ , as defined in Section 8.2.8, into CBRAKEMDDL★ , the equivalent
CBRAKEM scheme. The revised scheme operates as follows:
• CBRAKEMDDL★ .KeyGen(𝑠) → (pk, sk):
Choose sk in ℤ𝑝3 using randomness in 𝑠.
Compute pk← 𝑔2sk.
• CBRAKEMDDL★ .PerformerContext() → (ctx):
ctx.Type← Performer.
Set ctx.𝑃 to an empty sequence.
return ctx.
• CBRAKEMDDL★ .ReceiverContext(𝑇) → (ctx):
ctx.Type← Receiver.
ctx.𝑇 ← 𝑇 .
Set ctx.𝑉 to an empty sequence.
return ctx.
• CBRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Encapsulate(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗, sk∗; 𝑠′) → (ctx′):
if (ctx.Type ≠ Performer) return ⊥.
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′.
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Choose ElGamal secret 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑝3 .
Compute 𝑦 ← 𝑔2𝑟.
Compute sk∗ ← sk∗−1 (mod 𝑝2).
Compute ElGamal ciphertext ℎ← 𝑥𝑟 × sk∗ (mod 𝑝2).
for each (1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅 |) {




𝐶 ← (𝑦, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |).
ctx′← ctx.
Append (𝑅, pk∗, sk∗, 𝑟, 𝑦, ℎ, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |, 𝑘, 𝐶) to sequence ctx′.𝑃.
return ctx′.
• CBRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Decapsulate(ctx, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅, pk∗) → (ctx′, sk∗):
if (ctx.Type ≠ Receiver) return ⊥.
if (! 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ |𝑅 |) return ⊥.
if (! 𝑅 𝑗 ≠ 𝑔2sk) return ⊥. ⊲ Guaranteed by insider security; can omit for speed
ctx′← ctx.
Read (𝑦, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |) from the start of ctx.𝑇
↩→ and set ctx′.𝑇 to the remaining data.
if (reading the data from ctx.𝑇 failed due to an invalid transmission) return ⊥.
Compute sk′← 𝑦sk/ℎ 𝑗.
sk∗ ← sk′ (mod 𝑝3).
Append (𝑅, pk∗, 𝑦, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |) to sequence ctx′.𝑉.
return (ctx′, sk∗).
• CBRAKEMDDL★ .Verify(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗) → (ctx′, 𝑏):
if (ctx.Type ≠ Receiver) return ⊥.
ctx′← ctx.
Read (𝑦, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |) from the start of ctx.𝑇
↩→ and set ctx′.𝑇 to the remaining data.
if (reading the data from ctx.𝑇 failed due to an invalid transmission) return (ctx′, 0).
Append (𝑅, pk∗, 𝑦, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ|𝑅 |) to sequence ctx′.𝑉.
return (ctx′, 1).
• CBRAKEMDDL𝑥 .Finish(ctx; 𝑠′′) → 𝑇:
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if (ctx.Type ≠ Performer) return ⊥.
Derive all subsequently required randomness from 𝑠′′.
Let 𝑚 = |ctx.𝑃 |.
simultaneously, merging Fiat-Shamir challenges into 𝑐 {
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Load (𝑅𝑖, pk∗𝑖 , sk∗𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖, 𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |, 𝑘𝑖, 𝐶𝑖) from ctx.𝑃𝑖 into scope.
Prove 𝜋𝑖 = BDLEQ{𝑟𝑖 : (𝑔2, 𝑦𝑖) ≈ (𝑅𝑖,1/𝑥, ℎ𝑖,1/ℎ𝑖) ≈ . . . ≈ (𝑅𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/𝑥, ℎ𝑖, |𝑅𝑖 |/ℎ𝑖)}.
}
Prove 𝜋0 = Π0{(𝑟1, . . . , 𝑟𝑚, 𝑥𝑟1 , . . . , 𝑥𝑟𝑚 , sk∗1, . . . , sk∗𝑚) :
𝑥, (𝑘1, ℎ1, 𝑦1, pk∗1) ≈ ··· ≈ (𝑘𝑚, ℎ𝑚, 𝑦𝑚, pk∗𝑚)}.
}
𝑇 ← (𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚, 𝑐, 𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚).
return 𝑇 .
• CBRAKEMDDL★ .Apply(ctx) → 𝑏:
if (ctx.Type ≠ Receiver) return ⊥.
Read 𝑐, 𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚, ℎ1, . . . , ℎ𝑚, 𝑘1, . . . , 𝑘𝑚 from the start of ctx.𝑇
↩→ and set 𝑇′ to the remaining data.
if (reading the data from ctx.𝑇 failed due to an invalid transmission) return 0.
if (𝑇′ is not empty) return 0.
Let 𝑚 = |ctx.𝑉 |.
simultaneously {
for each (1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑚) {
Load (𝑅𝑖, pk∗𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖, ℎ𝑖,1, . . . , ℎ𝑖,|𝑅𝑖 |) from ctx.𝑉𝑖 into scope.
Compute the random oracle inputs for 𝜋𝑖 using 𝑐 from the prover.
}
Compute the random oracle inputs for 𝜋0 using 𝑐 from the prover.
}
Apply the random oracle to the inputs for 𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚 to produce 𝑐′.
if (𝑐′ ≠ 𝑐) return 0.
return 1.
Note that CBRAKEMDDL★ also performs the standard optimization of combining the Fiat-Shamir
challenges for all NIZKPKs into a single challenge 𝑐. This means that all of the NIZKPKs for
𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚 are executed simultaneously until they reach the call to the programmable random
oracle. Once the prover has reached this state for NIZKPKs, the inputs to the random oracles
are concatenated in an unambiguous order before being fed to a single batched random oracle
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call. The resulting challenge 𝑐 is used to simultaneously complete all of the NIZKPKs. Due to
the combined challenge, the proofs 𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝜋𝑚 do not need to include duplicated copies of
𝑐. Note also that the ciphertexts 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑚 and the combined challenge 𝑐 must be provided in
the commit 𝑇 before any of the proofs 𝜋0, 𝜋1, . . . , 𝑝𝑖𝑚 in order for the receiver to decapsulate the
private keys and verify the proofs.
The alternative BRAKEM construction based on zk-SNARKs presented in Section 8.5.5,
BRAKEMZK, can be transformed into a CBRAKEM scheme using the same approach that was used
for CBRAKEMDDL★ above. The resulting scheme is referred to as CBRAKEMZK. The contents of the
context and how the functions manipulate it are the same as in CBRAKEMDDL★ ; the only difference
is that the ciphertexts and proofs are produced as in BRAKEMZK. Since the transformation is
straightforward, the complete definition of CBRAKEMZK is omitted.
When deploying Safehouse, the developer must decide which CBRAKEM construction to use.
This could be CBRAKEMDDL★ , CBRAKEMZK, or a different construction. In any case, the operations
in this chapter simply refer to the generic names for the CBRAKEM functions; this is implicitly
understood to refer to the construction chosen by the developer.
10.3 Single BRAKEM
It is often necessary to use BRAKEM to transfer a specific private key to a single set of receivers.
This functionality is required by the LVSM and KC layers. In these situations, batching together
the encapsulation of multiple private keys is not possible. Unfortunately, the general BRAKEM
interface defined in Section 8.1 does not support private keys generated by the caller, and the
CBRAKEM scheme described in Section 10.2 supports additional features that harm presenta-
tional clarity. As a notational convenience, this section defines three wrapper functions that
produce and consume a single BRAKEM encapsulation with a key pair specified by the caller.
Together, these functions are referred to as a Single BRAKEM (SBRAKEM) scheme. The encapsu-
lation, decapsulation, and verification functions are shown in Algorithms 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3,
respectively.
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Algorithm 10.1 BRAKEM encapsulation for a single set. (Ref: 348)
Subroutine SBRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅, pk∗, sk∗; 𝑠) → 𝑇
Derive randomness 𝑠′ and 𝑠′′ from 𝑠.
ctx← CBRAKEM.PerformerContext().
ctx′← CBRAKEM.Encapsulate(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗, sk∗; 𝑠′).
𝑇 ← CBRAKEM.Finish(ctx′; 𝑠′′).
return 𝑇 .
Algorithm 10.2 BRAKEM decapsulation for a single set. (Ref: 348)
Subroutine SBRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑅, 𝑗, sk, pk∗, 𝑇) → sk∗
ctx← CBRAKEM.ReceiverContext(𝑇).
(ctx′, sk∗) ← CBRAKEM.Decapsulate(ctx, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅, pk∗).
if (sk∗ = ⊥) { return ⊥. }
if (CBRAKEM.Apply(ctx′) ≠ 1) { return ⊥. }
return sk∗.
Algorithm 10.3 BRAKEM verification for a single set. (Ref: 348)
Subroutine SBRAKEM.Verify(𝑅, pk∗, 𝑇) → 𝑏
ctx← CBRAKEM.ReceiverContext(𝑇).
(ctx′, 𝑏) ← CBRAKEM.Verify(ctx, 𝑅, pk∗).
if (𝑏 ≠ 1) { return 0. }
if (CBRAKEM.Apply(ctx′) ≠ 1) { return 0. }
return 1.
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10.4 Contextual Key Generation
In several circumstances, it is useful to generate a new key pair in a performer context while keep-
ing the private key secret (i.e., not transferring it to other parties using a scheme like CBRAKEM).
This operation is denoted CKeyGen (“contextual key generation”). CKeyGen operates as follows:
Output: pk∗, a new public key; and sk∗, either the private key corresponding to pk∗ or ⊥.
if (performer context) {
(pk∗, sk∗) ← CBRAKEM.KeyGen().
Add pk∗ to the commit.
} else {
Read pk∗ from the commit.
sk∗ ← ⊥.
}
return pk∗ and sk∗.
10.5 Key Graph Manipulation
The KGM layer provides fundamental operations that safely alter the state of the key graph, as
discussed in Section 10.1.3. These operations primarily involve modifying the key graph PS.𝐺,
the superfluous edges PS.𝑆, the exhausted key set PS.𝑋 , and the associated private keys (see
Section 10.1.2 for an overview of the group state). KGM operations are implicitly given access to
the commit: performer contexts may append data to the commit being constructed, and receiver
contexts may read and remove a prefix from the commit being consumed.
The algorithms for operations often involve performing helper operations as subprotocols.
The pseudocode in this chapter uses an alternative notation to denote the execution of a helper
operation: the named parameters and named return values are listed on individual lines prefixed
with the “▶” symbol. This convention helps to distinguish operations from typical function calls;
helper operations are also given implicit access to the commit and the intermediate group state,
just like the calling operation.
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10.5.1 Key Transfer
The KGM.KeyTransfer operation uses CBRAKEM to send a private key to a set of recipients.
This is a low-level operation that is used only as a subroutine by other operations in the KGM
layer. For this reason, the operation does not alter the group state; it provides its output directly
to the caller. The new public key pk∗ is provided as a parameter. The performer also provides the
corresponding private key sk∗ as a parameter, whereas the receiver does not provide the private
key. If 𝑈proc is the performer or one of the intended recipients, then the operation outputs the
new private key sk∗.
Parameters: 𝑅, a set of 𝑘-nodes; pk∗, a public key; sk∗, either the private key corresponding
to pk∗ or ⊥; and bctx, a CBRAKEM update context.
Output: sk∗, either the private key corresponding to pk∗ or ⊥; and bctx, the updated
CBRAKEM context.
Form 𝐾, the set of public keys from PS.𝑃 corresponding to the 𝑘-nodes in 𝑅.
if (performer context) {
if (sk∗ = ⊥) { Abort. }
bctx← CBRAKEM.Encapsulate(bctx, 𝑅, pk∗, sk∗).
} else {
if (∃𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 such that 𝑟 → sk is in SS.𝑄) {
Let 𝑗 identify 𝑟 in 𝑅.
(bctx, sk∗) ← CBRAKEM.Decapsulate(bctx, 𝑗, sk, 𝑅, pk∗).
if (sk∗ = ⊥) { Abort. }
} else {
(bctx, 𝑣) ← CBRAKEM.Verify(bctx, 𝑅, pk∗).




for each (𝑘 ∈ 𝑅) {
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10.5.2 New Key Transfer
The KGM.NewKeyTransfer operation is a small wrapper that generates a new key pair us-
ing CKeyGen (see Section 10.4) and uses KGM.KeyTransfer to transfer the private key. Like
KGM.KeyTransfer, it is used only as a subroutine by other operations in the KGM layer.
Parameters: 𝑅, a set of 𝑘-nodes; and bctx, a CBRAKEM update context.
Output: pk∗, a new public key; sk∗, either the private key corresponding to pk∗ or ⊥; and
bctx, the updated CBRAKEM context.
Execute CKeyGen with:
▶ Output pk∗: store in pk∗
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗.
Execute KGM.KeyTransfer with:
▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑅
▶ Parameter pk∗: set to pk∗
▶ Parameter sk∗: set to sk∗
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
return pk∗, sk∗, and bctx.
10.5.3 Discard Member
The KGM.DiscardMember operation simply erases an existing member from PS.𝐺. A member
can only be removed if it does not know the private keys for any 𝑘-nodes except for its personal
key.
Parameters: 𝑈, the agent ID for the member to discard.
if (keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈) ≠ {personal(𝑈)}) { Abort. }
if (PS.𝑆 contains a mapping from 𝑈) { Abort. }
if (personal(𝑈) ∈ PS.𝑋) { Remove personal(𝑈) from PS.𝑋 . }
Remove personal(𝑈) from PS.𝐺.
Remove 𝑢-node 𝑈 from PS.𝐺.
if (𝑈proc = 𝑈) { Set SS to ⊥. }
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10.5.4 Merge Keys
The KGM.MergeKeys operation “merges” two source keys into a new destination key in PS.𝐺.
The user set of the destination key is the union of the user sets for the two source keys. In other
words, any member with knowledge of at least one source private key learns the destination
private key.
Parameters: 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, the two source 𝑘-nodes; and bctx, a CBRAKEM update context.
Output: bctx, the updated CBRAKEM context.
Execute KGM.NewKeyTransfer with:
▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to {𝑠1, 𝑠2}
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output pk∗: store in pk∗
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
Add a new 𝑘-node 𝑑 to PS.𝐺.
Add edges from 𝑠1 to 𝑑 and from 𝑠2 to 𝑑 in PS.𝐺.
if (sk∗ ≠ ⊥) { Add mapping 𝑑 → sk∗ to SS.𝑄. }
if (𝑑 ∉ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈perf)) { Add edge 𝑈perf → 𝑑 to PS.𝑆. }
for each (𝑈 → 𝑠1 in PS.𝑆) {
if (𝑑 ∉ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈)) { Add the mapping 𝑈 → 𝑑 to PS.𝑆. }
}
for each (𝑈 → 𝑠2 in PS.𝑆) {




The KGM.AddEdge operation adds an edge to PS.𝐺. This operation can only be performed if it
does not alter the key sets of any 𝑢-node in the graph. Equivalently, the user set of the destination
𝑘-node for the new edge is not altered.
Parameters: 𝑠, a source 𝑘-node; and 𝑑, a destination 𝑘-node.
if (an edge 𝑠→ 𝑑 already exists in PS.𝐺) { Abort. }
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if (usersetPS.𝐺 (𝑑) ⊈ usersetPS.𝐺 (𝑠)) { Abort. }
Add an edge from 𝑠 to 𝑑 in PS.𝐺.
10.5.6 Discard Key
The KGM.DiscardKey operation removes a given 𝑘-node from PS.𝐺. Personal keys cannot be
discarded. Edges are added to the key graph so that the semantic relations between other 𝑘-nodes
are not altered by the operation.
Parameters: 𝑘, a 𝑘-node to discard.
if (𝑘 is a personal key) { Abort. }
for each (𝑘-node 𝑠 such that PS.𝐺 contains an edge from 𝑠 to 𝑘) {
for each (𝑘-node 𝑑 such that PS.𝐺 contains an edge from 𝑘 to 𝑑) {
if (the only paths from 𝑠 to 𝑑 in PS.𝐺 pass through 𝑘) {




Remove 𝑘 and all edges involving 𝑘 from PS.𝐺.
If present, remove any edges to 𝑘 in PS.𝑆.
If present, remove 𝑘 from PS.𝑋 .
If present, remove the mapping from 𝑘 in SS.𝑄.
The test in KGM.DiscardKey to see if there are alternate paths from 𝑠 to 𝑑 in PS.𝐺 is inexpensive
in practice. The key graph is always a DAG, and it is often additionally a tree (for which the
test is trivial). Moreover, in typical deployments, the maximum path length in the key graph is
less than 5.1⁴ Consequently, it is reasonable to implement the test as a simple depth-first search
through PS.𝐺.
10.5.7 Evict
The KGM.Evict operation replaces all non-personal keys known by a set of members with new
keys. The key graph is then updated to reflect the new situation: each one of the specified
14 ⋏The performance of Safehouse in typical configurations with predictable key graph structures is explored in
Section 10.13.
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members will not have knowledge of any private keys except for its own personal key. The
member that performs this operation cannot be in the set of members to evict.1⁵ The operation
uses a variety of techniques to replace keys based on the shape of the key graph. In special cases
where a 𝑘-node is left with a single child 𝑘-node with the same user set, the 𝑘-nodes can be merged
together. However, since this may be undesirable for certain KC implementations, this option
is only used at the discretion of the KC subsystem. The function KC.MayMerge(𝐺, 𝑠, 𝑘) → 𝑏
returns 𝑏 = 1 if it is acceptable to merge 𝑘-nodes 𝑠 and 𝑘 (see Section 10.6). In the general case,
keys are replaced using the CBRAKEM scheme.
Parameters: 𝑈, a set of agent IDs specifying members to evict; and bctx, a CBRAKEM update
context.
Output: bctx, the updated CBRAKEM context.
if (𝑈perf ∈ 𝑈) { Abort. }
Let 𝐾′ = {𝑘 | ∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 (𝑘 ∈ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑢) ∧ 𝑘 ≠ personal(𝑢))}.
Let 𝐾′′ = {𝑘 | ∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 (PS.𝑆 maps 𝑢→ 𝑘)}.
𝐾 ← 𝐾′ ∪ 𝐾′′.
Compute 𝑆, a topological sort of 𝐾.
for each (𝑘 ∈ 𝑆 in topological order) {
𝑐← ∅.
for each (𝑘-node 𝑠 such that an edge from 𝑠 to 𝑘 is in PS.𝐺) {
if (∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 (𝑠 = personal(𝑢))) {
Remove the edge from 𝑠 to 𝑘 in PS.𝐺.
} else {
𝑐← 𝑐 ∪ {𝑠}.
}
}
if ( |𝑐| = 0) { ⊲ Discard 𝑘 and unused ancestors
Let 𝑠 be an empty stack.
Push 𝑘 onto 𝑠.
while (𝑠 is not empty) {
Pop 𝑟 off 𝑠.
if (there are no incoming edges to 𝑟 in PS.𝐺) {
for each (𝑟′ such that there is an edge from 𝑟 to 𝑟′ in PS.𝐺) {
15 ⋏ It is not possible for a member to unilaterally “leave” the group, because there is no way for it to provably
generate a new group key without learning enough information to derive the key. Section 10.12 revisits this
subject and describes an approach that achieves a similar effect.
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Push 𝑟′ onto 𝑠.
}
Execute KGM.DiscardKey with:
▶ Parameter 𝑘: set to 𝑟.
}
}
} else if ( |𝑐| = 1 && KC.MayMerge(PS.𝐺, 𝑠, 𝑘) = 1 for 𝑠 ∈ 𝑐) { ⊲ Merge 𝑠 into 𝑘
Let 𝑠 be the single element of 𝑐.
Set pk such that the mapping 𝑠→ pk is in PS.𝑃.
Update the mapping 𝑘→ pk in PS.𝑃.
if (SS ≠ ⊥) {
if (there is a mapping from 𝑠 in SS.𝑄) {
Set sk such that the mapping 𝑠→ sk is in SS.𝑄.
Update the mapping 𝑘→ sk in SS.𝑄.
} else {
Delete any mapping from 𝑘 in SS.𝑄.
}
}
Delete any mapping to 𝑘 from PS.𝑆.
for each (𝑢→ 𝑠 in PS.𝑆) {
Add the mapping 𝑢→ 𝑘 to PS.𝑆.
}
if (𝑠 ∈ PS.𝑋) { Add 𝑘 to PS.𝑋 . }
else if (𝑘 ∈ PS.𝑋) { Remove 𝑘 from PS.𝑋 . }
Execute KGM.DiscardKey with:
▶ Parameter 𝑘: set to 𝑠.
} else { ⊲ Transfer a new key pair for 𝑘
Execute KGM.NewKeyTransfer with:
▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑐
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output pk∗: store in pk∗
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
Update the mapping 𝑘→ pk∗ in PS.𝑃.
if (𝑘 ∈ PS.𝑋) { Remove 𝑘 from PS.𝑋 . }
if (SS ≠ ⊥) {
if (sk∗ = ⊥) {
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Delete any mapping from 𝑘 in SS.𝑄.
} else {
Update the mapping 𝑘→ sk∗ in SS.𝑄.
}
}
Delete any mapping to 𝑘 from PS.𝑆.
for each (𝑟 ∈ 𝑐) {
for each (𝑢 such that 𝑢→ 𝑟 is in PS.𝑆) {
if (𝑘 ∉ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑢)) { Add the mapping 𝑢→ 𝑘 to PS.𝑆. }
}
}
if (𝑈perf ∉ usersetPS.𝐺 (()𝑘)) {






The KGM.RefreshKeys operation updates all of the exhausted keys so that they are no longer
exhausted. The group key is also updated using one of two unique KDFs—denoted KDF0 and
KDF1—based on whether or not the old group key is used in the derivation.
Parameters: 𝑅, a set of 𝑘-nodes such that every member knows at least one corresponding
private key; 𝑏, a bit indicating whether or not the old group key should be required to derive
the new group key; and bctx, a CBRAKEM update context.
Output: bctx, the updated CBRAKEM context.
if (there exists a member 𝑈 such that keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈) ∩ 𝑅 = ∅) { Abort. }
Execute KGM.NewKeyTransfer with:
▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑅
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output pk∗: store in pk∗
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
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for each (𝑘 ∈ PS.𝑋) {
Set pk such that the mapping 𝑘→ pk is in PS.𝑃.
pk′← MixPK(pk, pk∗).
Update the mapping 𝑘→ pk′ in PS.𝑃.
if (SS ≠ ⊥ && there is a mapping from 𝑘 in SS.𝑄) {
Set sk such that the mapping 𝑘→ sk is in SS.𝑄.
sk′← MixSK(sk, sk∗).




if (SS ≠ ⊥) {







10.5.9 Ratchet Group Key
The KGM.RatchetGroupKey operation simply updates the group key using a unique KDF. This
operation can be used to provide a very efficient form of forward secrecy.




The KGM.ShareKey operation uses CBRAKEM to transfer the private key for a 𝑘-node to a given
set of recipient 𝑘-nodes. The key graph is updated to reflect the knowledge transfer.
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Parameters: 𝑘, a 𝑘-node to share; 𝑅, a set of 𝑘-nodes to receive the private key; and bctx, a
CBRAKEM update context.
Output: bctx, the updated CBRAKEM context.
if (𝑘 is a personal key) { Abort. }
Set pk∗ such that the mapping 𝑘→ pk∗ is in PS.𝑃.
if (performer context) {
if (there is no mapping from 𝑘 in SS.𝑄) { Abort. }





▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑅
▶ Parameter pk∗: set to pk∗
▶ Parameter sk∗: set to sk∗
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
if (sk∗ ≠ ⊥) { Store mapping 𝑘→ sk∗ in SS.𝑄. }
for each (𝑠 ∈ 𝑅) {
if (there is no path from 𝑠 to 𝑘 in PS.𝐺) {




As discussed in Section 10.5.6, checking for the existence of a path from 𝑠 to 𝑘 can be
implemented efficiently with a depth-first search; the Safehouse configurations used in practice
do not require a more efficient solution.
10.5.11 Import Tree
The KGM.ImportTree operation imports the key tree produced by a TKLL protocol execution
(see Section 9.4) into the key graph. None of the new nodes are connected to any of the existing
nodes. The processing agent may optionally provide private keys for nodes in the key tree if it
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was one of the participants in the TKLL protocol; these will be imported into the private state. In
general, the set of private keys given as a parameter will be different for each processing agent.
Parameters: 𝑇 , the key tree instantiated by the TKLL protocol execution; 𝑃∗, a bijection from
𝑘-nodes in 𝑇 to public keys; and 𝑄∗, a mapping from 𝑘-nodes in 𝑇 to private keys.
if (any 𝑢-node in 𝑇 has the same agent ID as a 𝑢-node in PS.𝐺) { Abort. }
Copy all of the 𝑘-nodes, 𝑢-nodes, and edges from 𝑇 into PS.𝐺.
Copy all of the mappings from 𝑃∗ into PS.𝑃.
if (𝑄∗ is not empty) {






Copy all of the mappings from 𝑄∗ into SS.𝑄.
}
In real implementations, 𝑘-nodes may be identified by distinct numeric labels. It is the respon-
sibility of KGM.ImportTree to appropriately relabel 𝑘-nodes imported from 𝑇 (while preserving
the structure) in order to ensure that there are no collisions in the resulting identifiers.
10.6 Key Control Overview
When a Safehouse session is created, a KC implementation must be selected. As discussed in
Section 10.1.3, the KC subsystem is responsible for determining the shape of the key graph, PS.𝐺.
A KC scheme provides two functions that are used to initialize a new Safehouse session:
• KC.InitGraphPerform(𝑈) → (𝐺, 𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑇): a function that initializes the key graph for a new
Safehouse session created by an initial member with agent ID 𝑈. The function produces the
initial key graph 𝐺 with associated public key map 𝑃 and private key map 𝑄. It also produces
an initialization message 𝑇 , which can be consumed by the server to derive the same key
graph.
• KC.InitGraphApply(𝑈, 𝑇) → (𝐺, 𝑃): a function that consumes an initialization message 𝑇
produced by an initial member 𝑈 and produces the resulting key graph 𝐺 and public key
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map 𝑃. This function is only executed by the server during the arranged creation of a new
Safehouse session.
The KC.InitGraphPerform and KC.InitGraphApply operations are provided by the KC subsystem
because the shape of the initial key graph determines the most efficient way to construct the
initialization message. These functions are used as part of an MLS-layer operation that initializes
the complete group state, discussed in Section 10.10.2.
The KC scheme is also responsible for keeping track of shape-specific structural data as the key
graph evolves. For example, if the KC scheme shapes the graph into a tree structure, additional
data may be stored that tracks tree statistics in order to inform decisions about where to add
new 𝑘-nodes. As the KGM-layer operations described in Section 10.5 modify the key graph, the
KC scheme updates its data accordingly. This process is not shown in the KGM operation or KC
scheme definitions because it is mainly an implementation concern, since the KC implementations
discussed in this chapter can always derive the data that they need from a generic graph structure.
The KC scheme provides a function that determines whether or not it is acceptable to merge
𝑘-nodes during a KGM.Evict operation (see Section 10.5.7):
• KC.MayMerge(𝐺, 𝑠, 𝑘) → 𝑏: a function that takes two 𝑘-nodes, 𝑠 and 𝑘, in the key graph 𝐺
as input, and determines whether or not the 𝑘-nodes may be merged. It must be the case that
an edge exists from 𝑠 to 𝑘 in 𝐺. The output is a bit 𝑏, where 𝑏 = 1 indicates that a merger is
permitted.
In practice, KC.MayMerge may be implemented as a stateful function that references the structural
data about 𝐺 previously extracted and tracked by the KC scheme.
There are several locations in Safehouse where it is necessary to serialize or deserialize the
public state. This is mainly done when a new member joins the session, because they must first
download the existing public state before they can add themselves using a joining operation.
The public state is also uniquely serialized when it is used as the input to a hash function.1⁶
16 ⋏ It is interesting to note that in general, outside of the context of Safehouse, using an abstract object as the input
to a cryptographic hash function requires only a serialization procedure. The serialization must be unique in order
for the hash output to be deterministic. However, if a matching lossless deserialization function does not exist,
then this is a security flaw instead of a correctness bug. This is because if the serialization procedure is lossy, then
“collisions” can be found by altering only the information about the object that is lost during serialization; the input
to the hash function, and therefore its output, will be the same. A classic example of this flaw occurred in the PGP
2.x software when the sizes of the RSA modulus and encryption exponent were lost during serialization [Ley02].
The existence of a lossless deserialization function ensures that collisions cannot be produced in this way. Since
Safehouse requires a lossless deserialization function for actual transmission purposes, the serialization function
is also safe to use when producing hash inputs.
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Serialization and deserialization of large parts of the public state are the responsibility of the KC
subsystem because the size of the encoded data can be greatly reduced by taking advantage of
the key graph structure. A generalized implementation for serializing the key graph would need
to transmit a uniquely ordered list of 𝑢-nodes, 𝑘-nodes, edges, and the corresponding contents
of the other elements of PS. In contrast, when both the serializer and deserializer know about
invariants that apply to the shape of the graph (e.g., knowing that the graph is a tree or that
it is a forest with a maximum number of leaves in each tree), some node or edge data can be
omitted from the serialization. The KC scheme provides the following two functions to implement
serialization and deserialization:
• KC.Serialize(𝐺, 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝐼) → 𝐷: a function that accepts a key graph 𝐺 with the expected shape,
a mapping from 𝑘-nodes to public keys 𝑃, a bipartite graph of superfluous edges 𝑆, and an
identity table 𝐼, and losslessly produces a unique opaque binary blob 𝐷.
• KC.Deserialize(𝐷) → (𝐺, 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝐼): a function that accepts a binary blob 𝐷 and losslessly
decodes it to produce 𝐺, 𝑃, 𝑆, and 𝐼 as defined in KC.Serialize.
The KC scheme is responsible for serializing the contents of PS.𝐼 because this is the only portion
of the public state that binds data to members (see Section 10.1.2). Since the KC scheme has
knowledge about the graph structure, it can strategically position the blinded identity tuples
in the serialization based on the location of the corresponding 𝑢-nodes in the key graph. Like
KC.MayMerge, in practice KC.Serialize may statefully reference structural data rather than
dynamically reconstructing it from 𝐺. However, KC.Deserialize must not require state, because
it must be usable by agents that have no prior knowledge of the group state. Note that the
serialization functions assume that PS.𝑋 = ∅; this is acceptable because serialization only occurs
for safe states with no exhausted keys.
The KC scheme provides two functions that return certain 𝑘-nodes in the graph based on
structural knowledge:
• KC.BroadcastKeys(𝐺) → 𝐾 returns a set of 𝑘-nodes 𝐾 such that every member has access
to at least one corresponding private key. Formally, ∪𝑘∈𝐾userset𝐺 (𝑘) = userset(𝐺).
• KC.SharedKey(𝐺) → 𝑘 returns a 𝑘-node such that userset𝐺 (𝑘) = userset(𝐺), or ⊥ if none
exists.
These two functions exist in order to improve the practicality of the system; general algorithms
exist to extract this information from arbitrary key graphs, but they involve solving small NP-
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complete problem instances.1⁷ In practice, these functions can use stateful structural information
to locate the requested 𝑘-nodes in constant time, which avoids the need to use the potentially
expensive general algorithms.
Finally, the KC scheme provides two components that are necessary to implement Safehouse’s
mass join functionality. The first component is an interactive protocol called KC.PrepareJoin that
is executed by one or more new members, producing a joining commit. The second is an operation
called KC.MergeJoin that takes a joining commit as a parameter and adds the members to the
session.
The KC.PrepareJoin protocol accepts the following parameters from the caller:
• The current public state for the Safehouse session, PS.
• The caller’s agent ID, which must not yet be a group member.
• A set of agent IDs for the joining members, including the caller. The agent IDs must be distinct
and must not already be present in PS.𝐺.
• A mapping from the joining members to public keys produced by CBRAKEM.KeyGen, which
will be bound to their personal keys in the key graph.
• A mapping from the joining members to the invitation in PS.𝐿 that they are using to join the
session.
• The caller’s ephemeral private key produced by CBRAKEM.KeyGen, which will be bound to
its personal key in the key graph.
• The caller’s (unblinded) identity public key.
• The caller’s identity witness.
17 ⋏A general approach for implementing KC.BroadcastKeys, assuming that the list of 𝑢-nodes is easily accessible, is
to choose an arbitrary 𝑢-node and to recursively follow outgoing edges until a set of nodes with an outdegree of
zero is found. For each of these “terminal nodes”, the edges can be explored in reverse to identify the 𝑢-nodes with
paths to the node (i.e., the user set). A minimal subset of the terminal nodes is selected such that the union of the
user sets is equal to the union of all terminal nodes’ user sets; this is the NP-complete set cover problem. This subset
of terminal nodes is added to the broadcast key set, and the 𝑢-nodes in the corresponding user sets are marked
as complete. The process is repeated until all 𝑢-nodes are marked as complete, starting by selecting another
arbitrary 𝑢-node that is not marked as complete. KC.SharedKey can be implemented by simply checking to see if
the output of KC.BroadcastKeys has a single element and returning that element, or returning ⊥ otherwise.
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As the protocol is executed, multiple transmissions of opaque data blobs may be sent to subsets
of the joining members; the developer must provide a mechanism to deliver these transmissions.
When the protocol completes successfully, it outputs the joining commit and joining private data;
both are opaque data blobs from the perspective of other subsystems. The same joining commit
is output for all joining members, whereas the joining private data is unique for each joining
member. In practice, most KC schemes implement KC.PrepareJoin using the authenticated TKLL
protocol (see Section 9.4).
The joining members produce authenticating NIZKPKs showing that they are permitted
to join the group as part of the KC.PrepareJoin protocol. These NIZKPKs are included in the
joining commit and verified by the server and existing members when applying the commit; see
Section 10.8 for details about the authentication mechanism.
The KC.MergeJoin operation is performed as part of an MLS-layer operation by one of the
joiningmembers, with the result that all joiningmembers are added to the session. The operation’s
parameters are a joining commit produced by KC.PrepareJoin and the joining private data. Joining
members provide the joining private data produced by their own call to KC.PrepareJoin, whereas
other agents set this parameter to ⊥. Initially, the joining members’ intermediate private state
is ⊥ when KC.MergeJoin is executed. Afterwards, the joining members are left with complete
private states that transform them into members of the session.
Several KC schemes are described in Section 10.11.
10.7 Label-Value Store Manipulation
The Safehouse group state contains three different label-value stores: the public label-value
store PS.𝐴, the confidential label-value store PS.𝐸, and the unblinding ciphertext table PS.𝑈. A
high-level description of the label-value stores and how they operate was given in Section 10.1.7
for PS.𝐴 and PS.𝐸, and in Sections 10.1.8 and 10.1.9 for PS.𝑈. The public label-value store
PS.𝐴 is trivial: it is simply a list of unencrypted label-value pairs. The state hash, discussed in
Section 10.1.3, enables Safehouse to ensure the integrity of PS.𝐴, which is all that is required.
Since there is no cryptography involved with accessing or altering PS.𝐴, it is not discussed
further in this section. In contrast, PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 require a variety of cryptographic mechanisms
to implement. Whereas PS.𝐸 provides a developer-facing confidential storage mechanism for
arbitrary values, PS.𝑈 is only used internally by Safehouse to implement anonymity preservation
by storing private keys used to unblind identity public keys. Nonetheless, PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 share
large parts of their implementation. This section discusses the motivating factors behind the
general design, and Section 10.7.1 describes a specific implementation.
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As discussed in Section 10.1.7, the contents of the confidential stores must be decryptable
in two scenarios: new members must be able to non-interactively decrypt the contents upon
joining the session, and existing members must be able to decrypt new values when they are
updated. Since the only private key material available to new members is an invitation private
key (see Section 10.1.9), and no interactivity with existing members can be used to establish new
private key material, the keys necessary to decrypt the stores must necessarily be encrypted to all
invitation public keys associated with entries in the current layaway table, PS.𝐿. Moreover, since
existing members likely do not have access to a currently valid invitation private key (especially
since individual invitations are removed from the layaway table upon use), value updates must
also be encrypted to all existing members. Encrypting the keys is accomplished by using the
chosen BRAKEM scheme, discussed in Chapter 8, to produce a single encapsulation to a single
receiver set. This BRAKEM encapsulation can then be stored in the public state.
Forward secrecy is a concern for the values stored in PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈, but the attack scenarios
are slightly different than they are for the group key. It is important to consider these scenarios
in order to avoid an over-engineered design that pays a performance price for no real security
gains. The only legitimate mechanism for decrypting values currently stored in PS.𝐸 or PS.𝑈 is to
use an invitation private key to decrypt the ciphertexts. An honest server does not store historical
public states for a session. This means that if the server is honest and the adversary compromises
an invitation private key, they will only be able to decrypt the currently stored values, which
is as expected. However, an honest-but-curious server is free to store historical public states.
In this scenario, if the adversary acquires a historical public state and an invitation private key
associated with an entry in the state’s layaway table, then they will be able to recover a historical
value; there is no way to avoid this attack without either requiring an interactive protocol with
an existing member upon joining, or not giving new members immediate access to the values.
Consequently but perhaps unintuitively, there is usually no benefit to re-encrypting values under
a new key unless the value changes, since the easiest way for an adversary to recover the value is
usually to attack an old public state in cooperation with the server.
Finally, efficiency is an important consideration in the design of the label-value stores. The
simplest solution based on the aforementioned design considerations would be to use BRAKEM to
encrypt each value to each invitation public key in the layaway table and to the existing members.
However, this design incurs a large performance cost when issuing an invitation (which would
require all values to be encrypted to new invitation public key) or when adding a value to PS.𝐸
or PS.𝑈 (which would require the value to be encrypted to all invitation public keys). These costs
can be mitigated by introducing an intermediate private key to “decouple” changes to either list.
This is the purpose of the anchor key pair consisting of the anchor public key, apk, and the anchor
private key, ask, as first mentioned in Section 10.1.9. The anchor private key is encrypted to all of
the invitation public keys using BRAKEM, and all entries in the store are encrypted to the anchor
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public key using BRAKEM. When the layaway table is updated, the anchor private key can simply
be encrypted to the new list of invitation public keys, without altering the ciphertexts for the
values; this is called a RefreshInvites operation. If the anchor key pair is changed, then all of
the values only need to be re-encrypted to the new anchor public key, rather than to all of the
invitation public keys; this is called a RefreshEncryption operation.
A separate anchor key pair is used for PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈, since it is usually not necessary to use
the RefreshEncryption operation for both stores at the same time. In general, using separate
anchor key pairs means that fewer RefreshEncryption operations are required. The anchor private
key for PS.𝐸 is stored in SS.𝐸.𝐴, and the anchor private key for PS.𝑈 is stored in SS.𝑈.𝐴. Members
continue to store the current anchor private keys even after joining the session.
A malicious insider can always provably share the decrypted values with the adversary.
Safehouse tracks when an anchor key pair is fresh, meaning that the adversary can only recover
the anchor private key with the help of a malicious insider. The anchor key pair becomes stale
when the adversary could recover the anchor private key by compromising a former member or
an invitation private key that is no longer valid; this occurs when a member is evicted from the
session, keys are updated for post-compromise security purposes, or an invitation is retracted.
When the anchor key pair is stale, a RefreshEncryption operation must be performed before
new values are stored. This prevents the adversary from learning any more than it could by
compromising an old group state, as discussed above.
The LVSM layer provides all of the low-level operations necessary to access and update PS.𝐸
and PS.𝑈. In summary, the layer provides the following operations for both stores:
• Initialize sets up an empty label-value store. It is used only as part of the MLS-layer operation
that initializes the group state at the start of a session.
• RefreshInvites encrypts the current anchor private key to all of the invitation public keys in
the layaway table, storing the BRAKEM encapsulation in the public state.
• RefreshEncryption generates a new anchor key pair, encrypts the anchor private key to all of
the invitation public keys in the layaway table as well as all existing members, re-encrypts all of
the values to the new anchor public key, and stores all of the resulting BRAKEM encapsulations
and the anchor public key in the public state. NIZKPKs are included as needed so that the
correctness of the operation is publicly verifiable.
• MarkStale marks the anchor key pair as stale.
• Set changes a value associated with a given label by encrypting the new value to the anchor
public key and storing the BRAKEM encapsulation in the public state.
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• Delete removes a value associated with a given label by deleting the ciphertext and label in
the public state.
These operations are provided for PS.𝐸 with the prefix LVSM.𝐸, and for PS.𝑈 with the prefix
LVSM.𝑈. For example, LVSM.𝐸.Initialize denotes the operation that initializes PS.𝐸. In addition
to these operations, a decryption function is provided for both PS.𝐸 and PS.𝑈 with the same
prefixes:
• Decrypt(PS, SS, id, isk) → SS′ decrypts the contents of the store in the given public state,
updating the given private state, using a given invitation private key isk with invitation
identifier id. The function returns ⊥ if the decryption failed.
The LVSM.𝐸.Decrypt and LVSM.𝑈.Decrypt functions are used by new members when joining the
session to gain access to the confidential data in the stores. Existing members do not use these
functions; when an anchor key pair changes as part of a RefreshEncryption operation, or when
the content of the stores is changed by a Set or Delete operation, existing members’ private states
are updated as part of the algorithm to apply the operation.
BRAKEM is used to encrypt the keys because it is necessary for the LVSM operations to be
publicly verifiable. However, this is not enough to guarantee that the values themselves are
correctly formed. In the PS.𝑈 case, additional NIZKPKs are used when authenticating identities
(as discussed in Section 10.8) in order to show that the encrypted values in PS.𝑈 will correctly
unblind the identity public key. In general, this cannot be done for the developer-supplied values
stored in PS.𝐸. Safehouse is not aware of the required structure for the values stored in PS.𝐸, so
it cannot provide any guarantees about the correctness of the values. The design takes advantage
of this limitation by using efficient but unverifiable cryptosystems to protect the values. For this
reason, secure group messaging tools built using Safehouse must be able to handle values in PS.𝐸
that have been covertly corrupted by malicious insiders.
The implementation of the LVSM layer depends on the developer’s choice of BRAKEM con-
struction for a Safehouse deployment. In any case, the LVSM layer is implemented as described
above. Section 10.7.1 provides specific implementation details in the case that BRAKEMDDL★ is
used. The same general approach can be used to implement the LVSM layer for BRAKEMZK.
10.7.1 Implementing with Double Discrete Logarithms
This section describes how to implement the LVSM layer introduced in Section 10.7 when using
BRAKEMDDL★ , as discussed in Section 10.2. Section 10.7.1.1 describes how to implement the
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operations for the confidential label-value store, Section 10.7.1.2 introduces a new NIZKPK used
to implement the confidential label-value store, and Section 10.7.1.3 describes how to implement
the operations for the unblinding ciphertext table. Whenever operations in this section read
elements from the commit, they are implicitly assumed to validate that the elements belong to
the expected group (if any), aborting if this is not the case.
10.7.1.1 Confidential Label-Value Store
The confidential label-value store is implemented in mostly the manner described in Section 10.7,
but with three important optimizations:
• Instead of directly using the anchor key pair, which is necessarily generated from the large
and slow BRAKEMDDL★ key space, the anchor private key ask is also used to produce a public
key in an elliptic curve group, cpk. The private key is proven to be equivalent using the
standard Schnorr-based DLEQ NIZKPK presented in Section 8.2.2.2. It is possible to use this
efficient NIZKPK securely as long as elliptic curve group has order 𝑝3.1⁸
• Since the values do not need to be verifiably correct, it is possible to encrypt the values using
a standard symmetric cryptosystem. For each value, a secret random curve point called the
entry key is encrypted to cpk. Each value is encrypted using authenticated encryption with the
symmetric key derived from the associated entry key using a unique KDF. AEnc𝑘(𝑣) denotes
the encryption of 𝑣 with key KDF(𝑘) using the authenticated encryption scheme. ADec𝑘(𝑐)
denotes the corresponding decryption operation for ciphertext 𝑐 with key KDF(𝑘), which may
return ⊥ if the decryption fails.
• The mechanism for encrypting the entry keys needs to be a symmetric cryptosystem using ask
as the key, but there must also exist an efficient plaintext equality NIZKPK for the cryptosystem.
The existence of this efficient NIZKPK allows the RefreshEncryption operation to efficiently re-
encrypt the same entry keys to a new anchor key pair without requiring the values themselves
to be re-encrypted. This allows very large ciphertexts to be stored in PS.𝐸 with no size-
based performance penalties, except when updating the large value. Entry key encryption is
accomplished using elliptic curve ElGamal in a pseudo-symmetric mode: the private key ask
is used at both encryption and decryption times. The “ElGamal randomness” public key is
derived from a random hash stored alongside the value.
Figure 10.2 depicts the structure of PS.𝐸 when using BRAKEMDDL★ with the aforementioned
optimizations.
18 ⋏Otherwise, the proof would be unsound. This soundness problem was discussed in Section 8.2.3.
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Figure 10.2 The confidential label-value store structure when using BRAKEMDDL★ .
The anchor private key ask is transferred to the invitation public keys in PS.𝐿 using BRAKEMDDL★ .
The anchor public key, apk, is proven to be equivalent to an elliptic curve version, cpk, using a
DLEQ NIZKPK. Elliptic curve ElGamal is used to encrypt the entry key 𝑘𝑖 for the 𝑖th label-value
pair, which enables efficient Schnorr plaintext equality NIZKPKs when re-encrypting 𝑘𝑖. A standard
authenticated encryption scheme is used to encrypt the value for an entry using the associated entry
key. 𝑓 indicates the anchor key pair’s freshness, while 𝑓𝑖 indicates the freshness of entry key 𝑖.
(Ref: 368)
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The prototype Safehouse implementation uses the sample parameters presented in Sec-
tion 8.3.1.4 for its BRAKEMDDL★ implementation. These parameters set 𝑝3 to the order of the
Curve25519 [Ber06] elliptic curve group. However, the LVSM implementation does not use
Curve25519 directly. Instead, it uses Ristretto [VGT+21] as the elliptic curve group; this group
has the same order as Curve25519, but comes with several practical safety advantages. 𝐵 denotes
the Ristretto base point. 𝐻 denotes a secure “hash to curve” function; for Ristretto, this is usually
a cryptographic hash with the output processed by the Elligator 2 method [FSS+20, §6.8.2].
The entry key for entry 𝑖 is denoted as 𝑘𝑖.1⁹ Each entry key 𝑘𝑖 is an element in the Ristretto
group that is generated by using 𝐻 to hash a 128-bit value chosen uniformly at random.2⁰
Although 𝑘𝑖 can be efficiently and verifiably re-encrypted to a new cpk, 𝑘𝑖 itself will remain stale
(i.e., accessible to an adversary that compromises outdated private key material). Consequently,
the freshness of the entry keys must be trackable independently of the freshness of the anchor
key pair. PS.𝐸. 𝑓 stores a bit that indicates if ask is fresh; it is fresh if 𝑓 = 1. Similarly, 𝑘𝑖 is fresh if
the entry-specific freshness bit 𝑓𝑖 = 1.
In summary, the scheme stores the following data in the public state:
• PS.𝐸.𝑇: an SBRAKEM encapsulation of SS.𝐸.ask to the set of invitation public keys in PS.𝐿.
• PS.𝐸.apk: the anchor public key in 𝔾2.
• PS.𝐸.cpk: the anchor public key in the Ristretto group.
• PS.𝐸.𝜋: a DLEQ proof showing that apk and cpk have the same discrete logarithm in their
respective groups.
• PS.𝐸. 𝑓 : a bit indicating if ask is fresh.
• For the 𝑖th entry with label ℓ𝑖:
◦ PS.𝐸[ℓ𝑖]: a tuple ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖).
◦ 𝑓𝑖: a bit indicating if the entry key 𝑘𝑖 is fresh.
◦ 𝑥𝑖: a random 128-bit value.
◦ 𝑐1,𝑖: an ElGamal encryption of 𝑘𝑖 to cpk using ElGamal random public key 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖).
19 ⋏ Since the values are indexed by the associated label, the entries are not normally addressable by position.
However, this section uses integer indices as a notational convenience for explanatory purposes.
20 ⋏This procedure generates a group element with an unknown discrete logarithm (with respect to the base 𝐵)
uniformly at random. The randomly generated 128-bit value that is used as input to 𝐻 is an intermediate value
that is not stored.
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◦ 𝑐2,𝑖: an authenticated encryption of the value 𝑣𝑖 using key KDF(𝑘𝑖).
The following data is stored in the private state:
• SS.𝐸.ask: the anchor private key.
• For the 𝑖th entry with label ℓ𝑖:
◦ SS.𝐸[ℓ𝑖]: the decrypted value 𝑣𝑖.
In practice, implementations may cache intermediate keys, such as the entry keys. The following
sections describe how to implement the LVSM operations and the decryption function for PS.𝐸.
10.7.1.1.1 Initialize
The LVSM.𝐸.Initialize operation proceeds as follows:
Execute CKeyGen with: ⊲ Generate anchor key pair
▶ Output pk∗: store in PS.𝐸.apk
▶ Output sk∗: store in SS.𝐸.ask.
if (performer context) { ⊲ Generate anchor on curve
PS.𝐸.cpk← ask · 𝐵.
Write PS.𝐸.cpk to the commit.
} else {
Read PS.𝐸.cpk from the commit.
}
if (performer context) { ⊲ Prove anchors are equivalent
Prove 𝜋: PK{(ask) : apk = 𝑔2ask ∧ cpk = ask · 𝐵}.
Write 𝜋 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝜋 from the commit.
if (𝜋 fails to verify) { Abort. }
}
PS.𝐸.𝜋← 𝜋.
PS.𝐸. 𝑓 ← 1.
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10.7.1.1.2 Refresh Invitations
The LVSM.𝐸.RefreshInvites operation proceeds as follows:
Let 𝑅 denote the set of invitation public keys stored in PS.𝐿.
if (performer context) {
𝑇 ← SBRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅, PS.𝐸.apk, SS.𝐸.ask).
Write 𝑇 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝑇 from the commit.
if (SBRAKEM.Verify(𝑅, PS.𝐸.apk, 𝑇) ≠ 1) { Abort. }
}
PS.𝐸.𝑇 ← 𝑇 .
10.7.1.1.3 Refresh Encryption
The LVSM.𝐸.RefreshEncryption operation proceeds as follows:
apk′← PS.𝐸.apk.
if (SS ≠ ⊥) { ask′← SS.𝐸.ask. }
Execute LVSM.𝐸.Initialize. ⊲ Update anchor key pair
Execute LVSM.𝐸.RefreshInvites. ⊲ Transfer anchor private key to invitations
Let 𝑅′ = KC.BroadcastKeys(PS.𝐺). ⊲ Transfer anchor private key to members
if (performer context) {
𝑇′← SBRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅′, PS.𝐸.apk, SS.𝐸.ask).
Write 𝑇′ to the commit.
} else if (SS = ⊥) {
if (SBRAKEM.Verify(𝑅′, PS.𝐸.apk, 𝑇′) ≠ 1) { Abort. }
} else {
Find 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅′ such that 𝑟 → sk is in SS.𝑄.
Let 𝑗 represent the position of 𝑟 in 𝑅′.
SS.𝐸.ask← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑅′, 𝑗, sk, PS.𝐸.apk, 𝑇′).
if (SS.𝐸.ask = ⊥) { Abort. }
}
for each (entry ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖) with label ℓ𝑖 in PS.𝐸, sorted) { ⊲ Re-encrypt entry keys
𝑥′
𝑖
← 𝑥𝑖. ⊲ Store old values for use in the NIZKPK
𝑐′1,𝑖 ← 𝑐1,𝑖.
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if (performer context) {
𝑘𝑖 ← 𝑐1,𝑖 − ask′ · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖).
𝑥𝑖
$←− [0, 2128).
𝑐1,𝑖 ← ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖) + 𝑘𝑖.
Write 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐1,𝑖 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐1,𝑖 from the commit.
}
PS.𝐸[ℓ𝑖] ← ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖).
}
if (performer context) { ⊲ Prove correctness
Produce a NIZKPK 𝜋 showing that all updates are correct.
Write 𝜋 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝜋 from the commit.
if (𝜋 fails to verify) { Abort. }
}
PS.𝐸. 𝑓 ← 1.
The NIZKPK produced as part of the operation, 𝜋, must prove the following:
• knowledge of ask′, the discrete log of the old anchor public key, apk′;
• knowledge of ask, the discrete log of the new anchor public key, apk; and
• that for every label-value pair (denoted with index 𝑖), the old entry key was encrypted to the
new anchor public key.
If there are 𝑚 entries in the store with indices 1 to 𝑚, then the proof corresponds to the following
statement, given in Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97]:
PK{(ask, ask′) : apk′ = ask′ · 𝐵 ∧
apk = ask · 𝐵 ∧
∀𝑚𝑖=1 𝑐
′
1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖 = ask′ · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) − ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖) }
This proof can be implemented using techniques similar to those used by the BDLEQ NIZKPK
presented in Section 8.2.2.3. A NIZKPK for the statement is introduced in Section 10.7.1.2, along
with security proofs.
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10.7.1.1.4 Mark Stale
The LVSM.𝐸.MarkStale operation proceeds as follows:
PS.𝐸. 𝑓 ← 0.
for each (entry ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖) with label ℓ𝑖 in PS.𝐸) {
PS.𝐸[ℓ𝑖] ← (0, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖).
}
10.7.1.1.5 Set
The LVSM.𝐸.Set operation proceeds as follows:
Parameters: ℓ, a label; and 𝑣, either a value to store or ⊥.
if (PS.𝐸. 𝑓 = 0) {
Execute LVSM.𝐸.RefreshEncryption.
}
if (PS.𝐸[ℓ] exists) {




if ( 𝑓𝑖 ≠ 1) { ⊲ If stale, generate a new entry key
if (performer context) {
Set 𝑘𝑖 to a curve point uniformly at random.
𝑥𝑖
$←− [0, 2128).
𝑐1,𝑖 ← SS.𝐸.ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖) + 𝑘𝑖.
Write 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐1,𝑖 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐1,𝑖 from the commit.
}
} else if (performer context) {
𝑘𝑖 ← 𝑐1,𝑖 − SS.𝐸.ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖).
}
if (performer context) { ⊲ Encrypt the new value
if (𝑣 = ⊥) { Abort. }
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𝑐2,𝑖 ← AEnc𝑘𝑖 (𝑣).
Write 𝑐2,𝑖 to the commit.
} else {
if (𝑣 ≠ ⊥) { Abort. }
Read 𝑐2,𝑖 from the commit.
if (SS ≠ ⊥) {





𝑓𝑖 ← 1. ⊲ Update the store
PS.𝐸[ℓ] ← ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖).
The operation is performed with parameter 𝑣 set to the new value, and received with 𝑣 = ⊥.
Members can retrieve the value from SS.𝐸[ℓ] after receiving the operation. It is important to
note that the performer does not produce a NIZKPK showing that 𝑣 was correctly formed. For
this reason, it is also not necessary to prove that 𝑐2,𝑖 is valid. In such situations, SS.𝐸[ℓ] will end
up set to ⊥. Since the server always has SS = ⊥, it can never detect this condition, and so it is
not possible for members to reject the operation when they detect a malformed 𝑐2,𝑖—doing so
would fork the session. Consequently, the developer must be able to handle the scenario in which
SS.𝐸[ℓ] = ⊥.
10.7.1.1.6 Delete
The LVSM.𝐸.Delete operation proceeds as follows:
Parameters: ℓ, a label.
if (PS.𝐸[ℓ] exists) { Delete PS.𝐸[ℓ]. }
if (SS ≠ ⊥) {
if (SS.𝐸[ℓ] exists) { Delete SS.𝐸[ℓ]. }
}
10.7.1.1.7 Decrypt
The LVSM.𝐸.Decrypt(PS, SS, id, isk) → SS′ function proceeds as follows:
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Let 𝑅 denote the set of invitation public keys stored in PS.𝐿.
Let 𝑗 refer to the invitation in 𝑅 with identifier id.
SS′← SS.
SS′.𝐸.ask← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑅, 𝑗, isk, PS.𝐸.apk, PS.𝐸.𝑇).
if (SS′.𝐸.ask = ⊥) { return ⊥. }
if (PS.𝐸.𝜋 fails to verify) { return ⊥. }
for each (entry ( 𝑓𝑖, 𝑥𝑖, 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐2,𝑖) with label ℓ𝑖 in PS.𝐸) {





10.7.1.2 NIZKPK for Refreshing Encryption
The LVSM.𝐸.RefreshEncryption operation introduced in Section 10.7.1.1.3 requires a NIZKPK to
prove that the same entry keys were correctly re-encrypted to the new anchor public key with
elliptic curve ElGamal. For convenience, the proof statement is repeated here:
PK{(ask, ask′) : apk′ = ask′ · 𝐵 ∧
apk = ask · 𝐵 ∧
∀𝑚𝑖=1 𝑐
′
1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖 = ask′ · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) − ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖) }
An efficient NIZKPK can be constructed for this statement using the Schnorr proof system [Sch91].
The three terms in the statement are combined with a logical “AND” operation; this can be
implemented by simply sharing the Fiat-Shamir [FS87] challenge between NIZKPKs of the
individual terms, as in the DLEQ construction (see Section 8.2.2.2). The third term is the most
complicated to prove, since the structure of the term for each entry is uncommon. Additionally,
Peng et al. [PBD07, Fig. 4] introduced a batching technique that is applicable to this term; the
technique was first discussed in Section 8.2.2.3. Batching the NIZKPK significantly improves the
performance, particularly in terms of size: the proof size remains constant even as the number
of label-value entries increases.
Let _0 denote a security parameter controlling the soundness of the NIZKPK. In this setting,
_0 = 128. Let the tag 𝜏 denote a unique encoding of the public values in the proof statement:
𝜏 = apk∥apk′∥𝑥1∥𝑥′1∥𝑐1,𝑖∥𝑐′1,𝑖∥ . . . ∥𝑥𝑚∥𝑥′𝑚∥𝑐1,𝑚∥𝑐′1,𝑚
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The prover P proceeds as follows:
1. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝜏) where 𝐻1 is a cryptographic hash function with _0 · 𝑚 bits of output
2. Split 𝑒 into 𝑚 parts such that for each 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑚], the part 𝑒𝑖 is in [0, 2_0)
3. Choose 𝑟1
$←− ℤ𝑝3 and 𝑟2
$←− ℤ𝑝3
4. Compute 𝑡′1 ← 𝑟1 · 𝐵 and 𝑡′2 ← 𝑟2 · 𝐵
5. Compute 𝑡′3 = 𝑟1 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − 𝑟2 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖))
6. Compute 𝑐′ ← 𝐻2(𝜏∥𝑡′1∥𝑡′2∥𝑡′3) where 𝐻2 is a cryptographic hash function with _0 bits of
output modeled by a random oracle
7. Compute 𝑠1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑐′ · ask′ (mod 𝑝3) and 𝑠2 = 𝑟2 − 𝑐′ · ask (mod 𝑝3)
8. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, 𝑠2)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that all values appearing in 𝜏 are valid group elements and abort otherwise
2. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝜏) and split 𝑒 into 𝑒𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑚]
3. Compute 𝑡1 ← 𝑠1 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′
4. Compute 𝑡2 ← 𝑠2 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk
5. Compute 𝑡3 ← 𝑠1 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − 𝑠2 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + 𝑐′ ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
6. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻2(𝜏∥𝑡1∥𝑡2∥𝑡3)
7. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
Section 10.7.1.2.1 proves that the NIZKPK is correct, Section 10.7.1.2.2 proves that it is
zero-knowledge, and Section 10.7.1.2.3 proves that it is sound. Readers that are not interested
in checking the security proofs may wish to skip to Section 10.7.1.3.
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10.7.1.2.1 Proof of Correctness
If both the prover and the verifier are honest and the statement is true, then the verifier will
always accept the proof. It must be shown that the inputs to the random oracle query match:
𝑡1 = 𝑡′1, 𝑡2 = 𝑡′2, and 𝑡3 = 𝑡′3. 𝜏 is computed in the same way by both parties, so it always matches.
The first task is to show that 𝑡1 = 𝑡′1:
𝑡1 = 𝑠1 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′ ⊲ Verifier step 3
= (𝑟1 − 𝑐′ · ask′) · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′ ⊲ Prover step 7
= 𝑟1 · 𝐵 − 𝑐′ · ask′ · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′ ⊲ Expand
= 𝑟1 · 𝐵 − 𝑐′ · apk′ + 𝑐′ · apk′ ⊲ Statement
= 𝑟1 · 𝐵 = 𝑡′1 ⊲ Prover step 4
The second task is to show that 𝑡2 = 𝑡′2:
𝑡2 = 𝑠2 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk ⊲ Verifier step 4
= (𝑟2 − 𝑐′ · ask) · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk ⊲ Prover step 7
= 𝑟2 · 𝐵 − 𝑐′ · ask · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk ⊲ Expand
= 𝑟2 · 𝐵 − 𝑐′ · apk + 𝑐′ · apk ⊲ Statement
= 𝑟2 · 𝐵 = 𝑡′2 ⊲ Prover step 4
The final task is to show that 𝑡3 = 𝑡′3:



























(𝑒𝑖 · ((𝑟1 − 𝑐′ · ask′) · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) − (𝑟2 − 𝑐′ · ask) · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖) ⊲ Statement





(𝑒𝑖 · ((𝑟1 − 𝑐′ · ask′ + 𝑐′ · ask′) · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) ⊲ Merge terms
− (𝑟2 − 𝑐′ · ask + 𝑐′ · ask) · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)))
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(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) = 𝑡′3 ⊲ Prover step 5
Since all terms input to the random oracle by the prover match the terms input by the verifier,
𝑐 = 𝑐′ and the final verifier check in step step 7 will succeed.
10.7.1.2.2 Proof of Zero Knowledge
To prove that the NIZKPK is zero-knowledge, it can be shown that there exists a simulator that
can produce a transcript for any given challenge that is indistinguishable from real transcripts. In
other words, the NIZKPK is 𝑐-simulatable [Hen14, Def. 9] in the ROM. Constructing the simulator
for this NIZKPK is straightforward, since it requires nothing more than the standard simulation
approach for Schnorr-based NIZKPKs: generate the responses 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 at random, compute
the commitments as the verifier would, and then program the random oracle accordingly. The
simulator proceeds as follows when given challenge 𝑐 as input:
1. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝜏) and split 𝑒 into 𝑒𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑚]
2. Choose 𝑠1
$←− ℤ𝑝3 and 𝑠2
$←− ℤ𝑝3
3. Compute 𝑡1 ← 𝑠1 · 𝐵 + 𝑐 · apk′
4. Compute 𝑡2 ← 𝑠2 · 𝐵 + 𝑐 · apk
5. Compute 𝑡3 ← 𝑠1 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − 𝑠2 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + 𝑐 ·
∑︁𝑚
𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
6. Program the random oracle 𝐻2 to output 𝑐 given the input 𝜏∥𝑡1∥𝑡2∥𝑡3
7. The simulated proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐, 𝑠1, 𝑠2)
Note that the simulated 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 values perfectly match the real distribution for an honest prover,
so the transcripts are indistinguishable.
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10.7.1.2.3 Proof of Soundness
To prove soundness, it must be shown that if an honest verifier accepts a proof, then there
exists a rewinding extractor that can recover witnesses for the statement from the prover with
overwhelming probability. For this NIZKPK, an extractor exists that can recover the witness given
only two challenge-response pairs for the same commitments. The extractor runs the prover in
order to produce a proof 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, 𝑠2). It then rewinds the prover to the point of the query to
the random oracle, reprograms the oracle to output a different challenge, and collects a second
proof 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠1, 𝑠2). A witness can be recovered from 𝜋 and 𝜋.
Consider the random oracle input 𝑡1. Since the verifier accepts in both instances and the
complete random oracle input is the same:
𝑠1 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′ = 𝑠1 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk′ ⊲ Verifier step 3
𝑠1 · 𝐵 − 𝑠1 · 𝐵 = (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) · apk′
𝑠1 − 𝑠1
𝑐′ − 𝑐′
· 𝐵 = apk′
𝑠1 − 𝑠1
𝑐′ − 𝑐′
= ask′ ⊲ Discrete logarithm
This equation shows how to compute a witness, ask′, for the statement term apk′ = ask′ · 𝐵. A
similar computation applies to the 𝑡2 random oracle input:
𝑠2 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk = 𝑠2 · 𝐵 + 𝑐′ · apk ⊲ Verifier step 4
𝑠2 · 𝐵 − 𝑠2 · 𝐵 = (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) · apk
𝑠2 − 𝑠2
𝑐′ − 𝑐′
· 𝐵 = apk
𝑠2 − 𝑠2
𝑐′ − 𝑐′
= ask ⊲ Discrete logarithm
This allows recovery of the a witness, ask, for the statement term apk = ask · 𝐵.
It remains to be shown that the extracted witnesses ask′ and ask satisfy the final term of the
proof statement. Firstly, consider the implication of verifier step 5 due to 𝜋 being accepted:
𝑡3 = 𝑠1 ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − 𝑠2 ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + 𝑐′ ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
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Secondly, consider the implication of 𝜋 being accepted:
𝑡3 = 𝑠1 ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − 𝑠2 ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + 𝑐′ ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
Next, subtract the second equation from the first equation to yield:
0 = (𝑠1 − 𝑠1) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − (𝑠2 − 𝑠2) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
The previously established equations for the witnesses ask′ and ask can be rearranged:
𝑠1 − 𝑠1 = ask′ · (𝑐′ − 𝑐′)𝑠2 − 𝑠2 = ask · (𝑐′ − 𝑐′)
Substituting these values into the equation yields:
0 = ask′ · (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − ask · (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) + (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
The term 𝑐′ − 𝑐′ can now be factored out:
0 = (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) · (ask′ ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − ask ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) −
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖)))
Since the premise is that the rewinding extractor will choose different challenge values 𝑐′ and 𝑐′,
it must be the case that 𝑐′ − 𝑐′ (mod 𝑝3) ≠ 0. This means that the (𝑐′ − 𝑐′) term can be dropped
from the equation:
0 = ask′ ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖)) − ask ·
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)) −
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖))
The equation can be rewritten as follows:
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (𝑐′1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖)) =
𝑚∑︂
𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑖 · (ask′ · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) − ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖)))
The logic of the proof now proceeds similarly to the logic in Section 8.4.1.3.2. It must be the case
that every 𝑒𝑖 was chosen independently of every 𝑐1,𝑖, 𝑐′1,𝑖, ask, ask′, 𝑥𝑖, and 𝑥′𝑖 value. This is due to
all of these values being included as part of 𝜏 (with ask and ask′ being included in the form of
apk and apk′), which was used to compute every 𝑒𝑖 value using the cryptographic hash function
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𝐻1 in verifier step 2. The hash function ensures that the 𝑒𝑖 values are drawn uniformly at random
from [0, 2_0). The large size of this range means that it is infeasible for a malicious prover to
predict any 𝑒𝑖 or the location of any collisions between them; this can be derived using the same
logic as in Section 8.4.1.3.2. Consequently, with overwhelming probability, the equation only
holds if the inner terms are equal:
∀𝑚𝑖=1(𝑐
′
1,𝑖 − 𝑐1,𝑖 = ask′ · 𝐻 (𝑥′𝑖) − ask · 𝐻 (𝑥𝑖))
This is exactly the final term in the proof statement, which demonstrates that the extracted
witnesses possess the correct form. This completes the proof of soundness.
10.7.1.3 Unblinding Ciphertext Table
As discussed in Section 10.1.8, the unblinding ciphertext table, PS.𝑈, stores blinding key pairs
that are used to blind members’ identity public keys. Each blinded public key is stored in the
identity table, PS.𝐼, along with a reference to the blinding public key in PS.𝑈 that was used
to blind it. The unblinding ciphertext table includes a mapping from blinding public keys to
ciphertexts containing the corresponding blinding private keys. PS.𝑈 [bpk] denotes the ciphertext
in the table containing the blinding private key bsk corresponding to the blinding public key bpk.
The unblinding secrets, SS.𝑈, contain the decrypted blinding private keys: SS.𝑈 [bpk] denotes the
decrypted PS.𝑈 [bpk] value stored in the private set. As discussed in Section 10.7, PS.𝑈 makes use
of an anchor key pair, similarly to the construction for the confidential label-value store described
in Section 10.7.1.1. The implementation for the unblinding ciphertext table is simpler than the
confidential label-value store: no elliptic curve groups are used, each blinding private key in the
table is encrypted to the anchor public key using only an SBRAKEM encapsulation, and there is
no per-entry freshness marker.
Figure 10.3 depicts the structure of the unblinding ciphertext table. In summary, the corre-
sponding portion of the public state contains the following data:
• PS.𝑈.𝑇: an SBRAKEM encapsulation of SS.𝑈.ask to the set of invitation public keys in PS.𝐿.
• PS.𝑈.apk: the anchor public key in 𝔾2.
• PS.𝑈. 𝑓 : a bit indicating if ask is fresh.
• For the entry with label bpk:
◦ PS.𝑈 [bpk]: an SBRAKEM encapsulation of the blinding private key bsk corresponding to
bpk, transferred to ask.
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Figure 10.3 The unblinding ciphertext table structure when using BRAKEMDDL★ . The
anchor private key ask is transferred to the invitation public keys in PS.𝐿 using BRAKEMDDL★ . The
entries in the table are public keys of the form bpk𝑖 = 𝑔2bsk𝑖 . Each blinding private key bsk𝑖 is
transferred to the anchor public key using BRAKEMDDL★ . 𝑓 indicates the anchor key pair’s freshness.
(Ref: 382)
The following data is stored in the private state:
• SS.𝑈.ask: the anchor private key.
• For the entry with label bpk:
◦ SS.𝑈 [bpk]: the blinding private key bsk corresponding to bpk.
The following sections describe how to implement the LVSM operations and the decryption
function for PS.𝑈.
10.7.1.3.1 Initialize
The LVSM.𝑈.Initialize operation proceeds as follows:
Execute CKeyGen with:
▶ Output pk∗: store in PS.𝑈.apk
▶ Output sk∗: store in SS.𝑈.ask.
PS.𝑈. 𝑓 ← 1.
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10.7.1.3.2 Refresh Invitations
The LVSM.𝑈.RefreshInvites operation proceeds as follows:
Let 𝑅 denote the set of invitation public keys stored in PS.𝐿.
if (performer context) {
𝑇 ← SBRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅, PS.𝑈.apk, SS.𝑈.ask).
Write 𝑇 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝑇 from the commit.
if (SBRAKEM.Verify(𝑅, PS.𝑈.apk, 𝑇) ≠ 1) { Abort. }
}
PS.𝑈.𝑇 ← 𝑇 .
10.7.1.3.3 Refresh Encryption
The LVSM.𝑈.RefreshEncryption operation proceeds as follows:
apk′← PS.𝑈.apk.
if (SS ≠ ⊥) { ask′← SS.𝑈.ask. }
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Initialize. ⊲ Update anchor key pair
Execute LVSM.𝑈.RefreshInvites. ⊲ Transfer anchor private key to invitations
Let 𝑅′ = KC.BroadcastKeys(PS.𝐺). ⊲ Transfer anchor private key to members
if (performer context) {
𝑇′← SBRAKEM.Encapsulate(𝑅′, PS.𝑈.apk, SS.𝑈.ask).
Write 𝑇′ to the commit.
} else if (SS = ⊥) {
if (SBRAKEM.Verify(𝑅′, PS.𝑈.apk, 𝑇′) ≠ 1) { Abort. }
} else {
Find 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅′ such that 𝑟 → sk is in SS.𝑄.
Let 𝑗 represent the position of 𝑟 in 𝑅′.
SS.𝑈.ask← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑅′, 𝑗, sk, PS.𝑈.apk, 𝑇′).
if (SS.𝑈.ask = ⊥) { Abort. }
}
for each (bpk such that PS.𝑈 [bpk] exists, sorted) { ⊲ Re-encrypt private keys
if (performer context) { bsk← SS.𝑈 [bpk]. }
else { bsk← ⊥. }
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Execute LVSM.𝑈.Set with:
▶ Parameter bpk: set to bpk
▶ Parameter bsk: set to bsk.
}
PS.𝑈. 𝑓 ← 1.
10.7.1.3.4 Mark Stale
The LVSM.𝑈.MarkStale operation proceeds as follows:
PS.𝑈. 𝑓 ← 0.
10.7.1.3.5 Set
The LVSM.𝑈.Set operation proceeds as follows:
Parameters: bpk, a public key; and bsk, either a private key to store or ⊥.
if (bpk is not valid) { Abort. }
if (performer context) {
if ((bpk, bsk) is not a valid keypair) { Abort. }
𝑇 ← SBRAKEM.Encapsulate({PS.𝑈.apk}, bpk, bsk).
Write 𝑇 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝑇 from the commit.
if (SS = ⊥) {
if (SBRAKEM.Verify({PS.𝑈.apk}, bpk, 𝑇) ≠ 1) { Abort. }
} else {
bsk← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate({PS.𝑈.apk}, 1, SS.𝑈.ask, bpk, 𝑇).
if (bsk = ⊥) { Abort. }
SS.𝑈 [bpk] ← bsk.
}
}
PS.𝑈 [bpk] ← 𝑇 .
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10.7.1.3.6 Delete
The LVSM.𝑈.Delete operation proceeds as follows:
Parameters: bpk, a public key.
if (PS.𝑈 [bpk] exists) { Delete PS.𝑈 [bpk]. }
if (SS ≠ ⊥) {
if (SS.𝑈 [bpk] exists) { Delete SS.𝑈 [bpk]. }
}
10.7.1.3.7 Decrypt
The LVSM.𝑈.Decrypt(PS, SS, id, isk) → SS′ function proceeds as follows:
Let 𝑅 denote the set of invitation public keys stored in PS.𝐿.
Let 𝑗 refer to the invitation in 𝑅 with identifier id.
SS′← SS.
SS′.𝑈.ask← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate(𝑅, 𝑗, isk, PS.𝑈.apk, PS.𝑈.𝑇).
if (SS′.𝑈.ask = ⊥) { return ⊥. }
for each (bpk such that PS.𝑈 [bpk] exists) {
bsk← SBRAKEM.Decapsulate({PS.𝑈.apk}, 1, SS′.𝑈.ask, bpk, PS.𝑈 [bpk]).
if (bsk = ⊥) { Abort. }




As discussed in Section 10.1.6, a Safehouse session has configurable authentication ephemerality
and deniability settings. The session may either use long-term identities, or only ephemeral
identities. In terms of deniability, the session can be configured in a “non-repudiable”, “offline
deniable”, or “strongly deniable” mode.
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When long-term identities are enabled for a Safehouse session, members must authenticate
themselves to the other members. An overview of this mechanism was given in Section 10.1.9.
Members authenticate themselves by producing a NIZKPK in three situations:
• New members authenticate to existing members when they join the session.
• When existing members come online, they authenticate to any new members that joined the
session while they were offline.
• When an existing member changes their identity for post-compromise security purposes, they
authenticate the change.
The proof statements for the authentication NIZKPKs vary widely based on the situation and the
group mode.
In all cases, the authentication NIZKPK demonstrates knowledge of a set of discrete logarithms
arranged in a specific logical expression. An identity witness contains a set of private keys that
satisfies the proof statement. The proof statement is always of the form:
PK{(discrete logarithms) : honest ∨ forged}
The “honest” term is a conjunction of discrete logarithms, potentially including discrete logarithm
equalities. The exact term depends on the which of the three aforementioned scenarios the proof
is for. The “forged” term depends only on the deniability mode of the Safehouse session. It allows
forgers to produce the proofs for transcripts, thereby providing plausible deniability.
The following algorithm summarizes what is proven as part of the “honest” term, where knowl-
edge of the discrete logarithm of a blinded public key is proven with respect to the corresponding
blinding public key:
if (the member is newly joining the session) {
Prove knowledge of an invitation private key corresponding to a layaway in PS.𝐿.
if (long-term identities are enabled) {
Prove knowledge of the private key for the new blinded public key.
if (the invitation is an individual invitation) {
Prove that the private key for the blinded public key in the layaway
↩→ matches the private key for the new blinded public key.
}
} else if (the invitation is an individual invitation) {
Prove knowledge of the private key for the blinded public key in the layaway.
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}
} else if (long-term identities are enabled) {
if (the member is authenticating to newly joined members) {
Prove knowledge of the private key for the member’s entry in PS.𝐼.
if (switching to a new public key for blinding) {
Prove that the private key for the member’s entry in PS.𝐼
↩→ matches the private key for the new blinded public key.
}
} else if (the member is changing their identity) {
Prove knowledge of the private key for the new blinded public key.
}
}
One potentially unexpected aspect of the “honest” algorithm is that when authenticating
during an identity changing operation, the member does not need to prove knowledge of their
previous blinded public key. This is because this operation will be digitally signed using the
member’s personal private key, as with most other MLS-layer operations. Since all of the recipients
of the NIZKPK in this scenario have already authenticated the prover, they have already bound
the prover’s identity to the personal key used to sign the operation. This is not true in the other
situations, which both involve new members that lack these established associations.
Another notable aspect of the “honest” algorithm is that it allows existing members to blind
their identity public key using a new blinding key pair in PS.𝑈 when authenticating to new
members. This is an important feature, because it allows the number of entries in PS.𝑈 to
decrease over time as existing members converge on a smaller set of blinding bases. The NIZKPK
requires proving that the discrete logarithm of the previous blinded public key with respect to
the previous blinding public key matches the discrete logarithm of the new blinded public key
with respect to the new blinding public key. This proof provides assurance to the new members
that the “identified” identity public key they previously assigned to the prover is associated with
the newly “authenticated” identity public key.
During normal operation, identity witnesses contain only the private keys required to satisfy
the “honest” term of the proof statement, and the “forged” term is ignored. When a Safehouse
session is configured to provide deniability, a forger can use an identity witness containing
private keys that satisfy the “forged” term to produce authentication NIZKPKs. The following
algorithm summarizes what is proven as part of the “forged” term, where knowledge of the
discrete logarithm of a blinded public key is proven with respect to the corresponding blinding
public key:
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if (long-term identities are enabled && the session is not in non-repudiable mode) {
Initialize an empty sequence 𝑅1.
for each (personal key for an existing or newly joining member) {
Append the personal public key to 𝑅1.
}
Initialize an empty sequence 𝑅2.
if (the session is in strongly deniable mode) {
for each (blinded public key for an existing or newly joining member) {
Append the blinded public key to 𝑅2.
}
}
for each (index 𝑖 in 𝑅1) {
if (the session is in strongly deniable mode) {
Prove knowledge of the private key for the 𝑖th entry in either 𝑅1 or 𝑅2.
} else {




When configured in “offline” or “strong” deniability modes,21 Safehouse makes it possible to
plausibly deny that an identity public key is associated with a member in a session, because the
transcript of that session could be forged.
If a Safehouse session is not in the “non-repudiable” mode, then any offline forger can forge a
transcript given only the identity public keys of the parties to include in the transcript. An offline
forger can simulate the behavior of all of the parties and use their personal private keys to forge
authentication proofs. Since the offline forger generates all of the personal private keys for the
simulated parties, it is able to use an identity witness containing all of the private keys for the
entries in 𝑅1.
When a session is in the “strong” deniability mode, then it is also possible for a misinformant
to forge proofs that are sent to the interactive judge, as long as the misinformant knows the
identity private keys for all of the members that are reporting to the judge. The misinformant
can simulate a session containing the members reporting to the judge and an arbitrary set of
simulated members that are not actually present (as long as the misinformant knows the identity
public keys of the members to simulate). For each member in the session, the misinformant’s
identity witness contains the private key for the associated entry in 𝑅2 if the member is under
21 ⋏The relevant forms of deniability are defined in Section 2.4.
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the control of the judge, or for the entry in 𝑅1 if they are simulating the member.22 This allows
the misinformant to satisfy the “forged” term of any authentication NIZKPK by using the identity
private keys of members reporting to the judge and the personal private keys of members that
are being simulated.
Importantly, the structure of the proof statement allows a misinformant to produce an authen-
tication NIZKPK for a newly joining simulated member even if they do not posses any invitation
private keys, which may be generated by the judge, since knowledge of invitation private keys
is part of the “honest” term. This method of achieving strong deniability is very similar to the
approach used by DAKEZ (see Section 5.4), except extended into the group setting.
During normal operation, every honest member in a Safehouse knows that incoming authen-
tication NIZKPKs cannot be produced by identity witnesses using the “forged” term, because
the honest member knows (but cannot prove to outsiders) that no other entities possess their
personal private key or identity private key. Consequently, any valid authentication proof received
by the member must have been produced using an identity witness for the “honest” term.
While the algorithms above are sufficient to derive the proof statements, explicit proof state-
ments are listed for the “honest” term in Section 10.8.1 and for the “forged” term in Section 10.8.2.
These proof statements are denoted using the following notational conventions, with the corre-
sponding proof statements given in Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97]:23
DL{𝛼 : (ℎ, 𝑥)} := PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥 = ℎ𝛼}
DLEQ{𝛼 : (ℎ1, 𝑥1) ≈ (ℎ2, 𝑥2)} := PK{(𝛼) : 𝑥1 = ℎ1𝛼 ∧ 𝑥2 = ℎ2𝛼}
The statements are given with respect to a generic group 𝔾 with generator 𝑔 and order 𝑞, since
the actual group will be the key space of the developer’s chosen BRAKEM scheme. Sections 10.8.4
and 10.8.5 describe two NIZKPKs constructions for the statements.
10.8.1 Honest Proof Term
This section uses the following notation for variables in the various proof statements:
22 ⋏The misinformant cannot use the personal private key of members controlled by the judge, because the judge
might provide a personal public key to use, preventing the misinformant from learning the personal private key.
The judge has no control over the other simulated parties, so the misinformant can freely generate personal key
pairs for them.
23 ⋏The notation for DLEQ is copied from Section 8.2.2.2.
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• (ipk, isk) denotes the invitation key pair for the invitation used by a newly joining member.
ipk is the invitation public key stored in PS.𝐿 for the layaway that is specified by the member
upon joining the session.
• (pk, sk) denotes the identity key pair for the prover.
• pk denotes the blinded public key for the prover—the value from PS.𝐼 for existing members,
or the new value for joining members.
• (bpk, bsk) denotes the blinding key pair used to produce pk from pk using the Blind function
(see Section 10.1.8).
When a new member joins the session using a bearer invitation and the session is configured to
use only ephemeral identities, the “honest” term is:
DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)}
When a new member joins the session using a bearer invitation and the session is configured to
use long-term identities, the “honest” term is:
DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)} ∧ DL{sk : (bpk, pk)}
When a new member joins the session using an individual invitation, the session is configured to
use long-term identities, and the associated layaway contains the blinded public key tpk that has
been blinded using the blinding public key btpk, the “honest” term is:
DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)} ∧ DLEQ{sk : (bpk, pk) ≈ (btpk, tpk)}
When an existing member authenticates to new members and retains its blinded public key, the
“honest” term is:
DL{sk : (bpk, pk)}
When an existing member authenticates to new members while switching to a new blinded public
key pk′ that has been blinded using the blinding public key bpk′, the “honest” term is:
DLEQ{sk : (bpk, pk) ≈ (bpk′, pk′)}
When an existing member changes to a new identity, the “honest” term is:
DL{sk : (bpk, pk)}
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10.8.2 Forged Proof Term
When the session is configured in non-repudiable mode, the “forged” term is:
False
When the session is configured in offline deniable mode and 𝑅1 denotes the set of personal public
keys for all existing and newly joining members, the “forged” term is:⋀︂
pk𝑖∈𝑅1
DL{sk𝑖 : (𝑔, pk𝑖)}
When the session is configured in strongly deniable mode, 𝑅1 denotes a sequence of the personal
public keys for all existing and newly joining members, 𝑅2 denotes the blinded public keys for the
same sequence of members, 𝐵 denotes the blinding public keys used to blind the corresponding





DL{sk1,𝑖 : (𝑔, 𝑅1 [𝑖])} ∨ DL{sk2,𝑖 : (𝐵[𝑖], 𝑅2 [𝑖])}
)︂
10.8.3 Interface
The authentication NIZKPKs are exposed to the other operational layers in the form of the
following two functions:
• Auth.Prove(ipk, bpk, pk, btpk, tpk, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝑤) → 𝜋.
• Auth.Verify(ipk, bpk, pk, btpk, tpk, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝜋) → 𝑏.
Some of the arguments may be omitted by setting them to the special symbol ⊥. 𝑅1 is a sequence
of personal public keys (or ⊥), 𝐵 is a sequence of blinding public keys (or ⊥), and 𝑅2 is a sequence
of blinded public keys. 𝐵 ≠ ⊥ if and only if 𝑅2 ≠ ⊥. The three sequences must all have the same
length, except for sequences that are ⊥. 𝑅1, 𝐵, and 𝑅2 will always contain at least one element if
they are not set to ⊥, because they must contain public keys for every existing and newly joining
member; the sequences will always contain a public key corresponding to the member producing
the proof (or they will be set to ⊥). 𝑤 denotes the identity witness. The output of Auth.Verify is
𝑏 = 1 if and only if the proof 𝜋 is valid. The value 𝑚 is associated data, which is an opaque blob
that is unambiguously concatenated into the Fiat-Shamir challenge for the NIZKPK; this ensures
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that the NIZKPK is bound to a particular context.2⁴ The functions choose the “honest” term
(see Section 10.8.1) and the “forged” term (see Section 10.8.2) to use based on the arguments
according to the following algorithm:
if (ipk ≠ ⊥ && bpk = ⊥ && btpk = ⊥) {
honest := DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)}
} else if (ipk = ⊥ && bpk ≠ ⊥ && btpk = ⊥) {
honest := DL{sk : (bpk, pk)}
} else if (ipk ≠ ⊥ && bpk ≠ ⊥ && btpk = ⊥) {
honest := DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)} ∧ DL{sk : (bpk, pk)}
} else if (ipk ≠ ⊥ && bpk ≠ ⊥ && btpk ≠ ⊥) {
honest := DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)} ∧ DLEQ{sk : (bpk, pk) ≈ (btpk, tpk)}
} else if (ipk = ⊥ && bpk ≠ ⊥ && btpk ≠ ⊥) {




if (𝑅1 = ⊥ && 𝑅2 = ⊥) {
forged := False
} else if (𝑅1 ≠ ⊥ && 𝑅2 = ⊥) {
forged := ⋀︁pk𝑖∈𝑅1 DL{sk𝑖 : (𝑔, pk𝑖)}
} else if (𝑅1 ≠ ⊥ && 𝑅2 ≠ ⊥) {
forged := ⋀︁𝑛




stmt := honest ∨ forged.
return stmt.
24 ⋏ For an example of associated data in NIZKPKs produced with the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] and how it
typically interacts with the surrounding system, see the discussion in Section 5.7 of the associated data for the
DAKEs presented in Chapter 5.
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10.8.4 Construction: Schnorr Compiler
There are five different possible forms2⁵ for the “honest” term, as shown in Section 10.8.1, and
three different possible forms for the “forged” term, as shown in Section 10.8.2. This is a total of
15 possible proof statements. This section describes an approach for implementing the NIZKPKs
for these proof statements.
The most straightforward way to implement NIZKPKs for all of the proof statements is to use
the Schnorr proof system [Sch91] with an appropriate NIZKPK compiler. All of the individual
components are DL or DLEQ proof statements. DLEQ statements appear in components of the
“honest” term when a new member joins using an individual invitation or when an existing
member switches to a new blinded public key. Constructions for DL and DLEQ statements using
the Schnorr proof system were presented in Sections 8.2.2.1 and 8.2.2.2, respectively. While
these constructions are given in the context of the BRAKEMDDL★ group setting, they also work in
other group settings, such as the elliptic curve group for BRAKEMZK.
Combining NIZKPKs for DL and DLEQ proof statements into an overall authentication NIZKPK
can be accomplished by using compilers for logical “AND” and “OR” operations. Combining two
Schnorr-based NIZKPKs with an “AND” operation is trivial: the two random oracle queries
are instead combined into a single random oracle query, and the challenges produced by the
two random oracles are instead output from the combined random oracle. This is essentially
equivalent to “simultaneously” performing both NIZKPKs as normal, yielding the same effect as
a logical “AND” operation. Combining two Schnorr-based NIZKPKs with an “OR” operation can
be done using the technique described by Cramer et al. [CDS94], which was previously used in
Chapter 5 to build a ring signature scheme (see Section 5.3.3) that forms the basis of the new
DAKEZ, ZDH, and XZDH DAKEs. In general, the compiler combines two Schnorr-based NIZKPKs
as follows:
1. Denote the original proofs as 𝜋1 = (𝑐1, 𝑠1) and 𝜋2 = (𝑐2, 𝑠2), each consisting of the Fiat-
Shamir challenge, 𝑐𝑖, and the response, 𝑠𝑖. Originally, the verifier would compute 𝑐1 = 𝐻1(𝑡1)
and 𝑐2 = 𝐻2(𝑡2), where 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 are the random oracles for the original NIZKPKs and 𝑡1
and 𝑡2 are the commitments.
2. The Fiat-Shamir challenge in the newly unified proof is denoted by 𝑐′. The challenges used
in the original proofs must satisfy the constraint 𝑐′ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2. The prover specifies 𝑐′ and 𝑐1,
thereby implicitly specifying 𝑐2. The unified proof becomes 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑐1, 𝑠1, 𝑠2).
25 ⋏ The form for an identity change is the same as the form for an existing member authenticating to new members
while retaining its blinded public key.
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3. The verifier computes 𝑐2 = 𝑐′ − 𝑐1 and derives the original queries 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 from (𝑐1, 𝑠1) and
(𝑐2, 𝑠2) as before. It then computes 𝑐 = 𝐻 (𝑡1∥𝑡2), where 𝐻 is the random oracle.
4. The verifier checks that 𝑐 = 𝑐′.
Without loss of generality, let the prover’s witness satisfy the 𝑖th original proof, but not the 𝑗th
original proof, where 𝑗 = 3 − 𝑖. The prover can produce the combined proof as follows:
1. Choose a random 𝑐 𝑗 value.
2. Run the zero-knowledge simulator for the 𝑗th original proof with challenge 𝑐 𝑗, producing 𝑡 𝑗
and 𝑠 𝑗.
3. Run the honest proving algorithm for the 𝑖th original proof normally up to the point of the
random oracle query, producing 𝑡𝑖.
4. Compute 𝑐′ = 𝐻 (𝑡1∥𝑡2).
5. Compute 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐′ − 𝑐 𝑗.
6. Complete the honest proving algorithm for the 𝑖th original proof with challenge 𝑐𝑖, producing
𝑠𝑖.
7. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑐1, 𝑠1, 𝑠2).
Together, the “AND” and “OR” compilers can produce NIZKPKs for all 15 possible proof statements.
Security proofs for these NIZKPKs follow directly from the security proofs for the underlying DL
and DLEQ NIZKPKs and the security proofs for the two compilers.
10.8.4.1 BDL: Batch Discrete Logarithm
When the session is configured in the “offline deniable” mode, the “forged” term becomes a
simple conjunction of DL NIZKPKs, as discussed in Section 10.8.2. The NIZKPK compilation
technique described in Section 10.8.4 can produce a correct and secure proof system for this
statement without issue: the “AND” compiler for the Schnorr proofs will result in a proof that
contains one hash (the challenge) and one group element for each public key in 𝑅1. An alternative
approach that provides better performance is to use a batched proof system similar to the BDLEQ
scheme presented in Section 8.2.2.3; the resulting proof requires only the challenge hash and
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one group element. Recall that the “forged” term in the “offline deniable” mode can be written
as a conjunction of 𝑛 DL statements:
𝑛⋀︂
𝑖=1
DL{sk𝑖 : (𝑔, pk𝑖)}
The batched proof system for this statement is called Batch Discrete Logarithm (BDL), and it can
be constructed using the same technique as the BDLEQ construction. The prover P produces the
NIZKPK, with security parameter _0, as follows:
1. Choose 𝑟 $←− ℤ𝑞
2. Compute 𝑡′← 𝑔𝑟
3. Compute 𝑐′← 𝐻2(pk1∥ . . . ∥pk𝑛∥𝑡′) where 𝐻2 is a cryptographic hash function with _0 bits
of output modeled by a random oracle
4. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝑐′) where 𝐻1 is a cryptographic hash function with _0 · 𝑛 bits of output
5. Split 𝑒 into 𝑛 parts such that for each 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], the part 𝑒𝑖 is in [0, 2_0)
6. Compute 𝑠← 𝑟 − ∑𝑛𝑖=1(𝑒𝑖 · sk𝑖) (mod 𝑞)
7. The proof is 𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑠)
The verifierV checks the proof as follows:
1. Verify that pk1, . . . , pk𝑛 ∈ 𝔾 and abort otherwise
2. Compute 𝑒 = 𝐻1(𝑐′) and split 𝑒 into 𝑒𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛]





4. Compute 𝑐← 𝐻2(pk1∥ . . . ∥pk𝑛∥𝑡)
5. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐 = 𝑐′
This previously known BDL construction is ultimately based on the “small exponent” technique
introduced by Bellare et al. [BGR98, §3.3] in the context of batched verification of digital
signatures. Hoshino et al. [HAK01, §2.2] were the first to informally apply the technique to
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zero-knowledge proofs.2⁶ Peng et al. [PBD07] formalized the batch verification techniques and
proved the security of these schemes. Henry [Hen14, Fig. 3.3] extended the formalization and
presented the most accessible description of the construction. The security of the BDL NIZKPK
described above follows from the security proofs given by Henry [Hen14, Th. 3.16] for the
interactive version of the proof system. The aforementioned NIZKPK was produced by applying
the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] to the interactive protocol. An optimization is also included in
the NIZKPK presented above: instead of deriving all 𝑛 of the 𝑒𝑖 terms from the commitment 𝑡′
and including these terms in the proof, the 𝑒𝑖 terms are instead derived from the random oracle
output. This optimization significantly reduces the size of the proof compared to the standard
result from the Fiat-Shamir transform, without affecting the applicability of the security proofs.
The BDL proof system can be used to prove the “forged” term when in “offline deniable”
mode. In this case, the “forged” term is still combined with the “honest” term using the “AND”
compiler: the random oracle queries in the proofs for the two terms are combined into a single
random oracle query, producing a unified proof. The BDL proof is not used in other modes; in
particular, the “forged” term in the “strongly deniable” mode must still be derived by appropriately
combining applications of the “AND” and “OR” compilers.
10.8.4.2 Example
For an example of the approach for constructing NIZKPKs described in Section 10.8.4, consider the
most complex scenario: a new member joining a session, configured to use long-term identities
and in “strongly deniable” mode, using an individual invitation. Combining the “honest” term
from Section 10.8.1 with the “forged” term from Section 10.8.2 yields the following combined
proof statement: (︂







DL{sk1,𝑖 : (𝑔, 𝑅1 [𝑖])} ∨ DL{sk2,𝑖 : (𝐵[𝑖], 𝑅2 [𝑖])}
)︂)︃
26 ⋏The proof system introduced by Hoshino et al. is applicable to a generalized family of proof statements. Their
construction applies to the BDL statement when the system’s parameter is set to 𝑘 = 1.
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When written out in full Camenisch-Stadler notation [CS97], the statement becomes:
PK
{︄




𝑅1 [𝑖] = 𝑔sk1,𝑖 ∨ 𝑅2 [𝑖] = 𝐵[𝑖]sk2,𝑖
)︁ )︃}︄
After applying the proof compilers to the original NIZKPKs, the proof becomes:
𝜋 = (𝑐′, 𝑐1, 𝑠1,1, 𝑠1,2, 𝑐2,1,1, 𝑠2,1,1, 𝑠2,1,2, . . . , 𝑐2,𝑛,1, 𝑠2,𝑛,1, 𝑠2,𝑛,2)
The challenges for the constituent NIZKPKs are related in the following way, modulo the group
order 𝑞:
• 𝑐′ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 (mod 𝑞).
• ∀𝑛
𝑖=1(𝑐2 = 𝑐2,𝑖,1 + 𝑐2,𝑖,2) (mod 𝑞).
Note that 𝑐2 and 𝑐2,𝑖,2 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 are not explicitly included in 𝜋—the verifier can derive
them from the other terms in 𝜋 based on the required relationships. The original proofs are
represented in the combined NIZKPK by the following terms:
• DL{isk : (𝑔, ipk)} is represented by (𝑐1, 𝑠1,1).
• DLEQ{sk : (bpk, pk) ≈ (btpk, tpk)} is represented by (𝑐1, 𝑠1,2).
• DL{sk1,𝑖 : (𝑔, 𝑅1 [𝑖])} is represented by (𝑐2,𝑖,1, 𝑠2,𝑖,1).
• DL{sk2,𝑖 : (𝐵[𝑖], 𝑅2 [𝑖])} is represented by (𝑐2,𝑖,2, 𝑠2,𝑖,2).
A prover with a witness satisfying the “honest” term would compute the proof as follows:
1. Choose a random 𝑐2.
2. For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛, choose a random 𝑐2,𝑖,1 and compute 𝑐2,𝑖,2 = 𝑐2 − 𝑐2,𝑖,1 (mod 𝑞).
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3. Simulate the proofs in the “forged” term using the DL zero-knowledge simulator with the
assigned challenges. For each entry 𝑖 ∈ [1, 𝑛], this produces commitments 𝑡2,𝑖,1 and 𝑡2,𝑖,2 and
responses 𝑠2,𝑖,1 and 𝑠2,𝑖,2.
4. Produce honest commitments 𝑡1,1 and 𝑡1,2 for the DL and DLEQ proofs in the “honest” term.
5. Query the random oracle to derive 𝑐′.
6. Compute 𝑐1 = 𝑐′ − 𝑐2.
7. Complete the proofs for the “honest” term, producing responses 𝑠1,1 and 𝑠1,2.
8. Output the proof 𝜋.
In contrast, a prover with a witness satisfying the “forged” term would compute the proof as
follows:
1. Choose a random 𝑐1.
2. Simulate the proofs in the “honest” term using the DL and DLEQ zero-knowledge simulators
with challenge 𝑐1, producing commitments 𝑡1,1 and 𝑡1,2, and responses 𝑠1,1 and 𝑠1,2.
3. For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛:
a) Let 𝑏𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} denote the index of the statement in the 𝑖th “forged” term for which the
prover knows a witness, and let 𝑏𝑖 = 3 − 𝑏𝑖.
b) Produce an honest commitment 𝑡2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 for the DL proof.
c) Choose a random 𝑐2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 .
d) Simulate the other DL proof for the 𝑖th term, producing commitment 𝑡2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 and response
𝑠2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 .
4. Query the random oracle to derive 𝑐′.
5. Compute 𝑐2 = 𝑐′ − 𝑐1.
6. For 𝑖 = 1 to 𝑛:
a) Compute 𝑐2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 = 𝑐2 − 𝑐2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 .
b) Complete the honest proof for the term, producing response 𝑠2,𝑖,𝑏𝑖 .
7. Output the proof 𝜋.
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This example demonstrated the proof compiler approach applied to the most complicated of
the 15 proof statements. The approach can be applied to the other proof statements to derive
similar NIZKPKs. Proof statements for the “offline deniable” mode can use the BDL proof system
introduced in Section 10.8.4.1 for the “forged” term instead of repeated applications of the “AND”
compiler. Deriving the other NIZKPKs using the compilers is straightforward.
10.8.5 Construction: Borromean Ring Signatures
Section 10.8.4 described a construction for the authentication NIZKPKs using standard Schnorr
proof compilers for “AND” and “OR” expressions. This approach is relatively simple and easy to
implement using common cryptographic libraries. However, using a more sophisticated proving
technique, it is possible to significantly decrease the size of the proofs without introducing
any new security assumptions. This section provides an overview of a more efficient approach
based on Borromean ring signatures [MP15]. Borromean ring signatures are a technique for
constructing efficient NIZKPKs for proof statements consisting of terms that can be implemented
using Schnorr-based proof systems. Prior to this work, Borromean ring signatures were only
applied to proof statements consisting of DL proofs combined by “AND” and “OR” operators. The
contribution of this section is to generalize Borromean ring signatures so that they can contain
DLEQ terms, allowing them to be applied to the authentication proof statements required by
Safehouse.
The main advantage of Borromean ring signatures over the approach in Section 10.8.4 is that
a Borromean ring signature requires only one challenge (i.e., hash output) to be transferred in the
proof. This results in a significantly reduced proof size, especially when using the “forged” term
for the “strongly deniable” mode introduced in Section 10.8.2: the approach in Section 10.8.4
produces proofs with 2+𝑛 hash values, where 𝑛 denotes the number of members, while Borromean
ring signatures require only 1 hash value in the proof.
In a standard NIZKPK created using the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87], the commitments
are part of the random oracle query, and the output of the random oracle (the challenge) is
used by the verifier to derive the commitments. In the Borromean ring signature framework,
the random oracle output and the challenge used by the verifier are decoupled. In other words,
the value output by the random oracle when queried with the commitments is not necessarily
the challenge value used by the verifier to derive the commitments (and thus also by the prover
to produce the response). Figure 10.4 depicts this situation in the form of a directed graph
representation. The vertices represent challenge values, and the edge represents a NIZKPK using
the Fiat-Shamir transform for some proof statement. Let 𝑇0 denote the complete random oracle
query in the original proof, including all of the necessary commitments. The random oracle is
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Figure 10.4 An edge in a Borromean ring signature graph. This is an incomplete graph that
shows the fundamental building block of a Borromean ring signature. The directed edge represents
a NIZKPK. The output of the random oracle query is 𝑐1. The response 𝑠0 is computed using the
challenge value 𝑐0. A prover can compute 𝑐1 in two possible ways: by using a witness for the proof
statement to execute the honest proving algorithm, or by using advance knowledge of 𝑐0 to execute
the zero-knowledge simulator with 𝑐0 as the challenge. (Refs: 400 and 401)
Figure 10.5 A Borromean ring signature graph for DL{pk0}. This proof is equivalent to a
standard Schnorr NIZKPK of a discrete logarithm (Refs: 401 a b)
queried as in the original proof, producing 𝑐1 = 𝐻 (𝑇0) (the target vertex of the edge). However,
the challenge used by the prover to complete the proof is 𝑐0 (the source vertex of the edge)
instead of 𝑐1. When using a standard Schnorr proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm 𝑥0 with
commitment 𝑇0 = 𝑔𝑟0 for the edge, the prover would compute the challenge 𝑐1 = 𝐻 (𝑇0) and the
response 𝑠0 = 𝑟0 + 𝑐0 · 𝑥0. Figure 10.4 does not depict a complete Borromean ring signature—only
the fundamental building block. The critical observation is that 𝑐1 can be computed in two
ways: given a witness for the proof statement, the honest NIZKPK proving algorithm can be
used to derive 𝑐1 from the random oracle output; or given 𝑐0, a 𝑐-simulatable [Hen14, Def. 9]
zero-knowledge simulator for the NIZKPK can be used to derive 𝑠0 and 𝑐1. In terms of the graph
representation, this means that it is possible to compute the challenge for the target of an edge
given a witness for the edge, or the challenge for the source of the edge.
Borromean ring signatures become useful when the associated graph representation contains
cycles, also known as causal loops. Consider the graph structure shown in Figure 10.5. The
Borromean ring signature produced by the prover for this graph is 𝜋 = (𝑐0, 𝑠0). The graph
contains a trivial cycle with the reflexive edge from 𝑐0 to itself. DL{pk0} denotes a proof statement
demonstrating knowledge of the discrete logarithm of pk0 with respect to some base; the base
is irrelevant to the discussion in this section. This reflexive edge means that the output of the
random oracle for this NIZKPK is also used to compute and verify the response, 𝑠0. In other words,
the graph in Figure 10.5 corresponds to a Borromean ring signature that is exactly equivalent to a
standard Schnorr NIZKPK of a discrete logarithm. The verifier knows that the target of the edge,
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Figure 10.6 A Borromean ring signature graph for DL{pk0} ∨ DL{pk1}. The verifier can
deduce that the prover knows the witness for at least one of the two edges. (Ref: 402)
𝑐0, could not have been computed by the prover by using knowledge of the source of the edge,
𝑐0, because these values are the same, and no prover can find a value with such a relationship
due to the properties of the random oracle. Therefore, the verifier can conclude that the target
of the edge, 𝑐0, must have been computed using a witness for the edge (i.e., the prover knows
the discrete logarithm of pk0).
Borromean ring signatures can be used to prove more interesting statements by using more
complex graphs. Consider the graph structure shown in Figure 10.6. The Borromean ring
signature produced by the prover for this graph is 𝜋 = (𝑐0, 𝑠0, 𝑠1). The verifier checks the proof
as follows:
1. Compute the commitment 𝑇0 using the challenge 𝑐0 and the response 𝑠0.
2. Compute the random oracle output 𝑐1 = 𝐻 (𝑇0).
3. Compute the commitment 𝑇1 using the challenge 𝑐1 and the response 𝑠1.
4. Compute the random oracle output 𝑐′0 = 𝐻 (𝑇1).
5. Accept the proof if and only if 𝑐′0 = 𝑐0.
Since the graph contains a cycle, it is not possible for the prover to satisfy the verification process
by running the zero-knowledge simulator for both DL statements. This means that the verifier
can conclude that at least one edge in the cycle was produced by using a witness for the edge.
There are two possibilities:
1. The prover used a witness sk0 to derive 𝑐1 and 𝑠0 using the honest proving algorithm, and
then used the zero-knowledge simulator with 𝑐1 to produce 𝑐0 and 𝑠1.
2. The prover used a witness sk1 to derive 𝑐0 and 𝑠1 using the honest proving algorithm, and
then used the zero-knowledge simulator with 𝑐0 to produce 𝑐1 and 𝑠0.
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Figure 10.7 A Borromean ring signature graph for (DL{pk0} ∧ DL{pk′0}) ∨ DL{pk1}. 𝑐1 is
the output of a random oracle query with commitments for both DL{pk0} and DL{pk′0}.
(Refs: 403, 404 a b, and 405)
Therefore, a Borromean ring signature for this graph corresponds to an “OR” proof of the two DL
NIZKPKs; the prover must know at least one of the two witnesses. Note that the resulting proof
differs from the equivalent proof produced using the technique from Cramer et al. [CDS94] that
was discussed in Section 10.8.4.
In addition to implementing logical “OR” operators in proof statements, Borromean ring
signatures can also be used to implement the “AND” operator. Accomplishing this requires a
small extension to the aforementioned technique. In the previously discussed graphs, all vertices
have an in-degree of at most 1. When a vertex in a graph for a Borromean ring signature has a
larger in-degree, this denotes that it is produced as the output of a random oracle call where
the commitments for all of the incoming edges are included in the random oracle query. For
example, consider the graph shown in Figure 10.7. The Borromean ring signature for this graph
is 𝜋 = (𝑐0, 𝑠0, 𝑠′0, 𝑠1). If 𝑇0 denotes the commitment for the NIZKPK for DL{pk0} and 𝑇′0 denotes
the commitment for the NIZKPK for DL{pk′0}, then 𝑐1 = 𝐻 (𝑇0∥𝑇′0) (i.e., 𝑐1 is the output of a
random oracle call that unambiguously contains both 𝑇0 and 𝑇′0 in the query). There are two
possible ways for a prover to compute 𝑐1:
1. Given witnesses sk0 and sk′0 for DL{pk0} and DL{pk′0}, the prover can use the honest proving
algorithm to create commitments 𝑇0 and 𝑇′0, compute 𝑐1, and then produce the responses 𝑠0
and 𝑠′0.
2. Given a value of 𝑐0, the prover can use the zero-knowledge simulator for DL{pk0} and DL{pk′0}
to choose random responses 𝑠0 and 𝑠′0, derive the expected commitments 𝑇0 and 𝑇′0, and then
compute 𝑐1.
In other words, the effect of edges can be generalized for vertices in the graph with in-degrees
larger than 1: for each incoming edge, the prover must either know the witness for the cor-
responding proof statement, or it must know the value of the source vertex. When multiple
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Figure 10.8 An edge for a DLEQ proof in a Borromean ring signature graph. (Ref: 404)
incoming edges have the same source vertex, as in Figure 10.7, this has the effect of requiring
the prover to know the value for the source vertex (𝑐0), or the witnesses for all of the edges.
Consequently, subgraphs of this shape can be used to implement the “AND” operator in the overall
proof. Figure 10.7 depicts the shape as part of a larger cycle, thereby implementing a Borromean
ring signature for the more complex statement (DL{pk0} ∧ DL{pk′0}) ∨ DL{pk1}.
Finally, although Maxwell and Poelstra [MP15] describe Borromean ring signatures only
in the context of DL NIZKPKs, edges in the graph may correspond to more complicated proof
statements. For example, Figure 10.8 depicts an edge that corresponds to a DLEQ proof statement;
DLEQ{pk0, pk′0} denotes a NIZKPK demonstrating that the discrete logarithms of pk0 and pk′0 are
equal with respect to some bases (which are omitted for clarity). The standard DLEQ NIZKPK
built using the Schnorr proof system, which was presented in Section 8.2.2.2, can be used as
part of this Borromean ring signature without issue: the proving algorithm and 𝑐-simulatable
zero-knowledge simulator can be used in exactly the same way as for edges corresponding to DL
NIZKPKs. Internally, the commitment 𝑇0 for the DLEQ NIZKPK is actually a commitment to two
group elements. Using the notation from the NIZKPK in Section 8.2.2.2, 𝑇0 = 𝑡1∥𝑡2, where the
verifier computes 𝑡1 ← ℎ1𝑠0 · 𝑥1𝑐0 and 𝑡2 ← ℎ2𝑠0 · 𝑥2𝑐0 .
10.8.5.1 Example
Given the building blocks described in Section 10.8.5, it is possible to implement Borromean ring
signatures for all of the authentication proof statements discussed in Section 10.8 by formulating
appropriate graphs. Figure 10.9 depicts the graph for a Borromean ring signature that corresponds
to the most complex authentication proof statement used by Safehouse: a new member joining
a session, configured to use long-term identities and in “strongly deniable” mode, using an
individual invitation. This is the same as the example used to illustrate the output of the Schnorr
“AND” and “OR” proof compilers in Section 10.8.4.2. Recall that the proof statement is:(︂







DL{sk1,𝑖 : (𝑔, 𝑅1 [𝑖])} ∨ DL{sk2,𝑖 : (𝐵[𝑖], 𝑅2 [𝑖])}
)︂)︃
404
Chapter 10 Safehouse: A Comprehensive Secure Group Messaging Solution
Figure 10.9 A Borromean ring signature graph for the most complex authentication
proof. A proof for this graph demonstrates knowledge of witnesses for the two NIZKPKs in the
“honest” term, or for at least one DL for each of the 𝑛 indices in the “forged” term. (Ref: 404)
The overall statement is an “honest” term and a “forged” term combined with a logical “OR”
operator, so the graph for the Borromean ring signature consists of an overall cycle with two
subgraphs—this forces the prover to know all of the witnesses for one of the two subgraphs. The
subgraph for the “honest” term uses the “AND” technique from Figure 10.7 to combine the DL
and DLEQ proof statements. The “forged” term is a conjunction of 𝑛 disjunctions with 2 terms
each, so the corresponding subgraph consists of 𝑛 2-step paths from the 𝑐1 vertex to the 𝑐0 vertex.
The final Borromean ring signature for the statement is:
𝜋 = (𝑐0, 𝑠0, 𝑠′0, 𝑠1,1, 𝑠2,1, . . . , 𝑠1,𝑛, 𝑠2,𝑛)
Borromean ring signatures are called “signatures” because they can be bound to a particular
message𝑚 by including𝑚 in all random oracle queries. As discussed in Section 10.8.3, Safehouse
authentication NIZKPKs must be bound to a particular context using “associated data”. When
using Borromean ring signatures to implement authentication NIZKPKs, the associated data is
the “message” that is included in the random oracle queries. The prototype implementation
of Safehouse uses the construction previously described in Section 10.8.4; formulation of the
Borromean ring signature graphs for all 15 possible statements and an implementation of the
construction is left as future work.
405
Chapter 10 Safehouse: A Comprehensive Secure Group Messaging Solution
10.9 Interface Functions
Developers interact with a Safehouse implementation using its public interface. This interface can
be divided into two parts: a set of interface functions, and the MLS layer. Interface functions allow
the developer to interact with the current group state in prescribed ways. Interface functions do
not modify the group state, and they do not produce commits. In contrast, the MLS layer consists
of operations (as defined in Section 10.1.1) that modify the group state and produce commits
to send to the server. MLS-layer operations are performed to update the group state, whereas
interface functions are called to make use of the currently established group state.
This section describes the interface functions exposed by Safehouse. Section 10.9.1 describes
the function that derives application-specific keys from the group key, Section 10.9.2 describes
functions for serializing and deserializing group states, and Section 10.9.3 presents functions for
authenticating payloads. Section 10.10 presents the rest of Safehouse’s public API: the MLS layer.
10.9.1 Group Key Derivation
The primary purpose of Safehouse is to establish and maintain a shared secret key that group
members can use to communicate. The group key, SS.𝐾, is this shared secret key. However, since
SS.𝐾 is used internally in the Safehouse protocol (e.g., in the KGM.RefreshKeys operation de-
scribed in Section 10.5.8 and the KGM.RatchetGroupKey operation described in Section 10.5.9),
directly exposing it to the developer is problematic. If an application built using Safehouse
were given direct access to the group key, then a security proof would need to account for the
application’s use of the group key. It is only possible to produce a composable security proof
for Safehouse if the application’s view is restricted to one-way functions of the group key; the
one-wayness property can be relied upon to prevent the behavior of the overall application from
undermining key secrecy. The design of Safehouse avoids revealing the group key in order to
facilitate the future development of composable security proofs and verification tools.
The following interface function is provided as part of Safehouse’s API:
• SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ, ℓ) → 𝐾: produces an ℓ-bit shared secret key 𝐾 associated with the
group state (PS, SS) and the domain separation string Φ.
The SharedKey function deterministically produces a key 𝐾 based on the tuple (SS.𝐾,Φ, ℓ). In
other words, all members of the session with the same public state PS will derive the same key if
they provide the same values for Φ and ℓ. The function’s output is computationally independent
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of outputs for different arguments: it should not be possible to efficiently distinguish between
outputs for different choices of Φ and ℓ without access to SS.𝐾.
For any group state (PS, SS) produced by a member’s honest execution of the Safehouse
protocol, any PPT adversary has negligible advantage in the following game:
1. The challenger sends PS to the adversary.
2. The adversary is given oracle access for SharedKey(PS, SS, ·, ·). The adversary may perform
a polynomially bounded number of SharedKey oracle calls and other operations.
3. The adversary outputs strings Φ0 and Φ1, and non-negative integers ℓ0 and ℓ1.
4. The challenger computes 𝐾0 ← SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ0, ℓ0).
5. The challenger computes 𝐾1 ← SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ1, ℓ1).
6. If ℓ0 < ℓ1 then the challenger chooses 𝐾′
$←− {0, 1}ℓ1−ℓ0 and sets 𝐾0 ← 𝐾0∥𝐾′.
7. If ℓ1 < ℓ0 then the challenger chooses 𝐾′
$←− {0, 1}ℓ0−ℓ1 and sets 𝐾1 ← 𝐾1∥𝐾′.
8. The challenger chooses 𝑏 $←− {0, 1}.
9. If 𝑏 = 0 then the challenger sets 𝑘0 ← 𝐾0 and 𝑘1 ← 𝐾1.
10. If 𝑏 = 1 then the challenger sets 𝑘0 ← 𝐾1 and 𝑘1 ← 𝐾0.
11. The challenger sends (𝑘0, 𝑘1) to the adversary.
12. The adversary may perform a polynomially bounded number of SharedKey oracle calls and
other operations.
13. The adversary outputs a guess 𝑏′.
14. The adversary wins if 𝑏′ = 𝑏 and it never queried the oracle for SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ0, ℓ0)
or SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ1, ℓ1).
Note that this security game implicitly requires that the SharedKey implementation produces keys
that are computationally indistinguishable from random strings. If a SharedKey implementation
did not provide this property, then an adversary could choose to output ℓ0 = 0 and ℓ1 > 0; the
game would then reduce to distinguishing SharedKey outputs from random strings. It is also
important to note that it is easy for an adversary to win this game against an implementation for
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which SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ, ℓ0) is a prefix (or any public function) of SharedKey(PS, SS,Φ, ℓ1)
for ℓ0 < ℓ1.
In practice, it is easy to implement SharedKey using an XOF that generates random and
unrelated outputs, such as cSHAKE128 [KCP16]. The XOF can be given a unique encoding of
(SS.𝐾,Φ, ℓ) as the preimage and asked to produce ℓ bits of output. Since the adversary does
not know SS.𝐾, it can not directly compute the SharedKey outputs—it must guess the order
by examining the output streams. However, the cSHAKE128 outputs are unrelated [KCP16,
§8.2.2] and indistinguishable from random [Dwo15, §A.2], so the outputs do not reveal any
useful information to the adversary.
10.9.2 State Serialization
The ability to serialize and deserialize the public state (defined in Section 10.1.2) is needed
for both transmission to new members over the network and for ensuring that the state hash,
PS.𝐻, can prevent forked group states from being maliciously “merged”. Most of the difficult
work involved in serializing or deserializing the state is done by the KC subsystem, which, as
discussed in Section 10.6, provides a structure-aware efficient serialization mechanism for the
key graph, PS.𝐺, the public key map, PS.𝑃, the superfluous edges, PS.𝑆, and the identity table,
PS.𝐼. Knowledge of special key graph structure does not help to optimize serialization of the
other items in the public state, so this process is the same regardless of the developer’s choice
of KC implementation. The exact details of how to serialize the remaining contents of PS are
straightforward implementation concerns that are outside the scope of this chapter.2⁷ However, it
is important to define the serialization interface so that it can be clearly referenced in MLS-layer
operations. Additionally, as noted in Section 10.6, it is critically important that the serialization
process produces a lossless encoding; otherwise, a malicious server may be able to undermine the
insider security guarantees. Moreover, the serialization function must produce a unique encoding
for a given group state, but it is acceptable for the deserialization function to (losslessly) decode
multiple alternative representations into the same group state.2⁸
27 ⋏ PS.𝐻, PS.𝑋 , PS.𝑀, PS.𝐴, PS.𝐸, PS.𝑈, and PS.𝐿 can all be efficiently serialized in the obvious way, using fixed-
length fields, length-prefixed strings, and an efficient integer encoding method.
28 ⋏ State serialization is used for three purposes in Safehouse: to encode the group state in the input to hash
functions as part of operations, to save the group state in persistent storage, and to transmit the current public
state to newly joining members. In the first and second cases, since the serialization function produces a unique
encoding, all honest members will serialize the same group state in the same manner, so there is no possibility for
the adversary to produce different serializations for the same group state. It is possible for a malicious server to
send different serializations of the current group state to different joining members, but this has no effect: since
the encoding is lossless, all members will recover the same group state to proceed with the joining process. The
actual serialized binary blob sent to newly joining members is not used for any other purpose.
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The following interface functions are provided as part of Safehouse’s API:
• SerializePS(PS) → 𝐷: a function that accepts a public state PS and losslessly encodes it as a
unique opaque binary blob 𝐷. Internally, SerializePS calls KC.Serialize (see Section 10.6) to
serialize the relevant portions of PS.
• DeserializePS(𝐷) → PS: a function that accepts a binary blob 𝐷 and losslessly decodes it as
a public state. Multiple values of 𝐷 may produce the same output. Internally, DeserializePS
calls KC.Deserialize to invert KC.Serialize’s output.
• SerializeSS(SS) → 𝐷: a function that accepts a private state SS and losslessly encodes it as
a unique opaque binary blob 𝐷.
• DeserializeSS(𝐷) → SS: a function that accepts a binary blob 𝐷 and losslessly decodes it as
a private state SS. Multiple values of 𝐷 may produce the same output.
SerializeSS and DeserializeSS are only used by the developer to store a member’s private state
in a storage device; these functions are not needed internally by Safehouse.
10.9.3 Commit and Payload Signing
Internally, Safehouse ensures that all commits are digitally signed by a member in the group.
To avoid interfering with the deniability of the transcript, commits are usually signed by the
performing member’s personal key, personal(𝑈perf), instead of a long-term key.2⁹ The exception
is when an invitation is issued and the session is configured to use anonymous invitations
(see Section 10.1.6). When an invitation is issued anonymously, the commit that adds the
corresponding layaway to PS.𝐿 is signed using a key known to all members in the session,
KC.SharedKey(PS.𝐺), rather than the personal key of the performer. All other commits are
signed by the performing member’s personal key. For KC implementations in which a shared key
does not exist, the group cannot be set into anonymous invitation mode.3⁰ In all cases, digitally
signing a commit using a 𝑘-node requires the definition of a digital signature scheme that operates
in the same key space as the developer’s chosen BRAKEM construction. It is necessary to use the
29 ⋏The deniability system discussed in Section 10.8 ensures that personal keys can only be provably bound to
long-term identities by members. Although the signed commits provably link operations to a particular member,
that member cannot be linked to a long-term identity when the session is in a deniable mode.
30 ⋏Alternatively, the commit could be signed using a ring signature over KC.BroadcastKeys(PS.𝐺). The prototype
implementation of Safehouse simply disallows this configuration instead of supporting it with a dedicated ring
signature scheme. This is not a significant concern because a shared key exists for most KC schemes.
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public key associated with the 𝑘-node as the signature verification key in order to support public
verifiability—the server, with no access to private keys, must be able to verify the signature in
order to decide if it should reject the commit.
The signature scheme for the BRAKEM key space consists of two functions:
• Sig(pk, sk, 𝑚) → 𝜎: produces a signature 𝜎 on message 𝑚 using signing key sk corresponding
to verifying key pk.
• SVerif(pk, 𝑚, 𝜎) → 𝑏: outputs 𝑏 = 1 if 𝜎 is a valid signature on message 𝑚 for verifying key
pk, and 𝑏 = 0 otherwise.
This is the same scheme definition that is required as a parameter to the authenticated TKLL
implementation, which was described in Section 9.4. An implementation of this scheme is
implicitly provided to Safehouse alongside the chosen BRAKEM construction. Commits are
internally signed using the Sig function with the signing key corresponding to personal(𝑈perf)
(for most commits) or corresponding to KC.SharedKey(PS.𝐺) (for anonymous invitations). These
signatures are internally verified using the SVerif function upon receipt.
As mentioned in Section 9.4.2, implementing the required digital signature scheme is trivial
for both BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK. For BRAKEMDDL★ , the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch91]
can be used: this is essentially a DL NIZKPK, which is used widely throughout Safehouse, that also
includes 𝑚 in the random oracle query. For BRAKEMZK, the EdDSA signature scheme can be used
with the subgroup on the Jubjub elliptic curve that is used for the key space (see Section 8.5.2).
In general, reusing keys across cryptosystems is not guaranteed to preserve security. It
is important to ensure that the digital signature scheme and the BRAKEM scheme can use
the same keys while remaining secure. The Schnorr signature scheme uses the same NIZKPK
construction as all of the proofs in BRAKEMDDL★ , and thus it is trivial to extend the security
proofs for BRAKEMDDL★ to include the digital signature scheme. The EdDSA signature scheme is
ultimately built from the same ECDH key exchange protocol as the ElGamal cryptosystem in the
BRAKEMZK construction. While the security of this combination would not be as trivial to prove
as the BRAKEMDDL★ combination, the digital signature scheme is still fundamentally compatible
with BRAKEMZK.
One of the design objectives of Safehouse, as discussed in Chapter 7, is providing optional
sender authentication for payloads. This is accomplished by exposing functionality to the de-
veloper that signs payloads in the same way that commits are signed. The following interface
functions are provided as part of Safehouse’s API:
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• AuthMember(PS, SS, aid, 𝑚) → 𝜎: signs a message 𝑚 as the member with agent ID aid in
the session with group state (PS, SS), producing a signature 𝜎. Internally, the function sets
pk = personal(aid) and locates a mapping pk→ sk in SS.𝑄. If no such mapping is found, the
function returns 𝜎 = ⊥. Otherwise, it returns 𝜎 = Sig(pk, sk, 𝑚).
• VerifyMember(PS, aid, 𝑚, 𝜎) → 𝑏: verifies that 𝜎 is a valid signature for the message 𝑚 by
the member with agent ID aid in the session with public state PS. The function returns 𝑏 = 1
if and only if the signature is valid. Internally, it computes 𝑏 = SVerif(personal(aid), 𝑚, 𝜎).
• AuthAny(PS, SS, 𝑚) → 𝜎: signs a message 𝑚 using a signing key known to all members in
the session with group state (PS, SS), producing a signature 𝜎. This function is the same as
AuthMember, except that it internally sets pk = KC.SharedKey(PS.𝐺). If the KC scheme does
not provide a shared key, then the function returns 𝜎 = ⊥.
• VerifyAny(PS, 𝑚, 𝜎) → 𝑏: verifies that 𝜎 is valid signature for the message 𝑚 produced by
a member in the session with public state PS. This function is the same as VerifyMember,
except that it sets pk in the same way as AuthAny.
The developer can use the four functions above to authenticate payloads. AuthMember and
VerifyMember can be used to authenticate that a specific member signed a message. Alternatively,
AuthAny and VerifyAny can be used to authenticate that somemember signed a message, without
revealing the specific member’s identifier. As with the anonymity preservation feature, while
AuthAny does not specifically reveal the member that produced the signature, the developer
must take additional steps to ensure real-world anonymity (e.g., avoiding a leak of the author’s
identity through network metadata). A benefit of using AuthAny is that the resulting signature
is verifiable by the server, so the server can reject invalid messages without storing or forwarding
them. In cases where this functionality is not needed, the developer can simply use authenticated
encryption or a MAC using a key derived from the group key (see Section 10.9.1).
10.10 Message Layer Security
This section defines the Safehouse operations in the MLS layer. As discussed in Sections 10.1.3
and 10.9, these operations are the portion of the Safehouse API that allows the developer to
update the group state.
MLS-layer operations modify the group state as part of an update context. Performer contexts
generate a commit when they are finished. This commit is relayed by the server to the other
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members. The other members use receiver contexts to process the commit and update their own
group state. The following functions are exposed to the developer for managing update contexts:
• MLS.PerformerContext(PS, SS) → ctx: initializes a performer context ctx given the initial
group state (PS, SS).
• MLS.ReceiverContext(PS, SS, 𝑇) → ctx: initializes a receiver context ctx given the initial
group state (PS, SS) and the commit 𝑇 . New members (when receiving a joining commit)
and the server (always) use SS = ⊥.
• MLS.Intermediate(ctx) → (PS, SS): returns the intermediate group state between opera-
tions. This can be used by the group policy to determine if subsequent operations should be
permitted.
• MLS.Finish(ctx) → 𝑇: finalizes the operations performed in the performer context ctx,
producing a commit 𝑇 . The commit is digitally signed using the Sig function, as described in
Section 10.9.3.
• MLS.Apply(ctx) → (PS, SS): finalizes the operations that were performed in the receiver
context ctx, producing a new group state (PS, SS) if the commit was valid, or ⊥ if the commit
was invalid. Validating the commit includes checking that the digital signature is valid using
the SVerif function, as described in Section 10.9.3. For the server, applying a valid commit
always produces PS ≠ ⊥ and SS = ⊥.
The update context internally contains the intermediate group state and the partially as-
sembled (for performer contexts) or partially consumed (for receiver contexts) commit. As MLS
operations are performed, the intermediate group state and commit are updated. Operations
from other layers, such as the KGM (see Section 10.5), KC (see Section 10.6), and LVSM (see
Section 10.7) layers, are all implicitly given access to the intermediate group state and commit.
Before applying an MLS-layer operation, the developer’s group policy can use MLS.Intermediate
to determine whether or not the operation is permitted. Similarly, the group policy can consult the
history of MLS-layer operations before the call to MLS.Finish or MLS.Apply in order to evaluate
the transaction as a whole. This configurable behavior was described in Section 10.1.6.
The MLS-layer update context also includes a CBRAKEM context, as defined in Section 10.2,
called bctx. MLS.PerformerContext calls bctx← CBRAKEM.PerformerContext() to initialize the
context. MLS.Finish calls 𝑇′← CBRAKEM.Finish(bctx) to produce a CBRAKEM commit 𝑇′ and
includes 𝑇′ in the MLS commit, 𝑇 . MLS.ReceiverContext immediately recovers 𝑇′ from the given
commit 𝑇 and calls bctx← CBRAKEM.ReceiverContext(T’) to initialize the context. MLS.Apply
returns ⊥ if CBRAKEM.Apply(bctx) returns 0.
412
Chapter 10 Safehouse: A Comprehensive Secure Group Messaging Solution
The remainder of this section describes all of the operations that can be applied to MLS-layer
update contexts. Unless otherwise noted, these operations are exposed to the developer.
10.10.1 Internal Helpers
10.10.1.1 Complete Operation
TheMLS.CompleteOperation operation is an internal helper that is not exposed to the developer.
It is called at the end of most operations in the MLS layer in order to ensure that the resulting
group state after the operation is safe and that the group key has been updated. As discussed
in Section 10.1.3, this is a mandatory postcondition for MLS-layer operations. The state hash
PS.𝐻 is updated using a domain-separated cryptographic hash function, 𝐻, before being used by
KGM.RefreshKeys to derive the new group key.31 This process ensures that forked sessions can
never be maliciously “merged”.
Parameters: 𝐷, a description of the MLS-layer operation that was just performed, expressed
as a sequence of arbitrary elements; and 𝑏, a bit indicating whether or not the old group key
should be required to derive the new group key.
Let 𝐷′ represent a unique and lossless encoding of the contents of 𝐷.
PS.𝐻 ← 𝐻 (PS.𝐻∥𝑈perf∥𝑏∥SerializePS(PS)∥𝐷′).
𝑅← KC.BroadcastKeys(PS.𝐺).
Execute KGM.RefreshKeys with:
▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑅
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 𝑏
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
The new state hash PS.𝐻 that is produced by MLS.CompleteOperation is derived from the
previous public state (represented by the previous state hash), a description of the operation that
was performed (represented by 𝑈perf, 𝑏, and 𝐷), and the new public state. Since the previous
and new public states are included in the hash input, it is not possible for the adversary to cause
honest members to arrive at different public states without forking the group. However, it is
important to guarantee that honest members also arrive at the same public state through the
31 ⋏The domain-separated hash function 𝐻 is used in a similar role as distinct KDFs elsewhere in the protocol.
Although the underlying implementation is likely the same, it would be misleading to call 𝐻 a KDF because PS.𝐻
is not a key.
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same sequence of steps. If a malicious server colludes with a malicious member, they might
theoretically be able to perform different operations that result in the same public state, causing
honest members to experience a different sequence of operations without forking the group. To
prevent the possibility of such attacks, 𝐷 must include all of the public information about the
MLS-layer operation that was performed, with the exception of information that appears in the
new public state (since the new public state is always used in the derivation of PS.𝐻).
10.10.1.2 Replace Keys
The MLS.ReplaceKeys operation is an internal helper that is not exposed to the developer. This
operation replaces the key pairs for a subset of the 𝑘-nodes known to 𝑈perf. The procedure is easy
to implement correctly by combining other operations: an “adversary” is temporarily added to
the group state with knowledge of the member’s keys, and it is then “evicted” from the session.
Parameters: 𝑅, a set of 𝑘-nodes such that 𝑅 ⊆ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈perf).
Choose an agent ID for the “adversary”, aid, that does not appear in PS.𝐺.
Add a 𝑢-node for aid to PS.𝐺.
Add a personal key for aid to PS.𝐺.
for each (𝑟 ∈ 𝑅) {
Add aid→ 𝑟 to PS.𝑆.
}
Execute KGM.Evict with:
▶ Parameter 𝑈: set to {aid}
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
Execute KGM.DiscardMember with:
▶ Parameter 𝑈: set to aid.
10.10.1.3 Deniability Sets
The DeniabilitySet(PS, 𝑈) → (𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) function is an internal helper that is not exposed to
the developer. It determines the sets of keys to use for authentication proofs in order to support
the session’s deniability mode. DeniabilitySet returns a set of personal keys 𝑅1, a set of blinding
public keys 𝐵, and a set of blinded public keys 𝑅2. Section 10.8.2 discusses how the 𝑅1, 𝐵, and 𝑅2
sets are used in the authentication proof. If 𝑈 = ⊥, then the sets contain entries for all members
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in the session. Otherwise, the sets only contain entries for members in the session that are also
found in the set 𝑈. The function proceeds as follows:
Set 𝑅1 to ⊥ if PS is in “non-repudiable” mode, or ∅ otherwise.
Set 𝐵 and 𝑅2 to ⊥ if PS is not in “strongly deniable” mode, or ∅ otherwise.
for each (aid→ (pk, bpk) in PS.𝐼, sorted by aid) {
if (𝑈 ≠ ⊥ && aid ∉ 𝑈) { continue }
if (the session is not in “non-repudiable” mode) { Append personal(aid) to 𝑅1 }
if (the session is in “strongly deniable” mode) {
Append bpk to 𝐵.
Append pk to 𝑅2.
}
}
return (𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2).
10.10.2 Initialize
The MLS.Initialize operation initializes the group state for a new Safehouse session. It is the
only operation for which the initial public state PS is ⊥.
Parameters: 𝑀, the initial developer-supplied group mode.
if (PS ≠ ⊥) { Abort. }
Initialize PS with the correct structure (see Section 10.1.2).
Set PS.𝑋 to an empty set.
Set PS.𝑆 to an empty graph.
PS.𝑀 ← 𝑀.
Set PS.𝐴 to an empty map.
Set PS.𝐿 to an empty set.
Execute LVSM.𝐸.Initialize.
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Initialize.
if (performer context) {
Initialize SS with the correct structure (see Section 10.1.2).
Set SS.𝐾 to a random key.
(PS.𝐺, PS.𝑃, SS.𝑄, 𝑇′) ← KC.InitGraphPerform(𝑈perf).
Write 𝑇′ to the commit.
} else {
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Read 𝑇′ from the commit.
(PS.𝐺, PS.𝑃) ← KC.InitGraphApply(𝑈perf, 𝑇′).
}
if (long-term identities are enabled) {
if (performer context) {
(bpk, bsk) ← BRAKEM.KeyGen().
pk← Blind(pk, bpk, bsk).
Write bpk and pk to the commit.
} else {





▶ Parameter bpk: set to bpk
▶ Parameter bsk: set to bsk.
10.10.3 Invitations
There are three MLS-layer operations that are used to modify the set of layaways in PS.𝐿. All three
operations are affected by the “invitation anonymity” configuration for the setting, discussed in
Section 10.1.6. When the InviteAnonymity value returned by SessionConfig(PS.𝑀) is false, the
commits produced by these three functions are digitally signed by personal(𝑈perf) as usual. When
InviteAnonymity is true, the commits are signed by the private key associated with a 𝑘-node
known to all group members instead. Specifically, the 𝑘-node returned by KC.SharedKey(PS.𝐺)
(see Section 10.6) is used to sign the commits.
Over time as layaways in PS.𝐿 are removed (either due to being used, expiring, or retraction)
and added, invitation identifiers may be reused. This approach avoids the need to store the
historical invitation count in PS.𝐿 or to use long and randomly generated identifiers, but it raises
the possibility that an agent may try to join the group using an invitation identifier that no longer
corresponds to the expected invitation key pair. Such an attempt to join the group will eventually
fail when the joining member is unable to produce the required authenticating NIZKPK. However,
a “fast fail” mechanism can be introduced into Safehouse deployments to avoid wasting time
attempting to join the group when the effort is doomed to fail: the newly joining member can
provide a hash of the expected invitation public key to the server alongside the invitation identifier
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when arranging to join the session. This mechanism enables the server to quickly reject clients
using outdated invitations prior to starting the “mass join” procedure.
10.10.3.1 Invite Bearer
The MLS.InviteBearer operation issues a new bearer invitation to join the session.
Parameters: 𝑒, an approximate expiry date for the invitation; 𝑢 the maximum number of
times that the invitation can be used to join the group, or ⊥ for unlimited uses.
Output: 𝐼, either the invitation for secure out-of-band transmission, or ⊥.
Let iid be the smallest positive integer that does not appear as an identifier in PS.𝐿.
Execute CKeyGen with:
▶ Output pk∗: store in ipk
▶ Output sk∗: store in isk.




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“InviteBearer”, 𝑒, 𝑢)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
if (performer context) { return 𝐼 = (iid, ipk, isk, bpk, pk). }
else { return 𝐼 = ⊥. }
10.10.3.2 Invite Individual
The MLS.InviteIndividual operation issues a new individual invitation to join the session. The
performing member provides the unblinded identity public key as a parameter, while receiving
agents leave the parameter empty. The identity public key is blinded as part of the operation.
Parameters: 𝑒, an approximate expiry date for the invitation; pk, either an unblinded identity
public key, or ⊥.
Output: 𝐼, either the invitation for secure out-of-band transmission, or ⊥.
if (long-term identities are not enabled) { Abort. }
Let iid be the smallest positive integer that does not appear as an identifier in PS.𝐿.
Execute CKeyGen with:
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▶ Output pk∗: store in ipk
▶ Output sk∗: store in isk.
if (performer context) {
(bpk, bsk) ← BRAKEM.KeyGen().
pk← Blind(pk, bpk, bsk).
Write bpk and pk to the commit.
} else {
Read bpk and pk from the commit.
bsk← ⊥.
}




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“InviteIndividual”, 𝑒)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
if (performer context) { return 𝐼 = (iid, ipk, isk, bpk, pk). }
else { return 𝐼 = ⊥. }
10.10.3.3 Retract Invitation
The MLS.RetractInvitation operation removes a layaway from PS.𝐿, preventing future use of
the associated invitation.
Parameters: iid, the identifier for the invitation to retract.
Remove the layaway with the identifier iid from PS.𝐿.






▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“RetractInvitation”, iid)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
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10.10.4 Mass Join
TheMLS.MassJoin operation adds one or more new members to the session; these new members
are called joining members during the joining process. The operation is parameterized by a joining
commit (see Section 10.6) produced by the KC.PrepareJoin protocol. One of the agents that
executed KC.PrepareJoin acts as 𝑈perf on behalf of all of the joining members. 𝑈perf digitally
signs the commit using personal(𝑈perf) as it exists at the end of the operation, rather than at
the start (as is the case for all other MLS-layer operations), since 𝑈perf is not a member at the
start of the operation. The joining members also provide the joining private data produced by
KC.PrepareJoin and a state unlocker (see Section 10.1.9) as parameters. All agents executing
the operation, including the joining members, must begin with the same PS ≠ ⊥. The joining
members begin with SS = ⊥.
Parameters: 𝑇′, a joining commit; 𝑄∗, either joining private data or ⊥; and 𝑈, either a state
unlocker or ⊥.
Output: 𝑈∗, a set of the agent IDs of the joining members; 𝑉∗, a mapping from new agent IDs
to the invitation IDs used to join; 𝐼∗, a mapping from newly observed agent IDs to unblinded
identity public keys; and 𝐴∗, the set of agent IDs in 𝐼∗ that are authenticated.
Execute KC.MergeJoin with:
▶ Parameter 𝑇′: set to 𝑇′
▶ Parameter 𝑄∗: set to 𝑄∗
▶ Output 𝐵∗: store in 𝐵∗.
(𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) ← MLS.DeniabilitySet(PS,⊥).
for each ((aid, iid, bpk, bsk, pk, 𝜋) ∈ 𝐵∗) {
Add aid to 𝑈∗.
Add aid→ iid to 𝑉∗.
if (the session is not in “non-repudiable” mode) { Append personal(aid) to 𝑅1. }
if (the session is in “strongly deniable” mode) {
Append bpk to 𝐵.
Append pk to 𝑅2.
}
}
for each ((aid, iid, bpk, bsk, pk, 𝜋) ∈ 𝐵∗, sorted by aid) {
Locate the layaway (iid, ipk, 𝑒, btpk, tpk, 𝑢) with identifier iid in PS.𝐿.
if (if no such layaway exists) { Abort. }
if (𝑒 ≠ ⊥ && 𝑒 has expired) { Abort. }
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𝑚← personal(aid).
if (Auth.Verify(ipk, bpk, pk, btpk, tpk, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝜋) = 0) { Abort. }
if (𝑢 ≠ ⊥) { Update the layaway with identifier iid in PS.𝐿 with 𝑢← 𝑢 − 1. }
if ((𝑢 ≠ ⊥ && 𝑢 < 1) | | btpk ≠ ⊥) {
Remove the layaway with identifier iid from PS.𝐿.
}
}
if (𝑈proc is one of the joining members) {
Initialize SS with the correct structure (see Section 10.1.2).
if (𝑈 contains an invitation ID iid and invitation private key isk) {
SS← LVSM.𝐸.Decrypt(PS, SS, iid, isk).
if (SS = ⊥) { Abort. }
SS← LVSM.𝑈.Decrypt(PS, SS, iid, isk).
if (SS = ⊥) { Abort. }






for each (aid→ (pk, bpk) in PS.𝐼) {
if (aid ∈ 𝑈∗) { continue }
pk← Unblind(pk, bpk, SS.𝑈 [bpk]).









if (long-term identities are enabled) {
for each ((aid, iid, bpk, bsk, pk, 𝜋) ∈ 𝐵∗, sorted by aid) {
if (bpk does not appear in PS.𝐼) {
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Set with:
▶ Parameter bpk: set to bpk
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▶ Parameter bsk: set to bsk.
}
PS.𝐼 [aid] ← (pk, bpk).
if (bsk ≠ ⊥) {
pk← Unblind(pk, bpk, bsk).
Add aid→ pk to 𝐼∗.





▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“MassJoin”, 𝑇′)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 0.
10.10.5 Mass Evict
TheMLS.MassEvict operation allows a member to evict a set of other members from the session,
preventing them from decrypting future payloads. It is not possible for a member to evict
themselves; see Section 10.12 for a discussion of this limitation. If 𝑈proc is one of the evicted
members, then SS = ⊥ once the operation has been received.
Parameters: 𝑈, a set of agent IDs specifying members to evict.
Execute KGM.Evict with:
▶ Parameter 𝑈: set to 𝑈
▶ Parameter bctx: set to bctx
▶ Output bctx: store in bctx.
for each (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈, sorted) {
Execute KGM.DiscardMember with:
▶ Parameter 𝑈: set to 𝑢.
Delete any mapping from 𝑢 in PS.𝐼.
}
for each (bpk that previously appeared but no longer appears in PS.𝐼) {
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Delete with:
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Execute LVSM.𝑈.MarkStale.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“MassEvict”, 𝑈)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.6 fs-Ratchet
The MLS.FSRatchet operation is a lightweight operation that derives a new group key.
PS.𝐻 ← 𝐻 (PS.𝐻∥𝑈perf∥SerializePS(PS))
↩→ where 𝐻 is a domain-separated cryptographic hash function.
Execute KGM.RatchetGroupKey.
10.10.7 pcs-Ratchet
TheMLS.PCSRatchet operation allows a member to replace all of their ephemeral keys with new
ones. This is used to achieve post-compromise security by replacing any keys that an adversary
may have previously compromised. The label-value stores are marked as stale because in order to
provide post-compromise security, it must be assumed that an adversary may have compromised
SS.𝐸 or SS.𝑈.
Execute CKeyGen with:
▶ Output pk∗: store in pk∗
▶ Output sk∗: store in sk∗.
Update personal(𝑈perf) → pk∗ in PS.𝑃.
if (𝑈proc = 𝑈perf) {
Update personal(𝑈perf) → sk∗ in SS.𝑄.
}
𝑅← keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈perf) \ {personal(𝑈perf)}.
Execute MLS.ReplaceKeys with:




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“PCSRatchet”)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
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10.10.8 Cleanup
The MLS.Cleanup operation erases superfluous edges to any 𝑘-nodes known to 𝑈perf.
𝑅← ∅.
for each (𝑟 ∈ keysetPS.𝐺 (𝑈perf)) {
if (there exists a mapping to 𝑟 in PS.𝑆) {




▶ Parameter 𝑅: set to 𝑅.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“Cleanup”)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.9 pcs-Reidentify
The MLS.PCSReidentify operation allows a member to replace their long-term identity with a
new one. The purpose of this operation is to provide post-compromise security in the case where
the member’s identity private key has been compromised. Trust establishment will need to be
performed again for the new identity public key. 𝑈perf provides the new unblinded identity public
key and the new identity witness as parameters to the operation, while receiving agents set these
parameters to ⊥.
Parameters: pk, either a new unblinded identity public key or ⊥; and 𝑤, either an identity
witness for pk or ⊥.
if (long-term identities are not enabled) { Abort. }
(𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) ← MLS.DeniabilitySet(PS,⊥).
𝑚← SerializePS(PS).
Let bpk denote the most recently added blinding public key in PS.𝐼.
if (performer context) {
bsk← SS.𝑈 [bpk].
pk← Blind(pk, bpk, bsk).
𝜋← Auth.Prove(⊥, bpk, pk,⊥,⊥, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝑤).
Write pk and 𝜋 to the commit.
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} else {
Read pk and 𝜋 from the commit.
if (Auth.Verify(⊥, bpk, pk,⊥,⊥, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝜋) = 0) { Abort. }
}
Update 𝑈perf → (pk, bpk) in PS.𝐼.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“PCSReidentify”, 𝜋)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.10 Authenticate
The MLS.Authenticate operation allows 𝑈perf to prove its identity to members that recently
joined the session. An overview of this mechanism was given in Section 10.1.9. 𝑈perf provides
its unblinded identity public key and an identity witness as parameters to the operation, while
receiving agents set these parameters to ⊥.
Parameters: 𝑈, the set of members that 𝑈perf is authenticating to; pk, either the existing
unblinded identity public key or ⊥; and 𝑤, either an identity witness for pk or ⊥.
if (long-term identities are not enabled) { Abort. }
(𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) ← MLS.DeniabilitySet(PS, 𝑈).
𝑚← SerializePS(PS).
Locate 𝑈perf → (pk, bpk) in PS.𝐼.
Let bpk′ denote the most recently added blinding public key in PS.𝐼.




if (performer context) {
bsk′← SS.𝑈 [bpk′].
pk′← Blind(pk, bpk′, bsk′).
Write pk′ to the commit.
} else {
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if (performer context) {
bsk← SS.𝑈 [bpk].
𝜋← Auth.Prove(⊥, bpk, pk, bpk′, pk′, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝑤).
Write 𝜋 to the commit.
} else {
Read 𝜋 from the commit.
if (Auth.Verify(⊥, bpk, pk, bpk′, pk′, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝜋) = 0) { Abort. }
}
if (bpk′ ≠ ⊥) {
Update 𝑈perf → (pk
′
, bpk′) in PS.𝐼.
for each (bpk that previously appeared but no longer appears in PS.𝐼) {
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Delete with:




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“Authenticate”, 𝑈, 𝜋)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.11 Change Mode
The MLS.ChangeMode operation replaces the developer-supplied mode PS.𝑀 with a new one.
The group policy may alter the configurable behavior described in Section 10.1.6 based on the
new mode string. Only certain configuration changes are possible: sessions cannot become more
deniable, and long-term identities cannot be introduced after running in ephemeral mode.
Parameters: 𝑀, the new mode string.
(Deniability, LongTermIDs, InviteAnonymity, PCS) ← SessionConfig(PS.𝑀).
(Deniability′, LongTermIDs′, InviteAnonymity′, PCS′) ← SessionConfig(𝑀).
if (! LongTermIDs′ && Deniability′ ≠ “strongly deniable”) { Abort. }
if (Deniability′ is a more deniable mode than Deniability) { Abort. }
if (! LongTermIDs && LongTermIDs′) { Abort. }
PS.𝑀 ← 𝑀.
if (LongTermIDs && ! LongTermIDs′) {
Set PS.𝐼 to an empty map.
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for each (bpk such that PS.𝑈 [bpk] exists) {
Execute LVSM.𝑈.Delete with:




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“ChangeMode”, 𝑀)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.12 Change Developer Data
Several operations are made available to the developer to modify the contents of the public
label-value store, PS.𝐴, and the confidential label-value store, PS.𝐸. As with all operations, the
developer is responsible for providing the parameters for the operations that modify the label-
value stores (see Section 10.1.1). In particular, the developer must arrange for all of the members
to learn the label that is being targeted by the operation. The label could be transmitted explicitly
as part of the higher-level protocol, or it could be inferred from some other external event.
10.10.12.1 Set Public Data
TheMLS.SetPublicData operation modifies a value stored in PS.𝐴. The purpose of the operation
is for the performer to store a new value in the group state; the other members learn this value
when applying the commit. Consequently, the performing member provides the new value as a
parameter, while receiving agents leave the parameter empty.
Parameters: ℓ, the label; and 𝑣, either the new value or ⊥.
if (performer context) {
Write 𝑣 to the commit.
} else {




▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“SetPublicData”, ℓ)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
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10.10.12.2 Delete Public Data
The MLS.DeletePublicData operation removes a value from PS.𝐴.
Parameters: ℓ, the label to remove.
Delete PS.𝐴[ℓ], if it exists.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“DeletePublicData”, ℓ)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.12.3 Set Confidential Data
The MLS.SetConfidentialData operation modifies a value stored in PS.𝐸. The performing mem-
ber provides the new value as a parameter, while receiving agents leave the parameter empty.
Parameters: ℓ, the label; and 𝑣, either the (unencrypted) new value or ⊥.
Execute LVSM.𝐸.Set with:
▶ Parameter ℓ: set to ℓ
▶ Parameter 𝑣: set to 𝑣.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“SetConfidentialData”, ℓ)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
10.10.12.4 Delete Confidential Data
The MLS.DeleteConfidentialData operation removes a value from PS.𝐸.
Parameters: ℓ, the label to remove.
Execute LVSM.𝐸.Delete with:
▶ Parameter ℓ: set to ℓ.
Execute MLS.CompleteOperation with:
▶ Parameter 𝐷: set to (“DeleteConfidentialData”, ℓ)
▶ Parameter 𝑏: set to 1.
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10.11 Key Control Schemes
The KC subsystem is an important part of Safehouse that is primarily responsible for determining
the shape of the key graph, PS.𝐺. Section 10.6 defined the functions, operations, and protocols
that must be provided by the KC subsystem. The KC subsystem is separated from the other parts
of Safehouse because although many radically different schemes are possible, selecting a scheme
is entirely a matter of performance optimization—not cryptography or security. This section
provides high-level descriptions of some intuitive and efficient schemes in order to demonstrate
that it is practical to use Safehouse in the target scenarios (described in Chapter 7). Improving
upon these initial schemes is certainly possible, but it is fundamentally an algorithmic optimization
problem that is outside of the scope of this work.
The following four KC schemes are described in this section:
• Trivial (Section 10.11.1): the key graph contains no 𝑘-nodes except for the members’ personal
keys. This is the most basic possible KC scheme that uses BRAKEM. The Trivial scheme
provides a lower bound on how difficult it is to implement the KC subsystem.
• Star (Section 10.11.2): the key graph consists of the members’ personal keys and one
additional 𝑘-node shared by all members. The shared 𝑘-node makes MLS.CompleteOperation
(see Section 10.10.1.1) more efficient than in the Trivial scheme: KGM.RefreshKeys (see
Section 10.5.8), which is executed as a subroutine, can refresh exhausted keys with a BRAKEM
transfer to a single recipient, instead of 𝑛 recipients for a session with 𝑛 members.
• Shrub (Section 10.11.3): the 𝑢-nodes in the key graph are partitioned into sets with a given
maximum size, each sharing an intermediate 𝑘-node, with a root 𝑘-node shared by all sets.
The motivation for this scheme compared to the Star scheme is that it allows the root key to
be replaced far more efficiently as the group size increases: the BRAKEM transfer is usually
able to use the intermediate 𝑘-nodes as recipients instead of the personal keys, reducing the
cost of the BRAKEM by a constant factor.
• Tree (Section 10.11.4): a key graph is arranged in a generic tree structure. This scheme is
parameterized by a function that defines the maximum branching factor at each depth. It
uses heuristics to try to keep the tree as shallow as possible over time.
Figure 10.10 depicts some possible key graphs produced by the schemes in order to illustrate
the difference between them at a glance. Aside from the Trivial scheme, all of the KC schemes in
this section use TKLL (see Chapter 9) to establish shared keys during the KC.PrepareJoin protocol.
The following sections describe the schemes in terms of the KC interface (see Section 10.6).
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(a) The Trivial scheme. The graph consists
of only personal keys.
(b) The Star scheme. An extra 𝑘-node is
shared by the personal keys.
(c) The Shrub scheme. This example uses
a maximum set size of three. Each set of per-
sonal keys shares an intermediate 𝑘-node, and
one root 𝑘-node is shared by all intermediate
𝑘-nodes.
(d) The Tree scheme. This scheme can pro-
duce arbitrary tree structures. This example
uses a constant maximum branching factor of
three.
Figure 10.10 Examples of key graphs produced by the key control schemes. Shaded
squares represent personal keys, each with an implicitly attached 𝑢-node. Unshaded squares
represent 𝑘-nodes that are not personal keys. All key graphs are for groups with seven members.
These are not necessarily the simplest graphs produced by the schemes; they are examples of
possible states. (Ref: 428)
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10.11.1 Trivial Key Control
The Trivial scheme creates key graphs in which the only 𝑘-nodes are personal keys. It does not
maintain any structural information in its state.
10.11.1.1 Initialization
To initialize a session, the Trivial scheme simply creates a key graph with a single personal key.
The initialization message contains only the public key for the 𝑘-node. The initialization functions
operate as follows:
• KC.InitGraphPerform(𝑈) → (𝐺, 𝑃, 𝑄, 𝑇): Use CBRAKEM.KeyGen to generate a new key
pair (ppk, psk). Create a key graph, 𝐺, with one 𝑢-node bound to agent ID 𝑈 and an attached
personal key bound to public key ppk. Store a mapping from the 𝑘-node to psk in 𝑄. Set
𝑇 ← pk.
• KC.InitGraphApply(𝑈, 𝑇) → (𝐺, 𝑃): Create a key graph with one 𝑢-node bound to 𝑈 and a
personal key bound to public key pk = 𝑇 .
10.11.1.2 𝑘-node Merging
Since the Trivial scheme does not create any intermediate 𝑘-nodes, KGM.Evict (see Section 10.5.7)
never deletes any keys. Consequently, KC.MayMerge is never called and thus no implementation
is necessary.
10.11.1.3 Serialization
The serialization functions KC.Serialize and KC.Deserialize are easy to optimize. KC.Serialize
sorts the 𝑢-nodes by increasing agent ID. For each 𝑢-node in sorted order, KC.Serialize outputs
the agent ID, the personal public key, and the blinding public key and blinded public key of the
associated member (if long-term identities are enabled). It is not possible for superfluous edges
to exist in key graphs produced by the Trivial scheme, so KC.Deserialize always returns 𝑆 = ∅.
10.11.1.4 Shared Key
Since there are no shared 𝑘-nodes, KC.BroadcastKeys returns a set of all of the personal keys.
For the same reason, KC.SharedKey returns ⊥ to indicate that there is no 𝑘-node shared by all
members.
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10.11.1.5 Joining Procedure
The KC.PrepareJoin construction for the Trivial scheme is the only one in this chapter that does
not make use of TKLL. The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. If long-term identities are enabled for the session, then each joining member:
a) generates a new blinding key pair (bpk, bsk) using CBRAKEM.KeyGen;
b) blinds its long-term identity pk to produce pk;
c) encapsulates the blinding private key bsk to the existing members and other joining
members using SBRAKEM.Encapsulate (see Section 10.3); and
d) sends the blinding public key bpk, blinded public key pk, and the SBRAKEM encapsulation
to the other joining members.
2. Each joining member uses Auth.Prove (see Section 10.8.3) with its identity witness 𝑤 to
produce an appropriate authentication NIZKPK based on the session configuration and the
other joining members’ blinded public keys, as described below.
3. The members exchange authentication NIZKPKs.
The joining commit consists of the following fields, grouped by joining member:
• the agent ID, aid;
• the invitation to use, identified by iid;
• the personal public key ppk;
• the blinding public key, bpk;
• the SBRAKEM encapsulation of the blinding private key;
• the blinded public key, pk; and
• the authentication NIZKPK, 𝜋.
The identity blinding steps are skipped if long-term identification is not enabled for the session.
Each member produces its authentication NIZKPK 𝜋 as follows:
431
Chapter 10 Safehouse: A Comprehensive Secure Group Messaging Solution
Retrieve (iid, ipk, 𝑒, btpk, tpk, 𝑢) from PS.𝐿 for the given iid.
(𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) ← MLS.DeniabilitySet(PS,⊥).
for each (joining member identified by aid′ ≠ aid) {
if (the session is not in “non-repudiable” mode) { Append personal(aid′) to 𝑅1. }
if (long-term identities are enabled && the session is in “strongly deniable” mode) {
Let bpk′ be the blinding public key for the member.
Let pk′ be the blinded public key for the member.
Append bpk′ to 𝐵.




𝜋← Auth.Prove(ipk, bpk, pk, btpk, tpk, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝑤).
The joining private data contains only the personal private key.
The construction of KC.MergeJoin is straightforward. The joining commit is processed to
extract the aforementioned data. For each member:
1. A 𝑢-node is added to PS.𝐺 with agent ID aid.
2. A personal key for the 𝑢-node is added to PS.𝐺 and bound to ppk in PS.𝑃.
3. If 𝑈proc is an existing member or joining member, it decapsulates the blinding private key bsk
using SBRAKEM.Decapsulate. Otherwise, it sets bsk to ⊥ and verifies the encapsulation using
SBRAKEM.Verify.
4. (aid, iid, bpk, bsk, pk, 𝜋) is added to 𝐵∗.
KC.MergeJoin then returns the new member data in 𝐵∗.
10.11.2 Star Key Control
The Star scheme is like the Trivial scheme, except that it adds a single shared 𝑘-node to the key
graph. This 𝑘-node is called the root key. An implementation of the Star scheme might keep a
reference to the root key in its state for convenience, but this is a small optimization: it is always
possible to find the root key in constant time given a reference to any 𝑘-node in the graph by
simply following one outgoing edge, if one exists.
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10.11.2.1 Initialization
Initialization is identical to the Trivial scheme described in Section 10.11.1, except that an extra
key pair (rpk, rsk) for the root key is generated with CBRAKEM.KeyGen. A 𝑘-node is added
to the key graph with an edge from the personal key to this new root key. The root key is
mapped to rpk in the public key mapping. rpk is included in the initialization message 𝑇 . Within
KC.InitGraphApply, rpk is extracted from 𝑇 . A root key is added to the key graph in the same
way and mapped to rpk in the public key mapping.
10.11.2.2 𝑘-node Merging
Since the root key is shared by all personal keys, the only situation in which KC.MayMerge would
be called is if an KGM.Evict operation evicts all members except for 𝑈perf. There is no good reason
to discard the root key in this scenario, and doing so would make the scheme more complicated.
Consequently, KC.MayMerge always returns 𝑏 = 0 for the Star scheme.
10.11.2.3 Serialization
Serialization for the Star scheme is identical to the Trivial scheme, except that the public key
for the root key, rpk, is appended to the serialization by KC.Serialize. In KC.Deserialize, rpk is
extracted from the data. Next, KC.Deserialize adds a root key to the recovered key graph, and
adds edges from all personal keys to the root key. It then maps the root key to rpk in the public
key mapping.
10.11.2.4 Shared Key
The main advantage of the Star scheme over the Trivial scheme is the presence of a shared
𝑘-node in order to make key updates far more efficient. When KC.BroadcastKeys is called,
the Star scheme returns a set containing only the root key. This dramatically improves the
performance of MLS.CompleteOperation (see Section 10.10.1.1), LVSM.𝐸.RefreshEncryption
(see Section 10.7.1.1.3), and LVSM.𝑈.RefreshEncryption (see Section 10.7.1.3.3). Similarly,
KC.SharedKey returns the root key for the Star scheme.
10.11.2.5 Joining Procedure
The Star scheme uses authenticated TKLL (see Section 9.4) to implement the KC.PrepareJoin
and KC.MergeJoin process. When a mass join operation begins, the existing key graph for the
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session always contains only a root key, rpk, and personal keys for the existing members. The
KC.PrepareJoin protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Construct a new key tree, 𝑇∗, that contains personal keys for the joining members connected
to a merging root key, rpk∗. If long-term identities are enabled for the session, add another
𝑘-node called bpk∗ to the tree, and add an edge from rpk∗ to bpk∗.
2. The joining members use authenticated TKLL to establish key pairs for 𝑇∗.
The authenticated TKLL protocol used by KC.PrepareJoin must be given access to four func-
tions: Sig, SVerif, Compute-ID, and Prove-ID. The definition of these functions is given in Sec-
tion 9.4.1. The Star scheme instantiates TKLL using the following implementations of the required
functions:
• Sig(pk, 𝑠𝑘, 𝑚) → 𝜎: this function is implemented using the Sig function for the chosen
BRAKEM key space, as described in Section 10.9.3.
• SVerif(pk, 𝑚, 𝜎) → {0, 1}: this function is implemented using the SVerif function for the
chosen BRAKEM key space, as described in Section 10.9.3.
• Compute-ID(𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) → 𝐼: this function generates a long-term identity for the calling mem-
ber. If long-term identities are disabled for the session, then the function returns 𝐼 = ⊥.
Otherwise, the function locates the blinding public key bpk∗ in 𝑃∗ and the corresponding
blinding private key bsk∗ in 𝑄∗. It uses these values to compute the blinded public key
𝐼 ← Blind(pk, bpk∗, bsk∗) using the Blind function described in Section 10.1.8 with the
member’s identity public key, pk.
• Prove-ID(𝐼∗, 𝑃∗, 𝑄∗) → 𝜋: this function produces an authentication NIZKPK for the member.
The process is similar to the Trivial scheme, except that some values are extracted from
the function’s parameters instead of the public state. The implementation produces the
authentication NIZKPK using the calling member’s agent ID, aid, its (unblinded) identity
public key, pk, and its identity witness, 𝑤. The function proceeds as follows:
Locate the blinding public key bpk∗ in 𝑃∗.
Locate the blinding private key bsk∗ in 𝑄∗.
Retrieve (iid, ipk, 𝑒, btpk, tpk, 𝑢) from PS.𝐿 for the caller’s iid.
(𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2) ← MLS.DeniabilitySet(PS,⊥).
for each (mapping aid′→ pk′ in 𝐼∗) {
if (aid′ = aid) { continue }
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if (the session is not in “non-repudiable” mode) { Append personal(aid′) to 𝑅1. }
if (long-term identities are enabled && session is in “strongly deniable” mode) {
Append bpk∗ to 𝐵.




Locate the mapping aid→ pk in 𝐼∗.
𝜋← Auth.Prove(ipk, bpk∗, pk, btpk, tpk, 𝑅1, 𝐵, 𝑅2, 𝑚, 𝑤).
return 𝜋.
The output of the TKLL protocol includes a mapping from the joining members’ agent IDs to
blinded public keys in 𝐼∗ and to authentication NIZKPKs in Π∗. These mappings are used to
produce the joining commit. Additionally, the output of TKLL includes a multi-signature, 𝜎, that
demonstrates that all joining members accept the outcome of the protocol. The joining commit
consists of:
• For each joining member:
◦ the agent ID, aid;
◦ the invitation to use, identified by iid;
◦ the personal public key ppk;
◦ the blinded public key, pk, extracted from 𝐼∗; and
◦ the authentication NIZKPK, 𝜋, extracted from Π∗.
• The multi-signature for the TKLL output, 𝜎.
• The public key for each non-personal 𝑘-node in 𝑇∗, traversed in a deterministic order.
The joining private data contains 𝑄∗, the mapping from 𝑘-nodes to private keys produced by
TKLL. The KC.MergeJoin operation proceeds as follows:
1. Verify that the multi-signature 𝜎 in the joining commit is valid using the MSBN.Vf function
described in Section 9.4.1.
2. Compute the shape of 𝑇∗ as in KC.PrepareJoin.
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(a) Before KGM.DiscardKey. The merging
root key, rpk∗, is merged with the existing root
key, rpk, to form the new root key, rpk′. bpk∗ is
used as the blinding public key for the joining
members. An edge is added from rpk to bpk∗
using KGM.ShareKey.
(b) After KGM.DiscardKey. The 𝑘-nodes
for bpk∗, rpk, and rpk∗ are discarded, creating a
new key graph with root key rpk′ that satisfies
the Star scheme’s intended shape.
Figure 10.11 Joining procedure with the Star KC scheme. Shaded squares represent per-
sonal keys. Normal squares represent existing 𝑘-nodes. Squares with wave patterns represent
𝑘-nodes established by TKLL. Squares with dashed borders represent new 𝑘-nodes created by
KGM.MergeKeys during KC.MergeJoin. This example depicts two joining members being added
to an existing session with three members. (Refs: 436 and 440 a b)
3. The key tree instantiated by TKLL, 𝑇∗, is imported into the key graph using KGM.ImportTree
(see Section 10.5.11). If the joining private data is not ⊥, the private keys contained in 𝑄∗
are provided to KGM.ImportTree.
4. If long-term identities are enabled, then KGM.ShareKey (see Section 10.5.10) is executed to
share bpk∗ with rpk, which gives all existing members access to bsk∗. KGM.DiscardKey (see
Section 10.5.6) is executed to discard bpk∗ from the key graph.
5. KGM.MergeKeys (see Section 10.5.4) is executed to merge rpk and rpk∗ into a new root key,
rpk′.
6. KGM.DiscardKey is executed twice to discard rpk and rpk∗, causing all edges from the personal
keys to connect to rpk′.
7. For each joining member, (aid, iid, bpk∗, bsk∗, pk, 𝜋) is added to 𝐵∗.
Figure 10.11 depicts the state of the key graph during KC.MergeJoin, both before and after
𝑘-nodes are discarded. The correctness of this approach follows from the careful design of
the KGM-layer operations, and the use of TKLL to establish the new key tree ensures that the
KC.PrepareJoin protocol is very efficient. Using TKLL to share bsk∗ allows all of the joining
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members to blind their identity public keys using the same blinding key pair. This reuse of a
blinding key pair is another improvement compared to the Trivial scheme, in which each joining
member uses its own blinding key pair, leading to more entries in PS.𝑈. As existing members
authenticate to the joining members over time, they will slowly adopt the newest blinding key
pair (see Section 10.10.10).
10.11.3 Shrub Key Control
The Shrub scheme partitions the 𝑢-nodes in the key graph into sets. The scheme is parameterized
by 𝑛𝑆, the maximum set size, which is an upper bound on the number of 𝑢-nodes in each set. For
each set, the key graph contains a 𝑘-node called the set key. There are edges from each personal
key in a set to the associated set key. Finally, there is a single 𝑘-node called the root key. There
are edges from each set key to the root key, ensuring that all members know the private key
for the root key. Like the Star scheme (see Section 10.11.2), it is easy to locate the root key
and all of the set keys in constant time given a reference to any 𝑘-node, so it is not necessary
for an implementation of the Shrub scheme to store stateful structural information. However,
maintaining references to the root key and set keys may provide a marginal speed improvement
in practice.
10.11.3.1 Initialization
The initialization procedure for the Shrub scheme creates a key graph with one personal key,
one set key, and one root key. Consequently, KC.InitGraphPerform and KC.InitGraphApply are
identical to the Trivial scheme (see Section 10.11.1), except that the performer generates two
extra key pairs with CBRAKEM.KeyGen, adds both public keys to the initialization message, and
adds the two additional 𝑘-nodes to the key graph. KC.InitGraphApply reads the two public keys
and constructs the same key graph and public key mapping. This process is the same as for the
Star scheme, except that two non-personal 𝑘-nodes are added instead of just one.
10.11.3.2 𝑘-node Merging
The Shrub scheme never allows merging keys during evictions. The KGM.Evict operation will
only request a 𝑘-node merger if all but one member has been evicted from a set. These mergers
are disallowed because this would cause some personal keys to become direct children of the root
key instead of a set key. This would require additional complexity in order to restore the set key
when new members join the group, with very little performance benefit in return. Consequently,
KC.MayMerge always returns 𝑏 = 0 for the Shrub scheme.
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10.11.3.3 Serialization
Serialization is slightly more complicated for the Shrub scheme than for the Trivial or Star
schemes. KC.Serialize first encodes the public key for the root key. Next, KC.Serialize groups
together sets by the number of 𝑢-nodes contained in them. For each cardinality 𝑛𝑖, with 1 ≤
𝑛𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑆, KC.Serialize encodes the cardinality and an array of sets with that cardinality. For each
set in this array, KC.Serialize encodes the public key for the stem key, an optional list of agent
IDs that have superfluous knowledge of the set key (based on the contents of PS), and a list of
𝑢-nodes contained in the set. For each 𝑢-node in a set, KC.Serialize encodes the agent ID of the
member, the personal public key, and the blinding public key and blinded public key (if long-term
identities are enabled). The arrays and lists in the serialization are sorted in a canonical order; in
practice, the sets can be sorted by their position in the key tree, and the agent IDs and 𝑢-nodes
can be sorted based on the numerical ordering of the agent IDs. Grouping the sets together by
cardinality in the serialization can result in a significant size reduction for large groups, since
most sets will contain 𝑛𝑆 members.
10.11.3.4 Shared Key
KC.BroadcastKeys for the Shrub scheme returns a set containing only the root key. KC.SharedKey
returns the root key itself. This is the same as the Star scheme.
10.11.3.5 Joining Procedure
The joining procedure for the Shrub scheme is essentially the same as for the Star scheme, except
that the key trees instantiated by TKLL are more complicated. The KC.PrepareJoin protocol
behaves very similarly as in the Star scheme, except that it must take set keys into account.
KC.PrepareJoin for the Shrub scheme proceeds as follows:
1. Prepare a mapping from joining members to the sets that will contain them. For each joining
member, check to see if there is an existing set containing fewer than 𝑛𝑆 members. If so, add
a mapping from the joining member to this existing set. Otherwise, initialize a new set and
add a mapping from the joining member to the new set.
2. Construct a new key tree, 𝑇∗, containing the personal keys for the joining members. Add a
merging set key 𝑘-node, spk∗𝑖 , for each set with index 𝑖 in the joining member mapping. Add a
merging root key 𝑘-node, rpk∗. Add edges from each personal key to its associated merging
set key, spk∗𝑖 , and from every spk∗𝑖 to rpk∗. If long-term identities are enabled for the session,
add another 𝑘-node called bpk∗ to the tree, and add an edge from rpk∗ to bpk∗.
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3. The joining members use authenticated TKLL to establish key pairs for 𝑇∗, using the same
definitions for Sig, SVerif, Compute-ID, and Prove-ID as for the Star scheme.
The joining commit is produced exactly as for the Star scheme: it contains the per-member data
for each joining member, the multi-signature 𝜎 produced by TKLL, and the public key for each
non-personal 𝑘-node in 𝑇∗, traversed in a deterministic order. The joining private data contains
𝑄∗, the mapping from 𝑘-nodes to private keys produced by TKLL. The KC.MergeJoin operation
differs from the Star scheme in that the merging set keys that correspond to existing set keys
are combined using KGM.MergeKeys, while merging set keys for completely new sets are simply
imported into the key graph. KC.MergeJoin proceeds as follows:
1. Verify that the multi-signature 𝜎 in the joining commit is valid using the MSBN.Vf function
(see Section 9.4.1).
2. Compute the shape of 𝑇∗ and the mapping from joining members to set keys using the same
algorithm as KC.PrepareJoin.
3. The key tree instantiated by TKLL, 𝑇∗, is imported into the key graph using KGM.ImportTree
(see Section 10.5.11). If the joining private data is not ⊥, the private keys contained in 𝑄∗
are provided to KGM.ImportTree.
4. If long-term identities are enabled, then KGM.ShareKey (see Section 10.5.10) is executed to
share bpk∗ with rpk. KGM.DiscardKey (see Section 10.5.6) is executed to discard bpk∗ from
the key graph.
5. KGM.MergeKeys is executed to merge rpk and rpk∗ into a new root key, rpk′.
6. For each existing set referenced in the joining member mapping, let spk𝑖 denote the existing
set key in PS.𝐺 and spk∗𝑖 denote the corresponding merging set key in 𝑇∗. KGM.MergeKeys
(see Section 10.5.4) is executed to merge spk𝑖 and spk∗𝑖 into a new set key, spk′𝑖. For any new
set keys created in this way, KGM.AddEdge (see Section 10.5.5) is executed to add an edge
from spk′𝑖 to rpk′.
7. KGM.DiscardKey is executed twice to discard rpk and rpk∗, causing all edges from the personal
keys to connect to rpk′.
8. For each merging set key spk∗𝑖 that corresponds to an existing set key spk𝑖, KGM.DiscardKey
is executed twice to discard spk𝑖 and spk∗𝑖 .
9. For each joining member, (aid, iid, bpk∗, bsk∗, pk, 𝜋) is added to 𝐵∗.
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(a) Before KGM.DiscardKey. rpk′ is produced and bsk∗ is shared as in the Star scheme, depicted
in Figure 10.11. Additionally, the merging set key spk∗2 and set key spk2 are merged to produce the
new set key spk′2, essentially adding one joining member to the existing set. KGM.AddEdge connects
spk′2 to rpk′.
(b) After KGM.DiscardKey. This final key graph is produced when the 𝑘-nodes are discarded
in the following order: bpk∗, rpk, rpk∗, spk2, and then spk∗2. The edge from spk′2 to rpk′ that was
previously added prevents edges from being added from spk2 and spk∗2 to rpk′ when rpk and rpk∗
are discarded, which would be semantically equivalent but syntactically undesirable.
Figure 10.12 Joining procedure with the Shrub KC scheme. The graph is depicted with the
same graphical conventions as in Figure 10.11. This example depicts a session with five existing
members, four joining members, and a maximum set size of 𝑛𝑆 = 3. One new 𝑢-node is placed
in the set with set key spk2, while the other three new 𝑢-nodes are placed in a new set. After the
KC.MergeJoin operation, the three set keys are {spk1, spk′2, spk∗3} and the root key is rpk′.
(Refs: 441 a b)
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Figure 10.12 depicts an example of the joining process both before and after keys are discarded
using KGM.DiscardKey executions. The procedure is mainly the same as in the Star scheme,
except that the edges for the set keys must be carefully managed. Using KGM.AddEdge to add
edges from new set keys to the new root key is important to ensure that there are no edges from
personal keys directly to rpk′ at the end of the KC.MergeJoin operation. Adding an edge of this
form is always permitted, because the two 𝑘-nodes with edges to a new set key are the (existing)
set key and the merging set key, and these have outgoing edges to the (existing) root key and
the merging root key, respectively; this means that all 𝑘-nodes with connections to a new set
key already have alternate paths to the target of the sole outgoing edge, so the added edge is
semantically redundant. The final graph depicted in Figure 10.12 is a tree with the correct form,
with one joining member added to an existing set, and three joining members added to a new
set. In total, the KC.MergeJoin operation only requires three CBRAKEM encapsulations for this
example: one to share the blinding private key with the existing group, one to establish the new
root key, and one to establish the new set key for the updated set.32
10.11.4 Tree Key Control
The Tree scheme arranges the key graph in a tree structure. It attempts to keep the tree as shallow
as possible as members join and leave the session over time. The scheme is parameterized by a
branching factor function, bf (𝑑), that determines the maximum number of children at each tree
depth, 𝑑. The branching factor function must be monotonically increasing (i.e., the maximum
number of children for a 𝑘-node at depth 𝑑 is at least as many as for a 𝑘-node at depth 𝑑 − 1).
The scheme also tries to preserve (but does not guarantee) a property: the children of every
non-personal 𝑘-node are either all personal 𝑘-nodes or all non-personal 𝑘-nodes; this property is
not strictly necessary, but it allows the joining procedure to use simpler techniques more often.
Aside from these constraints, the graphs produced by the scheme are fully generalized key trees.
Figure 10.13 depicts the key graph produced by the scheme for a session with 24 members with a
branching factor function such that bf (0) = 2, bf (1) = 3, and bf (2) = 4. The scheme is designed
to gracefully reduce the size of the tree if the number of members in the session decreases, so
the performance of the scheme is not “poisoned” by leftover intermediate 𝑘-nodes after a large
decrease in membership.
32 ⋏The overall MLS.MassJoin operation (see Section 10.10.4) will require additional CBRAKEM encapsulations as
layaway entries are claimed and exhausted keys are refreshed.
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Figure 10.13 A complete key tree with branching factors (2, 3, 4, . . . ). With a height of four,
this key tree contains 24 𝑢-nodes. Shaded 𝑘-nodes are personal keys. (Ref: 441)
10.11.4.1 Initialization
The initialization procedure for the Tree scheme is the same as for the Trivial scheme, described
in Section 10.11.1. Specifically, KC.InitGraphPerform and KC.InitGraphApply initialize a key
graph containing only one 𝑢-node and one personal key. Unlike the Star and Shrub schemes,
which both maintain a specific arrangement of intermediate 𝑘-nodes, the Tree scheme is capable
of dynamically increasing the height of the key tree without limit. Consequently, it does not need
to add any additional 𝑘-nodes to the initial group state.
10.11.4.2 𝑘-node Merging
The KC.MayMerge(𝐺, 𝑠, 𝑘) function for the Tree scheme allows 𝑘-nodes to be merged whenever
possible, as long as the resulting tree does not violate the constraints imposed by the branching
factor function. KC.MayMerge requires that an edge from 𝑠 to 𝑘 exists in 𝐺. In the context of
the Tree scheme, this means that 𝑘 is the parent of 𝑠. If 𝑠 is initially at depth 𝑑, implying that
𝑘 is at depth 𝑑 − 1, then the subtree rooted at 𝑠 must satisfy the branching factor function if it
was positioned at depth 𝑑 − 1. If and only if the branching factor function would be satisfied,
KC.MayMerge returns 𝑏 = 1. In general, determining if the branching factor function is satisfied
requires traversing the entire subtree to check each 𝑘-node. If the branching factor is known to
be constant at depth 𝑑 − 1 and greater, then the condition is trivially satisfied.
10.11.4.3 Serialization
The serialization functionality for the Tree scheme must be capable of encoding arbitrary key
trees. KC.Serialize encodes an array of blinding public keys used by the members (in a canonical
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order33), followed by the key tree. The tree is encoded recursively, starting at the root node. For
each node, a bit indicates if it is a 𝑘-node or a 𝑢-node. For 𝑢-nodes, the type bit is followed by
the agent ID and, if long-term identities are enabled, the blinded public key and the index of the
blinding public key in the initial array. If there are superfluous edges for the 𝑢-node’s member,
then the 𝑢-node data is followed by an array of superfluously known 𝑘-nodes. For 𝑘-nodes, the
type bit is followed by the public key for the node and the recursively encoded child nodes.
KC.Deserialize recursively decodes this data.
10.11.4.4 Shared Key
KC.BroadcastKeys for the Tree scheme returns a set containing only the 𝑘-node at the root of
the tree. KC.SharedKey returns the root 𝑘-node itself. This is the same as the Star and Shrub
schemes.
10.11.4.5 Joining Procedure
The high-level joining procedure for the Tree scheme is similar to the Star and Shrub schemes:
1. a new key tree is formed for the joining members;
2. the key tree is instantiated using authenticated TKLL within KC.PrepareJoin;
3. the instantiated key tree is imported into the existing key graph by KGM.ImportTree within
KC.MergeJoin;
4. the old and new key trees are combined using KGM.MergeKeys and KGM.AddEdge; and then
5. certain 𝑘-nodes are discarded using KGM.DiscardKey to achieve the intended key graph shape.
The main difference between the Tree scheme and the other schemes is that the key trees in
the Tree scheme are generalized and may increase in height without any imposed bounds or
structure (other than the branching factor function). Consequently, it is more complicated to
form the new key tree and to merge the old and new trees.
Both KC.PrepareJoin and KC.MergeJoin begin by examining the existing key tree in PS.𝐺 and
deciding where to add the newly joining members using the same deterministic algorithm. This
33 ⋏ In the prototype implementation, the blinding public keys are stored in PS.𝐼 in a sequence based on the order
that they were introduced to the session. This order is included in the serialization. Other implementations can
use alternative approaches, such as sorting the blinding public keys lexicographically during serialization.
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(a) Existing key graph. (b) Subtree insertion. This option shows a
subtree containing two 𝑢-nodes being inserted
under the target 𝑘-node 𝑠.
(c) Rotation. This option shows two new 𝑘-nodes being added on the edge from the root to the
target 𝑘-node, 𝑠, with new subtrees contained under the new 𝑘-nodes.
Figure 10.14 Node insertion options for the Tree KC scheme. Shaded 𝑘-nodes are personal
keys. 𝑘-nodes and edges depicted with dashed lines indicate the newly proposed additions to the
key tree. This example uses a constant maximum branching factor of two. (Ref: 445)
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algorithm first produces a node insertion plan that describes a sequence of steps. Each step uses a
parameterized node insertion option that modifies PS.𝐺 in a specific manner to add new 𝑘-nodes
and 𝑢-nodes. The Tree scheme uses two types of node insertion options: subtree insertion, and
rotation. Examples of these options are depicted in Figure 10.14.
The subtree insertion option adds a new subtree as the child of an existing 𝑘-node. It accepts
two parameters: the existing 𝑘-node that will become the new parent, 𝑠, and the number of
𝑢-nodes that should be contained in the subtree. 𝑠 is called the target of the subtree insertion.
This option is only applicable if PS.𝐺 contains a 𝑘-node with fewer children than the maximum
branching factor for its depth, which is not always the case. When employed, the subtree insertion
option creates a complete subtree (i.e., all personal keys are located at the same depth and as
far left as possible) with the given number of 𝑢-nodes, respecting the branching factor function
for the intended depth. This subtree is then added as a child of the given parent 𝑘-node.
The rotation option adds one or more new nodes above a target node, 𝑠. The new nodes form
a subtree, and 𝑠 becomes a child in the leftmost path of this subtree. If 𝑠 was the root, then the
root of the newly added nodes becomes the new root for the entire key tree. If 𝑠 was not the
root, then the original parent 𝑘-node of 𝑠 becomes the parent of the newly added nodes. The
rotation option accepts two parameters: the target 𝑘-node 𝑠, and the number of 𝑢-nodes that
should be contained in the newly added subtree. The rotation option computes how many new
𝑘-nodes must be added as immediate ancestors of 𝑠 in order to provide the required number of
𝑢-nodes in their other children, when taking the branching factor function into account.
There are many different ways to produce a node insertion plan for a given existing key graph
PS.𝐺 and a set of joining members. The subtree insertion option can be used to fill the deepest
points an existing tree to a desired depth, while the rotation option can be used to increase the
height of the tree by adding nodes in shallower locations, increasing the 𝑢-node capacity while
retaining the tree density (i.e., keeping the tree close to perfect). The Tree scheme produces a
plan using the following algorithm:
Compute ℎ, the minimum height of a tree that can contain all 𝑢-nodes.
while (there are more 𝑢-nodes to add) {
Find 𝑠, the shallowest 𝑘-node in the tree.
if (𝑠 is a personal key) {
Find 𝑝, the deepest ancestor of 𝑠 with all descendant 𝑢-nodes at the same depth.
Plan a rotation targeting 𝑠 to add as many 𝑢-nodes as possible while respecting ℎ.
} else if (all children of 𝑠 are personal keys) {
Plan as many subtree insertions of height one (i.e., personal keys) under 𝑠 as possible.
} else {
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Plan as many subtree insertions under 𝑠 as possible while respecting ℎ.
}
}
Given a node insertion plan, the remainder of the joining procedure can be performed.
Figure 10.15 depicts an example of the joining procedure to add 12 joining members to a session
with four members. The node insertion plan for the example includes a rotation that replaces an
edge with two 𝑘-nodes, a rotation that replaces an edge with one 𝑘-node, and a subtree insertion
of a tree with height two.
The next step in the joining procedure is to use the node insertion plan to create 𝑇∗, the
key tree that is instantiated by TKLL as part of KC.PrepareJoin. Figure 10.15a depicts the node
insertion plan for the example. In the Tree scheme, 𝑇∗ is called the grafting tree. Transforming
the node insertion plan into a grafting tree is straightforward. The node insertion options in the
plan are first translated into new subtrees, as described previously. For each of these subtrees,
the intended parent 𝑘-node in PS.𝐺 is added to a set. A topological sort is then performed on this
set, producing a subgraph of PS.𝐺 that contains the existing root key. A copy of this subgraph is
made. For each 𝑘-node in the copied subgraph, the scheme keeps track of the original 𝑘-node
in PS.𝐺; this original 𝑘-node is said to correspond to the 𝑘-node in the copy. The newly planned
subtrees can then be attached to the copied subgraph at the appropriate points, yielding the
grafting tree. Figure 10.15b depicts the grafting tree for the example.
KC.PrepareJoin for the Tree scheme proceeds as follows:
1. Construct the grafting tree, 𝑇∗, as described previously.
2. If long-term identities are enabled for the session, add another 𝑘-node called bpk∗ to 𝑇∗, and
add an edge from the root of 𝑇∗ to bpk∗.
3. The joining members use authenticated TKLL to establish key pairs for 𝑇∗, using the same
definitions for Sig, SVerif, Compute-ID, and Prove-ID as for the Star and Shrub schemes.
The joining commit is produced exactly as for the Star and Shrub schemes: it contains the per-
member data for each joining member, the multi-signature 𝜎 produced by TKLL, and the public
key for each non-personal 𝑘-node in 𝑇∗, traversed in a deterministic order. The joining private
data contains all of the private keys produced by TKLL, 𝑄∗.
As in the Star and Shrub schemes, KC.MergeJoin begins by verifying the TKLL result and
importing the grafting tree with KGM.ImportTree, along with any private keys contained in the
joining private data. If long-term identities are enabled, then KGM.ShareKey (see Section 10.5.10)
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(a) Node insertion plan. The 𝑘-nodes with stars are part of the grafting core. New 𝑘-nodes are
drawn with dashed outlines. This plan uses two rotations and a subtree insertion. The original tree
has four non-personal 𝑘-nodes.
(b) The grafting tree. The optional 𝑘-node for bpk∗ is not shown.
(c) Merge operations. A fragment of the merged key graph prior to discarding keys.
Figure 10.15 Example of the joining procedure for the Tree KC scheme.
(Refs: 446 a b c, 448, and 450 a b c d e)
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is executed to share bpk∗ with rpk, and then KGM.DiscardKey (see Section 10.5.6) is executed
to discard bpk∗ from the key graph. Next, a set of attachment points is computed: these are
𝑘-nodes in the original key graph that were the targets of node insertion options in the node
insertion plan. Specifically, the set contains any 𝑘-node that was designated as a parent for a
subtree insertion option, and any 𝑘-node that was designated to become a descendant in the
new subtree for a rotation option. Next, a topological sort of the attachment points is performed,
yielding a subgraph called the grafting core—this is the subset of the original key tree that will
be “merged” with the grafting tree. In the example shown in Figure 10.15a, the grafting core
consists of the three 𝑘-nodes drawn with stars; the two non-root 𝑘-nodes in the grafting core are
the two attachment points in the example.
Once the grafting tree has been imported into PS.𝐺 and the grafting core has been computed,
KC.MergeJoin can begin to merge the two key trees together to achieve the planned result. This
is done using the following procedure:
for each (𝑘-node 𝑘 in the grafting core, traversed from shallowest to deepest) {
if (𝑘 has children in the grafting core or was the target of a subtree insertion) {
Let 𝑘∗ denote the 𝑘-node corresponding to 𝑘 in the imported grafting tree.
Execute KGM.MergeKeys (see Section 10.5.4) to merge 𝑘∗ and 𝑘 into a new node 𝑘′.
if (𝑘 was not the target of a rotation) {
Let 𝑝 denote the parent of 𝑘 in the original key tree.
Execute KGM.AddEdge (see Section 10.5.5) to connect 𝑘′ to 𝑝.
}
}
if (𝑘 was the target of a rotation) {
𝑠← 𝑘.
if (a new node 𝑘′ was just created for this 𝑘) { 𝑠← 𝑘′ }
for each (merging node 𝑠∗ being rotated above 𝑘, from deepest to shallowest) {
Execute KGM.MergeKeys to merge 𝑠∗ with 𝑠 into a new node 𝑠′.
if (𝑠 ≠ 𝑘) {




if (𝑘 has a parent 𝑝 in the original key tree) {
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}
for each (𝑘-node 𝑘 in the grafting core, traversed from shallowest to deepest) {
if (𝑘 was the target of a rotation) {
for each (merging node 𝑠∗ being rotated above 𝑘, from shallowest to deepest) {
Execute KGM.DiscardKey to discard 𝑠∗.
}
}
if (𝑘 has children in the grafting core or was the target of a subtree insertion) {
Let 𝑘∗ denote the 𝑘-node corresponding to 𝑘 in the imported grafting tree.
Execute KGM.DiscardKey to discard 𝑘∗.
Execute KGM.DiscardKey to discard 𝑘.
}
}
This completes the KC.MergeJoin operation; once the algorithm has been executed, the
resulting key graph will be the original key graph with the node insertion plan applied. Note
that this algorithm captures an important edge case: if a node is in the grafting core, has no
children in the grafting core, is the target of a rotation, and is not the target of subtree insertion,
then this node is merged directly with a 𝑘-node in the grafting tree corresponding to one of its
new parents. In contrast, most nodes in the grafting tree, including targets of rotations that
are also parents to other nodes in the grafting core, are merged with a 𝑘-node in the grafting
tree corresponding to the original node itself. It is important to handle this edge case because
the node will have no corresponding node in the grafting tree in this scenario, so the standard
approach will not work. Adding a corresponding node to the grafting tree in order to eliminate
the edge case would have the side effect of requiring an extra CBRAKEM encapsulation in order
to complete the operation, which would harm performance.
To assist with the KC.MergeJoin algorithm, implementations of the Tree scheme may maintain
stateful information about the existing tree structure. Primarily, the creation of the node insertion
plan can be accelerated by storing, for each 𝑘-node in the tree, the node’s height above the shal-
lowest descendant with room for additional children (according to the branching factor function),
and how many children may be inserted below that descendant. However, the performance costs
of the CBRAKEM scheme usually dominate the costs of the tree algorithms, so this additional
state is not a critical performance optimization.
The merging algorithm is best visualized as a three-dimensional key graph with the original
key tree on one plane and the grafting tree in a parallel plane. The new nodes created by
the KGM.MergeKeys executions can be visualized as residing in another parallel plane located
between the original tree’s plane and the grafting tree’s plane. Once the grafting core and
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associated nodes in the grafting tree are discarded with KGM.DiscardKey executions, the resulting
three-dimensional graph structure can be projected back into a two-dimensional tree on the
original plane. While this visualization technique is useful, it is difficult to depict in this document.
The example in Figure 10.15 is simple enough to visualize conveniently in two-dimensional space.
Figure 10.15c depicts this merging process for the example prior to the key discarding stage, with
𝑘-node labels referring to nodes from the grafting core and grafting tree. The arrows depict the
edges in the key graph that are created by the executions of KGM.MergeKeys and KGM.AddEdge.
The aforementioned three-dimensional visualization technique can be used to interpret the figure
in a more generalized way: the original subgraph from the node insertion plan in Figure 10.15a
(i.e., ignoring the new nodes with dashed outlines) can be interpreted as the “front” view of a
foreground parallel plane, the grafting tree in Figure 10.15b can be interpreted as the “front”
view of a background parallel plane, and the merged graph in Figure 10.15c can be interpreted
as the “top” view (not to scale) of the three parallel planes, with the new nodes in the middle
parallel plane. Because of the simplicity of the example, the merged graph can be projected into
two dimensions without overlapping nodes, but this is not the case in general. Note that while
this geometric interpretation may aid with intuitively understanding the effects of the algorithm,
actual implementations of the Tree scheme would simply execute the previously described graph
algorithms without this interpretation.
10.11.5 Choosing a Key Control Scheme
The developer must select a KC scheme and its parameters when deploying a secure group
messaging protocol based on Safehouse. This chapter described several possibilities at a high
level. Aside from implementation complexity, choosing between the schemes is largely a matter
of estimating the intended number of members in a session.
The Trivial (see Section 10.11.1), Star (see Section 10.11.2), Shrub (see Section 10.11.3),
and Tree (see Section 10.11.4) schemes ultimately represent points on a tradeoff spectrum.
Simpler schemes, like the Star scheme, add very few non-personal 𝑘-nodes to the key graph
(none in the case of the Trivial scheme). Complex schemes, like the Tree scheme, add many
non-personal 𝑘-nodes. In general, schemes with more non-personal 𝑘-nodes make KGM.Evict
(Section 10.5.7) and KC.MergeJoin perform more CBRAKEM encapsulations to fewer recipients.
The exact increase in encapsulations and decrease in recipient counts depends on the shape of the
key graph. In the case of the Tree scheme, higher trees require more CBRAKEM encapsulations,
and larger branching factors require larger recipient sets for those encapsulations. The branching
factor function controls the tradeoff between the height and width of the tree for a given group
size. In the case of the Shrub scheme, increasing the maximum set size also increases the number
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of recipients when using CBRAKEM to replace a set key, but it reduces the number of recipients
when using CBRAKEM to replace the root key. Selecting optimal parameters for the Shrub and
Tree schemes depends on the exact performance costs of the CBRAKEM scheme for various
encapsulation and recipient counts, which was evaluated empirically in Section 8.6, and the
expected number of members in a session. The cost of executing KGM.Evict is the main cost
of executing MLS.MassEvict (see Section 10.10.5), MLS.PCSRatchet (see Section 10.10.7), and
MLS.Cleanup (see Section 10.10.8). Optimizing MLS.PCSRatchet is particularly important when
it is in use by the developer, because the frequency with which it is executed scales linearly with
the number of members in the group.
In general, simpler schemes (e.g., Trivial, Star, and Shrub) perform better for small groups,
and more complex schemes (e.g., Tree) perform better for large groups. An empirical evaluation
and comparison of key control schemes is presented in Section 10.13, providing specific insight
into the best schemes to choose for various scenarios.
10.12 Steady-State Behavior
The developer interacts with Safehouse by using the serialization functions described in Sec-
tion 10.9.2, the signing functions described in Section 10.9.3, and the MLS-layer operations
described in Section 10.10. This section describes how this interface should actually be used in a
secure group messaging protocol.
Initially, a Safehouse session is created by a single group member. This member creates a
commit that performs MLS.Initialize (see Section 10.10.2). The developer may also want the
member to set certain labels in the public or confidential label-value stores using the appropriate
MLS-layer operations (see Section 10.10.12). It is possible to enforce that labels (either public
or confidential) and public values are set during the initialization by configuring an appropriate
group policy that would otherwise deny the transaction. Similarly, the group policy can enforce
the creation of a bearer invitation with unlimited uses during initialization in order to implement
an “open” group, as discussed in Section 10.1.9.
Once a Safehouse session is initialized, new members can join the session. The server can
queue and aggregate new members, inform them that they are permitted to join the group,
distribute their agent IDs and personal public keys, and relay interactive messages between
them as they execute KC.PrepareJoin (see Section 10.11). Once the protocol is complete, a
representative of the new members can use the joining commit and its joining private data to
perform an MLS.MassJoin operation (see Section 10.10.4). The resulting commit incorporates
all of the new members into the session. As with the initialization procedure, the group policy
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can be configured to enforce that the representative also sets values in the public or confidential
label-value store as part of the commit containing the MLS.MassJoin operation.
Members in a session can store their group state on non-volatile storage devices using the
serialization functions (see Section 10.9.2). However, as discussed in Section 10.1.1, members
should automatically securely erase their private state if they have been unable to connect to the
session for longer than the forward secrecy period. Members that have been disconnected for an
entire forward secrecy period must rejoin the group again after connectivity has been restored in
order to continue participation.
There are several MLS-layer operations that are typically performed in commits in response
to end-user action: issuing or retracting invitations (see Section 10.10.3), evicting members
(see Section 10.10.5), changing the developer mode (see Section 10.10.11), and altering the
label-value stores (see Section 10.10.12). The developer might also choose to automatically
perform commits with these operations. For example, some secure group messaging tools might
automatically issue invitations in reaction to events occurring in external protocols.
There are several operations that should always be performed automatically by members in a
Safehouse session. Tools should periodically check if any of these operations need to be performed.
A Safehouse library might silently implement these automated operations and hide them from the
developer’s group policy, ensuring that all agents accept these necessary maintenance operations.
The following maintenance operations should be performed automatically:
• MLS.RetractInvitation (see Section 10.10.3.3) should automatically remove any expired
layaways; this decreases the overhead of encrypting blinded identities in the identity table
and anchor keys in the label-value stores.
• MLS.FSRatchet (see Section 10.10.6) should be executed frequently on a per-session (not per-
member) basis in order to provide stronger forward secrecy. For example, a member might
automatically perform an MLS.FSRatchet commit if none was performed by any member
during the last 24 hours. When Safehouse is used in secure group messaging protocols that
enforce a total ordering on payloads and the payloads are infrequent, it is plausible to enforce
that a commit containing an MLS.FSRatchet operation is performed alongside every payload.
• If post-compromise security is enabled, then members must perform MLS.PCSRatchet (see
Section 10.10.7), and may optionally perform MLS.PCSReidentify (see Section 10.10.9), at
least once during each forward secrecy period. This ensures that any previously compromised
private keys known to the member can no longer be used to decrypt payloads or future
changes to the label-value stores.
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• If post-compromise security is disabled and the 𝑘-nodes on the path to a member’s 𝑢-
node are the target of superfluous edges, then the member must perform MLS.Cleanup
(see Section 10.10.8) at least once during each forward secrecy period. This ensures that
MLS.MassEvict (see Section 10.10.5) remains efficient by reducing the prevalence of super-
fluous edges.
• Members automatically authenticate to new members by performing MLS.Authenticate oper-
ations (see Section 10.10.10).
• Members that fail to perform the required automated tasks can be automatically evicted from
session using an MLS.MassEvict operation. Each agent (including the server) can maintain
local state about the last time that members performed their required automated tasks and
automatically evict them after too much time has passed. Agents will only accept these
automated evictions if their own local state also shows that too much time has passed. It
is safe for members that have recently joined the group and have no record of the time
since other members last performed operations to blindly accept these automated evictions:
malicious evictions using this mechanism would require cooperation from a malicious server
and would fork the group, which a malicious server can do at any time in any case.
There is no built-in mechanism in Safehouse for a member to unilaterally “leave” a session,
because there is no mechanism for a leaving member to correctly replace private keys known
to them with ones that are unknown to them in a publicly verifiable manner—BRAKEM always
reveals the new private keys to the agent performing the encapsulation. However, there are
several ways to achieve the same effect in practice. The simplest solution is for the “leaving”
member to delete their group state. This will cause other members to automatically evict the
leaving member from the group after the automated duties are not performed within the forward
secrecy period. To avoid the need to wait for the entire forward secrecy period, the overall secure
group messaging protocol could implement functionality that allows the leaving member to signal
their intention (e.g., by adding an entry to the public label-value store authorizing an eviction),
allowing another member to evict them from the session. The group policy could be configured
to recognize this signaling mechanism and allow the associated commits. Client software could
also be configured to automatically evict leaving members—potentially as a precondition before
sending new messages. User interfaces could indicate that a member is in the process of leaving
(indicating that they have deleted their private state, assuming that they are behaving honestly)
for the duration between the receipt of the leaving signal and the receipt of the commit that
actually evicts the member.
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10.13 Performance Evaluation
A prototype implementation of Safehouse—including BRAKEMDDL★ , BRAKEMZK, TKLL, and all of
the functions and operations described in this chapter—was developed as part of this work. An
empirical evaluation of this prototype was performed in order to answer two questions about
Safehouse’s performance:
1. What is the cost, in terms of time and space, to secure a realistic messaging protocol using
Safehouse, and is this cost reasonable?
2. Of the key control schemes introduced in Section 10.11, which schemes are the best candidates
for sessions of different sizes?
In the experiment, the prototype implementation was used to replay a collection of conversation
transcripts as if they had been secured using Safehouse. The experiment evaluated several impor-
tant metrics for each conversation, including the communication overhead and the computational
overhead for all agents.
In terms of the MLS operations presented in Section 10.10 and the steady-state behavior
described in Section 10.12, the experiment included only a subset of the available functionality.
Each session included only MLS.MassJoin commits, MLS.MassEvict commits, either MLS.Cleanup
or MLS.PCSRatchet commits, and payload transmissions. The experiment did not include any
operations related to invitation or label-value store management: these operations are optional
and their use is situational. Each session in the experiment included a single bearer invitation with
unlimited uses in order for new members to join; this is the technique suggested in Section 10.1.9
to implement “open” groups.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 10.13.1 describes how the
conversation transcripts used in the experiment were produced, Section 10.13.2 discusses how
to estimate the performance overhead of the scheme on consumer hardware, Section 10.13.3
describes the approach used in the experiment to emulate Safehouse sessions, Section 10.13.4
presents and discusses the results, and Section 10.13.5 summarizes the findings into actionable
deployment advice.
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10.13.1 Data Sets
To emulate a Safehouse session, the experiment required a data set that specified a sequence of
events, including the virtual timestamps indicating when each event occurs, with the following
possible event types:
• Mass join: a set of new members with given agent IDs joins the session.
• Mass evict: a set of existing members with given agent IDs are evicted from the session.
• Payload: an existing member with a given agent ID sends a payload with a given plaintext
size.
The experiment involved emulating multiple Safehouse sessions for several different data sets.
Although Safehouse allows agent IDs to be reused over the lifetime of the session, for convenience,
each data set was expected to include at most one join and evict event for each agent ID.
Additionally, each data set only needed to include the sizes of payload plaintexts and not the
plaintexts themselves, since the IND-CCA2 cryptosystem used to encrypt the payloads would
exhibit the same behavior for any plaintexts of the same size. Given a data set containing these
types of events with timestamps, the experiment automatically determined the virtual times at
which each group member should perform an MLS.Cleanup or MLS.PCSRatchet operation. Data
sets with this form are also general enough to be used in experiments evaluating alternative
secure group messaging protocols. To achieve the desired generality, the “mass evict” events
in the data sets did not specify which member performed the eviction, because secure group
messaging protocols other than Safehouse may not necessarily require an unevicted member to
participate in an eviction.
There were several possible options for acquiring data sets to use in the experiment. One
option was to randomly generate a synthetic data set: an invented sequence of events that satisfies
some desirable characteristics, such as the average number of members in the group. Synthetic
data is useful for evaluating a spectrum of scenarios with carefully controlled properties, but
these scenarios might be different from scenarios encountered in practice. Another option was
to use a real data set: a sequence of operations and payloads that was observed in a real target
scenario. Real data sets can provide stronger evidence that the results will hold in practice, but
relatively few real data sets are available.
Unfortunately, none of the real data sets that were available contained enough data to produce
data sets with the aforementioned structure. There are many sources of publicly logged IRC
conversations, but the IRC protocol does not support non-interactivity. Consequently, IRC clients
frequently disconnect and reconnect as their network connections are temporarily interrupted.
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Moreover, many public IRC logs do not include records of these connection and disconnection
events, nor the set of members in the channel. Most other publicly available data sets involved
protocols that inherently lacked the concept of a stateful conversation, such as social media posts,
emails, or SMS message logs. The most widely used protocols that provide both non-interactivity
and stateful conversations, such as Discord and Slack, are generally used in private deployments
that do not publish public logs.
As a compromise, the experiment used several partially synthetic data sets: combinations
of data contained in real data sets with additional synthetic data that achieved the required
structure. Publicly available IRC logs were used as a source of payloads. The IRC logs defined the
sequence of messages that were sent, the usernames (known as nicknames in the IRC protocol)
that sent them, and the associated timestamps. Mass join and mass evict events were then
synthetically generated for every payload sender appearing in the data set. These events were
added based on the assumption that, if IRC was replaced by a protocol like Safehouse that
supports non-interactive communication, then the senders appearing in the data set would
remain in the session for as long as possible.
The Ubuntu Chat Corpus [UA13] supplied the real chat logs that served as the basis of the data
sets used in the experiment. This corpus consists of IRC logs of public technical support channels
for users of Ubuntu, a popular Linux-based operating system. The corpus contains messages
sent to 11 different channels between 2004-05-07 and 2012-11-30.3⁴ Importantly, all of the
users appearing in the logs were informed that their messages would be released publicly. The
log for each channel is a text file containing nickname changes and various types of messages,
as they would be displayed in a typical IRC client; it does not contain notifications of users
joining or leaving the channel. The log includes the date and time that each message was sent,
expressed as the hour and minute—logs do not contain the second or timezone. Compared to the
target scenarios described in Chapter 7, most users in technical support channels are expected
to participate in the session for relatively short periods of time—just long enough to receive
technical support. For this reason, emulating these chat logs using a secure group messaging
protocol is particularly expensive.
To construct the data set for the experiment, three channels were selected from the Ubuntu
Chat corpus: #ubuntu-se, #ubuntu-cn, and #ubuntu. These channels are technical support
forums with messages written in Swedish, Chinese, and English, respectively. These channels
were selected because they represent “small”, “medium”, and “large” group conversations. All
data prior to 2008 was discarded because earlier data in the #ubuntu channel log contains
ambiguous timestamps (12-hour times with no a.m. or p.m.markers) and nicknames with special
34 ⋏More recent public logs for the same channels are available, but they are not as easily accessible as those in the
Ubuntu Chat Corpus, and the number of users participating in the channels has slowly decreased over time.
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characters that cannot generally be distinguished from message contents. The #ubuntu-se
and #ubuntu-cn channel logs begin in 2010, so no data was discarded from these logs. Next,
network-wide messages and private messages to the logging bot were discarded, leaving only
messages that were sent to the channels. The messages in each channel were then processed
chronologically and sent through a series of processing layers, producing a data set consisting
of the desired event types as output. Messages in the original chat logs were substituted with
“payload” events that contain the size of the message (in terms of bytes appearing in the original
chat log), but not the original message itself—as discussed previously, message contents were
irrelevant for the experiment.
The first processing layer tracked nicknames participating in the conversation at every point
in time. When a message from a new nickname was encountered, a new agent ID was assigned
to the nickname, and a “join” event was inserted into the output immediately preceding the
message. When a nickname change was encountered, the agent ID was unassigned from the
previous nickname and assigned to the new one. As a special case, if the logs contained a
nickname change to a nickname that was already active in the conversation, then the identities
were “merged”—this typically occurs in IRC when a user rejoins under an alternate nickname
after a connection interruption and then automatically restores their nickname once the original
connection has timed out. To merge agent IDs, all events that were previously output using the
agent ID assigned to the old nickname were rewritten to use the agent ID assigned to the new
nickname, and the “join” event that occurred later was removed. After processing each message,
“evict” events were added to the output for all agent IDs in the session that last sent a message
over a week ago (in terms of the timestamps in the log). “Evict” events were given a timestamp
of exactly 24 hours after the last message received from the user.
The second processing layer aggregated “join” and “evict” events into “mass join” and “mass
evict” events. The data set was processed so that any “join” and “evict” events occurring within
sliding 5-minute windows would be combined into aggregated events. For example, if users
with agent IDs 1–6 joined the conversation at 00:01, 00:02, 00:05, 00:08, 00:10, and 00:12,
respectively, then the events would be aggregated into a “mass join” of agent IDs 1–3 at 00:01
and a “mass join” of agent IDs 4–6 at 00:08. Similarly, if the users left the conversation at 01:01,
01:05, 01:14, 01:16, 01:16, and 01:18, respectively, then the events would be aggregated into a
“mass evict” of agent IDs 1 and 2 at 01:05, and a “mass evict” of agent IDs 2–6 at 01:18.
Finally, the third processing layer removed any messages sent to the channel when there was
only one active participant. This can occur in the Ubuntu Chat Corpus because users that “idled”
in the channels have no presence in the logs. However, for a data set intended for performing
experiments with secure group messaging protocols, it was convenient to ensure that all messages
appearing in the data set actually represented communication between clients.
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Table 10.1 Properties of the data sets used to evaluate the Safehouse prototype.
(Refs: 458 a b c, 463, 464, 466, 467, 469, 471, and 475)
#ubuntu-se #ubuntu-cn #ubuntu
First event 2010-11-04 2010-11-04 2008-01-01
Last event 2012-11-30 2012-11-30 2012-11-30
Measurements start 2010-11-12 2010-11-12 2008-01-08
Measurements end 2012-11-29 2012-11-29 2008-02-07
Messages / day 720 (380) 2 140 (770) 10 990 (900)
Payload bytes / day 35 000 (19 000) 88 000 (30 000) 691 000 (58 000)
Mass joins / day 6.5 (3.1) 22.9 (6.4) 191 (5.9)
Joining members / day 6.7 (3.3) 26.3 (8.4) 501 (30)
Mass evicts / day 5.8 (2.7) 21.9 (6.6) 190 (6.7)
Evicted members / day 6.7 (3.3) 26.3 (8.5) 502 (29)
Members 52 (12) 127 (28) 1386 (46)
The measurements are means with standard deviations in parentheses. The means were computed based on all
events with dates in the “measurements start” to “measurements end” range, inclusive. The mean number of
members in the group was computed on a per-second basis.
The data sets for the three channels produced using this procedure were stored as gzip-
compressed text files with one JSON-encoded event per line. This format makes it easy for
other researchers to use the same data sets to test alternative secure group messaging protocols.
Table 10.1 presents various measurements of the events contained in the data sets. For all three
data sets, the experiment involved emulating the conversation beginning with the first event in the
log. However, since “evict” events were generated for participants that did not send any messages
for at least one week, the data sets began with a “warming up” phase in which there were far
more “join” events than “evict” events. Consequently, the data collected in the experiment was
only processed for the time period beginning one week (in virtual time) after the first event in the
data set. The “measurements start” and “measurements end” rows in Table 10.1 indicate the first
and last dates in the data sets for which experimental results were collected. Although the data
set for the #ubuntu channel contained almost five years of events, the experiment only measured
at most one month of the emulated session due to computational constraints. The measurements
in Table 10.1 show that the number of members in each session remained relatively constant
during the measurement period—the “joining members / day” and “evicted members / day” are
essentially equal within each of the three data sets.
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10.13.2 Estimating BRAKEM Costs
In order to emulate Safehouse sessions for the data sets described in Section 10.13.1 in a
reasonable amount of time, the experiment had to be performed on a large machine in an
academic computing cluster. The emulation was expensive because each commit induced by the
data set had to be applied by every member in the session, and all of these applications had to be
emulated. One of the downsides of using a computing cluster to perform the experiment is that
time measurements do not reflect the expected performance of consumer devices. Consequently,
the performance of Safehouse in terms of computation time had to be evaluated indirectly from
the experimental measurements.
The computation time required to execute the Safehouse protocol is dominated by the
underlying BRAKEM scheme, which requires many modular exponentiations for encapsulation,
decapsulation, and verification. This means that it is possible to derive a good approximation
of the computation time required to execute a session on a consumer device in the following
manner:
1. Emulate Safehouse sessions for the data sets in the computing cluster and record the number
of BRAKEM encapsulations during the performance of each operation, the number of rings
(i.e., sets of recipients) in each encapsulation, and the number of recipients in each ring.
2. On a consumer device, measure the time required to execute the BRAKEM functions for
encapsulations with different shapes: different numbers of rings and recipients.
3. Derive a statistical model to extrapolate the time required to execute the BRAKEM functions
on the consumer device for encapsulations of any shape.
4. Apply the model to the encapsulation shapes recorded during the emulation to derive an
approximation of the total time requirements if the session had been executed on the consumer
device.
Step 2 is essentially the performance evaluation described in the context of comparing
BRAKEM constructions in Section 8.6, except that the evaluation must be performed for a
larger set of possible encapsulation shapes. As part of the experiment, the performance of
BRAKEM.Encapsulate, BRAKEM.Decapsulate, and BRAKEM.Verify was evaluated 100 times us-
ing all Skylake cores on an Intel Core i7-6700K CPU with all core frequencies pinned to 4.0GHz
and Intel Turbo Boost disabled; this was the same consumer machine that was used in the eval-
uation of the new DAKEs in Section 5.9 and in all of the performance evaluations of BRAKEM
in Section 8.3.2. The experiment measured the BRAKEM time for shapes with 1–10 rings and
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Table 10.2 A performance evaluation of BRAKEMDDL★ .Decapsulate for various shapes.
All times are means given in milliseconds. Standard deviations are not shown, but they are between
2 and 5 milliseconds for all values. (Refs: 460 a b)
Recipients / ring
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
2 18 18 19 18 19 19 19 19 19 19
3 26 26 26 27 27 27 28 27 28 27
4 31 31 32 31 32 32 32 32 32 33
5 34 35 36 37 37 37 37 37 37 38
6 39 39 40 41 41 41 42 42 42 42Ri
ng
s
7 42 43 44 45 45 46 46 46 46 47
8 47 48 48 49 50 50 50 50 51 51
9 50 51 52 53 54 54 55 56 55 56
10 54 55 57 58 58 58 59 60 60 60
1–10 recipients in each ring, where all rings had the same number of participants in each sce-
nario. The experiment was repeated for the prototype implementations of both BRAKEMDDL★ and
BRAKEMZK. As an illustrative example of this intermediate step, Table 10.2 depicts the results of
the experiment for BRAKEMDDL★ .Decapsulate. The results for the other two BRAKEMDDL★ functions
and the three BRAKEMZK functions are not shown.
For each of the six BRAKEM functions (three functions for each of the two constructions),
the experiment produced a two-dimensional matrix of mean timing measurements, such as the
results for BRAKEMDDL★ .Decapsulate in Table 10.2. Consider how the shape of the encapsulation
affects the the work that is performed by these functions. Both BRAKEM constructions follow the
general design described in Section 8.1.1. For all functions, this design results in a fixed cost for
each ring, and a different fixed cost for each recipient in each ring. In terms of BRAKEMDDL★ (see
Section 8.2.8): for each ring 𝑖, the machine generates or processes pk∗𝑖 , sk∗𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖, 𝑦𝑖, ℎ𝑖, 𝑘𝑖, and 𝜋𝑖;
and for each recipient 𝑗 in each ring 𝑖, the machine generates or processes ℎ𝑖, 𝑗. In other words,
the per-ring set of operations scales linearly with the number of rings, and the per-recipient set of
operations scales linearly with the number of recipients in each ring. Additionally, in the case of
BRAKEMDDL★ , the proof statement for Π0 grows to contain a term for each recipient in each ring.
Careful evaluation of the proof system described in Section 8.2.7 shows that this also induces
linear scaling with respect to the same shape parameters. A similar analysis can be performed
for BRAKEMZK (see Section 8.5.5).
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Table 10.3 Models for the BRAKEM performance of the consumer machine. 𝑥 is the
number of rings, and 𝑦 is the total number of recipients (across all rings). The models output time
values in milliseconds. The coefficients are given with four significant figures because 𝑥 and 𝑦 are
always less than 2 000 for the scenarios of interest. 𝑅2 is the coefficient of determination with respect
to the empirically measured means used to establish the linear regression.
(Refs: 461, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 469)
Predicted mean time [ms] 𝑅2
BRAKEMDDL★ .Encapsulate 0.4776 + 4.079𝑥 + 0.2451𝑦 0.9998
BRAKEMDDL★ .Decapsulate 10.92 + 4.472𝑥 + 0.06165𝑦 0.9874
BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify 10.97 + 3.667𝑥 + 0.05584𝑦 0.9827
BRAKEMZK.Encapsulate 77.88 + 133.9𝑥 + 0.5260𝑦 0.9969
BRAKEMZK.Decapsulate 2.083 + 0.6338𝑥 + 0.2051𝑦 0.9744
BRAKEMZK.Verify 2.109 + 0.5038𝑥 + 0.2080𝑦 0.9723
Based on the aforementioned analysis of the implementation, the results of the experiment
should closely match a model that predicts time requirements based on a linear equation in terms
of the number of rings and the total number of recipients. The scikit-learn Python library3⁵
was used to compute linear regressions for all six functions based on the experimental results.
The linear regressions accurately predict the results of the experiment with very high coefficients
of determination. The resulting models are presented in Table 10.3. These models can be used
to predict the mean performance of the i7-6700K machine when performing or applying the
commits in the emulated sessions.
10.13.3 Session Emulator
The session emulator that was developed for the experiment read the data sets described in Sec-
tion 10.13.1, emulated Safehouse sessions that performed the specified sequences of operations,
and outputted performance measurements to an SQLite database for each emulated session. Each
execution of the session emulator was parameterized with the KC scheme to use and whether
to use MLS.Cleanup or MLS.PCSRatchet operations. All sessions were instantiated using the
BRAKEMDDL★ construction and were configured for ephemeral authentication.
The session emulator was designed to run on a large machine in an academic computing
cluster. The experiments were performed on a machine with eight Intel Xeon E7-8870 pro-
cessors; each of these processors has 10 physical Westmere-EX cores running at 2.4GHz and
with hyperthreading enabled. To take advantage of this configuration, the session emulator was
35 ⋏ https://scikit-learn.org/
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designed to exploit massive parallelism while being aware of the NUMA topology (i.e., ensuring
that processes did not share memory across different processors). For this reason, the session
emulator spawned one worker process for each active member in the session, allowing the Linux
scheduler, rather than the Go runtime, to handle most of the scheduling work. These worker
processes were recycled as existing members were evicted and new members joined. Each of
these worker processes was pinned to a single processor using taskset. The master process
was responsible for reading the input data set and managing worker processes. The master
process used the stdin and stdout pipes for each worker process to assign the active agent
ID, instruct them to perform Safehouse operations, or to receive a commit from the server and
apply it. The master process also implemented a simplified Safehouse server that would receive
commits, apply them to the server state, and relay them to all other clients. The worker processes
connected to this server using localhost TCP connections; all active members in the session
remained connected to the server for the entire duration of their participation in the session,
avoiding the need to implement a storage mechanism for commits. A similar localhost server
was also provided by the master process to relay transmissions between joining members during
execution of the KC.PrepareJoin protocol. As an important optimization, the large precomputed
modular exponentiation tables for BRAKEMDDL★ discussed in Section 8.3.2.5 were computed only
once and shared between all worker processes by using an anonymous in-memory file initialized
with memfd_create.
The data sets described in Section 10.13.1 did not explicitly specify when to perform
MLS.Cleanup (or MLS.PCSRatchet) operations, or the existing members responsible for per-
forming MLS.MassEvict operations. Omitting these instructions from the data sets ensured that
they were generalized enough to be used in evaluations of alternative secure group messaging
protocols. The session emulator tracked the last cleanup time of each member in the session
and instructed the associated worker process to perform an MLS.Cleanup or MLS.PCSRatchet
operation (based on the configuration of the experiment) every week (in terms of virtual time
as specified in the data set). When instructed to perform a mass eviction, the session emulator
selected an existing, unevicted member uniformly at random to perform the commit. During the
application of commits to the server state, the master process recorded a variety of measurements
and stored them in the SQLite database:
• a description of the operation that was performed;
• the size of the resulting commit, in bytes;
• a list of all BRAKEM encapsulations performed as part of the commit, the number of rings in
each encapsulation, and the number of recipients in each ring;
462
Chapter 10 Safehouse: A Comprehensive Secure Group Messaging Solution
• for “mass join” operations, the total number of bytes transmitted between joining members
during the KC.PrepareJoin protocol;
• the size of the public state, in bytes, before and after the application of the commit; and
• the number of members in the session before and after the application of the commit.
The session emulator did not actually emulate the transmission of payloads, because they would
not affect the group state in the worker processes. Instead, when the master process encountered
a payload in the data set, it recorded the size of the message and the size of the digital signature
that the sender would attach in practice—for BRAKEMDDL★ , the signature is always 64 bytes. The
session emulator did not record the cryptographic overhead of the IND-CCA2 encryption for
payloads because Safehouse does not impose a choice of cryptosystem.
10.13.4 Results
In the experiment, the session emulator measured Safehouse sessions for the #ubuntu-se,
#ubuntu-cn, and #ubuntu data sets (see Table 10.1) using five different KC schemes with
MLS.Cleanup:
1. the Trivial scheme (see Section 10.11.1);
2. the Star scheme (see Section 10.11.2);
3. the Shrub scheme (see Section 10.11.3) with maximum set size 𝑛𝑆 = 5;
4. the Tree scheme (see Section 10.11.4) with a constant branching factor function bf (𝑑) = 10;
and
5. the Tree scheme with a constant branching factor function bf (𝑑) = 64.
Due to computational constraints, the #ubuntu data set was only emulated using the Trivial,
Star, and Shrub schemes for one week (in virtual time) instead of one month—this is sufficient
data to demonstrate that these schemes are drastically inferior to the Tree scheme for large
groups. To understand the overhead of using MLS.PCSRatchet, the experiment also emulated
a session for #ubuntu-se using the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 and MLS.PCSRatchet instead
of MLS.Cleanup. In total, the experiment involved 16 scenarios. The number of scenarios was
limited because the purpose of the experiment was to gather preliminary intuition about the
practicality and scalability of potential KC schemes; developing superior algorithms and finding
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optimal configurations is left as future work. The 𝑛𝑆 = 5 and bf (𝑑) = 10 configurations for the
KC schemes were chosen arbitrarily to test the schemes. The choice of bf (𝑑) = 64 for the second
Tree configuration was based on the coefficients in the BRAKEMDDL★ .Verify performance model
(see Table 10.3), rounded down to the nearby power of 2 for convenience: 3.667/0.05584 ≈ 26.
The per-commit measurements produced by the session emulator, as described in Sec-
tion 10.13.3, were processed to derive aggregated statistics, with the goal of answering the
experimental questions (see the start of Section 10.13). In order to capture the behavior after
the initial “warming up” phase, only measurements for operations performed between the “mea-
surements start” and “measurements end” date ranges listed in Table 10.1 were considered. The
following statistics related to communication and storage costs, expressed as means and standard
deviations, were computed for each of the 16 scenarios:
• the average daily size of the commits;
• the average daily size of the digital signatures attached to payloads;
• the average daily size of the AEAD tags attached to payloads,3⁶ assuming that each encryption
produces a typical 128-bit authentication tag;
• the average daily size of the transmissions for KC.PrepareJoin protocol executions; and
• the average size of the public state, on a per-second basis.
Reporting a measurement as only a mean and standard deviation can hide outlier samples
that may have significant real-world impact (e.g., unrealistic storage requirements). This is
not the case for the measurements in this experiment: daily commit size and KC.PrepareJoin
transmission size is based on the number of members in the group and the number of group
membership changes, daily signature and AEAD tag sizes are based on the number of message
transmissions, and the public state size is based on the number of members in the group. Without
a sudden increase in the number of members, membership turnover, or message frequency, there
will not be a sudden increase in any of the measurements.
36 ⋏AEADs also require a (public) nonce to encrypt or decrypt payloads. In most applications, the developer can
choose an AEAD designed to work with sequentially selected nonces, such as ChaCha20-Poly1305 [NL18]. Each
member of the group can use a KDF to derive an encryption key from their agent ID and the group key. By using
this personalized key for all payloads, each member can safely use sequential nonces for its outgoing payloads.
This approach allows the nonces to be encoded using a variable-length integer encoding, such as the one used
by Google’s protocol buffers [Goo20], making the transmission cost of nonces negligible. If this approach is not
feasible for an application and 128-bit random nonces must be attached to payloads, then the added transmission
cost will be identical to the evaluated transmission cost of the 128-bit AEAD tags.
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The BRAKEM shape information recorded by the session emulator was supplied to the perfor-
mance models in Table 10.3 in order to estimate computation time requirements for the consumer
device to act as a member in the session. The computation time estimates were produced for both
BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK, even though the communication and storage costs were directly
measured for only BRAKEMDDL★ ; an evaluation of the communication costs of the session when
instantiated with BRAKEMZK is left to future work. For each member that participated in the
session, the experimental results were searched to find all of the days in which that member
performed at least one operation. The BRAKEM shape information for these operations was
provided as input to the performance models; the result was the estimated amount of time per
day spent by the member to perform commits, excluding days in which the member did not
perform any commits. These calculations were then averaged across all members in the session
to produce the “daily BRAKEM Encapsulate / performer” metric.
For each day in the experimental results, all of the BRAKEM shapes were provided as input
to the performance models. The “daily BRAKEM max Decapsulate / member” metric is the
sum of the estimated cost to call BRAKEM.Decapsulate on all of the shapes, averaged across all
days. In a real deployment, members generally do not decapsulate all of the BRAKEM transfers,
because usually there are a few transfers for which the member is not an intended recipient.
Consequently, this metric serves as an upper bound for the amount of time that a member would
spend applying all of the commits for a day. Similarly, the “daily BRAKEM Verify” metric is the
sum of the estimated cost to call BRAKEM.Verify on all of the shapes, averaged across all days.
This metric is the estimated time that the server will spend applying the commits for a day,
because the server never decapsulates a BRAKEM transfer. It also serves as a lower bound for
the time spent by a member to apply the commits. These upper and lower bounds are generally
quite close in the experimental results, because decapsulation is only marginally more expensive
than verification for both BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK.
The communication sizes and computational requirements are presented in the experimental
results as daily averages. Safehouse is designed to support non-interactive communication, so
members may be disconnected for long periods of time (within the forward secrecy period) before
reconnecting to the server. Upon reconnection, the member will receive and apply the commits
that were performed while it was disconnected. The daily averages in the results provide an
estimation of how much commit data will accumulate during these periods and how long it will
take for the member to apply the commits to its locally stored group state.
10.13.4.1 Small Group: #ubuntu-se
Table 10.4 presents the results of the experiment for the #ubuntu-se data set, representing
a “small” group. The results suggest that securing an IRC channel like #ubuntu-se requires
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Table 10.4 Performance evaluation of Safehouse for a small group. This table shows the
experimental results for emulating the #ubuntu-se data set. The Trivial scheme generally performed
the best for this data set. The Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 64 essentially behaves like the Star scheme
with less efficient public state compression, because the average number of members (52, according
to Table 10.1) is smaller than the branching factor. (Refs: 465, 470, and 474 a b)
Shrub Tree Tree
Trivial Star 𝑛𝑆 = 5 bf (𝑑) = 10 bf (𝑑) = 64
Daily update data:
Commits [KiB] 550 (250) 570 (230) 740 (270) 730 (270) 560 (220)
PrepareJoin messages [KiB] 2.8 (1.4) 3.2 (1.7) 5.6 (2.8) 5.6 (2.8) 3.2 (1.9)
Daily payloads (common):
Plaintext (goodput) [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 (18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Signatures [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 (24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AEAD tags [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.3 (6.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Storage (per-second average):
Public state [KiB] 36.2 (4.4) 36.6 (4.4) 42.5 (4.8) 40.4 (4.4) 37.1 (4.7)
Daily computation:
Perform probability / member 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.19
BRAKEMDDL★ total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.022 (0.006) 0.019 (0.007) 0.019 (0.006) 0.019 (0.006) 0.018 (0.006)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 0.33 (0.13) 0.36 (0.14) 0.47 (0.17) 0.46 (0.17) 0.36 (0.14)
Verify (for server) [s] 0.32 (0.13) 0.34 (0.13) 0.42 (0.16) 0.42 (0.16) 0.34 (0.13)
BRAKEMZK total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.37 (0.12) 0.50 (0.13) 0.64 (0.20) 0.63 (0.20) 0.50 (0.13)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 0.191 (0.093) 0.130 (0.060) 0.110 (0.041) 0.107 (0.040) 0.123 (0.052)
Verify (for server) [s] 0.191 (0.094) 0.128 (0.059) 0.105 (0.039) 0.101 (0.038) 0.121 (0.051)
The measurements are means with standard deviations in parentheses. Communication sizes were measured using
the BRAKEMDDL★ instantiation. Daily computation times are estimated using the BRAKEM cost models. “Encapsulate
/ performer” is the mean time to perform all BRAKEM encapsulations for a member on a day where they perform a
commit; the cost is zero on other days. “Max Decapsulate / member” is the mean time to decapsulate all BRAKEM
transfers for the day, and “Verify” is the mean time to verify all BRAKEM transfers for the day. The actual mean time
spent by a member to process BRAKEM transfers when applying commits would be between these values; for the
server, it would be the “Verify” time.
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hundreds of KiB of communication per day, tens of KiB of storage, and hundreds of milliseconds of
computation per day. These costs are very low for modern devices—both the daily communication
and daily computation costs are lower than the costs for a mobile device to load a typical web
page [An17]. Although the daily payload size (also known as goodput) is an order of magnitude
smaller than the communication overhead, this is a consequence of using IRC logs as the data set;
the size of the payloads could be increased without bound without increasing the communication
costs for the commits, signatures, or AEAD tags. In order to secure a conversation like the
#ubuntu-se channel using Safehouse, the server would be required to store the public state,
transmit almost all of the daily commits to all of the members in the session (it would not need
to transmit a commit to the member that performed the operations), and it would need to spend
hundreds of milliseconds per day to verify all of the commits. In practice, the bandwidth cost
of distributing the commit data is likely the most significant deployment cost for the server.
These results suggest that the deployment costs to secure an IRC channel like #ubuntu-se with
Safehouse are reasonable.
The Trivial KC scheme generally performed the best for the #ubuntu-se data set when using
BRAKEMDDL★ . This is potentially surprising: the Star scheme might be expected to outperform
the Trivial scheme due to the presence of the root key making MLS.CompleteOperation (see
Section 10.10.1.1) more efficient. The Trivial scheme outperformed the Star scheme when using
BRAKEMDDL★ because as shown in the performance models (see Table 10.3), the per-ring cost for
BRAKEMDDL★ is much larger than the per-recipient cost. Consequently, a BRAKEMDDL★ transfer to
approximately 64 recipients in one ring is more efficient to verify than a BRAKEMDDL★ transfer
to two rings with one recipient in each. Consider the BRAKEM transfers that occur within the
two schemes when performing KC.MergeJoin (see Section 10.11.1.5 for the Trivial scheme and
Section 10.11.2.5 for the Star scheme) within MLS.MassJoin (see Section 10.10.4) to merge 𝑚
new members into an existing session with 𝑛 members:
• Trivial: The 𝑚 new personal keys are simply added to the key graph. A BRAKEM transfer
occurs with 𝑛 + 𝑚 − 1 recipients in a ring in order to establish a new group key.
• Star: A BRAKEM transfer occurs with two recipients in a ring in order to combine the merging
root key with the existing root key, and one recipient (the new root key) in a ring in order to
establish a new group key.
Although the rings in the Star scheme are of constant size, the approach used by the Trivial
scheme outperforms it when 𝑛+𝑚−1 < 64. Since the #ubuntu-se data set has an average of 52
members (see Table 10.1), this is usually the case. Additionally, consider the BRAKEM transfers
that occur within the two schemes when performing MLS.MassEvict (see Section 10.10.5) to
evict 𝑚 members from an existing session with 𝑛 > 𝑚 members:
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• Trivial: A BRAKEM transfer occurs with 𝑛 −𝑚 recipients in a ring in order to establish a new
group key.
• Star: A BRAKEM transfer occurs with 𝑛 − 𝑚 recipients in a ring in order to replace the root
key, and one recipient (the new root key) in a ring in order to establish a new group key.
The need for the Star scheme to include a second ring in the BRAKEM transfer during a mass
eviction incurs another per-ring BRAKEMDDL★ cost. For sessions with a similar number of join
and evict events, this additional cost roughly doubles the average number of members that must
be in the group in order for Star to outperform the Trivial scheme; the size of the #ubuntu-se
data set is much smaller than this crossover point. Note that the Star scheme outperformed the
Trivial scheme when using BRAKEMZK. This can be explained by the per-recipient cost to verify
a BRAKEMZK transfer being much closer to the per-ring cost (see Table 10.3). This also explains
why the Shrub and Tree (with bf (𝑑) = 10) schemes improve the estimated computation times
further: these schemes generally result in BRAKEM transfers with more rings containing fewer
recipients in each. However, these more complex schemes also result in much more commit data
for this small data set when using BRAKEMDDL★ , because each additional BRAKEM ring requires
more large 𝔾1 elements to be transmitted (see Section 8.2.8). In summary, for small groups like
#ubuntu-se, the Trivial scheme is a good choice when using BRAKEMDDL★ , and the Star, Shrub,
or Tree schemes are a good choice when using BRAKEMZK (depending on if the developer prefers
to minimize communication or computation costs).
It is important to note that the Trivial KC scheme comes with two main disadvantages
compared to the Star scheme that were not measured in the experiment:
1. In KC.PrepareJoin (see Section 10.11.1.5), each joining member generates its own blinding
key pair. Over time, this leads to much faster growth of the unblinding ciphertext table.
The costs of aggregating the blinding public keys are deferred until the members execute
MLS.Authenticate (see Section 10.10.10). This disadvantage only applies when the session is
configured to use long-term authentication. Since the experiment configured the sessions for
ephemeral authentication, this cost was not measured.
2. The group cannot be set into anonymous invitation mode, and it is not possible to sign
payloads using an “anonymous key” known to all group members. Section 10.10.3 discussed
this limitation.
In order to overcome these disadvantages, a developer might choose to use the Star scheme
instead of the Trivial scheme for a group of this size when using BRAKEMDDL★ even though the
experimental results suggest that the Star scheme performs slightly worse.
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10.13.4.2 Medium Group: #ubuntu-cn
Table 10.5 presents the results of the experiment for the #ubuntu-cn data set, representing a
“medium” group. The results suggest that securing an IRC channel like #ubuntu-cn requires
a few MiB of communication per day, under 100KiB of storage, and just over a second of
computation per day. The communication cost to download all of the commits for a day is slightly
larger than the cost to visit an average web page with a mobile device [An17]. Performing a few
seconds of computation per day is a very minor cost for modern devices and is unlikely to impact
the user experience. These costs are completely reasonable for a secure group messaging tool
running on a consumer desktop processor.
It is important to note that the BRAKEM performance models in Section 10.13.2 were derived
from measurements on a consumer desktop machine using the x86-64 architecture, rather than
on a slower ARM processor like the ones typically found in smartphones. Nonetheless, even
if a Safehouse implementation for ARM was an order of magnitude slower than the estimates
in Table 10.5, securing a group like the #ubuntu-cn data set with Safehouse would still only
require tens of seconds per day of computation. With an appropriate user interface, this could
deliver a reasonable experience for interacting with a group of this size (roughly 127 members).
The Trivial and Star KC schemes perform similarly for the #ubuntu-cn data set. As discussed
in the context of the #ubuntu-se data set, these two schemes behave slightly differently when
performing mass join and mass evict operations. The Star scheme uses small rings of constant
size for the BRAKEM transfers during mass join operations, which generally reduces the daily
communication due to smaller MLS.MassJoin commits. The average size of the #ubuntu-cn
group (roughly 127 members), the balance between joins and evictions (see Table 10.1), and
the ratio between the per-ring and per-recipient BRAKEMDDL★ costs (see Table 10.3), all come
together to cause the Trivial and Star schemes to have nearly identical computational costs
when using BRAKEMDDL★ . An average of 127 members is approximately the crossover point: the
Trivial scheme gains an advantage in smaller groups, and the Star scheme gains an advantage in
larger groups. As with the #ubuntu-se data set, the #ubuntu-cn data set does not have enough
members for the more complex KC schemes to be helpful. The Shrub and Tree schemes both
add extra layers in the key graph that induce additional rings in the BRAKEM transfers, and
the per-ring costs outweigh the benefits of having fewer recipients in the rings. However, the
performance models suggest that the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 would achieve the lowest
computation time requirements when using BRAKEMZK, which benefits from using more rings
with fewer recipients. In summary, for medium groups like #ubuntu-cn, the Trivial and Star
schemes are good choices when using BRAKEMDDL★ , and the Shrub and Tree schemes are good
choices when using BRAKEMZK.
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Table 10.5 Performance evaluation of Safehouse for a medium group. This table shows the
experimental results for emulating the #ubuntu-cn data set. When using BRAKEMDDL★ , the Trivial and
Star schemes generally performed the best for this data set; both exhibited comparable performance
according to all measurements. When using BRAKEMZK, the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 provided
the best performance in terms of BRAKEM decapsulation and verification times.
(Refs: 469 a b and 472)
Shrub Tree Tree
Trivial Star 𝑛𝑆 = 5 bf (𝑑) = 10 bf (𝑑) = 64
Daily update data:
Commits [MiB] 3.2 (1.3) 2.68 (0.92) 2.78 (0.73) 2.72 (0.78) 2.56 (0.79)
PrepareJoin messages [KiB] 11.1 (3.6) 14.5 (5.9) 23.2 (8.4) 26 (11) 22.5 (8.4)
Daily payloads (common):
Plaintext (goodput) [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 (30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Signatures [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 (48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AEAD tags [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 (12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Storage (per-second average):
Public state [KiB] 64 (11) 65 (11) 80 (12) 77 (18) 84 (15)
Daily computation:
Perform probability / member 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.27
BRAKEMDDL★ total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.043 (0.014) 0.030 (0.019) 0.023 (0.009) 0.021 (0.008) 0.024 (0.010)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 1.41 (0.43) 1.43 (0.39) 1.68 (0.42) 1.70 (0.46) 1.52 (0.44)
Verify (for server) [s] 1.33 (0.40) 1.32 (0.36) 1.54 (0.38) 1.55 (0.41) 1.39 (0.40)
BRAKEMZK total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.42 (0.14) 0.53 (0.15) 0.67 (0.23) 0.68 (0.24) 0.61 (0.20)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 1.41 (0.63) 0.83 (0.36) 0.50 (0.15) 0.42 (0.12) 0.56 (0.16)
Verify (for server) [s] 1.42 (0.64) 0.83 (0.36) 0.48 (0.15) 0.40 (0.11) 0.55 (0.16)
The measurements are means with standard deviations in parentheses. The table structure and semantics are the
same as in Table 10.4, except that the mean daily commit size is reported in MiB instead of KiB.
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10.13.4.3 Large Group: #ubuntu
Table 10.6 presents the results of the experiment for the #ubuntu data set, representing a “large”
group. The results suggest that securing an IRC channel like #ubuntu using the most efficient KC
scheme (the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 64) requires tens of MiB of communication per day, under
a MiB of storage, and tens of seconds of computation per day. These costs may or may not be
reasonable, depending on the intended application. The BRAKEM shapes induced by all of the KC
schemes are determined almost entirely by the group size (and partly by the structural gaps left
by evicted members), so the daily computation costs are spread across all operations; the daily
computation averages do not hide any extremely expensive individual operations. The session in
this data set contains an average of 1 386 members (see Section 10.13.1), which is consistent
with a large technical support channel or a departmental channel for a large organization.
As mentioned in Section 10.13.1, the #ubuntu data set represents a particularly challenging
scenario for a group of this size, because users join and leave the group at a relatively rapid pace:
approximately 500 users join and 500 users leave every day according to Table 10.1, which is over
1/3 of the average group size. When using MLS.Cleanup, the communication and computation
costs to use Safehouse are primarily based on the quantity of membership changes (triggering
mass join and mass evict events) rather than group size. Consequently, applications with more
stable group membership (such as corporate communication channels) would experience lower
costs. In any case, the most concerning cost shown in Table 10.6 is likely to be the daily commit
size (a mean of 31MiB for the best KC scheme), since the server must transmit this data to all
members in the group. On average, this would amount to a mean of 43GiB of traffic per day
being uploaded by the server for a group of this size (with each client downloading 31MiB).3⁷
For comparison, this upload cost is equivalent to a single upload of approximately 8 hours of high
definition video.3⁸ This bandwidth cost could be reduced by using multicast networking or by
switching to BRAKEMZK instead of BRAKEMDDL★ .
For large groups like the #ubuntu data set, the Tree KC scheme clearly outperforms the others
for both BRAKEMDDL★ and BRAKEMZK. This is an intuitive result, because the Trivial, Star, and
Shrub schemes all routinely require a BRAKEM transfer with a number of recipients that scales
linearly with the group size. For a session with 𝑛 existing members:
• The Trivial scheme requires a BRAKEM transfer to all 𝑛 personal keys (and the personal keys
for the joining members) during a mass join, and to almost 𝑛 personal keys (excluding those
belonging to evicted members) during a mass evict.
37 ⋏ In practice, the communication sizes would be slightly smaller because the server does not need to echo a
commit back to the member that performed it.
38 ⋏At the time of this writing, the YouTube video service recommended a video bitrate of 12Mbps for 1080p60
videos encoded with the H.264 codec in the BT.709 color space.
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Table 10.6 Performance evaluation of Safehouse for a large group. This table shows the
experimental results for emulating the #ubuntu data set. The Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 64 and
BRAKEMDDL★ significantly outperformed the other configurations for this data set in terms of commit
size (the primary communication cost) and computation time. The Trivial, Star, and Shrub schemes
all result in BRAKEM transfers that scale linearly with the group size, whereas the Tree scheme scales
logarithmically (as the key graph grows deeper to accommodate all of the 𝑢-nodes). A branching
factor of 10 instead of 64 slightly improved the computation time when using BRAKEMZK because
the per-recipient cost is much closer to the per-ring cost than it is for BRAKEMDDL★ . (Refs: 471 a b)
Shrub Tree Tree
Trivial Star 𝑛𝑆 = 5 bf (𝑑) = 10 bf (𝑑) = 64
Daily update data:
Commits [MiB] 204 (6) 111 (5) 49 (2) 41 (2) 31 (1)
PrepareJoin messages [KiB] 210 (10) 460 (30) 630 (40) 710 (40) 540 (30)
Daily payloads (common):
Plaintext (goodput) [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 675 (56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Signatures [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689 (56) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AEAD tags [KiB] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 (14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Storage (per-second average):
Public state [KiB] 545 (8) 546 (8) 657 (8) 660 (20) 570 (20)
Daily computation:
Perform probability / member 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005
BRAKEMDDL★ total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.37 (0.09) 0.2 (0.2) 0.06 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 40 (1) 27.0 (0.9) 20.0 (0.8) 21 (1) 16.0 (0.5)
Verify (for server) [s] 38 (1) 24.7 (0.8) 18.0 (0.8) 18.4 (0.9) 15.0 (0.5)
BRAKEMZK total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 1.1 (0.3) 0.9 (0.4) 0.9 (0.4) 1.1 (0.5) 0.7 (0.3)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 111 (3) 57 (2) 14.9 (0.5) 6.2 (0.3) 7.3 (0.3)
Verify (for server) [s] 112 (3) 57 (2) 14.8 (0.5) 5.9 (0.3) 7.2 (0.3)
The measurements are means with standard deviations in parentheses. The table structure and semantics are the
same as in Table 10.5. Note that the mean daily commit size is reported in MiB instead of KiB. The data for the
Trivial, Star, and Shrub schemes was collected over one week of emulated time. The data for the two Tree scheme
configurations was collected over one month of emulated time.
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• The Star scheme requires a BRAKEM transfer to almost 𝑛 personal keys during a mass evict.
• The Shrub scheme requires a BRAKEM transfer to approximately 𝑛/𝑛𝑆 set keys during a mass
evict.
In contrast, the Tree scheme with a constant maximum branching factor bf (𝑑) = 𝑐 usually
requires a BRAKEM transfer with approximately log𝑐 (𝑛) rings (with at most 𝑐 recipients in each)
during a mass join or mass evict event, increasing with the number of joining or evicted members
(which increases the number of paths in the grafting core). This allows the Tree scheme to
scale much more efficiently for large groups. The best choice of branching factor is based on the
per-ring and per-recipient costs for the BRAKEM construction: bf (𝑑) = 10 performed better for
BRAKEMZK, and bf (𝑑) = 64 performed better for BRAKEMDDL★ . In any case, the Tree scheme is
the best of the suggested KC schemes for large groups.
10.13.4.4 Post-Compromise Security
Table 10.7 presents the experimental results for using MLS.PCSRatchet (see Section 10.10.7)
instead of MLS.Cleanup (see Section 10.10.8) in the emulated #ubuntu-se session with the Tree
KC scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10.3⁹ The fundamental difference between these operations is that
MLS.Cleanup replaces the minimum number of keys required to eliminate superfluous edges,
whereas MLS.PCSRatchet replaces all keys known to the performer. In this sense, MLS.Cleanup
performs a subset of the work performed by MLS.PCSRatchet. This means that the choice has
no effect on the average size of the public state (since the only structural change caused by
both operations is the elimination of the same superfluous edges) or on the amount of data
exchanged during KC.PrepareJoin executions (since both operations are only performed by
existing members). Additionally, using MLS.PCSRatchet instead of MLS.Cleanup causes members
to perform commits on a greater proportion of days, as shown in Table 10.7: MLS.Cleanup
does not produce a commit on days in which the member cannot eliminate any superfluous
edges, whereas MLS.PCSRatchet proceeds regardless. When an existing member performs an
39 ⋏The Tree KC scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 was chosen for the experiment because it produces more work for
MLS.PCSRatchet than the Trivial or Star schemes: the Tree scheme places 𝑢-nodes further away from the root
node and therefore causes MLS.PCSRatchet to replace more keys. This effect is enhanced for smaller maximum
branching factors, so the Tree KC scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 produces more work for MLS.PCSRatchet than with
bf (𝑑) = 64. The Shrub scheme requires slightly more work in this scenario because every 𝑢-node’s keyset always
includes three entries (the personal key, the set key, and the root key), whereas the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10
for a session with 52 members adds log10 (52) ≈ 1.7 layers of intermediate 𝑘-notes; most 𝑢-nodes’ keysets would
include three entries when using the chosen Tree scheme, but some would include only two. The Tree scheme
was selected instead of the Shrub scheme because it is more likely to be used in practice.
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Table 10.7 Post-compromise security overhead for a small Safehouse group. This table
compares the experimental results for emulating the #ubuntu-se data set when using MLS.Cleanup
versus when using MLS.PCSRatchet. The Tree KC scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10 is used in both cases.
Enabling post-compromise security does not affect the communication costs of KC.PrepareJoin or
the average size of the public state, but it generates more commits and correspondingly requires
additional computation time. In general, the costs for the two configurations are comparable for this
data set. (Refs: 473 a b and 475)
Tree Tree
bf (𝑑) = 10 bf (𝑑) = 10
MLS.Cleanup MLS.PCSRatchet
Daily update data:
Commits [KiB] 730 (270) 920 (320)
PrepareJoin messages [KiB] 5.6 (2.8) 5.6 (2.8)
Storage (per-second average):
Public state [KiB] 40.4 (4.4) 40.4 (4.4)
Daily computation:
Perform probability / member 0.22 0.25
BRAKEMDDL★ total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.019 (0.006) 0.022 (0.010)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 0.46 (0.17) 0.56 (0.19)
Verify (for server) [s] 0.42 (0.16) 0.51 (0.18)
BRAKEMZK total time / day:
Encapsulate / performer [s] 0.63 (0.20) 0.70 (0.32)
Max Decapsulate / member [s] 0.107 (0.040) 0.137 (0.049)
Verify (for server) [s] 0.101 (0.038) 0.130 (0.046)
The measurements are means with standard deviations in parentheses. The table structure and semantics are the
same as in Table 10.4. The results for the configuration using MLS.Cleanup are identical to the corresponding
column in Table 10.4.
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MLS.PCSRatchet operation, they are effectively performing a simplified KC.MergeJoin operation
in which they are the only joining member. Based on the steady-state behavior suggested in
Section 10.12, the cost of enabling MLS.PCSRatchet is less than the cost of having all existing
members rejoin the group once for every forward secrecy period. In the case of the #ubuntu-se
data set with a forward secrecy period of one week (the setting for the session emulator), this
would be equivalent to having 52/7 ≈ 7.4 additional joining members per day, which is more
than the actual rate (see Table 10.1). However, this is an upper bound: in practice, members
that join and leave the session faster than a single forward secrecy period will not execute
MLS.PCSRatchet. This type of short-lived participation is typical for the #ubuntu-se data set,
because users often leave the channel immediately after receiving an answer to their Ubuntu
technical support question. Consequently, the results shown in Table 10.7 indicate that the cost
of post-compromise security is relatively low: hundreds of KiB of additional commit data per day,
and approximately a hundred milliseconds (in the case of BRAKEMDDL★ ) or tens of milliseconds
(in the case of BRAKEMZK) of additional computation per day. The additional costs compared to
MLS.Cleanup would increase linearly with the number of existing group members that remain in
the group for longer than the forward secrecy period. A broader evaluation of the cost of using
MLS.PCSRatchet is left to future work.
10.13.5 Summary of Findings
The findings discussed in Section 10.13.4 can be summarized as follows:
• When implementing Safehouse with BRAKEMDDL★ :
◦ For groups with fewer than 128 members, use the Trivial scheme if anonymous invitations
are not enabled and the AuthAny function is never used. Use the Star scheme if these
functions are needed.
◦ For larger groups, use the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 64.
• When implementing Safehouse with BRAKEMZK:
◦ For groups with fewer than 128 members:
■ If computation time is the primary concern, then use the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10.
■ If communication size is the primary concern, then use the Trivial scheme if anonymous
invitations are not enabled and the AuthAny function is never used. Use the Star
scheme if these functions are needed.
◦ For larger groups, use the Tree scheme with bf (𝑑) = 10.
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• Enabling MLS.PCSRatchet adds additional communication and computation costs that scale
linearly with the average number of members in the session. Use MLS.PCSRatchet if the
security benefits of post-compromise security justify this additional cost for the intended
application.
10.14 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced Safehouse, a protocol that can be used to implement modern secure group
messaging protocols and tools. Safehouse solves the central difficult cryptographic problems in
the conversation security design layer (as defined in Section 2.6.2), allowing a developer to focus
on creating secure group messaging tools for a particular application. Safehouse provides strong
security properties and can be configured to achieve the security objectives of a wide range
of deployment scenarios, as described in Chapter 7. Safehouse operates with a semi-trusted
central server that forwards commit messages produced by members. These messages alter the
state of the group in order to achieve the desired functionality (e.g., non-interactivity, dynamic
membership, and secure property storage) and security properties (e.g., forward secrecy, post-
compromise security, insider security, and strong deniability). The server is trusted to store an
authoritative copy of the group state and to store and forward commits between group members.
If the server misbehaves, the worst attack that it can perform is a denial-of-service attack that
“forks” the group, partitioning its members into separate groups that can no longer communicate.
This chapter introduced the specific algorithms needed to implement Safehouse, including a
variety of NIZKPKs, and how these algorithms should be used. The chapter also presented the
results of a performance evaluation in which Safehouse was used to secure partially synthetic
IRC transcripts, providing insight into the expected costs for using the protocol.
While this chapter described Safehouse as an abstract protocol (as defined in Section 2.2), it
is helpful to consider how Safehouse can be deployed in a concrete scenario. The next chapter
describes a complete implementation of Safehouse that was prepared as part of this work, as well
as a prototype implementation of a graphical secure group messaging tool that uses Safehouse




An Example of a Safehouse
Deployment
In this chapter: Implementation Discussion
W
hen designing an abstract cryptographic protocol intended for real-world use, develop-
ing a prototype implementation of the protocol provides several benefits. Section 8.3
discussed several of these benefits in the context of implementing BRAKEMDDL★ . In
particular, beyond merely demonstrating the practicality of a protocol, an implementation may
uncover weaknesses or errors in the design that necessitate iteration. For example, the benefit of
introducing burner keys in the BRAKEMDDL★ construction in order to enable fixed-base exponenti-
ation in Π0 is an important optimization that is difficult to foresee when designing an abstract
protocol. This chapter describes a prototype implementation of the Safehouse protocol and a
complete group secure messaging tool developed using the protocol implementation. All of the
code described in this chapter was written in the Go programming language. The prototype
implementation will be made available at safehouse.im. Section 11.1 describes a high-level
prototype library that allows developers to use Safehouse in most settings without concerning
themselves with the details in Chapter 10, Section 11.2 describes a specific group secure mes-
saging tool created using the aforementioned library, and Section 11.3 discusses how Safehouse
could be used to develop tools for other scenarios.
11.1 A High-Level Safehouse Library
Chapter 10 described the Safehouse protocol at a low level of abstraction. A Safehouse library
must implement the interface functions described in Section 10.9 and the MLS-layer operations
described in Section 10.10. Using these functions and operations, a developer can implement a
secure groupmessaging tool for any of the target scenarios introduced in Chapter 7, among others.
The prototype implementation that was produced as part of this work includes implementations
of all of these functions and operations using BRAKEMDDL★ with all of the optimizations discussed
in Section 8.3.
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However, in most deployment scenarios, simplifying assumptions can be made that allow
many of the details of the Safehouse protocol to be abstracted away, simplifying the experience
for the developer. The prototype implementation exposes a high-level library that makes some of
these simplifying assumptions about the intended use. The library is carefully designed to make
it difficult to misuse the Safehouse protocol in an insecure manner.
The high-level library provides a Client struct1 and a Server struct that represent agents in
a Safehouse session. Each session controlled by the high-level library is orchestrated by a single
Server struct. In other words, the library makes the simplifying assumption that the “server”
agent for a session is truly a process running on a single machine. Secure group messaging
protocols that require a federation of machines to act as the logical “server” must use the low-
level Safehouse interface described in Chapter 10.
The high-level library does not impose a total ordering on payloads. In other words, the
library does not produce a global transcript unless this is desirable. The developer can use the
high-level Safehouse library to implement a looser notion of causality preservation, such as the
notions used by the schemes discussed in Section 2.8.2.
The high-level library makes some assumptions about the configuration of the Safehouse ses-
sion. The library always enables post-compromise security using the MLS.PCSRatchet operation
(see Sections 10.10.7 and 10.12). By default, it sets the forward secrecy period to two weeks;
members are automatically evicted and delete their local state if they are disconnected from the
server for two weeks or longer. The developer can configure a different forward secrecy period
using the library.
The high-level library provides functions to create and receive payload messages. Payloads
are always encrypted using the XChaCha20-Poly1305 [Arc18] AEAD with a key derived from
the group key SS.𝐾 and the sender’s agent ID. This key is produced by the SharedKey function
described in Section 10.9.1 with the sender’s agent ID unambiguously provided as part of the
domain separation string. Each member selects AEAD nonces for its outgoing payloads sequen-
tially.2 The nonce sequence is reset when a new group key (and therefore a new key for the AEAD)
is established. Payloads are also signed using the sender’s personal key, personal(𝑈perf), and the
server verifies the signatures before relaying the payloads to other members. For performance
reasons, the developer can configure the library so that the server refrains from verifying the
signatures. The library also allows a “public tag” to be attached to payloads. The public tag is an
1 ⋏A “struct” in Go is similar to a “class” in object-oriented languages: a Go struct is a collection of named data
fields, and functions can also be attached to structs.
2 ⋏This approach is safe for the chosen AEAD, and it ensures that the nonces can be highly compressed when
attached to the ciphertexts. Although different members may use the same nonces, this is acceptable because
each member uses a unique AEAD key derived from the group key. Individual members never reuse nonces with
the same key.
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opaque binary blob that is authenticated but sent as plaintext—it is authenticated by providing it
to the AEAD as “associated data”. The state hash PS.𝐻 is also always included in the “associated
data”, even for payloads with no public tag. This ensures that messages can only be transmitted
between members sharing the same public state, as recommended in Section 10.1.1.
All cryptographic hashes in the prototype are implemented using cSHAKE128 [KCP16].
cSHAKE128 is an XOF derived from the SHA-3 sponge construction. Importantly, it provides a
standardized domain separation mechanism that ensures that hashes for different contexts do not
collide, even for the same preimages. Moreover, as an XOF, cSHAKE128 provides an arbitrarily
long output value. This is convenient for implementing rejection sampling when generating
uniformly random integers in a given range, which is a common requirement in Safehouse. The
implementation of the SharedKey function (see Section 10.9.1) uses cSHAKE128 to derive keys
from the group key. The SharedKey implementation unambiguously provides both the developer’s
domain separation string Φ and a constant string specific to the Safehouse implementation as
inputs to cSHAKE128’s domain separation mechanism. The SharedKey implementation also
includes a unique encoding of the group key, SS.𝐾, and the requested key length, ℓ as the
cSHAKE128 preimage. This ensures that the cSHAKE128 output is not a prefix of outputs for
longer key lengths.
By default, the high-level library limits group sizes to 2,000members, payload sizes to
1,200 bytes, and public tags to 50 bytes. These limits can be reconfigured by the developer. The
default group policy (see Section 10.1.6) permits payload transmissions, mass join operations,
mass evict operations, invitation issuances and retractions, and modifications of the confidential
label-value store by all members. The developer can also provide an implementation of a different
group policy.
When a session is created using the high-level library, the client specifies the deniability and
authentication ephemerality modes (see Section 10.1.6). If the developer wishes to limit the
protocol to specific modes, a custom function can be provided that is executed by the server to
verify the initial public state for the session. The library automatically stores the deniability and
authentication ephemerality configuration in the developer mode of the group state, PS.𝑀. If
the developer provides an opaque mode string, it is transparently appended to these internal
options. The developer can specify whether invitations should be anonymously issued or not (see
Section 10.1.6) as part of the library configuration.
The high-level library begins communications with an internal protocol version number. This
allows for future expansion. Unlike the cipher negotiation mechanism historically used by TLS,
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the cryptographic primitives used by the library are implicitly defined by the protocol version.
The library always implements Safehouse using BRAKEMDDL★ .3
The aforementioned configuration options are hashed to produce an options fingerprint. When
a client creates a new session or joins an existing session, it first compares options fingerprints
with the server to ensure that both endpoints agree on the configuration of the high-level library.
This is a convenient “fast fail” mechanism and not a security requirement—if this check were
omitted, then the client would eventually reject commits or payloads that are allowed by the
server’s configuration, but not by the client’s configuration. This would eventually lead to the
client being evicted from the group due to diverging from the server’s public state and being
unable to perform MLS.PCSRatchet commits.
11.1.1 Server Design
To set up a server with the high-level library, the developer first initializes a Server struct in
the program. The developer is responsible for accepting network connections (represented as
net.Conn interfaces from the Go standard library) from members. The developer then calls the
Handle function on the Server struct with the connection. The library takes complete control
of the connection. By default, the library checks to ensure that network connections to the
server were established using TLS (but without requiring client authentication, which would
undermine the deniability properties of the scheme). When calling Handle, the developer can
specify configuration options: the expected agent ID of the connecting client, a function that
validates the public state of a newly created session, a message router to use, a storage system to
use, and whether to allow non-TLS connections to the server. The message router and storage
system mechanisms are discussed later in this section.
The Server struct provided by the library exposes aspects of the public state to the developer.
The following values are exposed:
• The labels and values stored in the public label-value store, PS.𝐴.
• The labels (but not the values) stored in the confidential label-value store, PS.𝐸.
• The agent IDs of the members in the session, which are bound to 𝑢-nodes in the key graph,
PS.𝐺.
3 ⋏The prototype includes an incomplete implementation of BRAKEMZK that is developed enough to produce the
performance evaluation in Section 8.6, but not enough to implement the whole Safehouse protocol. Completing
the BRAKEMZK implementation in the prototype is left as future work.
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• The identifiers, types, expiry dates, and remaining uses of layaways in the layaway table,
PS.𝐿.
• The deniability mode, authentication ephemerality mode, and developer mode, all stored in
PS.𝑀.
The other values stored in the public state, as discussed in Section 10.1.2, are low-level details
that are irrelevant in most applications. In order to prevent the possibility of misuse, the high-level
library does not expose these other values to the developer.
Once a connection is given to the Server struct for handling, an initial protocol handshake
takes place. The client specifies whether it is creating a new session, joining a session, or
reconnecting as an existing member. The server rejects the connection in invalid situations (e.g.,
if a client asks to create a new session but the server’s group state is already non-empty).
The developer may optionally supply a message router when instantiating the server. The
message router is responsible for scheduling the delivery of payloads and commits, as well as
replaying old payloads and commits when a client reconnects to the server. Newly received
payloads and commits are provided to the message router for delivery scheduling. This powerful
abstraction allows the developer to implement an arbitrary concurrency policy that yields the
desired causality preservation property. In order to support the store-and-forward functionality
of the message router, the high-level library assigns monotonically increasing numbers to group
states in the session. Numbers are also assigned to payloads, but this assignment is controlled
by the message router. The message router is responsible for assigning a number to payloads
when they are routed. When clients reconnect to the server, they provide the numbers of the
most recently received group states and payloads; this allows the message router to schedule
delivery of stored commits and payloads that were processed since that time. Message router
implementations must be able to replay the linear sequence of commits (at least within the forward
secrecy window), but payloads do not necessarily need to be replayable—for high-throughput
real-time applications like multimedia transmission, the developer might supply a message router
that does not store payloads. The message router can also selectively deliver messages to a subset
of members (e.g., based on the public tag attached to the payload) if desired.
The developer may also supply a storage system when instantiating the server. The storage
system is responsible for storing the server’s current group state, PS, which is treated as an opaque
blob of data. By default, the high-level library does not store the server’s state; developers can
trivially provide custom implementations that store the data in a filesystem or database.
The server implementation in the prototype high-level library makes extensive use of concur-
rency and synchronization mechanisms. Alternative implementations of the Safehouse protocol
will likely need to use similar locking techniques. The server’s group state is protected by a
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read/write lock. The semantics of this lock, defined by the Go standard library, are that ac-
quisition of the read lock blocks while an acquisition of the write lock is pending. There are
two queues for requests to acquire the write lock: a high-priority queue for members wishing
to perform ordinary commits, and a low-priority queue for new members that wish to join the
session. Commits from existing members are always serviced before mass join operations; this
prevents a denial-of-service attack in which outsiders continuously request to join the group, and
also ensures that the mass join mechanism is used more efficiently.
Members attach the public state number when sending a payload. When a payload is received
from a member, the read lock is acquired. If the server notices that a payload was sent for an old
public state, it sends a rejection notification to the client and discards the payload. Otherwise,
the payload is provided to the message router for delivery scheduling. Once the message router
schedules the payload for delivery, the server sends an acknowledgment to the client.
When a member requests to perform a commit, the server adds the request to the back of
the high-priority queue. When the server removes a request from the high-priority queue, it
informs the associated client that it may perform its commit. The client must then transmit the
commit within a configurable time limit. Upon receipt, the server acquires the write lock for
the group state, applies the commit, stores the updated group state, increments the group state
number, and then provides the new group state to the message router for delivery. The server
then releases the write lock and moves on to the next request, if one is pending.
It is important to note that this locking design allows the server to continue to successfully
route payloads at almost all times. Payloads, commits, and handshakes are generally handled
concurrently. In particular, payloads can continue to be delivered while a member is authorized to
perform a commit, but before the commit is received. This is an important feature because some
devices may require a noticeable amount of time to perform a commit, especially for low-power
devices in sessions with many members. The only time in which payloads are rejected is when
the server is in the process of applying a commit, because the payloads will be encrypted using
keys derived from an outdated group key.
The high-level library provides a default implementation of amessage router that is suitable for
most secure group messaging applications. This default message router induces a total ordering
of payloads, thereby providing a global transcript. Payloads are assigned monotonically increasing
numbers. The commits and payloads are stored in a configurable storage location in sequential
order. Old commits and payloads are retrieved from storage in order to replay transmissions for
reconnecting clients. The message router has a configurable maximum backpressure that specifies
how many commits and payloads may be pending for delivery to a client. If the maximum
backpressure is exceeded, the message router instructs the server to drop the client connection.
This protects the server against denial-of-service attacks in which a client stops processing
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transmissions. By default, the high-level library stores commits and payloads for the default
message router in memory; the developer can provide a custom implementation to store the data
in a non-volatile location, such as a database.
A joining manager routine concurrently accepts requests from new members to join the
session, alongside the invitation identifiers that the joining members intend to use when joining.
The joining members also provide a domain-separated cryptographic hash of the invitation public
key in order to ensure that the invitation identifier refers to the expected invitation key pair
(see Section 10.10.3 for a discussion of identifier reuse). When at least one new member is
waiting to join, the joining manager submits a request to perform a commit. This request is
added to the low-priority queue. When the server has processed all commit requests in the
high-priority queue, it grants permission for the joining manager to produce a commit. The
server can be configured so that the joining manager delays starting the mass join procedure
for a minimum amount of time (one second by default) in order to aggregate sudden bursts of
join requests. When the joining manager is granted permission to perform a commit, it sends
the public state to each of the joining members. For each joining member, the public state is
encrypted to the invitation public key corresponding to the invitation identifier for that member;
this implicitly prevents the contents of the public state from being leaked. The joining manager
selects a representative for the joining members at random, then distributes the set of agent IDs
and the representative’s agent ID. The joining members then perform the KC.PrepareJoin protocol
introduced in Section 10.6. During the KC.PrepareJoin procedure, the server routes transmissions
between the joining members by receiving messages and recipient lists over the corresponding
net.Conn interfaces; for most KC schemes, these are transmissions for the authenticated TKLL
protocol. Finally, the joining manager receives a commit with the MLS.MassJoin operation (see
Section 10.10.4) from the representative and verifies that the commit adds the expected joining
members to the session. The server then acquires the write lock for the group states, applies
the commit, and distributes the commit as with operations performed by existing members. The
server can then resume its processing of commit requests.
11.1.2 Client Design
Group members can be implemented using the high-level library by creating a Client struct.
When creating the Client, the developer provides an established net.Conn connection to the
server (typically an established TLS tunnel) along with connection options. Among these options,
the developer must specify whether to initialize a new session, join an existing session honestly,
join an existing session by forging authentication (for deniability purposes), or reconnect to a
session. Reconnecting to a session requires access to previously stored state. Joining an existing
session requires the appropriate private keys, as discussed in Section 10.8: to join honestly, the
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developer must provide the user’s identity private key (if long-term authentication is enabled for
the session) and the invitation private key; to join using the deniability mechanism when the
session is not in “non-repudiable” mode, the developer must provide either the personal private
key or the identity private key of every member in the session.⁴ The library provides functions to
generate a new identity key pair, which is exposed as an opaque binary blob.
Once created, the developer can interact with the Client struct in four ways:
1. The next event that occurs in the session can be read.
2. When no event is being read, an abstraction of the group state can be inspected.
3. A payload can be sent to the group.
4. The group state can be modified.
The developer is expected to concurrently read the next event from the Client at all times,
except when it is deemed necessary to inspect the group state. The events are descriptions of
payloads that have been received or operations that have been performed; this is the mechanism
that allows the secure group messaging tool to react to communication. All events include the
server time that the payload or commit was first handled and the sender’s agent ID (except for
anonymous issuances of invitations). A special event indicates the completion of the historical
event replay upon reconnection.
The developer can inspect an abstraction of the group state stored in the Client. This
abstraction includes all of the information from the public state that is also made available to the
Server, as discussed in Section 11.1.1. In addition, the state exposed by the Client also includes
(decrypted) values in the confidential label-value store, (unblinded) identity public keys for the
members, and whether or not members have authenticated their identities (see Section 10.8).
The library provides access to the SharedKey function (see Section 10.9.1) so that the devel-
oper can derive shared keys for use in the application. However, a constant string is prepended
to the domain separation strings provided by the developer in order to prevent applications
from deriving the same key that is used by the high-level library to encrypt payloads. This is a
precautionary defense mechanism to prevent misuse of keys.
The high-level library allows payloads, with a given public tag, to be sent either “reliably”
or “unreliably”. When sent reliably, the Client will wait to receive a receipt acknowledgment
4 ⋏ For sessions in the “non-repudiable” mode, it is not possible to join using forged authentication. Sessions in the
“offline deniable” mode require the personal private keys for all members. Sessions in the “strongly deniable”
mode require either the personal private key or identity private key for all members. See Section 10.8 for a
detailed description of the authentication mechanism.
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or rejection from the server before returning. A payload may be rejected if the server applies
a new commit while the payload, encrypted using a key derived from an outdated group key,
is still being transmitted; in these cases, the developer would typically retry the transmission.
When sent unreliably, control immediately returns to the developer’s code. Unreliable payload
transmissions can occur concurrently with other unreliable or reliable transmissions.
MLS-layer operations (see Section 10.10) are not directly exposed to the developer by the
high-level library. Instead, the developer can ask the Client to modify the group. This sends
a request to the server for permission to perform a commit, which adds the member into the
high-priority queue discussed in Section 11.1.1. Once the server informs the Client that it
may perform the commit, control is transferred to a developer-supplied callback function. This
function is given access to the abstraction of group state described previously, with its values in a
stable state immediately prior to the modification. The function is also given access to simplified
abstractions of theMLS-layer operations that can be performed. Instructions to perform operations
are passed along to an underlying MLS-layer performer context. Upon completion of the callback
function, the commit is produced and sent to the server. Control is returned to the developer
upon acknowledgment from the server that the commit has been handled by the message router
(see Section 10.8). This design takes into account the possibility that the group state stored by
the server may change in the time between the developer’s request to modify the group and when
permission to perform an MLS-layer operation is finally granted. The developer is responsible for
inspecting the group state and determining whether the desired modifications are still necessary;
in some cases, commits submitted by other members may render the intended commit redundant.
The Client automatically handles the expected steady-state behavior discussed in Sec-
tion 10.12. The Client automatically authenticates itself to new members that join the session
using MLS.Authenticate (see Section 10.10.10), retracts invitations that have expired using
MLS.RetractInvitation (see Section 10.10.3.3), regularly performs MLS.PCSRatchet operations
(see Section 10.10.7), and evicts other members from the group when they have not performed
a MLS.PCSRatchet operation within the forward secrecy window.
11.2 Example Application: Secure Internet Relay Chat
As part of this work, a complete secure group messaging tool was implemented using the high-
level Safehouse library discussed in Section 11.1. The purpose of this example application is to
demonstrate how a developer might use Safehouse to build a practical tool for one of the target
scenarios described in Chapter 7. Of course, Safehouse is applicable to many scenarios—the
example application merely demonstrates one possible use.
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The example includes a graphical desktop client application and a server program that
approximate the functionality of a modernized IRC chat server. In particular, unlike IRC, the
example application’s user experience supports non-interactivity: users can close and reopen
their client (within the forward secrecy period) and receive all messages that they missed while
offline. The graphical client allows users to log in with a username and password combination,
with support for password changes. This type of authentication is very familiar to users and
is more accessible than explicit management of private keys.⁵ Like IRC, the example supports
multiple independent channels, each with its own list of participants and chat history. The server
stores a list of accounts and which channels each account is participating in.
Each channel in the example is implemented as an instance of a Server struct in the high-
level library (i.e., each channel has its own independent Safehouse session). For simplicity, the
example server does not support federation like IRC; all accounts and channels are operated
by a single server process. From a privacy perspective, the example server is permitted to link
members’ activity across channels, but Safehouse ensures that the server cannot unblind the
long-term identities associated with the members. The server assigns a globally unique agent ID
to each account. The agent ID is reused by the client for each channel in which they are a member.
Like IRC, the example allows channels to have an associated topic, which is a persistent text string
that always appears in the chat display for the channel. This value is stored in the confidential
label-value store. The example application configures the high-level Safehouse library with the
default settings, including the default message router, which produces a global transcript for each
channel. The Safehouse sessions are configured in the “offline deniable” mode with long-term
identification.
The following sections describe the example application in greater detail. Section 11.2.1
describes the design of the server and the communication protocol, Section 11.2.2 describes how
the graphical client encrypts its state, and Section 11.2.3 depicts and describes the user interface.
11.2.1 Server and Protocol Design
The example application is designed to support the classic username and password authentication
model, while also making it easy to change the password. At a high level, these requirements yield
a simple design: the identity key pair for use in the Safehouse protocol is randomly generated,
the identity private key is encrypted using a key derived from the password, and the encrypted
identity private key is stored on the server. This design allows a client with no state other than
the username and password to recover the identity key pair and resume participation in active
5 ⋏ The usability studies surveyed in Section 2.1 routinely found that it is difficult for most users to create accurate
mental models of public-key cryptography.
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Figure 11.1 Client key derivations in the example application. (pk, sk) is the long-term identity
key pair used in the Safehouse sessions; it is generated independently of the password. The server
name, username, and password are used to derive a key pair and two symmetric keys. (apk, ask) is
an Ed25519 key pair used to initially authenticate to the server. sk is encrypted using lsk as a key
and the ciphertext is stored by the server, retrievable after signing a nonce with ask. ssk is used as
the master key for the system that encrypts the state stored by the client device.
(Refs: 487, 489, and 490 a b)
Safehouse sessions, which is necessary for multi-device support. While the prototype does not
yet support multiple devices sharing the same account, the authentication structure is designed
to anticipate this as a future feature; this topic is revisited in Section 11.3.
Figure 11.1 depicts the cryptographic key material involved in implementing the aforemen-
tioned authentication scheme. The client derives a master key, 𝑘, from the user’s password using a
password-based key derivation function: Argon2 [BDK16]. cSHAKE128 [KCP16] is then used as
a KDF to derive the authentication key pair, (apk, ask), the locking key, lsk, and the storage master
key, ssk, from 𝑘. sk is then encrypted using XChaCha20-Poly1305 [Arc18] with lsk as the key.
When registering an account on the server, apk and the encrypted version of sk are stored as part
of the account information. When logging in, the client sends the username, the server responds
with a challenge nonce, and then the client replies with an Ed25519 signature [BDL+12] on the
nonce using the signing key ask. After verifying the signature, the server sends the encrypted
form of sk to the client, which can decrypt it using lsk. The presence of the authentication key
pair ensures that adversaries cannot download an encrypted identity private key in order to
guess the password and recover lsk in an offline brute force attack. It is also important that the
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authentication protocol occurs within a secure channel, because an adversary can perform an
offline brute force attack against the password if it gains access to a valid signature produced
using ask.⁶ As discussed in Section 11.1.1, the high-level library ensures that Safehouse traffic
is contained within a TLS tunnel by default; the example performs the authentication protocol
within a TLS tunnel that is subsequently used for the Safehouse communications. After logging
in, the server sends the client’s agent ID and a list of channels that it has joined. The identity
private key, sk, is generated independently of the password in order to support password changes:
the account data is simply updated with a new authentication key pair and an encryption of sk
using the new locking key.
As discussed in Section 11.1.1, the default message router provided by the high-level library
can store payloads and commits in a configurable location. The example server stores the payloads
and commits in a relational database that is accessed using SQL. This database also stores all
of the accounts and channel data. Each channel is identified by a unique name. The high-level
library is configured with a storage system that stores the state for each Server struct in the
database row for the associated channel. The payloads and commits are stored as rows containing
the sequence number, the data itself, and the server timestamp at the moment that the payload
or commit was handled by the message router.
The connection between the client and the server begins as a TLS tunnel over TCP with server
authentication and OCSP stapling, but without client authentication. The example server is
capable of automatically downloading new OCSP responses to staple and automatically reloading
the TLS certificate. Once the TLS handshake is complete, the yamux connection multiplexer⁷ is
used to facilitate multiple independent “streams” within the same TLS connection. These streams
function similarly to the multiplexing approach used by the HTTP/2 protocol, except that the
example application uses them primarily for labeling and logical organization rather than for
performance.⁸ The initial registration or log-in process occurs over the default stream, called
the control stream. The client can open a new channel stream at any time. In a channel stream,
the client first sends the name of the channel. The server instantiates a Server struct for the
channel if one does not already exist, and then sends the yamux stream to the Server struct for
handling, as discussed in Section 11.1.1. The high-level Safehouse library then handles creating,
joining, or reconnecting to the session.
6 ⋏ The server can always perform offline brute force attacks against the accounts (e.g., by using apk as a verification
oracle), which is a downside of the approach used in this example.
7 ⋏ https://github.com/hashicorp/yamux
8 ⋏ Since the streams produced by yamux are all broken into labeled frames that are transmitted inside the same
TCP connection (inside a TLS tunnel), they are subject to the same head-of-line blocking as HTTP/2: if a packet is
dropped and must be retransmitted, all streams in the connection stall.
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After successfully registering or logging in, the client can request the username associated with
an agent ID by sending a query in the control stream. This allows the client to display usernames
in the channels. The trust establishment mechanism, which is discussed in Section 11.2.3, ensures
that the usernames and identity public keys are bound to the correct entities.
11.2.2 Client State Encryption
The graphical client for the example application stores secret state for the Safehouse sessions in
the local filesystem. This data should be encrypted independently of disk or filesystem encryption
mechanisms that may be present.⁹ For this reason, the example includes a state encryption
subsystem in the client.
At a low level, the client implements a “block device” that stores encrypted data in 4,056-byte
blocks indexed by position. When combined with a 24-byte nonce and 16-byte authentication
tag, this quantity is aligned with the 4KiB block size used by most modern storage devices.
Each “block device” is simply an abstraction layer on top of a simple file; this abstraction is
not a “block device” in the sense used by Linux- or BSD-based operating systems. The first
block in the file contains the 32-byte block device key padded to 4056 bytes and encrypted using
XChaCha20-Poly1305 with ssk (see Figure 11.1) as the key and a random nonce. The nonce
and authentication tag are appended to the 4056 bytes of ciphertext. Each subsequent block is
encrypted using XChaCha20-Poly1305 a block-specific key derived from the block device key and
block position using cSHAKE128 as a KDF. Every time that data in the block device is changed,
a new nonce is generated at random and the corresponding block is entirely re-encrypted; this
does not suffer a performance penalty in practice as long as the blocks are the same size as the
blocks in the underlying device. If the storage master key, ssk, is replaced with a new storage
master key, ssk′, because the user changes the password, then the block device key can simply be
re-encrypted using ssk′; only the first block in the file needs to be updated.
The client stores an index file with a list of stored connection configurations. Each stored
connection contains a server address, a username, the client’s agent ID, the last connection time,
and a channel list. The client can consult the timestamps in the index file and compare the stored
channel list with the channel list received upon reconnection in order to identify channel states
that should be securely erased, either because the client has not reconnected within the forward
9 ⋏Modern operating systems are increasingly introducing security barriers between processes running under the
same account. Encrypting the local state of a secure messaging client is a barrier of this type that can mitigate
some information leakage attacks. Additionally, cryptographically enforcing the presence of the password in
order to decrypt the client state aligns the cryptographic guarantees with the expectations established by the user
interface, which requires a password to connect to a session.
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secrecy period, or because the server has refused to reconnect the client to the channel. The
index file is unencrypted and unauthenticated, because it must be read prior to the input of a
password—the index file is a list of server connections, each of which requires a password. If the
kernel allows a malicious process to edit the index file, there are two potential negative outcomes:
the malicious process could erase the client’s knowledge of a legitimate session (which would
eventually cause the other members to evict the client due to a timeout), or it could configure
a new session (potentially for a connection to a malicious server). However, since the server
hostname is included in the derivation of the master key (see Figure 11.1) and Safehouse is
designed to tolerate malicious servers, causing a user to connect to a malicious server does not
undermine any of the security properties.1⁰
The client creates two encrypted block devices for each channel in each server: a chat log,
and a state file. These block devices use a storage master key derived from the server, username,
and password for the connection, as depicted in Figure 11.1. The chat log stores the history of
all events that have occurred in the channel in such a way that a range of events can be rapidly
accessed by their sequential index. The state file contains the group state for the Client struct,
exported using the high-level Safehouse library. The state is restored when the client starts again,
allowing the Safehouse protocol to continue.
The file format of the chat log must be carefully designed in order to ensure that positional
event lookups are extremely fast; this is an important requirement of the user interface implemen-
tation described in Section 11.2.3. The file contains three types of blocks: chatter blocks, index
blocks, and event blocks. Each chatter block stores a list of mappings from numeric chatter IDs
to usernames. These chatter IDs are local to the chat log and do not necessarily match the agent
IDs that correspond to the usernames. The mappings stored in the chatter block are compressed
using a lossless compression algorithm. The chatter block ends with the index of the next chatter
block in the file. Index blocks occur at a regular interval in the file: every 507 blocks. The index
block contains a list of the first event indices that appear in the next 506 blocks, if they are event
blocks (or a special value if they are chatter blocks). These values are fixed-length integers and
10 ⋏ In practice, a malicious process that can edit the index file could mount an elaborate “phishing” attack in which
it configures a connection to a malicious session that tricks the user into sending messages that they would not
normally send. This attack would be bolstered if the malicious process also had access to the user’s password
and storage files for the legitimate session, because then it could set up the malicious session to replicate the
legitimate session’s conversation history. These attacks could be partially mitigated by requiring an additional
secret (e.g., another password or a hardware security module) to add integrity protection to the index file, but
this secret would need to remain uncompromised by the adversary. The example application does not include
this extra layer of protection. If the example application did not use the client state encryption described in this
section, then a powerful adversary with a malicious process running on the user’s device would be able to recover
and exfiltrate the user’s conversation histories and group states without access to the user’s password, rather than
being limited to these phishing attacks.
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are not compressed. The periodicity of the index blocks is determined by the block size and
the number of bits used to store block indices: 507 = 4056/8. Event blocks store serializations of
events with all of the information necessary to draw them in the user interface, compressed using
a lossless compression algorithm. Events that refer to usernames do so by using chatter IDs.
When a new event is added to the chat log, the client first attempts to append it to the latest
event block, compress the new data, and write the updated plaintext to the block device. If the
new data does not fit, then a new event block is appended to the file, along with a new index
block if necessary. During operation, the client caches the entire mapping from chatter IDs to
usernames in memory.11 If a new username is encountered when writing to the chat log, it is
added to the latest recent chatter block; in a similar manner as for event blocks, a new chatter
block is added if the new mapping does not fit. This design allows for very fast binary searches of
the encrypted chat log to recover all events within a given range. Additionally, the client uses a
caching layer with a least-recently-used eviction policy in order to cache recently queried events.
For each server, the client also stores a trust database in a block device. The trust database
stores the results of the trust establishment mechanism: a list of usernames, the associated
(unblinded) identity public keys, and whether or not the user has verified that those values
correspond to the expected identity.
11.2.3 GUI Design and Implementation
The graphical user interface for the example application was designed to be similar to a modern
IRC client, demonstrating that it is possible to create familiar and simple user experiences using
Safehouse. The interface, depicted in Figures 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5, was implemented using
the Gio library.12 The Gio library is an immediate mode graphics toolkit, which is an alternative to
traditional retained mode toolkits such as Qt or GTK. An immediate mode library operates similarly
to a video game engine: the developer sends the commands to repaint the entire interface during
each frame of rendering. A caching layer makes this process efficient. Aside from simplicity, the
main advantage of immediate mode libraries is that they support rapid changes in large portions
of the interface, since the library does not store any state information that needs to be updated
when the interface is modified. This makes immediate mode libraries particularly suitable for
chat applications with very long conversation histories: the chat log can be scrolled extremely
efficiently, with the frame rate limited by the size of the window instead of the size of the chat
log. The design of the encrypted chat log storage system discussed in Section 11.2.2, which
11 ⋏This is sufficient for the example application, in which the total number of usernames over time is expected to
be small. Other applications using a similar storage design could implement a cache eviction policy if necessary.
12 ⋏ https://gioui.org/
491
Chapter 11 An Example of a Safehouse Deployment
Figure 11.2 The connection screen in the example application. Alice enters a server address,
username, and password in order to derive the appropriate keys and connect to the server.
(Ref: 491)
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Figure 11.3 The status screen in the example application. Alice encounters this status view
upon logging in. This screenshot shows Alice’s view prior to joining any channels. Alice uses the
/create command to create a new channel called crypto, which starts a new Safehouse session.
(Ref: 491)
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Figure 11.4 The conversation screen in the example application. Alice securely communicates
with Bob and Carol in the crypto channel. Alice has performed trust establishment with Bob, but
not with Carol; this is indicated by the lock iconography in the user list on the right. The channel
topic is securely set in the confidential label-value store and displayed at the top of the chat log.
(Ref: 491)
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Figure 11.5 The trust establishment screen in the example application. This screen is
shown to Alice when verifying the identity of Bob. The same set of numbers will appear to Bob
when verifying the identity of Alice. (Refs: 491 and 496)
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Figure 11.6 Trust level symbology in the example application. Alice’s identity public key has
been authenticated and trust is established. Bob’s identity public key has not yet been authenticated.
Carol’s identity public key has been authenticated but trust establishment has not yet been performed.
Dave’s identity public key does not match the one stored in the trust database. (Ref: 496)
allows a range of historical events to be quickly retrieved based on their sequential position, is
important for achieving good performance when using an immediate mode rendering library.
The example application borrows the “safety number” system that is used for trust estab-
lishment in Signal [Ope13]. The trust establishment process is depicted in Figure 11.5: each
pair of users ensures that their “safety number” matches using an authenticated out-of-band
channel. The safety numbers are generated using cSHAKE128 with rejection sampling to pro-
duce the 5-digit numbers. The hash input is a canonical ordering of the two usernames and the
(unblinded) identity public keys. Once a user has verified the safety number and completes the
trust establishment, the result is stored in the trust database for the server. Usernames in the
user list for a channel are displayed with symbology that indicates the status of authentication
and trust establishment, as depicted in Figure 11.6. Notably, the design of Safehouse means that
some members may be “identified” but not yet “authenticated” (see Section 10.1.9). The client
in the example application depicts these users with a gray hourglass symbol, regardless of any
trust establishment that may have been performed for the claimed (but not yet authenticated)
identity public key.
The example application uses IRC-like commands to issue invitations and join channels
instead of graphical elements; this is a design choice. After issuing an invitation, the interface
presents a button that copies a base64 encoding of the invitation (including the private key)
to the clipboard for secure out-of-band transmission. These encoded invitations are typically
45 characters long.13 The recipient provides this input as an argument to the /join command in
order to join a channel.
13 ⋏Additional characters may be added in sessions with dozens of outstanding invitations due to the variable-length
encoding of the invitation identifier.
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11.2.4 Natural Extensions
The secure messaging tool described in Section 11.2 is a proof-of-concept demonstration that can
be expanded in several natural ways. This section describes some of these natural extensions.
A major limitation of the example application is that it does not support multiple devices
sharing one account. Atwater et al. [AH16] discussed several standard mechanisms for adding
multi-device support to secure messaging tools. There are generally two approaches that can be
used in the example application: share the same Safehouse group state between devices, or have
each device act as an independent Safehouse member. Sharing the group state between clients
would require a mechanism to provision new devices with the existing group states (including
the private states) for the channels in which the user is a member. This could be done by having
clients periodically upload encrypted group states to the server for storage. The states could be
encrypted using the locking key, lsk (see Section 11.2.1), which would allow new authorized
devices to recover a recent state and catch up to the current group state by downloading a replay
of events from the server. In the alternative approach where each device acts as an independent
Safehouse member, the tool would need to be altered to support automated issuance of individual
invitations. An old device would authorize a new device, issue individual invitations to its own
identity public key in each channel, and then transmit the invitations—encrypted with lsk—to
the new device.
The server software in the example application runs entirely as a single process on a single
machine, which is not scalable. A simple extension would be to shard channels across multiple
server machines. The servers could all share a single SQL-based backend, or the system could be
made even more scalable by sharding payload and commit data across multiple databases. Due
to the design of the system, it would also be easy to migrate channels across servers, because all
state is stored in the database. This migration can be important if the channels handled by a
machine become active enough to overload its resources, or if a machine is decommissioned.
Finally, the example application makes a variety of design decisions that might not be desirable
even in the context of a similar IRC-like deployment. For example, the channel topic is stored
in the confidential label-value store, but this is not necessary. The topic could be stored in the
public label-value store instead, enabling the implementation of a channel listing command.
The decision of whether or not the channel topic should be confidential could even be stored
as a setting in the public label-value store, which is similar to channel modes in some IRC
server software that hide the channel topic from the channel list. In general, Safehouse offers
functionality that can replicate far more of the IRC experience than what the example application
achieves (e.g., channel moderation, presence information, rich text formatting, and more).
497
Chapter 11 An Example of a Safehouse Deployment
11.3 Beyond IRC: Safehouse Integration Strategies
The IRC-like example application described in Section 11.2 demonstrates how to build a complete
group secure messaging tool using Safehouse, but it is only one potential design. The high-level
library described in Section 11.1 and the Safehouse protocol itself are far more widely applicable;
in particular, Safehouse is not limited to desktop applications, global transcripts, IRC-like “server”
and “channel” organization, or text-only communications. Safehouse can be used to implement
tools that are suitable for all of the target scenarios listed in Chapter 7. This section briefly
outlines some deployment techniques that could be used to replicate the functionality of popular
group communication tools that currently lack end-to-end encryption.
A common communication scenario involves small groups assembled in an ad-hoc fashion,
typically for event-based conversations. A tool for this scenario might take the form of a web
application in which the user creates a new group conversation, a randomized link is generated
and shared, the link allows others to immediately join the group, and the group is deleted as
soon as the related event has concluded. A tool like this could initialize a Safehouse session
for each group, configured with ephemeral authentication. The randomized link would contain
the invitation data in the “fragment” component of the URL. In this scenario, each Safehouse
session would be completely independent, with no data shared between them in the higher-level
protocol.
Another target scenario involves creating a user experience similar to the popular Discord
application. When using Discord, users invite others to join their “server” by sharing an invitation
URL with them. Each “server” is created by a user that has administrative privileges as the
“owner”. Each “server” contains multiple “channels”, including text-only channels and audio-
based channels. All users in a server can view the contents of all text-based channels at all
times (although channels can be locally “muted” in the interface to hide them), but audio-based
channels must be joined explicitly. Consequently, the list of users is associated with the “server”
and not with individual text-based channels. Discord also has a variety of other features, including
customizable nicknames and colors, user taglines, granular moderation access policies, custom
“emote” images, message reactions, and many monetization features. Moreover, Discord users
can maintain contact lists and directly message other users outside of the context of a “server”.
A secure group messaging tool that attempts to mimic the functionality of Discord using
Safehouse would likely establish a single Safehouse session for all of the text-based channels on the
“server”. The customizable user attributes and “emote” images could be stored in the confidential
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label-value store to hide them from the adversary.1⁴ The moderation privileges assigned to
members could be stored in the public label-value store, with an appropriately configured group
policy that ensures that members have the required privileges before performing operations. An
array of identifiers for the text-based channels would likely be stored in the public label-value store
in order to facilitate the expression of the moderation policy, but the human-readable names of the
channels would be stored in the confidential label-value store. Payloads for text-based messages
would include a channel identifier in the public tags, which would enable server-side support for
“muting” channels to reduce bandwidth use by selectively routing payloads in a custom message
router. Most of the rich text experience afforded by Discord, including reactions and file sharing,
can be treated in the same way as standard message payloads from a cryptographic perspective.
Direct messaging support outside of a “server” context could be achieved using an independent
Safehouse session in a similar fashion to the aforementioned “ad-hoc group” scenario. Audio-
based channels could be implemented securely using an independent Safehouse session with an
unlimited-use bearer invitation that is stored in the confidential label-value store of the “server”
Safehouse session. This would allow any member of the “server” to immediately join the audio-
based “channel”. Payloads in the audio-based channel would be unreliably transmitted audio
fragments using the same techniques as Discord itself, but encrypting the audio data with a key
derived from the group key for the “channel”.
Slack is similar to Discord in many ways, but it places greater emphasis on private channels
with many fewer members than the “server” itself. Consequently, many of the same techniques
described above in the context of Discord could be used to implement a secure version of Slack,
except that channels would be implemented as independent Safehouse sessions. Similarly to
the Discord example, bearer invitations for these channels could be stored in the confidential
label-value store for a Safehouse session associated with the “server”, allowing members to
immediately join certain channels.
Safehouse can also be used to implement tools for secure group video conferencing. One of
the most difficult challenges for video conferencing tools is scalability. Individual clients normally
have very limited bandwidth—particularly in the upstream direction for residential Internet
connections—and potentially significant packet loss. Historically, video conferencing tools have
relied on a central server to transcode the incoming video streams to lower bitrates in order to
accommodate participants with low-bandwidth connections. Some tools go further and perform
video compositing within the server, visually combining multiple video streams into a single
stream before sending it to the participants. These efforts are frustrated by end-to-end encryption,
14 ⋏Discord allows users to purchase access to server-specific emote images that can then be used in other servers
or in direct messages. Efficiently providing this feature would require granting the Safehouse server access to
the images. Storing the images in the confidential label-value store would limit its use to the members in that
Safehouse session.
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which prevents the server from performing transcoding, compositing, or other video processing.
Luckily, it is possible to develop highly scalable video conferencing tools that are completely
compatible with end-to-end encryption by using a layered coding technique such as Scalable Video
Coding (SVC) [SMW07]. The widespread adoption of the Zoom video conferencing tool has
shown that this type of encryption-compatible encoding technology can be deployed on a massive
scale. Zoom uses a proprietary video coding technique that is similar to SVC [Zoom19, 10:46].
Put simply, systems like SVC encode each frame of the source video as a sequence of packets
where the initial packets provide a rough approximation of the image, and subsequent packets
provide additional accuracy after decoding. The packets that provide additional accuracy can be
dropped in order to obtain a lower-quality stream with a lower bitrate. All of the packets can
be encrypted (e.g., using a key derived from the group key in a Safehouse session) before being
uploaded to a central server using a UDP-based protocol (potentially with added information in
the application layer to handle packet loss and reordering). The central server can learn which
encrypted packets correspond to each SVC quality layer by arranging for the client to attach
unencrypted public tags to the packets, or by using a preestablished packet ordering scheme.
The server can then relay the stream to the other participants in the session. For recipients
that require lower-bitrate streams (e.g., due to a low-bandwidth connection), the server can
simply omit the packets that provide additional decoding accuracy. This approach avoids the
need for the server to transcode video streams. Additionally, the tool can limit the maximum
bandwidth required to participate in a conversation, without resorting to server-side compositing,
by performing speaker detection (i.e., identifying when a participant is speaking) on the client
side and sending this signal to the server. Using the received speaker detection signals, the server
can make informed decisions about which streams to relay to participants at any given moment.
Zoom uses this design [BBG+20], albeit with a server-selected AES-GCM key for encryption of
the packets by default. Safehouse can be used to replace the key selection process in order to
implement a reliable, scalable, and end-to-end encrypted secure video conferencing tool.
Developers can use the design patterns described in this section and the features provided by
Safehouse to implement modern secure group messaging tools for all of the scenarios described
in Chapter 7, among others, in straightforward ways. Developing a tool for a given scenario using
Safehouse primarily involves identifying how to establish and configure Safehouse sessions, what
information to store in the public and confidential label-value stores, what information to store
independently of the Safehouse sessions, and how to structure payload data.
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11.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter described a prototype implementation of the Safehouse protocol and provided
examples of how it can be used in practice to develop secure group messaging tools, including the
presentation of a functional IRC-like tool that was implemented as part of this work. Section 11.1
described a high-level library that abstracts the Safehouse protocol in order to support rapid
development of tools for common target scenarios. The high-level library makes some simplifying
assumptions that makes it less general than Safehouse itself, but also easier to use. The prototype
implementation also includes a low-level library that implements the full Safehouse protocol
presented in Chapter 10. The libraries are not intended for production use, but they are sufficiently
developed to serve as a reference for the design and to evaluate the practicality of Safehouse.
Section 11.2 described the complete IRC-like example application, including a graphical desktop
client that was depicted in Section 11.2.3. Finally, Section 11.3 described some techniques that
could be used to build tools for the other target scenarios listed in Chapter 7. Overall, this chapter
demonstrated that the Safehouse protocol can be used to implement a practical application with
a familiar user experience that provides very strong security properties without exposing the





his dissertation introduced several new protocols that solve difficult cryptographic
challenges at the core of secure messaging schemes. In particular, the new protocols
establish shared secret keys to use for end-to-end encryption in a manner that provides
deniability and protection against attacks by malicious insiders. These protocols can be used
by developers to implement the majority of the conversation security design layer in a secure
messaging tool while achieving strong security properties and non-interactive communication.
The developers remain responsible for the application-specific aspects of the conversation security
layer, such as how to use the established shared secret keys to encrypt messages, and the design
of the surrounding protocol that triggers the exchange of keys and messages.
The thesis statement given in Section 1.1 claimed that it is possible to design efficient key
exchange protocols that support asynchronous communication with insider security in typical
two-party and group communication settings while relying on only common security assump-
tions. The new protocols that were introduced in this dissertation achieve these goals, and the
performance evaluations performed on the prototype implementations show that the protocols
are efficient enough for practical use. Specifically, the thesis statement is supported by the
following observations:
• Chapter 5 introduced new DAKEs including DAKEZ (in Section 5.4) and XZDH (in Sec-
tion 5.6). Both of these protocols provide online deniability, which is a form of insider
security, in two-party secure messaging scenarios. XZDH can be used to implement secure
messaging tools with non-interactive message delivery, which is suitable for common mo-
bile applications. In particular, XZDH can be used as a drop-in replacement for X3DH in
Signal [Ope13], one of the most popular secure messaging tools.
• Both DAKEZ and XZDH rely only on common security assumptions (see Proposition 1 and
Theorem 3 for DAKEZ and Proposition 4 and Theorem 6 for XZDH): the instantiations
described in Section 5.8 rely on DDH in a standard elliptic curve group, the security of AES,
and the security of SHA-3. Composable security proofs for the DAKEs in the ROM were
provided in Chapter 6.
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• The performance evaluation of DAKEZ and XZDH presented in Section 5.9 shows that the
new protocols achieve competitive performance compared to existing DAKEs while providing
stronger deniability properties. The new protocols add approximately 1ms of time and a few
hundred bytes of communication to complete the key exchange.
• Part III introduced the Safehouse protocol. As described in Chapter 7, this new CGKA-like
protocol manages shared keys throughout the lifetime of a secure group messaging session
while providing strong security properties. The protocol makes extensive use of NIZKPKs
to ensure that malicious insiders cannot deviate from the protocol. This insider security
property becomes more important for larger groups where the trust between users is not as
strong. Safehouse supports non-interactive secure group messaging protocols that can be
used in most common communication scenarios, including the ones mentioned in the thesis
statement.
• Safehouse must be instantiated with a particular BRAKEM construction, as discussed in
Chapter 8. Section 8.2 introduced the BRAKEMDDL★ construction. Theorem 7 claims that the
security of BRAKEMDDL★ relies on the DDH assumption and two unusual security assumptions
in a standard “finite field DH” group. Section 8.4 provided a security proof of this claim. The
two non-standard assumptions are the “discrete logarithm hidden subgroup” assumption (see
Definition 1) and “multiplicative subgroup rounding with verifiers” assumption (see Defini-
tion 2). There are good reasons to believe that these assumptions hold (see Section 8.4.2.2.1),
but they are not common assumptions. Section 8.5 introduced the BRAKEMZK construction,
which is an alternative to BRAKEMDDL★ . BRAKEMZK relies on common zk-SNARK security
assumptions that are used in popular cryptocurrencies. While cryptographers may have dif-
ferent opinions about the safety of the security assumptions for the two constructions, the
security assumptions used by BRAKEMZK satisfy the requirements of the thesis statement.
• Section 10.13 provided a performance evaluation of the Safehouse protocol. An experiment
was performed that evaluated the additional time and communication size required to secure
partially synthetic IRC chat logs using Safehouse. The results show that Safehouse can be
considered efficient for groups of various sizes: a small group with approximately 50 members
required hundreds of KiB of additional communication and milliseconds of computation
per day, while a large group with approximately 1,400 members required tens of MiB of
additional communication and seconds of computation per day. In addition to these synthetic
benchmarks, Chapter 11 described a complete secure group messaging tool that was built
with Safehouse in order to demonstrate its functionality. This tool can provide the experience




• The security properties provided by DAKEZ, XZDH, and Safehouse are designed to meet
the needs of both “low-risk” and “high-risk” users as defined by Ermoshina et al. [EHM17;
HEM18] and discussed in Section 2.1.2. The protocols all protect against global passive
adversaries by securely establishing a shared secret key, and against server seizures by giving
servers no secrets to keep. The protocols all provide anonymity preservation, allowing them
to be combined with a private transport layer to protect against metadata leak. Moreover,
the protocols can be used to develop tools that do not share metadata with insiders (e.g., by
using Safehouse with only ephemeral authentication), provide local protections against device
seizure (e.g., by automatically deleting messages and protecting local data with a password,
as with the demonstration application in Chapter 11), and provide paths to recovery after
device seizure (e.g., by using Safehouse’s post-compromise security and invitation features),
which are all significant concerns for high-risk users. In general, the protocols were designed
in response to all of the findings from the usability studies discussed in Section 2.1.
Much work remains to be done to improve the deployability and efficiency of Safehouse. The
chapters in Part III introduced Safehouse, described the prototype implementation, presented
the results of a performance evaluation, and showcased a complete proof-of-concept secure
group messaging tool built using the protocol. However, while Chapter 7 claimed that Safehouse
provides a variety of security properties and Section 8.4 proved the security of BRAKEMDDL★ (the
most significant building block for Safehouse), no security proof for the overall protocol was
given. This is the largest outstanding issue that should be resolved before Safehouse is deployed
in real secure group messaging tools. Unfortunately, as showcased by the security proofs for
the new DAKEs provided in Chapter 6, formally proving that complex protocols are secure is a
very challenging task. Safehouse is far larger than any of the protocols introduced in Part II,
and verifying its claimed security properties will require a correspondingly larger security proof.
Safehouse has been designed to anticipate this future work by breaking it down into smaller
components. In particular, composable security proofs (e.g., using the GUC framework) could
be produced for each of the operations described in Chapter 10. For each operation, the proofs
would need to show that the resulting key graph always accurately reflects the new group state,
even in the presence of an active adversary, and that the security of the blinded identities and the
confidential label-value store is maintained. Formalizing the required properties and providing
the required security proofs is left as the most significant future work.
In addition to proving the security of Safehouse, some methods for improving the efficiency
of the protocol are immediately apparent. The performance optimizations for BRAKEMDDL★ de-
scribed in Section 8.3.2 may be improved by investigating alternative integer representations or
using new x86-64 instruction set extensions like AVX-512 IFMA [DG19]. Experimental results in
the context of homomorphic encryption [BKS+21, Tbl. 4] and quantum-resistant KEMs [GK19]
have suggested that implementing modular multiplication with AVX-512 IFMA may speed up
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computation times by a factor of 1.7. In addition to the x86-64 optimizations, an entirely different
set of optimizations should be used to implement BRAKEMDDL★ for ARM-based processors, which
are typically found in mobile devices. An implementation of BRAKEMZK as described in Sec-
tion 8.5 was developed and partially evaluated in Section 8.6, but fully implementing Safehouse
using BRAKEMZK and evaluating the resulting communication sizes (as with BRAKEMDDL★ in Sec-
tion 10.13) is left to future work. Given the rapid pace of development of new zero-knowledge
proof systems, new techniques may be able to implement BRAKEM even more efficiently in the
near future. Section 10.8.5 described how the Safehouse authentication mechanism could be
implemented using Borromean ring signatures, but implementing and evaluating this technique
is left to future work. Although Section 10.11 introduced several key control schemes and the
performance evaluation in Section 10.13 provided some initial intuition about parameter se-
lection, more work is required to discover optimal algorithms and configurations for a broader
range of specific deployment scenarios.
Our reliance on Internet-based group communication technologies has grown rapidly, and
it will likely continue to do so. At the same time, the complexity of the conversation security
design layer for group communication has caused secure messaging protocols to lag behind the
demand for new tools. It is the author’s hope that the new protocols presented in this dissertation
will inform the next generation of secure group messaging tools by helping to solve the core
cryptographic challenges. The time to deploy efficient secure group messaging protocols with
strong security properties is upon us.
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While this dissertation was written, secure group messaging was the subject of many active
research projects from a variety of sources, including academia, the private sector, and the open-
source community. This heightened attention is a testament to the importance of secure group
messaging technologies and to the absence of a secure, scalable, and suitably featureful solution.
Work on the Safehouse protocol, described in Part III, began in late 2017, approximately near the
time that the ART protocol [CCG+18] was being developed. As discussed in Chapter 4, ART was
the project that heralded the emergence of CGKAs, eventually culminating in the MLS project
organized under the auspices of the IETF.
Safehouse was designed in intentional isolation from developments in the MLS project. The
rationale for this approach was that it would result in a truly independent construction free of any
design choices or assumptions made by the MLS project; if the solutions diverged, then it would
provide an opportunity to combine the best ideas from both efforts, and it would also highlight
potential design variables in the solution space. The reader likely has access to hindsight that
the author does not, with which they may judge the wisdom of this strategy. In any event, it
is interesting that the MLS project subsequently and independently developed extensions that
correspond to components of Safehouse, such as the near equivalence between TTKEM’s “blanked
nodes” and Safehouse’s “superfluous edges”. This convergence hints that the solution space for
the requirements may be small, and that the chosen approach may be a good one.
The author is aware of several independent and concurrent research efforts that published
relevant technical reports while this dissertation was being finalized. The remainder of this
section provides only a cursory summary of these reports; interested readers are encouraged to
consult the resulting publications to compare the results in greater detail.
Goel et al. [GGHK21] recognized that Borromean ring signatures [MP15] could be generalized
in the manner described in Section 10.8.5. They provided rigorous definitions and security proofs
for the generalized construction. Poettering et al. [PRSS21] surveyed and systematized GKEs
and CGKAs with formal computational game-based security models, which includes many of
the schemes surveyed in Chapters 3 and 4. Their systematization includes a newly proposed
model that is intended to unify the desirable properties of a modern GKE without being specific
to any particular protocol. Analyzing TKLL and Safehouse using this new model is a promising
direction for future work. Finally, Alwen et al. [AJM20] introduced Insider Secure TreeKEM
(ITK), a variant of TreeKEM (see Sections 4.2 and 4.5) that aims to provide insider security.
Unlike Safehouse, which uses NIZKPKs to prove that all modifications to the group state were
performed correctly and that the appropriate private keys were transferred to the expected
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recipients, the approach taken by ITK is much simpler: in essence, ITK is a variant of the MLS
protocol in which each member produces a digital signature attesting that its path in the key
graph accurately reflects the members’ knowledge of the private keys. This simpler approach
provides much weaker guarantees: the group state becomes secure only when all malicious
insiders are evicted. Safehouse provides stronger guarantees: payloads become confidential only
when all malicious insiders are evicted, but the entire group state is always guaranteed to be
consistent and correctly constructed, even when malicious insiders remain in the session.
507
Letters of Copyright Permission
Artwork Licenses
This work contains four commissioned artworks, all licensed under the Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View,
CA 94042, USA. A copy of this license is also included in the next section.
The contents of the listed pages below are copyrighted by the named licensors:
• Page xxiv: Copyright © 2021 Brandon Palas (brandonpalas.com). Some rights reserved. Used
under CC BY 4.0. Modifications: color changes, placement adjustments, and added text.
• Page 10: Copyright © 2021 Lukáš Vašut (lukasvasut.myportfolio.com). Some rights reserved.
Used under CC BY 4.0. Modifications: blurred particles, cropped, and downscaled.
• Page 71: Copyright© 2021 Nicole Cardiff (www.artofnicolecardiff.com). Some rights reserved.
Used under CC BY 4.0. Modifications: downscaled.
• Page 162: Copyright © 2021 Tower Junkie Art. Some rights reserved. Used under CC BY 4.0.
Modifications: lighting changes, cropped, and downscaled.
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
By exercising the Licensed Rights (defined below), You accept and agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (“Public
License”). To the extent this Public License may be interpreted as a contract, You are granted the Licensed Rights in consideration of Your acceptance of these terms and conditions, and the
Licensor grants You such rights in consideration of benefits the Licensor receives from making the Licensed Material available under these terms and conditions.
Section 1—Definitions.
a. Adapted Material means material subject to Copyright and Similar Rights that is derived from or based upon the Licensed Material and in which the Licensed Material is translated, altered,
arranged, transformed, or otherwise modified in a manner requiring permission under the Copyright and Similar Rights held by the Licensor. For purposes of this Public License, where the
Licensed Material is a musical work, performance, or sound recording, Adapted Material is always produced where the Licensed Material is synched in timed relation with a moving image.
b. Adapter’s License means the license You apply to Your Copyright and Similar Rights in Your contributions to Adapted Material in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Public
License.
c. Copyright and Similar Rights means copyright and/or similar rights closely related to copyright including, without limitation, performance, broadcast, sound recording, and Sui Generis
Database Rights, without regard to how the rights are labeled or categorized. For purposes of this Public License, the rights specified in Section 2(b)(1)-(2) are not Copyright and Similar
Rights.
d. Effective Technological Measures means those measures that, in the absence of proper authority, may not be circumvented under laws fulfilling obligations under Article 11 of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty adopted on December 20, 1996, and/or similar international agreements.
e. Exceptions and Limitations means fair use, fair dealing, and/or any other exception or limitation to Copyright and Similar Rights that applies to Your use of the Licensed Material.
f. Licensed Material means the artistic or literary work, database, or other material to which the Licensor applied this Public License.
g. Licensed Rights means the rights granted to You subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, which are limited to all Copyright and Similar Rights that apply to Your use of the
Licensed Material and that the Licensor has authority to license.
508
Letters of Copyright Permission
h. Licensor means the individual(s) or entity(ies) granting rights under this Public License.
i. Share means to provide material to the public by any means or process that requires permission under the Licensed Rights, such as reproduction, public display, public performance,
distribution, dissemination, communication, or importation, and to make material available to the public including in ways that members of the public may access the material from a place
and at a time individually chosen by them.
j. Sui Generis Database Rights means rights other than copyright resulting from Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of
databases, as amended and/or succeeded, as well as other essentially equivalent rights anywhere in the world.
k. You means the individual or entity exercising the Licensed Rights under this Public License. Your has a corresponding meaning.
Section 2—Scope.
a. License grant.
1. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the
Licensed Rights in the Licensed Material to:
a. reproduce and Share the Licensed Material, in whole or in part; and
b. produce, reproduce, and Share Adapted Material.
2. Exceptions and Limitations. For the avoidance of doubt, where Exceptions and Limitations apply to Your use, this Public License does not apply, and You do not need to comply with its
terms and conditions.
3. Term. The term of this Public License is specified in Section 6(a).
4. Media and formats; technical modifications allowed. The Licensor authorizes You to exercise the Licensed Rights in all media and formats whether now known or hereafter created, and
to make technical modifications necessary to do so. The Licensor waives and/or agrees not to assert any right or authority to forbid You from making technical modifications necessary to
exercise the Licensed Rights, including technical modifications necessary to circumvent Effective Technological Measures. For purposes of this Public License, simply making modifications
authorized by this Section 2(a)(4) never produces Adapted Material.
5. Downstream recipients.
a. Offer from the Licensor—Licensed Material. Every recipient of the Licensed Material automatically receives an offer from the Licensor to exercise the Licensed Rights under the terms
and conditions of this Public License.
b. No downstream restrictions. You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, the Licensed Material if
doing so restricts exercise of the Licensed Rights by any recipient of the Licensed Material.
6. No endorsement. Nothing in this Public License constitutes or may be construed as permission to assert or imply that You are, or that Your use of the Licensed Material is, connected with,
or sponsored, endorsed, or granted official status by, the Licensor or others designated to receive attribution as provided in Section 3(a)(1)(A)(i).
b. Other rights.
1. Moral rights, such as the right of integrity, are not licensed under this Public License, nor are publicity, privacy, and/or other similar personality rights; however, to the extent possible, the
Licensor waives and/or agrees not to assert any such rights held by the Licensor to the limited extent necessary to allow You to exercise the Licensed Rights, but not otherwise.
2. Patent and trademark rights are not licensed under this Public License.
3. To the extent possible, the Licensor waives any right to collect royalties from You for the exercise of the Licensed Rights, whether directly or through a collecting society under any
voluntary or waivable statutory or compulsory licensing scheme. In all other cases the Licensor expressly reserves any right to collect such royalties.
Section 3—License Conditions.
Your exercise of the Licensed Rights is expressly made subject to the following conditions.
a. Attribution.
1. If You Share the Licensed Material (including in modified form), You must:
a. retain the following if it is supplied by the Licensor with the Licensed Material:
i. identification of the creator(s) of the Licensed Material and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Licensor (including by
pseudonym if designated);
ii. a copyright notice;
iii. a notice that refers to this Public License;
iv. a notice that refers to the disclaimer of warranties;
v. a URI or hyperlink to the Licensed Material to the extent reasonably practicable;
b. indicate if You modified the Licensed Material and retain an indication of any previous modifications; and
c. indicate the Licensed Material is licensed under this Public License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Public License.
2. You may satisfy the conditions in Section 3(a)(1) in any reasonable manner based on the medium, means, and context in which You Share the Licensed Material. For example, it may be
reasonable to satisfy the conditions by providing a URI or hyperlink to a resource that includes the required information.
3. If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable.
4. If You Share Adapted Material You produce, the Adapter’s License You apply must not prevent recipients of the Adapted Material from complying with this Public License.
Section 4—Sui Generis Database Rights.
Where the Licensed Rights include Sui Generis Database Rights that apply to Your use of the Licensed Material:
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Section 6—Term and Termination.
a. This Public License applies for the term of the Copyright and Similar Rights licensed here. However, if You fail to comply with this Public License, then Your rights under this Public License
terminate automatically.
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